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HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
THE WAR IN THE AIR
Being the Story of
The part played in the Great War
by the Royal Air Force
VOL. V
H. A. JONES
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, EX. 4
London Edinburgh Glasgow
New York Toronto Melbourne
Capetown Bombay Calcutta
Madras Shanghai
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE
UNIVERSITY
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
PREFACE
In this volume the story of the German air attacks on
Great Britain is completed hy an account of the raids
which took place during 19 17 and 191 8. Their effect
upon British war policy is noted, and the narrative in-
cludes also home anti-aircraft defence developments, and
such matters as the provision of air-raid shelters, the
training of pilots for night flying, and the technical
equipment of the home defence squadrons.
By courtesy of the German authorities the author con-
sulted, at the Marinearchiv in Berlin, the official records
of the Zeppelin attacks. It was revealed that there were
more instances in 191 7 and 191 8, than in the earlier years,
of faulty British observation of the movements of the
raiding airships. This may be set down as due to the
greater heights at which the airships were navigated, and
to a depletion of the observer posts in Britain because of
the need to save man-power. On the other hand it was
often impossible for the Zeppelin commanders, owing to
the heights from which the attacks were delivered, some-
times from above thick cloud banks, to check their positions
by direct observation. They, also, like the defence
personnel, groped for their targets with more difficulty
and with less success than in the earlier years.
The author offers his thanks to Admiral Assmann,
President of the Marinearchiv, and to Kapitan 2. See
Weniger, the naval historian, for their courteous help. As
a result of the freedom with which the author was permitted
to work among the German records, his narrative has
gained in understanding as well as accuracy.
The air-raid maps in the separate case show the paths
of the raiders according to British observation at the
time, but the author has brought the identities of the
airships into line with the German official records. Where
differences cannot be reconciled a note has been added
to the map. The movements of the raiding aeroplanes were
less easy to follow than were those of the airships. The
vi
PREFACE
aeroplanes came with little or no warning, operated in a
more restricted area, passed swiftly on their way, and called
up many defence aircraft to add to the confusion. Al-
most consistently the numbers of raiding aeroplanes were
exaggerated. The maps showing the aeroplane attacks
should be looked upon as of general rather than of parti-
cular accuracy. They will not be superseded, but they
have been compiled from human observation which,
whether from the air or from the ground, was fallible.
This volume also deals with the air operations connected
with the military campaigns in Egypt, Sinai, the Western
Desert, Darfur, Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and in
Macedonia, and with naval air operations in the Mediter-
ranean and Red Seas. The period covered extends approxi-
mately to March 191 8. Finally, there is an account of the
training developments at home, in Egypt, and in Canada.
The reader will find, in the narrative dealing with the
subsidiary campaigns, frequent mention of the exploits of
individual pilots. He may perhaps think that there has
been a change of scale, but he will realize that in the
battles fought outside the main theatre of war single
aeroplanes sometimes mattered greatly. His attention,
as an example, might be directed to the story of the ac-
tions leading to the siege of Kut. When Major-General
C. V. F. Townshend was ready to fight the battle of
Ctesiphon a pilot discovered the arrival of the Turkish
51st Division. He was alert to the importance of his dis-
covery and made a careful study of all he saw, but
when the reconnaissance had been completed a chance
hit by a shell splinter put the engine in his aeroplane out
of action and forced him to land within the Turkish lines.
Although, as Mr. Arthur Balfour once said, when dis-
cussing an Air Board memorandum, 'imaginary history is
very easy to write and quite impossible to refute', it may
be stated as unlikely that Major-General Townshend
would have fought the battle of Ctesiphon if the aero-
plane had returned with the news of the arrival of the
PREFACE vli
relatively formidable Turkish reinforcements. There
might have been no siege of Kut and no consequent costly
attempts at relief. The small piece of shell which sufficed to
bring down the reconnoitring aeroplane can be said to have
carried with it suffering and death for thousands of men.
Again, the first battle of Gaza, the failure of which
changed the aspect of the campaign in Palestine, was lost
mainly because the German air observers gave an empha-
tic warning to the Turkish command of the impending
British attack. The military student who studies the dis-
positions of the Turkish forces before changes were made
as a result of the air reports may find it difficult to believe
that the battle could have been lost if the original Turkish
dispositions had been maintained. When the third battle
of Gaza, prelude to the fall of Jerusalem, was fought, the
Royal Flying Corps had local air superiority. The success
of General Allenby's brilliant plan depended upon sur-
prise. The British pilots had the equipment which enabled
them to play their allotted part in the preliminary efforts
by which surprise was achieved. One German aeroplane
which, helped by patches of cloud, eluded the British
patrolling aircraft and closely reconnoitred the British
area just when the concentration for the battle had been
completed, was shot down on its homeward journey, and
the observer's report, of vital mihtary importance, never
reached the enemy command. These instances are of a
kind which may serve to show why it has been necessary
to examine the campaigns in some detail.
The author records his thanks to the Mihtary Historical
Section with regard to maps Nos. 6 to 20 inclusive, which,
sometimes with minor adaptation, have been taken from
the separate mihtary histories of the campaigns in Egypt
and Palestine, in Mesopotamia, and in Macedonia. He
has also, once again, to pay tribute to the help he has
received from Professor Nichol Smith, and from the staff
of the Air Historical Branch.
H. A. JONES.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. German Air Raids on Great
Britain, 191 7-1 8 .... pp. 1-77
Lighting Restrictions . . . . . p. i
A belief that the airship menace had lost its force. The cry for more
light. Opposition of Chief Constables. Additional restrictions due to
coal shortage. Comment.
Reductions in the Defences . . . . p. 4
U-boat warfare. Guns diverted from anti-aircraft defence to shipping.
Appointment of an Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander for London.
Reductions in the defence squadrons. A surprising order.
Zeffelin Attacks . . . . . . p. 8
Attack of the i6th of March 1917. Unusual weather conditions. Loss
of the L.3g. Lord French protests. The abortive attack of the 23rd-
24th of May. The L.40 escapes from a flying-boat. A seaplane crew
adrift on the North Sea for five days. A gallant rescue.
^he Daylight A er of lane Raids , . . p. 18
Minor attacks by aeroplanes and seaplanes. Organization of the Ger-
man No. 3 Bombing Squadron (the Englandgeschwader). The Gotha
bomber (type G.IV). The first attack, 25th of May. Folkestone, un-
warned, suffers severely. Futility of the defence measures. A confer-
ence called. Nothing much decided. 'A continuance of the present
policy may have disastrous results.' The German bombers attack again
on the 5th of June.
The First Daylight Attack on London . . p. 26
London bombed on the 13th of June. 162 killed and 432 injured.
The raid stirs the country. War Cabinet meetings. Decision to double
the air services. Interim measures to strengthen the defences. Views
of Sir Douglas Haig. Fighter squadrons withdrawn from the Western
Front.
A Zeffelin Interlude
Zeppelins attack the East coast,
up. Destruction of the L.48.
. p. 32
Ramsgate ammunition store blown
The Daylight Campaign Resumed . . • P- 34
Felixstowe and Harwich bombed.
The second raid on London, July 7th. War Cabinet discussions. A
Committee set up. The report of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts
on home defence. The appointment of Brigadier-General E. B.
Ashmore.
The defences reorganized.
X TABLE OF CONTENTS
Public JVarnmgs for London . . . . p. 45
Decision of the Government to give raid warnings to the public. The
Warning organization.
Minor daylight raids.
The Mystery of a Zeppelin Attack . . . p. 54
One airship attacks Hull, August the 21st. Five airship commanders,
additionally, believe they dropped bombs on England. Where did tlic
bombs fall ?
The Last Daylight Aeroplane Attack . . p. 57
Ramsgate and Dover bombed. Three Gothas destroyed.
The daylight campaign abandoned. Some comments.
The Moonlight Campaign . . . . p. 60
Opens with an attack on Dover, September the 2nd. Chatham bombed
next night. A terrible scene in the naval barracks. Flying Sopwitli
'Camels' at night.
The bombers reach London. War Cabinet meetings. A memo-
randum of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts.
Balloon Aprons . . . . . . p. 66
The balloon scheme to protect Venice. Major-General Ashmore's
plan for a London balloon barrage.
Height-finding Instruments . . . . p. 70
Principles.
Sound Locators . . . . . • P- 73
Difficulties of sound location. The Claude Orthophony British inven-
tions.
Barrage Fire . . . . . . p. 76
The scheme to place 'curtains' of shell-bursts in the path of the raiders.
CHAPTER II. German Air Raids on Great
Britain 1917-18. (Concluded) . pp. 78-159
The Harvest Moon . . . . . p. 78
The series of raids beginning September the 24th. Aeroplanes and
airships. The attack of the 28th of September. Three Gothas de-
stroyed. Six more wrecked on landing. London suffers from anti-
aircraft gun shells. Barrage-fire not so effective as supposed.
Effect of the night raids on munitions output. War Cabinet decisions.
London bombed again, October the ist. Wear and tear of the
anti-aircraft guns. A serious position.
Government decide to begin the bombing of German centres.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
The October Airship Raid . . . . p. 92
Drama of the so-called 'silent' raid. Effect of the weather conditions.
Blown across England. Four Zeppelins lost. The £.50 disappears
with four of her crew.
Renewed A er of lane Attacks . . . . p. 102
The Hunters' Moon brings out the aeroplanes. Clouds and barrage-
fire defeat the bombers. Attacks in December 1917. Incendiary bombs
dropped to create 'panic and disorder'. Their failure. London bombed,
unexpectedly, December the 1 8th: heavy damage.
Warning the Public at Night . . . . p. 106
Public demands for sound warnings at night. How and why the
maroons were fired at night.
Observer Posts . . . . . . p. 108
The police take over majority of observer posts from the military.
Final aeroplane attack of 1917. Gotha lands near Margate.
I918 ........ p. 109
Formation of the Air Council.
War Cabinet consider possibility of large-scale air attacks on Lon-
don. Lord French submits reports. Maximum number of bombers
likely to reach England assumed as 80. Air defence requirements
fixed according to this assumption.
Air Council decide to build underground hangars at home.
Night raiding resumed, 28th of January 1918. London suffers. People
killed in a panic rush. Bombs fall near Thames bridges. Waterloo
Bridge. The disaster at Messrs. Odhams's printing works (air-raid
shelter). 'Giant' bomber hits a balloon apron. Polygon barrage-fire.
'Giants' out again on the 29th.
Attack of the i6th of February. First bomb of i,ooo-kg. weight
dropped on England. It hits the Chelsea Hospital. Bombs near
Woolwich Arsenal.
Damage at St. Pancras railway station next night. Alarms and excur-
sions on the 1 8th. Reporting British aeroplanes as hostile.
Attack of the 7th of March.
Zeffeliii Disasters . . . . . . p. 120
Explosions and fires at the Ahlhorn station, 5th of January. Five air-
ships destroyed. German plans affected.
Zeppelins raid again, 12th of March. Attack defeated by weather
conditions.
Out again next day. West Hartlepool taken by surprise.
The raid of the I2th-I3th of April. Wigan bombed by mistake.
Why Liverpool escaped. A wandering Felixstowe flying-boat causes
alarms, 26th of April.
Xll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
^ he Final Aeroplane Attack . . . . p. 127
Attack by moonlight, I9th-20th of May. Last and biggest of its kind.
Seven Gothas brought down.
Cessation of bombing campaign against London (and Paris) ordered.
The Last Zeppelin Attack . . . . p. 131
Five Zeppelins leave for the Midlands, 5th of August. An abortive
attack. The L.yo shot down. Death of Strasser.
Air-raid Shelters . . . . . . p. 134
The search for shelter in London. The Underground railways. Move-
ments from east to west. Need for adequate distribution of shelters.
Power taken under Defence of the Realm regulations. Responsibility
of local authorities.
The VI Brigade p. 138
Organization of the defence squadrons. Training pilots for niglit
flying. Night fighting squadrons. Coast defence duties.
Aeroplanes and Armament . . . . p. 147
Types of aeroplanes used by the defence squadrons. The Hutton Night
Sight. Lewis gun experiments. The Neame Sight. Heated ammuni-
tion magazines.
The Air-raid Campaign — a Summary . . p. 152
Statistics of the raids. Strength of the home defence forces. Effect of
the raids on the output of munitions. Mistakes in strategy. Defence
disadvantages of an island state. Attacks on London and on Paris
compared. Need for look-out posts at sea. Only effective defence in
the air is offence.
CHAPTER III. Air Operations in Egypt, Dar-
fur, and Palestine, 1 914-17 . . pp. 160-224
The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, igi5 . p. 160
Organization of the Canal defences. Reports reveal Turkish concentra-
tions. Failure of the attack.
The Gallipoli campaign leads to withdrawals of troops from Sinai.
The Fifth Wing arrives in Egypt.
The Western Desert . . . . . p. 166
The Sultan of Turkey proclaims a Holy War. The Senussi sympa-
thize with Turkey. War on the Senussi declared. Military operations
in the Western Desert. Aeroplane co-operation.
The Darfur Operations . . . . . p. 170
Ali Dinar, Sultan of Darfur, announces his intention to drive the
British into the sea. British column assembled near frontier of Darfur.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
Aeroplanes brought from Suez to co-operate. Maintenance and opera-
tions difficulties. The advance begins. Reconnaissance and bombing.
El Fasher captured. Ali Dinar found dead.
l^he Sinai Front . . . . . • P- 177
Evacuation of Gallipoli Peninsula re-awakens Sinai front, Suez Canal
defences extended into desert. Sir Archibald Murray takes command.
Fifth Wing headquarters moved to Ismailia. Survey work of the air
squadrons. Arrival of German aeroplanes. Technical superiority.
Qatiya posts protecting the railway line. Air reports indicate im-
pending Turkish attack on Qatiya. Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H.
Salmond warns G.H.Q. No record of action taken. The Turkish
attack succeeds.
Summer inactivity. Bombing and counter-bombing.
The Middle East Brigade . . . . p. i86
Formation of the Brigade. Duties and accomplishments of the Brigade.
End of Western Desert Campaign . . . p. 189
Aeroplanes keep watch on the Senussi in the southern oases. British
move out to attack. Defeat of the enemy forces. A treaty signed.
The Battle of Romani . . . . .p. 191
Air reports reveal increases in Turkish advanced camps. Watch kept
upon enemy preparations. The Turks attack and are severely defeated.
Threat to the Suez Canal at an end. Reorganization. Formation of
the Eastern Force.
Air activity. German pilots aggressive. Port Said bombed.
British cavalry prepare to raid Bir el Mazar. Intention discovered
by German air observers. Turks warned and alert. Attack broken
off. Ships and aircraft carriers co-operate in the attack.
The German aerodrome at El Arish bombarded. German aero-
planes shoot down the spotting seaplanes and put an end to the bom-
bardment. The railway line advances into the desert. Sir Archibald
Murray decides to secure El Arish. Duties of the air squadrons. Air
reports show Turks evacuating El Arish. Cavalry and camelry ordered
forward. El Arish occupied without opposition.
Turks seen to encamp at Magdhaba, which is attacked and captured.
The Advance into Palestine^ igiy . . .p. 202
The action of Rafah.
Air reconnaissances reveal enemy dispositions. Turkish force cover-
ing Rafah shown to be unsupported. A raid planned. Aeroplanes
co-operate. A race against time. The Turkish garrison captured.
German aerodrome at Beersheba bombed. German air service moves
back to Er Ramie.
New Turkish dispositions revealed from the air. British attack
xiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
prepared. Air observers discover Turks evacuating the main position
just when all w^as ready for the attack. The Royal Flying Corps ordered
to bomb the retreating Turks.
Lieutenant F. H. McNamara aw^arded V.C.
l^he First Battle of Gaza . . . .p. 208
Railhead reaches Rafah. Attack on Gaza defences planned. Aeroplanes
v^^ork from Rafah aerodrome. Operation orders. Turkish dispositions
before the battle. German air observers reveal British intentions.
Turkish troops redistributed. British attack in a fog. German air ob-
servers report British movements when fog lifts. Action taken on the
German air reports. The attack fails.
^ he Second Battle of Gaza . . . . p. 215
Sir Archibald Murray instructed to proceed to the capture of Jerusa-
lem. Gaza defences strengthened. New attack on Gaza. An operation
of siege warfare. Attack fails through insufficient artillery support.
1^ he Arab Revolt ...... p. 218
Arab unrest and aspirations. Arabs decide to expel the Turks from
Arab territory. British help. Seaplane operations in the Red Sea.
Bombs on Jidda. The Turkish garrison surrenders.
A Flight of aeroplanes sent to Rabigh. Tonic effect on the Arab
forces. Bombing the Hejaz railway.
The Turks, reinforced, attack the Arabs. Enemy advance threatens
Yenbo and Rabigh. Seaplanes bomb the victorious Turks. British
ships ready to bombard. The Turks withdraw. An Arab advance.
British naval forces co-operate. Seaplanes from the Anne participate.
Wejh captured.
Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps damaged in a storm. Flight
withdrawn to Egypt for refit.
CHAPTER IV. The Fall of Jerusalem . pp. 225-49
Trench Warfare . . . . . .p. 225
Second Gaza failure followed by six months of trench warfare. General
Sir Edmund Allenby succeeds Sir Archibald Murray. Requests for
aircraft reinforcements. Squadrons raised in Egypt. Kite balloon
sections arrive.
Composition of the Palestine Brigade, Royal Flying Corps. Work
of the squadrons during preparatory period. Arrival of Bristol Fighters.
Air superiority passes to the British. Bombing operations.
The Third Battle of Gaza .... p. 233
General AUenby's plan. Importance of surprise. Attempts to deceive
the Turkish command. A simple ruse succeeds. German airmen photo-
graph British preparations. They are shot down.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
XV
Air operation orders for the battle.
A list of Turkish batteries compiled from air information. Subse-
quent inspection of emplacements reveals the accuracy of the list.
Beersheba captured. Subsequent attacks on Gaza and on theQawuqa
defences.
The Turks in retreat. Bombing the retreating Turks.
The bombing of Et Tine. Panic breaks out in Turkish Eighth Army.
Evidence of the German commander.
German pilots inactive.
Towards Jerusalem. Aerodromes waterlogged. The 'flying start'.
General AUenby enters Jerusalem.
CHAPTER V. The Campaign in Mesopotamia,
1914-March 191 8. . . . pp. 250-331
The country and the climate. The Anglo-Persian oil company's instal-
lations at Abadan. An expedition to protect the pipe-line. Basra
captured.
The expedition strengthened and reorganized.
Difficulties about supplying an air detachment. Help from Australia
and New Zealand.
The Advance to Kut al Imara . . • P- 253
Major-General Townshend advances along the Tigris to Amara.
Air reconnaissances. Decision to capture Nasiriya on the Euphrates.
Importance of air reconnaissance. Nasiriya occupied.
Aeroplane engines give trouble. Better aeroplanes demanded. War
Office take over responsibility for aircraft from the Government of
India. Royal Naval Air Service seaplanes.
On the move to Kut. Air reconnaissances of the Kut defences. Kut
captured.
The Battle of Ctesifhon . . . . p. 261
Decision for an advance on Baghdad. Preparation. Arrival of aircraft
reinforcements. Air reports about the Ctesiphon defences. Ready for
the attack.
Major Reilly discovers Turkish reinforcements. He is shot down.
Prelude to the tragedy of Kut. Major-General Townshend attacks,
ignorant of the arrival of the Turkish 51st Division. This division
turns the scale. Defeat and withdrawal. Kut besieged.
Attempts to relieve Kut . . . .p. 265
Formation of a relief force. Inadequate aircraft support. On the move.
Operations hampered by bad weather.
Arrival of aircraft reinforcements.
The Attack on the Dujaila Redoubt . . p. 270
Dujaila Redoubt the key to the Es Sinn positions covering Kut.
xvi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A bold Strategic move. Fatal delays. Surprise thrown away. Turkish
reinforcements rushed forward. The race for time as seen from the air.
Bombing opportunities. Failure.
* The Advance Resumed . . . . . p. 276
New preparations. Direct attacks begin. Early success. Bad weather
intervenes. Its effect on the operations.
Hope of relieving Kut disappears.
Droffing Food in Kut . . . . • P- 278
The attempt to supply the besieged with food during the final opera-
tions.
Kut capitulates.
The Advance to Baghdad : Preparations . . p. 281
A period of inactivity.
Sickness reduces No. 30 Squadron. The Royal Naval Air Service
detachment withdrawn. Aircraft reinforcements arrive. Resumption
of the air offensive.
Reorganization and preparation. Plan of new operations.
The Offensive Of ens . . . . . p. 286
Crossing the Hai river. British and Turkish movements reported from
the air. Baghdad bombed. A methodical advance.
Crossing the Tigris . . . . . p. 293
Bridging the Tigris at Shumran. Preventing the German air observers
from discovering the British preparations.
A brilliant feat of arms.
Retreat and Pursuit . . . . .p. 294
The Turks in retreat. Bombing the enemy. Guns and material aban-
doned. British in pursuit. The scene from the air. Attempt by air
to cut the railway north of Baghdad. Baghdad falls. Value of air
superiority.
Baghdad and Beyond . . . . . p. 300
The situation in Persia. Major-General Maude divides his forces into
four columns. Advancing along three rivers. Air reconnaissances.
Turkish XIII Corps crosses the Diyala river. Arrival of new German
fighter aeroplanes. Moving up the Tigris.
B.E.2C 4500.
The Turks driven back. Baghdad secure.
Summer Operations ....
Abnormal heat. Morning and evening air photography
tures. Flying demonstrations overawe tribesmen.
Arrival of No. 63 (R.E.8) Squadron.
• p.
. Air adven-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
xvii
Fighting on three Fronts . . . • P- 313
Campaigning season begins in September. The brilliant action at
Ramadi. Plans based on air information.
Successful operations on the Diyala front.
Low-flying attacks on the retreating Turks.
An advance up the Tigris. Tikrit captured.
Lieutenant-General Maude dies of cholera.
Fighting in the Jabal Hamrin hills.
Bombing a camel supply column.
Bomb attacks on the enemy aerodromes.
Beginnings of the 'Dunster force'.
Air passage to Tehran.
Arrival of No. 72 Squadron.
Victory on the Euphrates . . , . p. 324
Turks at Hit reinforced. Enemy activity. Decision to capture Hit
and its garrison. Influence of air reports. Aircraft concentrated. A
bombing offensive. The Turks move back. Hit occupied. Retreating
columns bombed. Turks take up strong positions at Khan Baghdadi.
Action planned to capture Khan Baghdadi with its defenders. Care-
ful preparations. Success dependent upon the air reports. Perfect
co-ordination of all arms. The Turkish force captured.
A dash along the road to Ana. Rescue of the Royal Flying Corps
commander.
A change in the weather and what might have been.
CHAPTER VI. Air Operations in Macedonia,
1916-March 1918. . . • PP- 332-67
Balkan history. Position when war broke out. Early operations.
Bulgaria enters the war. The campaign to crush Serbia. French
and British troops land at Salonika. A difficult situation. An abortive
attempt to save Serbia. Stalemate follows. A Zeppelin bombs Salonika.
The L.Z.8$ shot down. The re-equipped Serbian army lands at
Salonika. The Bulgars advance into Greek territory. Trouble with
Greece. A 'pacific' blockade.
Lieutenant-General G. F. Milne takes command of British forces.
He asks for two aeroplane squadrons. No. 17 Squadron arrives from
Egypt. Romania enters the war. An offensive to help Romania.
Aircraft reinforcements arrive. Air combats.
The German Bombing Squadron . . • P- 343
No. I Kampfgeschwader achieves surprise. French aeroplanes destroyed
and damaged at Gorgop. Yanesh aerodrome bombed. No. 47 Squad-
ron casualties. Bombers over Salonika. Heavy casualties at Summerhill
camp. Help from the Royal Naval Air Service. A composite fighting
unit formed. Air combats. Arrival of a naval bombing squadron. A
2S04-5 b
xviii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
counter-bombing offensive. The German bombing squadron departs.
The British naval bombers blow up at Marian.
The Battle of Dojran p. 350
A general Allied offensive. Preparation for the British attack. Aircraft
co-operation with the artillery. A postponement. The attack fails.
A second attack.
Reasons for failure.
Greek politics. M. Venizelos takes over the full reins of Government.
Main activity in the air. Bombing attacks. Orlyak aerodrome
shelled. An Allied bombing attack on Gereviz. The Royal Flying
Corps help the French on the Monastir front. Inferiority of British
aeroplanes. Importance of the technical factor in air warfare. British
balloons shot down. Substituting explosives for the observer. Leut-
nant von Eschwege blown up.
Arrival of S.E.5a fighters.
The sortie of the Goeben and Breslau. The Royal Flying Corps help
the Royal Naval Air Service to attack the Goeben.
Success of the S.E.5a fighters. Air superiority attained.
Formation of No. 150 (Fighter) Squadron.
CHAPTER VII. Naval Air Operations in the
Mediterranean and Near-Eastern Waters,
1916-March 1918. . . . pp. 368-423
The Naval Convention of August 1914. Command of the Mediterra-
nean a French responsibility.
The Eastern Mediterranean in igi6 . . p. 370
Role of the British naval force after the evacuation of Gallipoli. Changes
in the Royal Naval Air Service organization. Wing Captain F. R.
Scarlett takes command. His proposals for expanding the air activi-
ties. Operations in the Gulf of Smyrna. And off the Bulgarian coast.
Redistribution of the naval aircraft. A repair base opened at Mudros.
Burning enemy crops by bombing.
Attacks on the Bulgar lines of communications. Bridges hit and
broken. Retaliation against Thasos aerodrome. Gereviz aerodrome
bombed in reply.
Air operations in the Dardanelles and Smyrna areas.
An increase in enemy air activity.
Naval aircraft sent to help Romania.
Palestine^ Asia Minor ^ and the Red Sea, Sea-
plane Carriers . . . . • P- 379
Air reconnaissances of the sea flank in Sinai and Syria. The seaplane
carriers Ben-my-Chree, Anne, Raven II, and Emfress.
Air operations in the Red Sea.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
A seaplane helps to destroy an ammunition carrier.
Air operations along the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor.
The Raven II hit by a bomb.
Enemy successfully dispute a combined attack on the El Arish aero-
drome.
Bombing the Turkish railway bridge across the Jeihan.
igiy-March igi8, The Adriatic. Anti- submarine
Measures . . . . . • P- 3^7
The Mediterranean a happy hunting-ground for U-boat commanders.
U-boat bases in the Adriatic. The Otranto net barrage. Rear-Admiral
Mark E. F. Kerr takes command of the British Adriatic Squadron. He
asks for aircraft and is referred to the Italians and the French.
Inadequacy of the Allied measures to counter the U-boat threat.
Reorganization. A British naval officer placed in charge of the Otranto
barrage. 'Inefficiency of this barrage is the root of all the submarine
trouble in the Mediterranean.' British air base opened at Otranto.
Orders given for torpedo-carrying seaplanes for attacks on the Austrian
fleet at Pola. Commodore Murray F. Sueter placed in command. Air
base opened at Taranto and slipways for seaplanes built in the Venice
Lagoon. Formation of No. 6 Wing.
Reorganization of the aircraft patrols.
Air operations in the Adriatic.
The Appointment of a British Commander-in-
Chief p. 393
The appointment of a British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,
had lapsed on the outbreak of war. British squadrons thereafter con-
duct operations independently. Unrestricted U-boat warfare reveals
weakness of the lack of co-ordination. British commander-in-chief ap-
pointed to take charge of questions affecting the protection of shipping.
Effect of this appointment.
Further demands for aircraft for Otranto. A Senior Air Service
Officer appointed to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief.
Reorganization of the air commands.
Malta P- 398
Anti-submarine patrols from Malta. Building of flying-boats in the
Malta dockyards.
Kite Balloons P- 39^
Provision of kite-balloons for escort duties with convoys.
The Eastern Mediterranean^ igiy . . .p. 398
General statement of air operations in the Aegean. Disposition of the
naval air units. Operations off the Bulgarian coast. Kavalla bom-
barded. Incendiary bombs on crops.
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Squadron at Imhros . . . . .p. 4^3
Reconnaissance and bombing operations.
'B^ and 'F' Squadrons at Mitylene . . .p. 404
Bombing the Smyrna-Panderma railway. Targets in the Smyrna area.
Mudros P- 405
Repair, supply, and anti-submarine work.
Arrival of a Handley Page bomber. Constantinople bombed. Penin-
sula objectives.
Anti-submarine patrols. Hydrophone experiments. Adrianople
bombed.
Successful air combats.
Loss of the Handley Page.
The Sortie of the Goeben and Breslau . . p. 410
Shipping in Kusu Bay shelled. The monitors Raglan and M.28 de-
stroyed. Aircraft in action. The Breslau sinks. The Goeben runs
aground. Abortive air attacks on the Goeben.
The Southern Aegean . . . . . p. 414
Air bases for anti-submarine patrols in the Southern Aegean. The
Peony fitted to carry seaplanes.
East Indies Squadron . . . . . p. 415
The Ben-my-Chree in flames. News of the German raider W olf in the
Indian Ocean. A hunt organized. The Raven II accompanies the
French cruiser Pothuau.
A seaplane adventure in the Maldive islands. An abortive search.
The Raven II returns to Port Said.
Aircraft carrier operations along the Syrian and Asia Minor coasts.
Seaplane co-operation in the Third Battle of Gaza. The City of
Oxford in the Red Sea.
CHAPTER VIII. Training Developments.
PART I. HOME .... pp. 424-71
Royal Flying Corps, igiy . . . .p. 424
Expansion programme of 108 service squadrons, January 191 7. Train-
ing developments in fulfilment. The German daylight raids and the
expansion programme of 200 service squadrons, July 191 7. Statistics
of pilot requirements. Average effective service of pilots and observers
in France. Formation of new Schools of Military Aeronautics and
of Cadet Wings. Miscellaneous training schools.
The Gosfort School. . . . . • P* 429
Major R. R. Smith-Barry and the School for Special Flying at Gosport.
Training value of the Monosoupape Avro. Spinning an aeroplane not
an 'act of God'. The Gosport method. Its importance and influence.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi
technical Instruction for Men . . .p.
The tendency towards concentration. The move to Halton.
^he Training of Observers . . . . p. 435
Proposals of Major-General Trenchard, December 191 6. The curri-
culum for observers. The Wireless and Observers' School at Brook-
lands. Administrative changes. Major-General J. M. Salmond.
The Royal Naval A ir Service^ igi4-March igi8 . p. 438
Position at the outbreak of war. Reorganization in September 191 5.
Opening of the School at Cranwell, April 1916. The scheme of standar-
dized training. The Vendome School.
Need for additional schools, September 1917. Naval air observers.
Fleet Air Officers . . . . .p. 443
Proposal of Captain Oliver Swann, R.N., July 1916. Training pilots
and observers in methods of co-operation with the Fleet.
The Royal Air Force^ igi8 .... p. 444
Formation of the first Air Council, January 191 8. Reorganizing the
training systems of the naval and mihtary air services. Issue of a
comprehensive manual. Flying Instruction. A model booklet. Addi-
tional schools of aeronautics. 'All-through' training. The special
training schools in Britain at the Armistice.
The French and British training systems compared. French Eco-
nomy of man-power.
PART 11. EGYPT . . . . . .p. 449
The War Office decide to train pilots in Egypt, April 1916. Reserve
squadrons sent from England. The beginnings of No. 3 School of
Military Aeronautics. Taking advantage of the winter climate in
Egypt.
Expansion in 1917. Supply of pupils from England stopped. Find-
ing pupils in the Middle East.
Formation of No. 3 Cadet Wing.
Training Egyptian mechanics at the Base Depot. Expansion in
1918. Formation of Depot Stations. Various schools.
Repair and Supply Organization in Egypt . p. 455
Aircraft Parks and Depots. The Eastern Aircraft Factory. Rapid
growth of the organization. The shape of the air service moulded by
Major-General W. G. H. Salmond. A tribute.
PART III. CANADA . . . . . . p. 458
Men and material available in Canada. The Admiralty has the pick of
the candidates. Canadian proposals for the formation of a school and
factory. Delays. War Office decide to raise twenty reserve squadrons
xxii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
in Canada. The Canadian Company takes over the Curtiss works and
staff at Toronto. Royal Flying Corps officers leave for Canada, January
191 7. Flying training in Canada begins. Rapid expansion.
Texas . . ..... p. 464
Effect of the entry of America into the war. An agreement made.
Training the personnel for ten American squadrons in Canada.
America provides facilities for winter training in Texas. A generous
arrangement. Statistics of training in Canada.
General remarks about the training developments in the war. 'The
prodigal fields of improvisation.' When the training given was in-
adequate. Insufficient allowance made for casualties. Importance of
reserves. The policy of the air offensive. Reader advised to suspend
judgement.
APPENDICES
I. Statistics of German Air Raids on Great Britain,
1917-18 .......
Table A. Airship Raids .... I between
Table B. Aeroplane Raids . . . . / 474-5
II. Air Raid Statistics for the County of London,
1917-18
III. German Aeroplane Raid on London, 13th June 1917.
Bombs, Damage, and Casualties. .... 475-9
IV. Methods suggested for the Preventing of Air Raids in
the United Kingdom. (Memorandum of Major-
General H. M. Trenchard, prepared for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, June I 91 7) . . . . 479-82
V. German Aeroplane Raid on London, 7th July 191 7.
Bombs, Damage, and Casualties .... 483-6
VI. Home Defence. (Report of Lieutenant-General J. C.
Smuts's Committee, July 1 91 7) .... 487-91
VII. Night Air Raids on London. (Memorandum of Lieu-
tenant-General J. C. Smuts, September 1917) . . 491-3
VIII. Home Defence Operation Orders (September 1918).
(By Major-General E. B. Ashmore, C.B., C.M.G.,
M.V.O., Commanding London Air Defence Area) . 493-504
IX. Anti- Aircraft Defences in Great Britain at the'
Armistice .......
Table A. Ground Defences ... 505~7
Table B. Home Defence Squadrons .
X. Statistics for the Training Brigade in Egypt, 191 8 . . after 507
INDEX
509
LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME
1. London and South-East England. Anti- Aircraft Defence
Scheme. January 191 8 To face p. i
2. Daylight Aeroplane Attack on London, 13th June 191 7
(Map No. 11) . . . . . . . 25
3. Daylight Aeroplane Attack on London, 7th July 191 7
(Map No. 12) 36
4. A London Gun Barrage Scheme (Night) about October
1917 89
5. Warning Organization, November 191 8 . . . 134
6. The Eastern Desert ....... 161
7. Operations against the Sultan of Darfur. March-
December 1916 ....... 171
8. Affair of Qatiya, 23rd April 1916 .... 181
9. The Western Desert ...... 190
10. Battle of Romani ....... 193
11. Southern Palestine ....... 209
12. Arabia and Syria, June 1 91 6 ..... 219
13. Third Battle of Gaza ...... 239
14. Mesopotamia 249
15. The Attack on the Dujaila Redoubt, 8th March 1916 . 269
16. Operations on the Tigris, 13th December 1916 to
25th February 1917 ...... 300
17. Area North of Baghdad 324
18. Situation, Sea to Vardar, 1st January 1917 . . ., 341
19. The Battle of Dojran. Night Attack of 24th April 1917 . 353
20. Macedonia ........ 366
21. Mediterranean and Red Seas. Sphere of Air Operations
1917-18 422
LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE CASE
AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN, 1917-18
Airship Raids, 1917
1. i6th-i7th March.
2. 2 3rd-24th May.
3. i6th-i7tli June. 2ist-22nd August.
4. 24th-25th September.
5 and 6. I9th-20th October.
Airship Raids, 1918
7. 1 2th March. 13th March,
8. I2th-I3th April.
9. 5th-6th August.
Aeroplane Raids, 191 7
10. 25th May. 5th June.
11. 13th June] , {facing p. 2$
, ^\ Bound in volume. J
12. 7th July J \ facing p. 36
13. 4th-5th September.
14. 24th September.
15. 25th September.
16. 28th September.
17. 29th September.
18. 30th September.
19. 1st October.
20. 31st October.
21. 6th December.
22. 1 8th December.
Aeroplane Raids, 1918
23. 28th-29th January.
24. 29th-30th January.
25. i6th February.
26. I7th-i8th February.
27. 7th-8th March.
28. I9th-20th May.
I
London and South-East England.
Anti-Airgraft Defence Scheme. January, 1918.
This double line of Searehlights
extended Northwards to Hmgham (Norfolk)
and thenee West to Petevboroagb
J
Scale of Ten SUilute Miles to One Inch ossso"
Ordnana; Sur-yey. 1935
CHAPTER I
GERMAN AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN
1917-18
In the third volume of this history the German airship
and aeroplane raids on Great Britain were dealt with to
the end of 1916, and the reader may recall that as that year
came to its close there was cause for a feeling of greater
confidence on the home front. Those responsible for the
air defence of the country no longer feared the airship.
It was to be expected that, soon after the naval raiding
Zeppelins left their sheds on the north German coast, the
usual wireless warnings would be received in England, so
giving ample time in which to set in motion the various
defence measures. The German crews, as they approached
the British coasts, would find the gun and searchlight
personnel alert at their posts, and if the Zeppelin com-
manders attempted to reach targets of any importance
they would have to reckon, in addition, with patrolling
aeroplanes. It seemed reasonably certain, at the end of
1916, that once an aeroplane, with its incendiary ammu-
nition, came within striking distance of a Zeppelin the
giant gas-bag was doomed. Even if airship raids developed
without previous warning it appeared unlikely that a ship
which penetrated any distance inland would get out again
without being attacked from the air. Nor, by the end of
1916, were there any indications of possible serious attacks
by heavier-than-air craft. Such aeroplane or seaplane raids
as had taken place had been unimportant and had posed
no problems for the defence. At the beginning of 191 7,
therefore, people in England went to their beds with no
particular thought about the threat from the air. As,
however, the year progressed, it came to be realized that
the feehng of confidence was premature, that the airship
threat had not lost its force, and that another menace,
more formidable, had arisen.
Lighting Restrictions'^
The feeling at the end of 1 916 that serious air attacks
^ Tables of Local Sunset had been issued by the Home Office in November
2504.5 B
1 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
had, perhaps, ended, led to suggestions from many quarters
that the Hghts should be turned up a little at night. So
far as London was concerned the military authorities
shared the wish for better street lighting because it would
assist military traffic. Their view was that so long as any
lighting that was at all useful was maintained London
was fairly well defined to aircraft approaching within
twenty-five miles, and that the existing restrictions were
not therefore justified by considerations of defence. After
much discussion the lights of London were made a little
brighter, but not for long. At the beginning of 191 7 the
coal controller was urging economy in the consumption
of coal, and various lighting authorities, anxious to help,
suggested a reduction of street lighting once more. The
position was therefore again reviewed early in 19 17, and
as a result it was agreed that an additional one-third of
the lamps in the London area should cease to be used.
The nocturnal gloom in London was bad enough, but
it was even more profound in some provincial cities, and
the cry for more light went up from many places in the
midlands and in the north. Representations were made
from Lancashire that it was inconvenient and even danger-
ous for the workers, most of them girls, to be compelled
to go to and from their work through unlighted streets,
and the Chief Constables of Lancashire were therefore
empowered, at the beginning of 19 17, to arrange for a
modest increase in lighting, especially in the early morning.
It soon became clear, however, that the lighting position
outside London needed consideration as a whole, and the
County and Borough Chief Constables were therefore called
into conference in February 191 7. It was revealed during
the conference that some cities had almost abandoned
street lighting. In Sheffield, for example, out of a total
of 12,000 lamps no more than forty-five were in use, and
even these few were extinguished at 7.30 p.m. After that
time the only lighting in the streets was supplied by the
headlights on tramcars, which ceased to run at 11 p.m.
1916 and placed on sale by the Stationery Office. They provided a ready
means for determining the hour at which the various Light Orders took
effect, according to locality and times of the year.
1917] GLOOM AT NIGHT 3
In general, it appeared that the number of street lamps
in use in the various towns was from about one-quarter
to one-fifth, of the total. Most of the lamps were gas-
lighted, and it took time to get them extinguished after
receipt of the order for air-raid action.
The Chief Constables, however, were, for the most part,
against an increase of lighting in provincial towns. They
argued that the public had become accustomed to the
darkness, and they feared that if the restrictions were
relaxed one result might be undesirable competition in
brightness between one town and another. In the result
little or nothing was done to improve the lighting in the
midland and northern industrial towns, and pedestrians
had to continue to grope their way about at night with
the help of electric torches. The state of mind of some
local authorities is revealed by the fact that there were
prosecutions and convictions for striking matches on the
sea-front, or even inland in the open, until Chief Con-
stables were informed from Whitehall that such prosecu-
tions were unnecessary.
In May 191 7 further lighting restrictions, applicable
to the whole of England and Wales, were made at the
request of the coal controller. These prohibited the use
of illuminated advertisements, of lights outside or at the
entrance to any place of amusement, and of all lighting
inside shop premises for display or for advertisement after
the shops had been closed. These restrictions, imposed
under the 'Advertisement Lights Order', took effect from
the 29th of May 191 7 and remained in force for two years.
There is no doubt that the darkening of English cities
was overdone. It is true, as has been made clear in this
history, that the German Zeppelin crews often searched
in vain for suitable bombing targets and that they passed
over many darkened Midland cities unaware of what lay
beneath them. The warning system, however, worked
so well on the whole that it is difficult to find justification
for permanent gloom from one end of the country to the
other. The requirement of General Head-quarters,
Home Forces, was that all lights which might be visible
from enemy aircraft must be put out within five minutes
4 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
of receipt of the order Take Air Raid Action, Chief Con-
stables were mainly concerned to see that no more street
lamps were lighted than could be extinguished within the
prescribed time. The public, however, were alive to the
importance of obscuring lights when warnings of attack
were given, and it is probable that responsible volunteers
could have been enrolled, and adequate arrangements
made, to extinguish when necessary those street lamps
which required to be put out by hand. Although the need
to save coal was an urgent one, it is doubtful whether
the economy of a few thousand tons at the expense of
street lighting compensated for the disadvantageous effects,
chiefly psychological, but also material, of the increased
obscurity. Against this it is fair to point out that in those
areas where the passage of enemy aircraft was fairly
frequent, the public derived from the darkness a feeling
of security and might not have tolerated any appreciable
increase of street lighting.
Reductions in the Defences
Meanwhile, at the beginning of 191 7, the Government
were anxiously concerned with the problem of the German
U-boat, a problem which, unexpectedly perhaps, greatly
affected the home anti-aircraft organization. There was
little doubt that submarine warfare would be intensified
in 1917, and it was clear that the existing countermeasures
would be ineffective. It was said that if the losses in
merchant tonnage, due to the U-boats, were not curtailed,
the importation of food and other necessaries into the
Allied countries might be so seriously affected that, by
the early summer of 191 7, peace might have to be sought
on terms not justified by the military situation. Contem-
porary naval opinion was fairly agreed that, to counter
U-boat activity, more merchant vessels must be armed.
It was estimated that about 3,000 merchant vessels were
in danger areas at any one time, but that only some 1,200
of them were equipped with a more or less efficient
gun. The naval view was that guns should be diverted
from home defence for the protection of merchant
shipping, and the argument was put forward that, even
1917] THE DEFENCES REDUCED 5
if the Zeppehn had not been defeated, it was necessary
to ensure against the greater risk. Whereas the depreda-
tions of the U-boats might mean the loss of the war, it
was unlikely that airship attacks could have a similar effect.
Furthermore, aeroplanes and not guns must be considered
to be the chief weapons of attack against Zeppelins.
It was perhaps inevitable that, in the circumstances of
the time, the Government should decide to divert
deliveries of guns, authorized for home defence, to the
mercantile marine. In January 191 7 the authorized
allotment of guns for home defence, mostly 3 -inch,
totalled 403^ fixed, 78 mobile, and 12 for training purposes.
Of the 3-inch guns 169 had been delivered, but as a result
of the Government decision it was arranged that the 186
guns outstanding, together with eleven 2*95-inch guns
on order, should be delivered to the Admiralty. In con-
sequence the home-defence organization had to be
remodelled. Under the existing scheme London was,
eventually, to have had a total of 84 guns, but, on the
new basis of distribution, this allotment was cut down to
65 and, in January 19 17, existing guns above this number
were withdrawn. ^ The system of double gun stations in
London was abandoned, except for the station at Hyde
Park, and the surplus guns were used to strengthen the
defences north and east of the capital.
At the end of 191 6, the anti-aircraft gun and search-
light defences in the London area had been placed under
one commander. Up to this time the seven sub-com-
manders in this area had been under the G.O.C., London
District, for training, and under Lord French, the Field-
Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, for operations. 3 Outside
the London area each Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander
was responsible both for training and operations, and it
' 355 3-inch 20 cwt.; 36 12-pdr.; 11 2-95-inch; and i 4-inch.
2 At the beginning of February 191 7 the London gun defences were:
48 3-inch 20 cwt.; 16 French 75 mm.; i 12-pdr.; and (temporarily)
I 3*5-inch.
3 The seven sub-commands were: Dartford (Perry Street); North-
West (Wembley); South (Hilly Fields Schools); South- West (Putney);
Waltham (Monkhams Hall); and Woolwich (Plumstead); Central (White-
hall Gardens, S.W.i).
6 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [cii. i
appeared anomalous that in London, the most important
area to defend, there should be no central commander.
Early in December 1916, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel
M. St. L. Simon, R.E., who had been brought home from
France in February 19 16 to supervise the construction of
gun and light positions in the London area, was given
the command with the title of Anti-Aircraft Defence
Commander, London. He was placed under the orders of
the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, for training and
operations, and of the G.O.C., London District, for ad-
ministration and discipline. On taking up his appointment
Lieutenant-Colonel Simon found that there was a lack of
uniformity in equipment and in the methods employed in
the various London sub-commands, and he took immediate
steps to simplify and to standardize both equipment and
methods so far as it was possible to do so. He also
elaborated a scheme whereby the searchlights were to
co-operate to provide an orderly 'light' patrol around
London. It had been noted that when a Zeppelin had
been destroyed in the air over England, other ZeppeHn
commanders who had been witnesses of the disaster had
appeared to abandon their attacks, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Simon believed, therefore, that if the London
searchlights were uncovered when Zeppelins were still
at a great distance, the moral effect might be such that
the commanders would not persist on their journey
towards the capital. Acting on this belief, he issued orders
that if and when airships approached the London area,
the searchlights and guns were to be used without hesita-
tion and that they were to open at long range. The main
object, he said, was to keep the enemy away from the
capital: the destruction of the hostile craft was a secondary
aim. This policy of unmasking all the searchlights was
adopted on the two occasions in 191 7 when Zeppelins
appeared to be making for London.
The intention, when the appointment of an Anti-Aircraft
Defence Commander, London, was made,was that the seven
sub-commands should be regrouped and reduced to four,
but it was not until April 191 7 that this reorganization
became effective. The new sub-commands and their head-
1917] ALARMS 7
quarters were as follows : iVof Waltham ; East^ Plumstead ;
West, Putney; and Central, Whitehall Gardens.
The reductions in the home anti-aircraft defences
extended also to the aeroplane squadrons. On the 6th
of February 191 7 Sir David Henderson, director-general
of military aeronautics, informed the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff that the Royal Flying Corps in
France was in urgent need of the services of two of the
five night-flying squadrons which had been sanctioned
for duty in the field, and he stated that two squadrons
could be sent to France at the beginning of March if
pilots were taken from the home-defence squadrons.
Thirty-six pilots would be required immediately, and he
estimated that there would be a call for nine additional
pilots each month as reinforcements. 'It is considered
'from a Royal Flying Corps standpoint', said Sir David
Henderson, 'that the diminished risk from Zeppelin
'attack amply justifies this temporary reduction.' The
matter was brought to the notice of the War Cabinet
three days later and no objections were raised.
A few days after this decision was made, that is to say
on the night of the 1 6th/ 17th of February 19 17, the
military ZeppeHn LZ.ioy dropped bombs near Calais,
without effect, and then crossed to the EngHsh coast. She
was seen over Deal about 2.0 a.m. and was afterwards
heard off Ramsgate, but no bombs from her fell on EngHsh
soil, and she was later reported over Holland on her way
back to Germany. The incursion of the Zeppehn was
without significance, but it led to a multitude of rumours
which showed that public disquiet might again be quickly
roused. It was freely reported, for instance, that the
Zeppehn had been accompanied by fighting aeroplanes,
but there was no evidence to support this statement.
There followed, on subsequent nights in February, many
rumours of airship activity in the area of the Downs, but
they had, so far as is known, no foundation in fact.
These alarms, however, did not affect the official out-
look, and on the 6th of March a conference was held at
the Horse Guards to explore ways and means still further
to reduce the number of pilots and aeroplanes allotted to
8 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
home defence, and of the personnel manning guns and
lights. Many suggestions were considered, but the most
important was one put forward by Lord French that fire
should not be opened against hostile aeroplanes or sea-
planes except by those guns which were situated near the
coast within the probable region of enemy aeroplane
attack. The members of the conference endorsed this
recommendation, and orders of Lord French, Field-
Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces, issued
next day, the 7th of March, stated: 'No aeroplanes or
'seaplanes, even if recognized as hostile, will be fired at,
'either by day or night, except by those anti-aircraft guns
'situated near the Restricted Coast Area which are
'specially detailed for the purpose.'
That is to say the anti-aircraft gunners, outside the
specified coastal areas, were prohibited from firing at
enemy aeroplanes and, in view of what was to happen
within a few weeks, the order may be read with surprise.
It certainly reflects the confidence of the home authorities,
but the reader should also remember that the calls for
trained personnel which came from the Western front
were urgent. It was no longer necessary, under the new
order, that the defences, outside the coastal areas, should
be fully manned by day, and it was possible, therefore,
to make a considerable reduction in the home-defence
gun-detachments. At the time the order was issued the
Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander, London, was pre-
paring plans for gun-fire to meet possible aeroplane attacks,
but as the general feeling was all against such a pos-
sibility, he received neither encouragement nor assistance
in the preparation even of an emergency scheme. This,
however, did not deter him from working out a detailed
plan which he kept ready for immediate issue if and
when the order not to fire should be cancelled.^
Zeppelin Attacks^
I On the 1 6th of March a raiding squadron of five naval
^ This happened on the 7th of June. See p. 26.
2 For a statistical summary of airship raids 1 91 7-1 8, see Appendix I,
Table 'A'. For the maps, noted in the margin, see separate case.
1917] THE L,39 DESTROYED 9
Zeppelins of the latest type, L.jg, L.40, L.41, and
set out to bomb southern England, with London
as the main objective.^ The weather conditions were
peculiar. When the airships began their journey an anti-
cyclone covered southern England and northern France
and extended well into Germany, but the not unfamiliar
depression from Iceland was approaching our north-
western seaboard, and by the time the airships were
nearing the British coast the depression had spread
eastwards and the velocity of the wind over the North
Sea had increased to forty miles an hour at 1,500 feet.
That is to say there was a fast moving storm area bearing
down on the airships which was calculated to make their
passage over England, and especially their return journey,
hazardous.
The first airship to reach the coast was the ill-fated
Z.J9 (Kapitanleutnant Robert Koch) which appeared
over Margate at 10.20 p.m. She moved across Kent, by
way of Ashford, to St. Leonards and Bexhill, and ultimately
went out to sea at Pevensey Bay at midnight. She dropped
six bombs on land, which damaged two cottages, and
other bombs from her were heard exploding in the
Channel. About 3 a.m. the L.jg was west of Dieppe, and
she afterwards ran across France towards Paris, but, short
of Mantes, turned back again and then pursued an easterly
course with the evident intention of passing over the
trenches. Dawn was approaching and it is possible that
Kapitanleutnant Koch decided that he could avoid attack
in the battle-field area if he shut off his engines and ran,
noiselessly, before the wind. At 5.25 a.m., however, the
L.jg was seen over Estrees and, five minutes later, was
dimly outHned to French gunners at Compiegne. She
^ Strasser's operation orders show that Great Britain was divided into
three areas: North was north of lat. 54°; Middle was between lat. 54° and
lat. 53°; and South was south of lat. 53°. The main objectives in the north
were given as the Firth of Forth, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and the mouths
of the Tyne and the Tees. In the middle they were Manchester, Liverpool,
and the Humber mouth area; and in the south, London, Birniinghani, and
Bristol. Attacks were ordered, according to the weather conditions, simply
as north, or middle, or south, and the airship commanders could apparently
exercise freedom of choice of objective within the area defined.
lo AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
was almost stationary, possibly because her engines had
frozen and could not be restarted, and during a fifteen-
minute bombardment in the half light more than one
hundred shells were fired at her by the French gunners
before she was hit and fell flaming to earth within view
of the German trenches.
This was the cHmax of a night which had kept the
Western front alert. The L.35 (Kapitanleutnant Herbert
Ehrlich) had come in at Broadstairs at 10.45 p.m. and,
at first, had followed much the same course as the
but after circling over Ashford she had moved off towards
Dover, west of which she went out at 12.15a.m. The Z.J5,
which encountered heavy snow, crossed the French coast
near Calais, ran across Belgium, and eventually landed at
Dresden with one of her engines out of action. Twenty
bombs from her had fallen on England, three of them
of 660-lb. weight, but they exploded in open country and
caused no casualties and only slight material damage.
The L.40 (Kapitanleutnant Sommerfeldt) passed the coast
late, about i a.m. at Herne Bay, and moved over Kent
to Romney Marsh where she dropped thirty-one bombs
in the open. She then crossed to France and ultimately
passed by way of St. Omer and Bethune over the trenches
near La Bassee at 3.20 a.m.
The Z.41 (Hauptmann Manger) made a slow approach
down Channel and came overland south of Winchelsea
at 1.20 a.m., dropping ten bombs as she came in. The
ship passed near Rye, dropping more bombs on Camber
Marsh and along the river Rother, and then went out
to sea at Dungeness. She crossed the French coast at
Boulogne and followed a south-easterly course over
France, passing the trench lines near Cambrai on her way
back to Ahlhorn. It is clear from the official reports of
the L.41 that Manger was deceived by the difficulties of
navigation. Ice and snow made the airship heavy and he
decided that he could not reach London, but would,
instead, attack Harwich. From the data on which he had
to work he was justified in assuming that his attack had,
in fact, been made on Harwich. The L.42 (Kapitanleut-
nant Martin Dietrich), in which was Fregattenkapitan
1917] LORD FRENCH COMPLAINS n
Peter Strasser, was known to have cruised about off the
Dutch and Belgian coasts, but she evidently had difficulty
of some kind and turned back to Germany across Belgium.^
The raid was defeated by the weather conditions. The
German official records leave no doubt that the un-
expectedly strong winds blew the airships off their course
and that the commanders, in trying to check their bear-
ings, received only scant help from the wireless stations,
and none at all from direct observation. Sommerfeldt, for
example, in the thought that his bombs had been
dropped on London, and it is true that the chart of his
course, as mapped in the airship, was roughly parallel with
his track over the ground as observed by us. The difference
is that he, as did the other commanders, thought he came
in farther north, near Mersea Island, and his subsequent
miscalculation about the fall of his bombs was a consequent
mistake. Because of the heavy cloud-banks that lay over
Kent and the north of France while the Zeppelins were
about, the searchlight, gun, and aeroplane defences could
do little. Sixteen pilots went up in England, but they
saw nothing and one of them crashed and was killed. ^
Lord French was inclined to blame the reductions in the
defence personnel for the fact that the Zeppelins got away
from England without mishap. On the 20th of March
191 7, in a letter to the Army Council, he pointed out that
the average number of pilots and aeroplanes available for
night flying in the Home Defence Wing had been 130
and that this number, although smaller than originally
contemplated, had sufficed for the maintenance of an
effective patrol. The strength in pilots when the raid of
the 1 6th / 1 7th of March was made was 7 1 , and Lord French
stressed the point that among those pilots who had been
sent overseas were many who had fought the Zeppelins,
successfully, in the autumn of 19 16. 'I recognize', he said,
'that the claims for trained pilots for overseas are all
'important, but in view of my responsibility for Home
^ The log of the L.42 shows that one of her engines went out of action,
and it was therefore decided, because of the difficult weather conditions,
to abandon the raid.
2 One of the defence aeroplanes was seen from the gondolas of the L.40.
12 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'Defence it is necessary for me to say that in my opinion
'the Home Defence Wing, Royal Flying Corps, has been
'reduced to a dangerously low point, and one which does
'not enable the general scheme of defence on which the
'present disposition of the squadrons is based to be carried
'out effectively. The escape of the airship which raided
'Kent and Sussex on the 1 6th/ 17th instant was, notwith-
'standing the unfavourable weather conditions, in my
'opinion due to this cause.' He asked that a minimum
strength in pilots and aeroplanes should be fixed, and he
stated that the existing scheme of aeroplane defence would
require 100 trained night pilots. The War Office replied
that the requirements for Home Defence were receiving
close attention, but said that the shortage at home was not
disproportionate to that existing in Royal Flying Corps
estabhshments overseas, and that no minimum of aero-
planes or personnel could be fixed for any theatre of war.
2 The next Zeppelin attack on England took place, in
conditions of snow and hail in the upper air, on the night
of the 23rd/24th of May. Six airships, Z.^o,
L.44, and crossed the North Sea in the after-
noon of the 23rd, but one of them, the L.44 (Kapitan-
leutnant Stabbert^), had engine trouble and turned back
and limped slowly home. Nothing could be seen owing
to the thick clouds, and Stabbert, calculating that he was
going out over Harwich, dropped his load of fourteen high
explosive and twenty incendiary bombs. No bombs from
his ship were found on land and they were presumably
dropped in the sea soon after he had re-crossed the coast.
The L.42 (Kapitanleutnant Martin Dietrich) came farthest
inland. She moved over Essex to Braintree, but just when
it appeared that she was shaping course for London, where
all the searchlights were exposed for 'moral' effect, she
turned north-west and, later, north-east, and ultimately
went out to sea near Sheringham at 3.25 a.m. after being
overland for three hours. The bombs which came from
her exploded in open country wdthout doing damage. The
^ Stabbert, who commanded the L.20 when she was wrecked in Norway
after raiding Scotland in May 1916 (see Vol. Ill, pp. 212-13) had escaped
from internment.
1917] ABORTIVE AIRSHIP ATTACK 13
German official records show that the attempt by the
L.42 to reach London had to be abandoned because of
engine trouble and strong head winds. The ship passed
through violent storm areas and was three times encircled
with lightning.
The L,45 (Kapitanleutnant Waldemar KoUe) passed
across Suffolk and Norfolk through an area of thunder-
storms, but no more than two bombs were traced from her
on land, although it is possible that some of the bombs on
Norfolk villages attributed hj us to the L.43 came, in fact,
from the 1,45.^ The L.43 (Kapitanleutnant Kraushaar)
came in later than the L.45^ but she followed a similar
course across Suffolk and Norfolk and dropped thirty-eight
bombs in fields and on villages, killing one man and
damaging cottage property. She made a safe journey
home, but did not much longer survive; on the morning
of the 14th of June she was destroyed off Vlieland by a
flying-boat from Felixstowe.^
The flying at about 18,000 feet with a star-lit
sky above and massed clouds below, did not, according to
our observation, come overland. From his wireless infor-
mation her commander thought he crossed the coast
south of Lowestoft and he then dropped three bombs to
bring the searchlights or anti-aircraft guns into action. As
there was no response (these bombs must have fallen in
the sea) and because visibility was nil, the attack was
abandoned and the L,4y carried her main load of bombs
home again. Kapitanleutnant Sommerfeldt in the L.40
was overland only a short time and his bombs, except two,
appear to have been dropped at sea. According to the
German official records Sommerfeldt gave up the attempt
to reach London because of engine trouble and dropped
his bombs, as he thought, in the neighbourhood of Nor-
wich. One of his bombs, of 660-lb. weight, fell in the open
at Little Plumstead, four miles east of Norwich, but no
other bombs were traced in this area.
' KoUe thought his attack was made on Norwich. He, like some of the
other airship commanders, came farther inland, and on a more northerly
course, than his calculations and his wireless reports led him to believe.
- See Vol. IV, p. 20.
14 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
It so happened that about an hour after the L.40 had
re-crossed the coast on her homeward journey a flying-
boat from Yarmouth, piloted by Fhght Lieutenant C. J.
Galpin, set out for Terschelhng in the hope that one or
more of the returning Zeppehns might be encountered.
The tracks of the Zeppehn and of the flying-boat show
that they were flying on converging courses, but clouds
and rain squalls curtained the scene and it was not until
about 5.30 a.m., when the flying-boat had already turned
back, that the L.40 suddenly appeared out of a cloud a
mile ahead. Sommerfeldt received no answer from the
flying-boat to his recognition signals and he quickly
realized that his only chance of safety lay in the clouds.
He dropped his two remaining bombs to lighten the ship
and climbed as rapidly as he could, but he must have been
aware, as he watched the flying-boat bearing down on
him at full speed, that it would be touch and go. Flight
Lieutenant Galpin had approached within 300 yards when
the nose of the Zeppelin met the clouds. There was just
time to get half a drum of incendiary ammunition in her
direction, without effect, before she was lost to view. The
log of the L.40 shows that she, also, opened fire with her
machine guns for a few brief moments when the flying-
boat was near and that Sommerfeldt subsequently sent
out a wireless message, addressed to all naval airships,
warning them of the presence of enemy aircraft. There
were, however, no other encounters. The flying-boat flew
on towards Yarmouth without incident until it was forced
down through petrol shortage near Cromer Knoll, whence
it was taken in tow by a trawler.
Many other naval and military pilots went up to combat
the raiders, but the cloud banks and the poor visibility
made the task somewhat hopeless. Among the aircraft
which ascended were two Sopwith 'Baby' seaplanes, at
3.40 a.m., from the Westgate air station. The two pilots
searched independently for some hours, and at 6.45 a.m.
one of them. Flight Sub-Lieutenant H. M. Morris, re-
turned to his station, but time passed and the second
pilot did not come in. At 8.10 a.m. Flight Sub-Lieutenant
Morris, with Air Mechanic G. O. Wright, went out in a
I9I7] ADRIFT ON THE NORTH SEA 15
Short seaplane to look for the missing Sopwith *Baby' sea-
plane which, it was now clear, must have been forced
down somewhere on the sea. As it happened, this sea-
plane, in a damaged condition, had been taken in tow by
a hopper from the Isle of Grain and was already safely
in port when the Short began to search for her over the
North Sea.
What happened to the Short was told later by Flight
Sub-Lieutenant H. M. Morris in his report : 'On Thursday
'24th at 8 a.m. I was ordered with A. M. 2nd Class Wright
'(W/T) as observer to go in search of Flight Sub-Lieu-
*tenant Maxton who had failed to return. I set out
'steering East for 30 minutes, then I turned N.W. for 5
'when my engine suddenly stopped. I was forced to land.
'The sea was choppy and the wind rising, so my observer
'sent off his pigeon while I kept the machine head to wind.
'At about 2.30 my starboard lower plane was carried
'away causing us to swing broadside on to the sea: we
'climbed out on to the other plane so as to balance things,
'but the machine gradually got tail to wind and the
'tail plane was smashed and the machine gradually began
'to sink tail first. As she sank we climbed out on to the
'floats and sat on them, till I was washed off, but managed
'to catch the tail under water and climb on again. Here
'we sat till the machine sat up propeller in air and finally
'turned right over, leaving just the underneath part of
'each float out of the water.
'By this time the sea was very rough and the wind
'blowing a gale. We clung as best we could all night and
'when morning dawned, the wind had dropped con-
'siderably and the sea was getting quieter. We watched
'all day and by evening the sea was calm and we caught
'sight of a lightship and a cruiser and two destroyers in the
'distance, but we could not make them. About sunset
'six seaplanes, flying very low, and in diamond formation,
'flew over us as we waved to them and they answered by
'firing a green light, but they took no further notice.
'Their machines had our markings, but were going east
'and flying very fast.
'Nothing else happened till the Sunday when an
i6 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'aeroplane flew over, but failed to see us. The weather
'remained calm till on the Tuesday at about 2 'clock
'we sighted an H.12, which also saw us; it circled round
'coming lower and lower and finally landed, although the
'sea was getting rough again. As it passed us we hung on
'to the wires and climbed in. We tried to get it up again,
'but the water was too rough and we only broke our tail
'plane, so we taxied for about 25 miles till we sighted the
'Orient which took us aboard and later on transferred us
'to the White Lilac which brought us into Felixstowe at
'about 9.30 p.m. on Tuesday night. The signal code book
'we had with us was first torn up and then thrown into the
'sea, just before our machine turned over.'
Not often have words so bald been used to cover a tale
of comparable endurance. All that the pilot and his
observer had to eat during the five days and nights they
were clinging to the float of the wrecked seaplane were
a few malted milk tablets. One of the pigeons which were
released was never seen again, but the other fell exhausted
on the deck of a mine-sweeping trawler and, after being
succoured, was released once more and eventually found
its way to its loft at Westgate.^ From the pilot's report
it will be seen that about sunset on the 25th, that is on
the second day, six seaplanes appeared over the castaways,
answered their distress signals by firing a green light, and
passed on without further action. As is told below, German
aeroplanes bombed Folkestone in the late afternoon of
the 25th, and many aircraft went up in pursuit. It is
known also that German seaplanes from the Belgian coast
stations were active. There is no record, however, of any
British formation such as is described in the pilot's quoted
report, and it is unlikely that the seaplanes were German.
There are recorded instances when German pilots risked
their lives to rescue British airmen in peril on the North
Sea, but none when they callously left them to their fate.
^ There is no record that any action was taken on receipt of the message.
It was, apparently, on the third day that the pigeon flew in, and that so
much time had elapsed, coupled with the fact that the weather was very
misty, probably made it appear that a search would entail risk with no
chance of success.
1917] A GALLANT RESCUE 17
It is not impossible that the seaplanes were a phantom
Flight, created from the stuff of the hopes and sufferings
of the two airmen.
The story of the rescue maintains the note of drama.
For some days fog had shrouded the East Coast air stations.
About II a.m. on the 29th the mist at Fehxstowe began
to lift, and two flying-boats were ordered to be ready to
make a routine patrol in search of German submarines.
They left soon after midday, but they had not long gone
out when the fog began to descend again. One of the
flying-boat pilots turned back, but the other continued
for a time until, beyond the North Hinder light vessel,
the fog had become so dense that he decided to return.
In this flying-boat were Flight Sub-Lieutenants J. L.
Gordon and G. R. Hodgson, Leading Mechanic S. F.
Anderson, and W/T Operator B. W. Millichamp. Through
a break in the fog on the homeward journey, at 1.30 p.m.,
an object was sighted on the water twelve miles west of
the North Hinder. The report of the two officers says:
*Came down to 600 ft., circled around, and observed it to
*be two people on upturned "Short" float. Then brought
'in aerial and descended to 50 ft. Flew directly over them
'and observed that they were urgently in need of assistance.
'Then ascended to 1,000 ft., wirelessed position and that
'we were about to land to pick up crew of wrecked plane.
'Also dropped three of the bombs: the fourth one hung
'up. Landed close by and on second attempt succeeded
'in getting pilot and observer aboard by taxying directly
'up to them and catching them on drift wires close to
'nose of boat. Made two attempts to take off, but was
'unable to do so on account of heavy sea. On second
'attempt smashed tail plane and starboard wing float.
'Taxied 280° and picked up Inner Gabbard buoy at 4.10
'p.m. Tail of boat was leaking badly and shipping con-
'siderable water over bows. Altered course to 300"^.
'Made Channel 3 miles S. of Shipwash at 5.30 p.m.
'Tail of machine was full of water so made distress signal
'and was taken in tow by Orient of Leith which was bound
'for Yarmouth. Transferred 30 minutes later to two
'armed drifters. H.M.S. White Lilac took rescued pilot
2504.5 c
i8 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'and observer aboard, also Flight Sub-Lieutenant Hodgson,
'Leading Mechanic Anderson, and Wireless Telegraphy
'Operator Millichamp, while H.M.S. Maratina took
'seaplane in tow, also Flight Sub-Lieutenant Gordon
'aboard. White Lilac arrived Felixstowe 9.30 p.m.
^Maratina 12.30 a.m.'
The Daylight Aeroplane Raids^
In 191 7, up to the date of the Zeppelin raid on the
23rd/24th of May, there had been no more than spasmodic
attacks by heavier-than-air craft. An aeroplane had
bombed Broadstairs in the ist of March, another West-
gate on the 1 6th, another Dover on the 17th, and a
seaplane had attacked Broadstairs again on the 5th of
April. Soon after midnight on the 6th/7th of May an
aeroplane had appeared over London and had dropped
five bombs between Hackney and HoUoway, but this
attack, like the others, was of the 'tip-and-run' kind to
which we had become accustomed. In the afternoon of the
25th of May, however, the day after the night-raiding
Zeppelins had struggled homeward across the North Sea,
a squadron of bombing aeroplanes appeared against the
sky to create a new anxiety.
The story of the development of this bombing squadron
must be told. It will be recalled that a military aeroplane
unit, to be used for the bombing of England, had been
formed near Ostend in November 1914.^ The Germans
hoped at the time that Calais would become available as
a base from which the unit could operate, but as Calais
was never captured, and because the technical qualities
of the contemporary aeroplanes did not permit of effective
operations being made against England from a Belgian
base, the squadron had been moved to Metz in the spring
of 1915. This squadron, which to conceal its purpose had
originally been called the 'Ostend Carrier-Pigeon Squad-
^ Information, from the German side, of the aeroplane attacks on
England is contained in a series of authentic articles which appeared in
Die Luftzvacht, Nos. 5 to 8 (May to August), 1927. The author was Major
Freiherr von Biilow. For a statistical summary of aeroplane raids 1917-18,
see Appendix I, Table B. 2 Vol. Ill, pp. 88-9.
I9I7] THE GOTHA BOMBERS 19
'ron', served for a brief time on the Eastern front and then
became the parent squadron of various units, including
the 'Metz Carrier-Pigeon Squadron'. In July 1915 the
'Ostend Carrier-Pigeon Squadron' was reconstituted at
its original aerodrome at Ghistelles, the duties assigned
to it being bombing, patrol work, and the provision of
escorts for Zeppelins returning from attacks on England.
In December 1915 the squadron was renamed Battle
Squadron No. i, and its establishment was laid down as
six Flights of six aeroplanes each. It operated under the
directions of German General Head-quarters (OHL)^
which intended to use the squadron for attacks on England
as soon as suitable aeroplanes became available, but in
the heavy fighting on the Western front which took place
in 19 16 this intention was forgotten. Between February
and June the squadron operated on the Verdun front and,
during July and August, in the Somme area. At the end
of August 191 6, the squadron was reorganized. Half
(Flights I, 4, and 6) remained on the Somme front, while
the remainder (Flights 2, 3, and 5) went to Romania and,
later, appeared on the Salonika front. It was the half-
squadron left behind on the Somme which, with picked
personnel, ultimately became the Englandgeschwader
(Bombing Squadron No. 3). The unit which went to
Romania retained its identity as Bombing Squadron No. i
up to the end of the war. It left the Salonika front for
Belgium in May 191 7 and began a bombing campaign
against the Allied back areas on the Western front.
It was the production of the twin-engined Gotha
(type G.IV) in the autumn of 1916, when the Hmitations
of the Zeppelin as a raiding weapon were becoming clear,
which brought the question of bombing England by
aeroplane within the realm of practical discussion. The
G.IV was a biplane of 75 feet wing span and 42 feet in
length. It was fitted with two Mercedes engines of 260 horse-
power driving pusher airscrews, carried a crew of three,
and was armed with three machine guns, one of which
could fire through a 'tunnel' to attack fighting aeroplanes
^ The Squadron was usually known as Bogohl i. {Bombengeschwader
Oherste Heeresleitting.)
20 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
coming up under the tail. Six 50-kg. bombs could be
carried, hy day, and it was said that, so loaded, the Gotha
had a ceiling of 18,000 feet, to which it could climb in one
hour. Actually the greatest height reached, on the first
daylight attack, was a little over 16,000 ft. Its speed was
stated to be, in still air, about 80 miles per hour. For
night attacks, when a lower ceiling, say about 10,000 feet,
sufficed, a greater load of bombs, up to a total of about
500-kg., could be carried.
The general officer commanding the German military
air service, in a memorandum issued in the autumn of
1916, said: 'Since an airship raid on London has become
'impossible, the air service is required to make a raid with
'aeroplanes as soon as practicable', and he went on to
point out that thirty aeroplanes of the Gotha G.IV type
would be ready by the 1st of February 191 7. Eighteen
aeroplanes could carry as great a weight of bombs as three
airships, and, 'so far', he said, 'three airships have never
reached London simultaneously'.^
The preparations for the new campaign, which were
very detailed, were covered by the code word Tilrken-
kreuz. The squadron was commanded by Hauptmann
Brandenburg and - its aerodromes were at St. Denis
Westrem (Flights 13 and 14) and Gontrode (Head-
quarters and Flights 15 and 16).^ The squadron ex-
perienced difficulties in some of the details of preparation,
which included liaison with the navy and with the
Flanders naval air units, organization of a meteorological
service and of a carrier-pigeon station, choice of targets,
and the settlement of questions of formation flying, tactics,
routes, maps, &c. There were other delays due to supply
and technical troubles, but by the middle of May 19 17
the squadron was at last ready to take advantage of the first
favourable weather opportunity to begin its campaign.
Map 10 About 5 p.m. on the 25th of May the squadron, flying
' Die Luftwacht, May 1927.
^ The designation of the squadron was changed from half-squadron
No. I to Heavy Bomber Squadron No. 3 in March. FHghts i, 4, and 6
became 13, 14, and 15. Another FHght, 16, was formed at once, and the
squadron was completed by two more Flights, 17 and 18, in July.
1917] THE ATTACK ON FOLKESTONE 21
very liigh, crossed the coast of Essex between the estuaries
of the Crouch and the Blackwater. It is of interest that
many people thought, because of the loud hum of the
engines, that Zeppehns were about, and some competent
observers reported that they had seen one or two airships
in company with the aeroplanes. There were dense clouds
over fissex and observation was, therefore, difficult. It
was because of the cloud banks that the squadron did not
continue to London, which was the objective, but turned
off instead across the Thames at Gravesend and, passing
over Kent west of Maidstone and Ashford, went out at
Folkestone about 6.30 p.m. The strength of the bombing
squadron was twenty-one aeroplanes (from British obser-
vation at the time the number was put at a probable
eighteen), and they were described as coming in 'more
or less in a line'. After crossing the Thames they seem
to have changed into some sort of group formation, and
two groups, some distance apart, were confidently re-
ported near Lympne. So far as can be stated 59 bombs
of 50-kg. weight and 104 of ip-kg. were dropped, but
27 of the bombs failed to explode and a few others burst
in the air. Shorncliffe and Folkestone which, for some
unexplained reason, had received no warning of the
presence of enemy aircraft over this country even though
Dover had reported the approach of the bombers
an hour and a half earlier, suffered most. Bombs on
Shorncliffe camp and on Cheriton killed seventeen
Canadian soldiers and wounded ninety-three, while the
casualties at Folkestone were 16 men (one soldier), 31
women and 25 children killed, and 31 men (8 soldiers),
48 women, and 12 children injured. A majority of the
casualties occurred in a crowded thoroughfare near the
harbour (Tontine Street) where shoppers had congre-
gated to make their Whitsun hoHday purchases. ^ Houses
I The Chief Constable of Folkestone, in his evidence at the inquest on
the victims of the raid, referring to his visit to Tontine Street, said: 'I saw
'an appalHng sight which I shall never forget. Dead and injured persons
'were lying on the ground. Three or four horses were also lying dead
'between the shafts of vehicles, and fire had broken out in front of premises
'which had been demolished.'
22 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
and shops, two schools, and the Central Station were
damaged. The total casualties for the raid were 95 killed
and 195 injured.
There were many gallant, but mainly abortive attempts
by pilots of the Royal Naval Air Service and of the Royal
Flying Corps to intercept the raiders. Thirty-seven pilots
from each service went up from various aerodromes, but
few of them had aircraft capable of reaching the height
at which the German squadron flew, nor was there any
attempt at co-ordinated flying, and such encounters as
there were were single-handed affairs. Flight Lieutenant
R. F. S. Leslie from Dover pursued the Gothas over the
Channel and fired 150 rounds into one of them before he
was driven off. Fighting pilots from Dunkirk intercepted
some of the raiders on the homeward journey and they
reported that in the subsequent fighting they destroyed
one Gotha and damaged another. According to German
sources of information the losses were one Gotha destroyed
in the Channel and another which, for some unknown
reason, crashed in Belgium on its return. There is evidence
also that one Gotha which made a safe landing had suffered
damage by gun-fire.
This daylight attack revealed the utter inadequacy of
the existing aeroplane defence measures. Deep feeling
was aroused throughout the country, and protest meetings
were held in Folkestone calling upon the Government
to take steps to prevent a repetition of the attack.^
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff called a confer-
^ The jury which sat upon the inquest of the Folkestone victims publicly
expressed their regret that the competent authority did not give notice
of the approach of the aircraft and recorded their opinion that in future
the town should be warned of any such approach by siren or other device.
A crowded meeting of townsmen unanimously passed the following resolu-
tion: 'The residents of the Borough of Folkestone demand that theGovern-
'ment be asked immediately to hold an inquiry into the air raid on Friday
'last, May 25tli. We ask how it was possible for a large number of hostile
'aircraft to attack the town in broad daylight, inflicting appalling loss of life
'and damage to property, and if the military authorities had knowledge
'of an impending attack why no warning was given, so that people could
'return home and take cover: and that the Government be urged to take
'such steps as will prevent further attacks of a similar nature and the whole-
'sale murder of women and children of the town.'
1917] DEFENCE MEASURES REVIEWED 23
ence 'to consider and report upon the question of the
'defence of the United Kingdom against attack by aero-
'planes, with special reference to the measures necessary
'to secure effective co-operation between naval and
'niihtary ^ forces, the organization of communications,
'distribution of information and the allotment of air
'forces'. As a result of the conference it was concluded
that, assuming a radius of action for the Gothas of 125
miles, the vulnerable area was bounded by the coast Hne
from Southwold to Rottingdean, and by a Hne connecting
the two places through Bury St. Edmunds and Brentford.
The report of the conference recommended that the
distribution of information about the movements of
hostile aeroplanes should be speeded up, that trained
anti-aircraft observers should be employed on lightships,
and that the aeroplane patrol east of Woolwich should
be strengthened. As a result, twenty-four non-commis-
sioned officers and men were withdrawn from anti-aircraft
batteries in France and were distributed among seven
lightships in the Thames Estuary and off the East Coast.
They were dressed in the same uniforms as the lightships'
crews and had orders to convey information by telephone.
It was stated in the report of the conference that at the
time of the daylight raid no more than twenty-two regular
defence aeroplanes were available in the area attacked, but
that arrangements were being made to reinforce the
aeroplanes within the vulnerable area. Squadrons of the
Training Brigade were being moved into the area, and,
in addition, Orfordness and Martlesham Heath Experi-
mental Stations were being organized for the protection
of Essex north of the river Blackwater. A point raised
at the conference by Sir David Henderson, director-
general of military aeronautics, deserves notice. He was
of the opinion, he stated, that the question of communi-
cating with pilots in the air by wireless should be con-
sidered, more particularly as ground signals had proved
ineffective. He was precluded from making experiments
or training personnel because the Admiralty objected
that the use of wireless for this purpose might jam the
Fleet communications. The Admiralty representatives
24 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
at the conference upheld this objection, but it was eventu-
ally decided that the question should be deferred for
separate discussion.
The conference, in spite of its wide terms of reference,
did not go very far towards improving what was, from
any point of view, an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Nor
was the problem of defence against night attacks, whether
by Zeppelins or aeroplanes, in any better state. Two
night-flying squadrons were to be formed in July (No. loi)
and August (No. 102) for service in France, and Colonel
T. C. R. Higgins, commanding the Home Defence Group,
pointed out in a letter to the director of air organization,
on the 1st of June, some of the effects. He stated that
since the ist of February 191 7, 77 trained night-flying
pilots had been withdrawn from the Home Defence
Group, leaving only 107 trained pilots as compared with
an establishment of 198. Furthermore, there had been
for some time a deficiency of one-third in various impor-
tant trades, and, although men had recently been posted
to the squadrons, there had been little time to train them.
If 420 trained men were taken away in July and August
to form Nos. loi and 102 Squadrons, there would be a
reduced proportion of trained mechanics in all home-
defence squadrons. To give time for officers and men
to be trained, so that the duties of the Home Defence
Group might be continued with reasonable efficiency.
Colonel Higgins stated his opinion that the formation of
No.ioi Squadron should be postponed until August and
of No. 102 until October. Lord French forwarded a copy
of this letter to the Secretary, War Office, and, in a
covering letter dated the 5th of June, stated that the
further depletion of the home-defence squadrons would
place the aeroplane defence of the United Kingdom in
a still more unsatisfactory position than it was when he
made representations on the subject on the 20th of March.
'The impracticability', he said, 'of securing adequate
'aeroplane home defence by relying on such machines and
'pilots as happen to be at any given time available at Training
'Squadrons was recognized by the formation of the Home
'Defence Wing over a year ago. Various demands have
I9I7] ANOTHER BOMBING ATTACK 25
'been, and are being made for the supply of machines,
'pilots, and other personnel from the Home Defence
'Squadrons for overseas, and the object with which the
'Home Defence Wing was originally constituted appears
'in danger of being lost sight of He went on to say that
there were only 75 aeroplanes available for night flying,
and ended: 'I cannot too strongly impress on the Army
'Council my opinion that the means placed at my disposal
'for aeroplane defence are now inadequate and that a con-
'tinuance of the present poHcy may have disastrous
'results.'
On the day that Lord French wrote his letter the Map
German bombing squadron effectively reinforced a part
of his argument. About 6.5 p.m. on the 5th of June
twenty-two Gothas came in along the same route as on
the 25th of May, but, instead of making towards London,
they turned south and attacked Shoeburyness and Sheer-
ness and places in the neighbourhood. At the former town
about 27 bombs were dropped, but most of them fell on
the beach or on waste land while a few exploded in the air;
the casualties were two soldiers killed. At Sheerness the
bombing was much more severe in its effect. Although
the attack on the town lasted no more than five minutes,
it resulted in the death of 1 1 people (only three of them
civilians) and in injury to 34 (25 soldiers). The material
damage was not heavy, but this was mainly because bombs
which hit important targets failed to explode. Eight anti-
aircraft guns (3 -inch 20 cwt.) at Sheerness and Shoebury-
ness fired 504 rounds of ammunition and one of the Gothas
was, as a result, shot down in the sea north of Barton's
Point. Two prisoners were taken off the Gotha, which
sank, but was afterwards raised. Sixty-six pilots went up
in England to fight the raiders and five got near enough
to deliver brief but ineffective attacks. As the Gothas
approached Belgium on their return they were intercepted
by ten naval pilots from Dunkirk and there was a running
fight during which it seemed as though two of the bombers
crashed, but the German records make no reference to
losses other than the one Gotha destroyed near Barton's
Point.
26 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
^he First Daylight Attack on London^
An important result of the above attack was the cancel-
lation, made verbally on the 7th of June, of the order of
the 7th of March which prohibited anti-aircraft guns,
outside specified coastal areas, from opening fire on enemy
aeroplanes. The scheme of gun-fire, prepared by the
Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander in anticipation that
the order might be cancelled, was at once issued, in time
to be used during the first of the daylight attacks on
London. The morning of Wednesday the 13th of June
was fine, but there was a fair amount of haze. At 10.43 a.m.
a hostile aeroplane was seen approaching Margate and,
within a few minutes, had passed across the town and
had dropped five bombs, two of which failed to explode :
the others injured four civilians, but caused only slight
damage. Meanwhile the main formation, from which
the Margate raider had detached itself, had continued
across the Thames Estuary, and at 10.50 a.m. approached
Foulness Island. At that place three more aeroplanes
appear to have left the main formation, and these
shaped course for Shoeburyness, where two of them
dropped six bombs which slightly injured two civihans
but caused no damage.^ The third flew up the Thames
to Greenwich. The main body of the raiders, number-
ing fourteen Gothas, after making the mouth of the
Crouch at 10.50 a.m., steered a direct course for London.
The noise of their engines was heard in many places ten
minutes before the aeroplanes came in sight. The forma-
tion kept during the approach to London was of a diamond
shape with three Gothas forming a point in front and
three similarly disposed in rear (see diagram, p. 27). The
attack on the capital began at 11.35 ^'^'^ ftiU
details of the bombs dropped and of the casualties and
damage they caused will be found in Appendix III.^ The
* For statistics of raids on the County of London, 1917-18, see
Appendix II.
2 Billow says that four Gothas turned back with engine trouble. It was
one of these which attacked Margate.
3 The order lake Air Raid Action was given to District 48 (London) at
11.21 a.m. See also map, p. 25.
I9I7] THE JUNE RAID ON LONDON 27
first group of bombs fell between East Ham and the Royal
Albert Docks, the second group in the city with Liverpool
Street station as the central point, a third in Southwark,
and a fourth in Dalston. The raiders appear to have begun
bombing in two separate formations which converged for
the main attack on the City, w^here, in two minutes,
seventy-two bombs fell within a radius of a mile from
Liverpool Street station. The total casualties were 162
killed and 432 injured, the greatest inflicted in any one
bombing attack on England during the war.^ The most
tragic happening of the morning took place in Upper
North Street Schools at Poplar. A bomb of 50-kg. weight
passed through the roof and three floors of the school to
the ground floor. In its passage through the building,
during which two children were killed, half of the bomb
was torn away, but the remainder exploded among 64
children. Sixteen of them were killed and thirty more,
together with two men and two women, were injured.
Another bomb, of similar weight, which passed through
the five floors of the Cowper Street Foundation School,
City Road, failed to explode.
The German leader of the raid, Hauptmann Branden-
burg, in his report of the attack says : ^London was reached
'by seventeen aeroplanes. The visibility was exceptionally
'good. With perfect clearness, the Thames Bridges, the
'railway stations, the city, even the Bank of England,
* A police return shows that of the 59 persons killed and 95 injured
within the City of London, 25 were killed and 41 injured in the streets.
28 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'could be recognized. The anti-aircraft fire over London
'was not particularly strong and was badly directed. Many
'enemy fighting aeroplanes had, meanwhile, nearly reached
'the height of the squadron. In all, sixteen enemy aircraft,
'which flew independently, were counted. The number
'which ascended may be rightly estimated about thirty.
'Only one of them attacked. Our aircraft circled round
'and dropped their bombs with no hurry or trouble.
'According to our observation, a station in the City, and
'a Thames bridge, probably Tower Bridge, were hit. Of
'all our bombs it can be said that the majority fell among
'the Docks, and among the city warehouses. The effect
'must have been great. After the bombs had been thrown
'the squadron closed formation again. The aeroplanes,
'lightened of the loads, flew well, and the pursuing enemy
'aircraft gave up at the coast. All the aeroplanes landed
'safely on their aerodrome.' ^
Seaplanes and aeroplanes went up from coast stations,
from acceptance parks, depots, experimental stations, and
training squadrons, as well as from the home defence
squadrons. In all, 92 pilots ascended in England, but they
flew as individuals. Most of them never saw the enemy,
but a few got within firing range and attacked unhesitat-
ingly. Captain C. H. C. Keevil, the observer in a Bristol
Fighter of No. 35 Training Squadron which abortively
attacked three Gothas 'straggling over Ilford', was killed
during the combat.
This raid stirred the country. The main feeling was one
of indignation. Innumerable people had been attracted
to their doors and gardens and into the streets on that
pleasant morning to see what concourse of aircraft was
making such an impressive noise. Many of the spectators
had watched the passage of the German squadron and
had turned to look at other aeroplanes climbing upwards
in various quarters of the sky, curious to know what the
bother was about. At first they had had no thought, or if
a doubt touched their minds they dismissed it as absurd,
that this might be an enemy bombing formation. But
afterwards they had heard the bursting of anti-aircraft
^ Quoted in Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft (Hoeppner), pp. 111-12.
I9I7] DOUBLING THE AIR SERVICES 29
shells, the occasional rattle of machine-gun fire in the air,
and, great numbers of them, the explosion of the bombs.
The War Cabinet met the same afternoon to consider
the reports of the raid, and again the following day to
discuss the details of the action which should be taken.
At the second meeting the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff urged that there should be a large-scale increase in
the number of our aeroplanes, even at the expense of
other weapons. The War Cabinet agreed with Sir William
Robertson, in principle, and decided that the departments
concerned should confer together to draw up a scheme
for the expansion of the air services. Various memoranda
were prepared, and after the preliminaries had been
explored departmentally, a general conference was held
at the War Office, under the chairmanship of Lord Derby,
on the 2 1 St of June. Lord Derby began by saying that
the War Office proposed to double the Royal Flying
Corps, even if it proved necessary in consequence to
reduce the supply of tanks and of motor transport. The
conference discussed this proposition and contingent
matters, and the statement of the decisions reached was
considered by the War Cabinet on the 2nd of July. In
the scheme put forward sanction was asked 'for an increase
'to commence at once, of the establishment of the Royal
'Flying Corps from 108 to 200 service squadrons, with the
'necessary aerodromes and establishment, and for a pro-
'gressive increase in the output of aero engines to 4,500
'a month, including certain supplies from overseas'. The
scheme was approved by the War Cabinet, and the
approval noted also that there should be a 'corresponding
'expansion and increase of the Royal Naval Air Service'.
This decision of the Government that the air services
must be doubled was one of outstanding importance which
was to have many repercussions. Meanwhile, as a tempo-
rary measure, the War Cabinet discussed the desirability
of making a raid on some town in Germany such as
Mannheim, and of bringing fighting squadrons over from
the Western front to give the bombers, if they came again,
a warm reception which would take them by surprise. ^ It
happened that Sir Douglas Haig was about to pay a visit
30 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
home to talk over with the Government his plans for the
Flanders offensive. He was informed, on the 15 th of June,
that the subject of the air raids on London would also
come up for discussion, and he therefore asked Major-
General Trenchard to put forward the views of the
Royal Flying Corps. These were set out in a memorandum
dated the 15th of June and, next day, a General Head-
quarters memorandum, based on that of Major-General
Trenchard, was prepared as follows:^
The capture by us of the Belgian coast would be
'the most effective step of all, as, in addition to increasing
'the distance to be traversed, it would force the German
'machines either to cross territory occupied by us — when
'going and returning — a considerable advantage to us —
'or to cross neutral territory, where our Secret Service
'could doubtless establish means of giving us warning
'quickly.
'2. The next most effective step is to inflict the utmost
'damage on the enemy's sheds and machines behind his
'Western front. Much has been done in this way. The
'amount which can be done is limited by the number and
'capacity of machines and pilots available in France.
'Increased activity on the Western front serves the double
'purpose of assisting the Armies in overcoming the enemy
'and at the same time reducing his power to send expedi-
'tions to England. To the Germans this reply would be
'most disappointing.
'3. Any system of patrols would entail the use of a
'great number of machines and pilots. To justify any
'hope of such a system being effective (except by sheer
'luck) the number of machines and pilots required would
'be entirely beyond our present power of supply. The
'great object the enemy has in view is undoubtedly to
^weaken us in France, and if we adopt a patrol system we
'play his game.
'4. As a temporary measure a modified system of patrols
'might be tried, working on both sides of the Channel.
'To give this its best chance of success an extensive system
^ Major-General Trenchard's original memorandum is, as a matter of
interest, reprinted as Appendix IV.
I9I7] VIEWS OF SIR DOUGLAS HAIG 31
^of communications, by wireless and other means, would
*be required ; and it is essential that there should be unity
*of command over the whole system of patrols and com-
*munications. A competent officer could be supplied from
'France for a short period, but both he and machines and
'pilots sent from France will be urgently required to be
'back there by the 5th July.
'5. Reprisals on open towns are repugnant to British
'ideas, but we may be forced to adopt them. It would be
'worse than useless to do so, however, unless we are
'determined that, once adopted, they will be carried
'through to the end. The enemy would almost certainly
'reply "in kind" and unless we are determined and prepared
'to go one better than the Germans, whatever they may
'do and whether their reply is in the air, or against our
'prisoners, or otherwise, it will be infinitely better not
'to attempt reprisals at all. At present we are not prepared
'to carry out reprisals effectively, being unprovided with
'suitable machines. If we decide to provide the necessary
'machines and to adopt the system, we might do good by
'sending out machines now to drop notices in selected
'German towns warning them of our intention if the raids
'on our open towns continue, and pointing out that their
'towns are within our reach. We should not do this,
'however, unless we intend, and are able, to keep our
'word. We might, however, drop notices pointing out
'that they are mistaken in thinking they are not within
'our reach, and although we have heretofore refrained
'from the brutalities of which their Government has been
'guilty it is not owing to lack of power to exact reprisals.'
Sir Douglas Haig paid his visit to London on the 17th
of June and, at the special request of the Government,
he was accompanied by Major-General Trenchard. They
attended a meeting of the Cabinet committee on war
policy on the 20th and, verbally, reinforced the views set
out in the memorandum. As a result the Government
decided to adopt the suggestion that fighting patrols be
tried temporarily on both sides of the Dover Straits.
Sir Douglas Haig was instructed to send one squadron
home from France and to move another to Calais. No.
32 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
56 (S.E.5) Squadron flew to Bekesbourne, near Canter-
bury, on the 2 1st of June, and No. 66 (Sopwith Tup')
Squadron to Calais. These squadrons were withdrawn
from the General Head-quarters Wing in France and their
absence was markedly felt.^ On the 5th and 6th of July,
after an uneventful fortnight, the squadrons rejoined the
British Expeditionary Force : within some hours of their
arrival on their aerodromes in France twenty-two German
bombers were flying over London.
A Zeppelin Interlude
Map 3 Meanwhile there had been two minor attacks on the
eastern counties, one by airships and one by aeroplanes.
In the afternoon of the i6th of June, four Zeppelins left
the north German sheds to bomb England. Owing to
the shortness of the night, with no more than four hours
of darkness, it was obvious that the airships under the
most favourable conditions would be unable to penetrate
very far inland. It happened that they encountered head
winds, and only two crossed the coast. The L.42 (Kapitan-
leutnant Martin Dietrich) came in over the North Fore-
land at 2.5 a.m. and bombed Ramsgate, Manston, and
Garlinge. The third bomb from the airship exploded
a naval ammunition store near the Clock Tower in
Ramsgate Harbour and great military damage was caused.^
The buildings of the naval base were destroyed and many
thousands of windows throughout the town were shattered
by the series of explosions. Two men and a woman were
killed and seven men, seven women, and two children
were injured. Of the seven men injured, one was a naval
rating, one a Lieutenant, Royal Flying Corps, and one
a policeman. It is of interest that the underside of the
L,42 was painted black and she could be seen only
faintly when held in the beams of the searchlights. One
of the many naval pilots who ascended. Flight Sub-
Lieutenant G. H. Bittles, in a seaplane, engaged her at
^ See Vol. IV, pp. 134-5.
2 The bomb was of 660-lb. weight. Dietrich, in his report, says it caused
a giant explosion which was later followed by other explosions. He was
under the impression that his attack was made on Dover.
1917] END OF THE L.48 33
11,000 feet when she was thirty miles east of Lowestoft,
but her nose went up rapidly and the seaplane was soon
outdistanced. Flight Lieutenant E. Cadbury, in a Sop-
with Tup', would possibly have claimed the L.42 as a
victim if he had not had bad luck. As she cHmbed away
from the seaplane, FHght Lieutenant Cadbury was gaining
height and he caught up with her at 15,000 feet and at
once attacked. Dietrich knew that his only hope was to
go still higher and he climbed on, unaware that the pursu-
ing aeroplane was a Sopwith Tup' which was capable of
overtaking him. At the critical moment, however, the
Tup' refused to chmb because of a petrol-pipe fracture,
and the at 16,000 feet, found herself alone and out
of harm's way and, although a flying-boat took up the
chase and followed her for ninety minutes, she had no
difliculty in maintaining her lead.
The L.48 (Kapitanleutnant Eichler), the flagship of the
raiding squadron, in which was travelling Korvetten-
kapitan Victor Schiitze, the commodore of the North Sea
airship division, was first seen about forty miles north-east
of Harwich at 11.34 P-^- cruised about for some
time and it was not until 2 a.m. that she crossed the coast
south of Orfordness. After circHng over Suffolk, apparently
trying to pick up her bearings, she bore down on Harwich,
but was turned back across the river Deben by accurate
anti-aircraft gun-fire, and she then made off north-east-
wards. The night was exceptionally clear, and although
the height of the L.48 when she was near Harwich was
estimated at 16,000 feet, she could be seen as she moved
across the sky. At 3.28 a.m. at Theberton, north-east of
Saxmundham, she met her end. She was attacked simul-
taneously by Captain R. H. M. S. Saundby, Royal Flying
Corps, in a D.H.2 of the Orfordness Experimental
Station, and by Lieutenant L. P. Watkins, Canadian
Army attached to No. 37 Home Defence Squadron, in a
B.E.I 2. The final blow was delivered by the latter officer
and the L.48, in flames, descended slowly into a field at
Holly Tree Farm.^
^ The report of Lieutenant Watkins reads: 'On the morning of the
*i7th June 1 91 7 I was told hy Major Hargrave there was a ZeppeHn in
34 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
The second in command of the airship, Leutnant zur
See Mieth, gravely hurt, was rescued from the blazing
ship hy a local constable, and two men, one of them
seriously injured, were also rescued. Kapitanleutnant
Eichler had jumped from the burning ship with four of
his crew, and they had been killed instantly. Leutnant
Mieth stated that between 12.30 a.m. and 2 a.m. the L.48
had been out of action because of engine trouble, and he
further stated that the ship had not, as had been thought,
been hit by anti-aircraft gun-fire near Harwich. A tribute
must be paid to the bravery and persistence of the com-
mander and of his crew who, in spite of engine trouble,
and the clear visibility which favoured the defence, en-
deavoured to fulfil their orders and gave their lives in
the attempt.^ About twenty-four bombs came from the
L.48 during her passage over Suffolk, but they fell in
fields and did no damage.
The Daylight Campaign Resumed
There was quiet over England until the 4th of July,
when the German bombing squadron made a brief
appearance at Harwich. At 6.55 a.m. sounds of aircraft
were heard out to sea from Orfordness and, five minutes
later, the bombing squadron, about eighteen strong,
crossed at Shingle Street. It happened that Captain
J. Palethorpe, Royal Flying Corps, from the testing
*the vicinity of Harwich, and was ordered to go up on B.E.12. 6610. I
'climbed to 8,000 feet over the aerodrome, then struck off in the direction
'of Harwich still climbing when at 11,000 feet over Harwich I saw the
'A.A. guns firing and several searchlights pointing towards the same spot.
'A minute later I observed the Zeppelin about 2,000 feet above me. After
'climbing about 500 feet I fired one drum into its tail, but it took no effect.
*I then climbed to 12,000 feet and fired another drum into its tail without
'any effect. I then decided to wait until I was at close range before firing
'another drum; I then climbed steadily until I reached 13,200 feet and
'was then about 500 feet under the Zeppelin. I fired three short bursts of
'about 7 rounds and then the remainder of the drum. The Zeppehn burst
'into flames at the tail, the fire running along both sides; the whole Zep-
'pelin caught fire and fell burning.'
^ It was over the grave of the crew of the L.48 that the Royal Flying
Corps had inscribed the text: 'Who art thou that judgest another man's
'servant. To his own master he standeth or falleth.'
1917] AEROPLANE BOMBING RESUMED 35
squadron at Martlesham Heath, was in the air in a D.H.4
when the German squadron appeared. He attacked at
once, but his passenger. Air Mechanic J. O. Jessop, was
shot through the heart, and the pilot had to break off
the fight and land. The bombing formation, which had,
meanwhile, altered course, steered for Felixstowe, where
it seems to have divided into two detachments, one of
which attacked Felixstowe and the other Harwich. The
clouds, however, were thick, and the movements of the
raiders were difficult to follow. According to our estimates
sixty-five bombs were dropped and twenty-three of them
fell in the water in Harwich Harbour, off Dovercourt, and
off Felixstowe. Harwich suffered no damage, but at the
Royal Naval Air Station at Felixstowe, where only two
i2-kg. bombs fell, the damage was considerable. Six naval
ratings and three civilian workmen were killed and eigh-
teen ratings and one workman injured. A flying-boat was
destroyed by fire and another damaged, and the telephone
system was put out of action. Two bombs, also of 12-kg.
weight, which fell near a camp of the 3rd Suffolks, killed
five soldiers and wounded ten. Four more bombs, dropped
near the balloon station at Shotley, inflicted no damage,
but killed three naval ratings.
The anti-aircraft guns of the Harwich defences were
in action for nineteen minutes and fired 135 rounds, but
the target was a difficult one and no hits were made. As
the bombing squadron did not come inland the task of
the defence pilots was almost hopeless, and none of the
eighty-three who ascended from various squadrons and
parks in Essex found the enemy. For an attack of this
kind the air stations on the north French coast were
better placed than those in England for interception of the
raiders. No. 66 Squadron, waiting at Calais for just such
an opportunity, was, through some unexplained muddle
in communications, kept on the ground while the Ger-
man bombing formation was making its way home within
easy distance. When the warning did reach the squadron
eighteen aeroplanes were sent away, at 8.20 a.m., but it
was then too late and the pilots searched in vain until they
were compelled to turn back by bad weather. Twenty
36 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
naval pilots from Dunkirk were in the air some time before
those of No. 66 Squadron, and five of them, in Sopwith
'Camels', found and attacked sixteen bombers about
8.30 a.m. They reported that they had shot one down in
flames, but the German records do not show any Gothas
lost on this day.
Then, on Saturday the 7th of July, after Nos. 56 and
66 Squadrons had rejoined the Royal Flying Corps in the
field, came the second daylight attack on London. The
morning was fine with a layer of stratus cloud high above
London and a somewhat hazy atmosphere. The enemy
bombers were first located well out to sea at 9.14 a.m.
About fifteen minutes later one Gotha dropped three
bombs on Margate, one of which wrecked two houses,
killing two women and a man, and injuring two women
and a child. It was thought at the time that the attack
on Margate had possibly been made as a diversion to draw
the attention of the defence aeroplanes away from the
main formation, but it is now known that the bombing
was done by a Gotha which had developed defects and had
turned for home. The main squadron, numbering twenty-
one, crossed the coast near the mouth of the Crouch
about 9.45 a.m., in diamond formation, and, dogged by
anti-aircraft gun-fire, kept a course direct for London.
They came into the capital from the north and north-
west and, clearly outlined to the people in the streets and
at their windows, passed across the City and the East End,
dropping bombs as they went. The total casualties were
54 killed and 190 injured, including 10 killed and 55
injured by anti-aircraft gun-fire, as set out, with the
damage caused, in Appendix V.^
The raid once again demonstrated the futility of an
unorganized defence. Seventy-eight pilots of the Royal
Flying Corps and seventeen from the Royal Naval Air
Service took the air from home defence and training
squadrons, from acceptance parks, and from coast stations.
The aeroplanes flown by the Flying Corps pilots were of
twenty-one types, many of them of little fighting value,
but thirty were efficient contemporary fighters ('Camels',
^ See also map facing.
Approximate position of Exploded bombs • i
„ Unexpioded „ o
WE A THBR :
Light easterly wind. Very little eloud.
STRENGTH OF RAIDING SQUADRON :
22 Gotha aeroplanes.
iOMBS : 65.
(In addition, 4 bombs were dropped
near Tottenham gasworks, 2
near Ferry Road, Edmonton, one
in a field at Ching/ord, one
at Ponders End sewage farm
and 3 on Margate!.
ipASUALTIES :
54 killed and 190 injured.
(In addition, there were 3 killed
and 3 injured at Margate).
MONETARY DAMAGE :
London— £205,022. Margate— £600.
Daylight Aeroplane Attack on London,
7th July, 1917.
1917] THE JULY RAID ON LONDON 37
S.E.5a's, Tups', Bristol Fighters, &c.). They ascended,
however, from all points of the compass and attacked
individually. Of gallantry there was no lack and, in all,
thirty-six pilots got close enough at various times to attack
the Gothas. Two naval pilots, in Sopwith 'Camels',
engaged them at close range over Chingford, but were
both forced to break off the combat because of machine-
gun trouble. A Sopwith two-seater of No. 37 Home
Defence Squadron which fought the bombers as they
came in was shot down, the pilot. Lieutenant J. E. R.
Young, being killed, and the observer. Air Mechanic C. C.
Taylor, wounded. Captain J. Palethorpe, in a D.H.4,
intercepted the enemy formation on its return and persis-
tently attacked the leader, ^ but he received a wound in
the hip and was forced to break off the combat and land.
Another pilot. Second Lieutenant W. G. Salmon, of No.
63 Training Squadron, in a Sopwith Tup', who unhesitat-
ingly attacked the bombing formation single-handed, was
killed in combat. One of the Gothas was found, flying low
down near the North Foreland apparently in trouble,
by an Armstrong- Whitworth two-seater of No. 50 Home
Defence Squadron and was shot down in the sea. Two
of the crew climbed on the wings as the Gotha lay on the
water, and the British pilot. Second Lieutenant F. A. D.
Grace (observer. Second Lieutenant G. Murray) fired all
his Very lights in the hope that he would attract attention
to the plight of the enemy. He could not stay in the
neighbourhood owing to shortage of petrol, and when the
area was searched later there was no sign of the Gotha or
its occupants. Four naval pilots from Manston had separate
combats over the sea and each thought that the engage-
ment had been successful, but the Germans record a loss
of only one Gotha shot down in air combat. Four others
crashed on landing, the result it is stated of a high wind,
and one of them was destroyed by fire. Pilots from
Dunkirk had a number of combats with enemy aircraft
^ The leader in this attack was Hauptmann Kleine who had taken over
from Hauptmann Brandenburg, out of action through a leg broken in a
crash. Kleine was killed on the Western front in Decexnber 191 7, and
Brandenburg then resumed command.
38 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
probably sent up to act as escorts for the returning
bombers, but none with the Gothas themselves.
This second daring attack on the heart of London
created a tense atmosphere. The population of the
capital and of the whole of the southern part of the country-
was deeply roused. The general view was that it was
intolerable that the enemy should be allowed to come
and go almost with impunity. Had the attacks taken
place at night the public would, no doubt, have made
allowances for those responsible for the defence, and would
have been prepared to exercise patience while the defence
measures were reorganized. But the enemy had flown
unimpeded across England in the full light of day for the
second time in a few weeks, and for that the public could
find no excuse. A special Cabinet meeting was held on
the Saturday afternoon and the view was then expressed
that, in the prevailing state of the war, the issue depended
as much on the endurance of the people as on that of the
armies. Sir William Robertson has recorded that at this
meeting much excitement was shown ('one would have
'thought the whole world was coming to an end').^ Two
methods to stop the raids were discussed, namely, (i) the
maintenance of an efficient force of aircraft in England
to repel attacks, and (ii) counter-attacks on German towns,
such as Mannheim. It was decided that the War Office
should allot a squadron, in process of formation for service
in France, to home defence; that Sir Douglas Haig should
be ordered to send two good fighting squadrons to England
until the War Cabinet sanctioned their return; and that
he should be informed that an attack on Mannheim was
desirable if it would not upset his plans. ^ Sir Douglas
Haig, on receipt of these instructions, replied at once by
telegram: 'Two good fighting squadrons will proceed to
'England to-morrow as ordered. Request following facts
'may be laid before War Cabinet at once in connection
'with this decision. Fight for air supremacy preparatory to
'forthcoming operations was definitely commenced by us
'this morning. Both enemy and ourselves have concentrated
'fighting machines for this struggle in the air which will
^ Soldiers and StatesmeUyYoX. II, p. 17. ^ ^iho Vol. IV, pp. 152-5.
1917] CABINET MEETINGS 39
'undoubtedly be the most severe we have yet had. Success
'in this struggle is essential to success of our operations.
'Withdrawal of these two squadrons will certainly delay
'favourable decision in the air and render our victory
'more difficult and more costly in aeroplanes and pilots.
'If raid on Mannheim is undertaken in addition our plans
'will have to be reconsidered entirely and the operations
'may have to be abandoned.'
This telegram impelled the Government to reconsider
the question at their meeting on Monday the 9th, and,
after much discussion, it was decided that only one
squadron need be transferred to England from France,
and that the project to raid Mannheim should be post-
poned until efficient bombing aircraft became available.
No. 46 (Sopwith 'Pup') Squadron left France for Sutton's
Farm, Essex, on the loth of July.
Additional light is thrown on these happenings by Sir
William Robertson, who quotes a letter he wrote to Sir
Douglas Haig on the 9th of July. Beginning with the
Cabinet meeting which met on the Saturday of the raid,
he says: 'I could not get in a word edgeways. French was
'there and gave a long story as to his insufficient forces,
'and made a great protest because the two squadrons you
'had lent him were taken away. In spite of all I could say
'the decision come to was that you were to send two
'squadrons to England until the Cabinet choose to release
'them. There is no doubt that French has not got a very
'good force. It is mainly made up of oddments, and of
'course oddments will not do. When we received your wire
'yesterday the Cabinet were inclined to go back on their
'decision, and agree to ask you for less than two squadrons
'and perhaps for none. To-day they had another meeting,
'at which French was again present, and the old ground
'was re-traversed. The result was that you have now to
'send back one squadron in place of two. I am afraid I
'cannot say when the squadron will be returned. Of course
'it is necessary that these raids should be put an end to, or
'at any rate be severely punished. We saw Saturday's
'raid from the War Office windows. Our anti-aircraft
'artillery was apparently of no use, and our airmen arrived
40 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'in driblets and were powerless, but succeeded in getting
'one machine down. The fact is we have not got enough
'machines to meet our requirements. I find that I have
'brought the question before the Cabinet no fewer than
'six times during the present year. I doubt if any real
'progress will be made until a different organization is
'estabhshed. The Army and Navy now say what they
'want, the Air Board consider their wants, and then
'Addison [Minister of Munitions] makes the machines. I
'am inclined to think that we need a separate air service,
'but that would be a big business. There is a special debate
'on the subject to-night, and it will probably be followed
'by a secret session.'^
At the War Cabinet meeting on the Monday, referred
to by Sir William Robertson, there had indeed been much
liveliness. Lord French had read a letter which he had
addressed to the Secretary of the War Office on the 2nd
of July in which he had stated that the withdrawal of the
two fighting squadrons, on loan from Sir Douglas Haig,
would leave wholly inadequate forces with which to meet
an attack on London. He also read another letter ad-
dressed to Sir Wilham Robertson, dated the 6th of July,
in which, after pointing out that he now had at his
disposal only twenty-one efficient fighters, he said: 'I
'desire to place on record my most emphatic opinion that
'even with the addition of twelve Sopwith Scouts, which
'it is hoped will be available by the 15th instant, the
'aeroplanes which I can dispose of are not sufficient for
'effective action against raids in force. Such raids may
'certainly be expected, and if London is again subjected
'to attack the results may be disastrous.'
These letters came as something of a shock to the
members of the War Cabinet who commented 'severely
'and adversely' on the fact that the letter of the 2nd of
July had not been brought to their attention. Had this
been done the question of sending the fighting squadrons
back to France would, undoubtedly, have been recon-
sidered. It was true that it had provisionally been decided
that they should return about the 5 th of July, at the desire
^ Soldiers and Statesmen^ Vol. II, p. 17.
1917] AN IMPORTANT COMMITTEE 41
of Sir Douglas Haig, but the War Cabinet felt that the
full discussion on air matters which they had had with
Sir Douglas Haig and Major-General Trenchard at
the conference on the 20th of June had left the members
fully apprised of the air position on the Western front.
They had, therefore, the knowledge to judge the relative
importance and urgency of the home and overseas require-
ments. Subsequent inquiries about Lord French's letter
of the 2nd of July revealed that it had not been seen by
the Secretary of State for War or by the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff. Because the letter had raised a
minor point for the attention of the director-general of
military aeronautics it had been passed to him for action.
Sir William Robertson explained that he himself had taken
the responsibility of returning the two squadrons to Sir
Douglas Haig in accordance with the provisional decision
originally made. There the matter was allowed to rest.
The Government had, at this meeting, ordered the
return of one fighting squadron to England, but that
was an immediate measure which left the main problem
unsolved. At a subsequent Cabinet meeting, on Wednes-
day the nth of July, the matter was again debated. One
difficulty which the Government had to face, in trying to
reassure the public, was that they could not, for obvious
reasons, advertise that they had weakened the air fighting
strength on the Western front in order to provide defence
aircraft for England. But apart altogether from the
question of allaying the general disquiet, it was obvious
to the Government that the problem of home defence
against air attack could not be isolated, that it must take
its place in a survey of the whole air policy and organiza-
tion.
The Government decided, therefore, to set up a
committee to examine :
(i) the defence arrangements for home defence against
air raids, and
(ii) the air organization generally and the higher direc-
tion of aerial operations.
The committee was of a special kind. Its chairman was
42 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, who was too busy
to give much more than the prestige of his name, and the
committee was really a one-man affair, and that one man
was Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. He consulted the
experts and presented his first report, dealing with the
problem of Home Defence, on the 19th of July. His
second report, on the subject of air organization, a notable
document in the history of the Royal Air Force because
it did much to ensure the creation of a separate air service,
will be dealt with in the subsequent volume. The German
daylight aeroplane raids, indeed, had a profound effect
on the whole air organization and development in Great
Britain, and Hauptmann Brandenburg's No. 3 Bombing
Squadron may lay claim to an important share in the
foundation of the Royal Air Force. A general comment
of Sir William Robertson on the results of these daylight
raids may be repeated here : *When war is afoot', he says,
'the requirements of Home Defence, whether on land, on
'sea, or in the air, will, except perhaps in the case of a
'great crisis, such as that which occurred in March 191 8,
'invariably have to be given precedence over requirements
'connected with operations abroad.'^
The report of Lieutenant-General Smuts on the subject
of Home Defence, given in full in Appendix VI, concerned
itself, in effect, with the defence of the London area.
'London', said the report, 'occupies a peculiar position
'in the Empire of which it is the nerve centre, and we
'consider, in the circumstances, that its defence demands
'exceptional measures. It is probable that the air raids
'on London will increase to such an extent in the next
'twelve months that London might through aerial war-
'fare become part of the battle front. . . .' It was pointed
out that the defence organization had been built up to
counter night attacks by Zeppelins. If a single aeroplane,
with its incendiary or explosive ammunition, came within
reach of an airship there was small chance that the latter
would escape destruction. To the aeroplane gunners, also,
the target was a big one, and could often be illuminated
by searchlights and held for lengthy periods. There had,
^ Soldiers and Statesmen, Vol. II, p. 18.
1917] DEFENCES REORGANIZED 43
therefore, been no need to concentrate the defence forces,
whether guns or aeroplanes. Day attacks by close forma-
tions of aeroplanes called for an entirely different tech-
nique of defence. They could only be properly met, said
the report, 'by a barrage fire from guns concentrated in
'batteries at suitable points in front of the area to be
'defended, or by Flights or Squadrons whose object is,
'by concentrated attack, to break up the hostile forma-
'tion and destroy individual machines after they have
'been scattered out of their formation. . . . ' It was
recommended, therefore, that a defensive anti-aircraft
gun barrage, covering London, should be established, and
that three single-seater fighter squadrons, with pilots
trained to fight in formation, should be made ready for
home defence as rapidly as possible.^
On the matter of organization, it was recommended
that a senior officer of air experience should be placed in
executive command, under the Field-Marshal Command-
ing-in-Chief, of the defences of the London area.^ The
appointment was given, on the 5th of August 1917, to
Brigadier-General E. B. Ashmore. His command em-
braced the whole area considered to be liable to aeroplane
attack and was, therefore, much wider than the term
'London Air Defence Area' implies. It included:
(i) the whole of the anti-aircraft fixed defences (guns
and lights) in the anti-aircraft commands of Lon-
don, Harwich, Thames and Medway, and Dover,
with the Eastern Command detached defences.
(ii) such anti-aircraft mobile batteries as were placed
at his disposal. These included the mobile brigade
^ No. 44 (Sopwith two-seater) began to form at Hainault Farm on the
24th of July; No 6i (Sopwith 'Pup') at Rochford on the 2nd of August;
and No. 112 (Sopwith Tup') at Throwley on the 30th of July. No. 44
was re-equipped with Sopwith 'Camels' in August and September.
^ Sir David Henderson, in a memorandum to Lieutenant-General
Smuts on the i6th of July, had said: 'I would suggest that the whole of
'our defences against air attack, observation, communication, aeroplanes
'and guns, should be organized under a single command. As the aeroplane
'is by far the most important means of defence, the commander should be
'an officer of the Royal Flying Corps. It is desirable that he should still
'be under the general command of the C.-in-C, Home forces.'
44 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
and the anti-aircraft mobile batteries then in the
Harwich and Dover anti-aircraft defence commands.
(iii) such Royal Flying Corps home defence units as
were placed at his disposal. When the command
began these were the home defence squadrons,
Nos. 51, 75, 37, 39, 50, and 78. Others were added
later.
(iv) the aircraft observation posts under the Comman-
dant, Observer Corps, Royal Defence Corps, in
the warning districts roughly east of the line,
Grantham — Portsmouth.
When Brigadier-General Ashmore took up his com-
mand he found that schemes for a reorganization of
the gun defences had already been put forward and
were awaiting decision. On the 21st of June Lieutenant-
Colonel Simon, the Anti-aircraft Defence Commander,
London, had submitted a plan, which involved forty-five
additional guns, with the object of strengthening some of
the gun sections on what was then the perimeter of the
London defences in order to greet the enemy with a
shower of shell bursts. The scheme had been rejected on
the ground that there was a shortage of guns and men.
On the 1 6th of July Lieutenant-Colonel Simon had, on
the suggestion of the Royal Flying Corps, submitted
another scheme, the main feature of which was the con-
struction of a ring of gun stations round London to meet
the bombing formations with heavy bursts of gun-fire
about twenty-five miles from the capital with the idea of
breaking up the formations to enable the home defence
pilots to engage the raiders in detachments or individually.
On the 23rd of July Lord French had put forward
the scheme to the War Office. He had pointed out how
difficult it was for the Royal Flying Corps pilots to deal
with large formations of Gotha type aeroplanes well
equipped for defence. 'Isolated attacks', he said, 'by
'aeroplanes on these unbroken formations are, it is clear,
'a useless sacrifice. . . . The task of our Royal Flying
'Corps units would be rendered much easier if the enemy
'formation could be broken up and use made of our
'superior power of manoeuvre to deal with the enemy in
1917] SCHEMES OF DEFENCE 45
'detail. Simultaneous attack, by aeroplanes and anti-
'aircraft guns, is not possible, but combined tactics in which
'the guns are assigned the definite role of breaking up the
'enemy formation, while the aeroplanes, having gained
'their height, are waiting to attack the enemy as he
'emerges in detached groups from the zone covered by
'gun fire, are it is considered not only possible, but
'essential to success.' He asked therefore for enough guns
of the 3 -inch 20 cwt. type to provide a barrage arc covering
London from attack from any direction from the north,
by way of the east, to the south. The time would come
when the enemy bombers would make their approach to
London from the west, and as guns became available Lord
French asked that the circle should be completed to
ensure protection from every direction. He estimated
that a total of 1 10 guns would be necessary for the first
part of the scheme, and eighty more to make the circle com-
plete. Lord French was told, in reply, that the matter
of a reallotment of anti-aircraft guns for home defence
would be laid before the War Cabinet, but that, mean-
while, he should consider taking guns from places less
likely to be attacked. The War Cabinet, when the ques-
tion came up for discussion, decided to adhere to their
decision recorded in December 19 16, that the deliveries
of 3-inch 20 cwt. guns must go to arm merchant vessels.
Lord French was so informed on the 9th of August, and,
to build up the eastern gun barrier, ten guns were with-
drawn from other stations around London, and twenty-
four from the provinces.
Public Warnings for London
The German daylight attacks raised, once again, in an
acute form, the question of giving public warnings in
London.^ So long as people were not warned in time to
take cover it was obvious that they would be caught
crowding the business thoroughfares, and that the casual-
ties would continue to be heavy. On the other hand,
^ Outside the London area, the question whether a warning should or
should not be made public was mainly a matter to be decided by local
authorities.
46 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
unless the warnings could be confined to those occasions
when it seemed fairly certain that London would be
attacked, the interruption of work would be greater by
day than by night and might reach the point when it
would become intolerable. After the raid on London on
the 13th of June local authorities in the Metropolis had
been consulted, and the Home Secretary had afterwards
called a conference, on the 21st of June, which had been
attended by the Lord Mayor of London and by the mayors
of the London Boroughs. The general opinion expressed
at the conference was that public warning was desirable,
and it was suggested that the order Take Air Raid Action
might be supplemented by a later warning, which could
be made public, on the nearer approach of the enemy.
The question was considered by General Head-quarters,
Home Forces, who argued that the speed of the enemy
aeroplanes made it impracticable to issue a second warning
in time to be of use. The matter was referred to the War
Cabinet who decided, on the 26th of June, against the
dissemination of a public warning, and this decision was
announced in the House of Commons by the Home
Secretary on the same day.
Then came the dayhght attack on the 7th of July which
was followed, once again, by insistent demands that the
public should be warned when raids were anticipated.
The War Cabinet reconsidered the question on the loth
of July and reversed their decision of the 26th of June.
The object, it was now stated, should be to give a warning
of five minutes at the circumference of a circle with a
radius of ten miles from Charing Cross, that is to say a
circle which would cover the main populated districts of
London. Allowing four and a half minutes for trans-
mission, the warning would have to be given when the
enemy aircraft were crossing a line twenty-two miles from
Charing Cross. There was, however, no line of observers at
that distance, the existing line of theLondon defences being
closer in, at an average of sixteen miles from the centre.
The idea of estabhshing observation posts farther out was
considered, but abandoned. Instead, the existing stations
of the Medway defences were used together with some
1917] PUBLIC WARNINGS 47
of the new gun stations which were set up as a result of
the reorganization of the defences. They formed an
incomplete ring, at a distance of twenty to twenty-five
miles, from the north-west, by the north and east, to the
south of London.
Many suggestions about the form the warning should
take were put forward, among them the ringing of tele-
phone bells, the lighting of street lamps, the clanging of
tramcar bells, the firing of blank charges from anti-air-
craft guns, and the sounding of sirens. It was objected
that all except the last-named would either take too
long or else be ineffective. Few patterns of siren of
suflBcient power existed, and trials with these revealed
that large numbers would be required to attract general
attention above the roar of London trafl[ic. This raised
the difficulty that sufficient stations with the necessary
power to work the sirens would be hard to find.
Attention was turned to the design of a rocket which
would explode with a loud noise and give off a cloud
of coloured smoke. Experiments with rockets were made,
but before a suitable type was produced it was decided
to make use of the ^Socket distress signals', used at sea,
which were sound bombs, or 'maroons', fired from a small
brass mortar. They were tested on the 19th of July and
proved effective over an area of rather more than a square
mile. The maroons had the advantage that they could
be fired from any building and that they were manufac-
tured as a regular Board of Trade and Admiralty store,
and could therefore be obtained in large quantities at
short notice.
The next problem was to decide which authorities
should be made responsible for firing the maroons. It
happened that there was in existence an observation
service whose chief duty was to report outbreaks of fire
and explosions caused by enemy attacks. This service had
been organized when air defence was an Admiralty
responsibility, and it had its head-quarters at County Hall,
Spring Gardens. It was under the direction of Com-
mander Henry Paget, R.N.V.R., and included about 1,200
civilian volunteers who manned posts in various parts of
48 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
the County of London. The posts were Hnked with a
central observation room at the County Hall with which,
also, the Fire Brigade head-quarters was directly connected.
There were many instances when lives and damage were
saved as a result of the prompt warnings of fire given
by this observation service. It seemed that the organiza-
tion could be easily adapted for the issue of public warnings,
and it was proposed, therefore, that, within the County
area, the maroons should be fired from the Fire Brigade
stations. Outside that area, within the ten-mile circle,
they could be fired from selected police stations, all of
which were already on the warning lists. The orders to
fire the maroons could be given, from County Hall, to
Fire Brigade head-quarters and to Scotland Yard. The
proposals were approved and Commander Paget went
ahead with his arrangements.
Meanwhile, as a temporary measure, pending the
organization of the new scheme, it was arranged that
Scotland Yard should be responsible for distributing the
warning. On receipt of information from General Head-
quarters, Home Forces, that an attack appeared imminent,
Scotland Yard was to instruct all police stations to send out
men on foot, on bicycles, and in motor-cars. They were to
carry Take Cover placards to which they were to draw
attention by blowing their whistles, or by sounding bells
and horns. They were to go out, similarly, with All Clear
notices when the danger was over. A statement to this
effect appeared in the press on the 14th of July. The
same evening the new arrangements were put into
operation through a false alarm about enemy aircraft.
The warning order was cancelled soon after it was issued,
but it had been in operation long enough to show that
it would be fairly effective in clearing the streets. The
maroons also were first used as a result of a misunder-
standing. It was not definitely decided that they were to
be employed for public warning until the 21st of July,
a Saturday, but early next morning, before the people
could learn, through the press, of the new arrangement,
they heard the noise of maroons and assumed that
an attack was in progress. There was, in fact, an attack
1917] THE FINAL SCHEME 49
on Harwich and Felixstowe, but the Gothas did not
penetrate inland and the London maroons were fired
through a misunderstood message. The affair, however,
showed unmistakably that the warning was too noisy
and lasted too long. The number of stations firing
maroons was therefore cut down, and each was to fire
two instead of three as originally planned.
The warning organization at County Hall took some
time to establish, and by the time it was ready the general
position had changed. In the first place, the Commis-
sioner of Police, who was ultimately responsible for the
effectiveness of the public warning, was reluctant to end
an arrangement by which the executive order came from
him. The interim organization which he had set up had
worked well and his staff, as well as the police stations,
had had opportunity to become familiar with its workings.
Furthermore, the Government had decided that the
maroon signals were to be fired only as a warning of attack
by day, and that the police must remain responsible for
the dissemination of warnings by night. Although day-
light attacks might continue to be made, it seemed possible
that night attacks might become more important.
The arguments put forward by the Commissioner, that
he and not Commander Paget should be responsible for
spreading public warnings, were not disputed, and the
scheme which emerged was as follows:
By Day. General Head-quarters, Home Forces, commu-
nicated to Scotland Yard, the London Fire
Brigade, and to the City Police, the code words
READINESS, RED DAY, WHITE DAY, and ALL CLEAR.
It will be remembered^ that the colour code
words were used to indicate the successive
^ See Vol. Ill, pp. 175-6. In that volume it is stated that the code
derived from the coloured Hghts shown on a transparent map in the
Operations Room at the Horse Guards. This is true, but it is of interest
that the system of lights followed the printed forms used by the General
Post Office to send out the various warnings. Each message was printed
on a different coloured form. Supplies were issued to the telephone
exchanges, and the subscribers required to be notified on receipt of each
message were entered locally, in advance, on the appropriate form.
2504.5 ft
50 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
warning orders, that is, Warning only (Green) ;
T ake Air Raid Action (Red) ; All Clear (Yel-
low); and Resume Normal Conditions (White).
The preliminary warning (green) was usually
given when the hostile aircraft were about fifty
or sixty miles from the district to which the
warning was issued. The word Readiness was
preferred by General Head-quarters, Home
Forces, because it was desired to issue a
warning on the first sign of enemy air activity.
Under the new scheme. General Head-
quarters, Home Forces, also kept Scotland
Yard and the London Fire Brigade informed
of the approach, and return, of the enemy
aircraft between the coast and the line of guns
of the London barrage. As soon as the bombers
were observed by the guns of the barrage, it
was the duty of the London Anti-Aircraft
Defence Commander to give the information
to Scotland Yard, and to keep it informed,
subsequently, of the main movements of the
enemy pilots until they left the area of the
London defences.
By Night. The code words, green, red, yellow, and
WHITE were given to Scotland Yard, the Fire
Brigade, and to the City Police, by General
Head-quarters, Home Forces, and subsequent
information, as by day, about the enemy move-
ments. Scotland Yard was informed by the
London Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander
when the enemy aeroplanes were observed by
the barrage guns, but subsequent movements
were not reported. Scotland Yard took action
as soon as it became clear that the enemy
aircraft were about to cross the outer defences.
A message. Commissioner's Warning — Take
Cover, was issued to all police stations in the
Metropolitan area, to the City Police head-
quarters, and to Fire Brigade head-quarters.
1917] MINOR DAYLIGHT ATTACKS 51
The message was aiso passed to the Trunk
Exchange Manager and transmitted by him
to all MetropoHtan poHce stations outside the
County of London. The object of dupHcating
these messages was to obviate the risk of delay
or non-delivery of the message in the outer
areas which might be the first to be attacked.
The message was regarded as an order to
fire the maroons, or to send out the T ake Cover
notices. When it was clear that the enemy
had gone, a further message, Commissioner's
Notice — All Clear ^ was communicated in the
same way as the Commissioner's Take Cover
message. It was some time before a satisfac-
tory method of disseminating the All Clear
notice was reached. Experiments were made
with a signal which could be fired in the same
way as the Take Cover signal, but would have
a different sound. Eventually, however, the
Commissioner enlisted the services of Boy
Scouts who blew bugles as they were driven
round the streets in motor-cars. At the same
time, constables on cycles rode around shout-
ing All Clear as they went.
London was never again attacked by day after the 7th
of July 19 1 7, but in September there began a series of
moonlight raids. Before the night raids, however, some
minor daylight attacks took place on the eastern and
south-eastern counties. Just after 8 a.m. on the 22nd of
July twenty-two Gothas approached the Suffolk coast
in HoUesley Bay, and then turned southwards and
bombed Felixstowe and Harwich. Most of the bombs
intended for Harwich fell in the harbour, but at Felix-
stowe an hotel and three houses were seriously damaged,
an engineer's shed was demolished on the Royal Naval Air
Service station, and there were a number of casualties.
Thirteen men, including 11 soldiers and a naval airman,
were killed and 24 men (20 soldiers, 3 naval ratings) and
2 women were injured. One hundred and twenty-one
52 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
British pilots went up to fight the raiders. The Gothas,
however, were over the country for so brief a period and
the information about their movements was so scanty
that very few pilots saw anything of them. It should
be remembered that the patrol areas were shaped
chiefly to cover the approach to London, and had the
Gothas made for the capital, or, indeed, come any distance
inland on this occasion they would have been met by
patrols of fighting aircraft. Many of the patrolling British
aeroplanes were fired at by the anti-aircraft gunners who
mistook them for German, and two were hit and damaged,
but were landed safely.
One pilot, in a two-seater, found the Gotha formation
and followed it towards Zeebrugge, where he vainly
attacked the rearmost bomber. A Bristol Fighter patrol
of No. 48 Squadron, which went up from the frontier
aerodrome near Bray Dunes, met five of the returning
Gothas and one pilot forced a Gotha down on the sea
north of Ostend.^
About 5 p.m. on the 12th of August ten Gothas, in
formation, were seen approaching Felixstowe. They did
not come in at once, but followed the coast in a south-
westerly direction and, at 5.50 p.m., were over Rochford,
where they dropped three bombs, two of which fell near
the hangars on the aerodrome of No. 61 Squadron and
wounded two mechanics. By this time a formation of
sixteen Sopwith Tups' of the squadron was gaining height,
and the presence of the British fighters seemed to fiurry
the bombers, who began to straggle as they turned off
towards Leigh, Westcliff, and Southend, where bombs
fell in succession, killing 32 civilians and injuring 43. The
raiders went straight out to sea with the Sopwith Tups'
of No. 61 Squadron in pursuit, but although the Tups'
were faster the bombers had the advantage of height and
could not be caught until they were about forty miles
distant from the coast. The leading Tup' pilots engaged
the enemy, but, owing to gun trouble or through petrol
shortage, the combats were brief and indecisive. A number
^ According to German information one Gotha crashed and was wrecked
on landing on its home aerodrome, but no other loss was incurred.
1917] AN ABORTIVE RAID 53
of other pilots who pursued the Gothas to sea had in-
dividual encounters, one of which was successful. Flight
Lieutenant H. S. Kerby, who had gone up from Walmer
in a Sopwith Tup', attacked a Gotha which, apparently
in difficulties, was flying about 4,000 feet below the
main formation. The Sopwith pilot forced the Gotha
down on the water, where it overturned. One member
of the crew was seen to be clinging to the tail, and
Flight Lieutenant Kerby dropped a lifebelt in the hope
that the German would be enabled to keep afloat until
help arrived. On the return journey the British pilot
found four destroyers on passage to Dunkirk, and he fired
Very lights to indicate that he wanted the destroyers to
follow him to the wrecked Gotha, but his message was
not understood and the destroyers continued on their
course. It was afterwards announced by the Germans
that the Gotha had been lost with its crew. The enemy
formation had been seen on its way to England by
a fighting patrol of naval aeroplanes from Dunkirk. The
naval pilots pursued the bombers, but had to land in
England owing to lack of petrol without having had any
opportunity for decisive encounters. The raiders, on their
way home, were again attacked by Dunkirk pilots near
the Dutch coast without result. A subsidiary bombing
attack, by one Gotha, was made on Margate. Four bombs
were dropped soon after 5.40 p.m., but they inflicted little
damage, although one woman was injured. The German
records show that the Gotha which attacked Margate had
engine trouble and was ultimately compelled to make a
forced landing at Zeebrugge. They also reveal that four
Gothas were wrecked on landing in Belgium.
Another attack was attempted on the i8th of August
and, although no bombs fell on Enghsh soil, the attempt
presents some features of interest. On this day England
lay between a low pressure area centred over the north-
! west of Scotland and a high pressure area over Germany.
Above Belgium and the Netherlands the sky was cloudless
and the barometer was rising, but over England the sky
was overcast and the barometer was falling. Twenty-
eight Gothas set out in the morning sunshine and headed
54 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
for England which, unknown to the crews, was at that
moment rain-swept. The bombers came down the coast
until they were off Dunkirk and then turned towards the
English coast. But the Channel and the air above it were
turbulent, and it must have become clear to Hauptmann
Kleine, who led the attackers, that to proceed was useless.
He kept on a northerly course, possibly with the intention
of making a wide circle over the North Sea to take him
back to the Belgian coast near the Dutch frontier, but as
he proceeded the strength of the wind increased and the
Gothas began to straggle. One of them, running for home
direct, came down on the beach near Zeebrugge. Most
of the others passed over the Dutch island of Schouwen,
where six bombs were dropped about 11.30 a.m. The
leader succeeded, hereabouts, in turning the greater part
of his squadron south-west again and they were last seen
about twenty strong, flying in the direction of Zeebrugge.
Two, however, which got lost over Holland, were shot
down by Dutch gunners near the German frontier. The
crews, uninjured, were made prisoners, and the Gothas
were destroyed. It is possible that some of the main
formation crashed when attempting to land because when
Hauptmann Kleine set out to attack the Kent coast four
days later he could muster only fifteen aeroplanes, four
of which had to turn back on account of defects.
^he Mystery of a Zeffelin Attack
Map 3 The next aeroplane attack was preceded by an airship
raid. On the 21st of August eight naval Zeppelins set out
from the north German sheds. They were the Z.J5, L.41,
L,42, L.44, L,4S, L.46, L.4y, and under the general
command of Fregattenkapitan Strasser who flew in the
L.46. While the ships were in the air Strasser sent out a
wireless message to the commanders informing them that
the conditions were favourable for a raid on central England
{Mitte) and they were instructed to attack accordingly.
So far as British observation went, the raid was of a
simple kind. The airships, keeping well together, ap-
proached the Yorkshire coast until they came within
1917] A ZEPPELIN MYSTERY 55
sixty miles of the Humber, when they dispersed and cruised
about for three hours. Eventually one airship, the L.41,
commanded by Hauptmann Manger, attempted an
attack on Hull. She crossed the coast soon after midnight,
but never reached the city, from which it appeared she
was turned back by the searchlights and by heavy anti-
aircraft gun-fire. Her bombs were dropped on Paull,
Hedon, Preston, and Thorngumbald. The damage, con-
fined to Hedon, was comparatively small: a Methodist
Chapel was destroyed, and some cottages, a Roman
Catholic building, and a Y.M.C.A. hut were damaged.
In addition, one man was injured. Two of the twenty
pilots who went up to attack the L.41 saw her, but they
could not get near enough to engage her. One of them
while flying at 15,000 feet estimated that the L.41 was
some 5,000 feet higher still and, although he pursued her
twenty miles out to sea and fired bursts at long range, he
could not get near enough for effective attack.
So far as we could judge none of the other airships came
overland, and certainly no other bombs were recorded on
any part of the country. When, therefore, the German
Admiralty issued a somewhat lengthy report of the raid, in
which it was claimed that the Zeppelin fleet had bombed
Hull, warships in the Humber, and various industrial estab-
lishments, it was assumed that the German communique y^^s
issued for home propaganda. The author of this history,
however, has seen the full records of the airships concerned
in the attack and can testify that the communique of the
German Admiralty was made in good faith. Strasser's
covering report shows that bombs to a total weight of
il,ooo-kg. were dropped. The airships encountered head
winds and had also to reckon with the shortness of the
night, so that it was impossible to penetrate any great
distance inland. The L.35 had to turn back when she
was off Scarborough because she had small chance of
attacking before light, and the Z.5J, which had compass
trouble, also did not attack. Of the others, the German
records show that Martin Dietrich in the L.42 attacked
ships off the Spurn and Spurn Point (he could not reach
Hull because of an engine failure); Stabbert in the L.44
56 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
bombed groups of lights at Lincoln; Kolle in the L.4S
attacked warships off Withernsea; Hollender in the L.46
came well in and saw in the distance the lights of a big city
which he judged to be Sheffield, but as he could not get
so far he turned back and dropped his main load of bombs
on Louth; finally, von Freudenreich in the attacked
Grimsby.
As has been said, our own decision at the time, after
consideration of all the reports of the night, was that none
of these airships came overland. There is not much doubt
that we were wrong. Among the British official documents
dealing with this attack is a packet of reports to which it
was judged no credence could be attached. In this packet,
labelled Hot Air, are messages which show that an airship
passed over Pontefract and was later reported near
Rochdale in Lancashire, while from Doncaster came news
of bombs heard exploding in the distance. The Zeppelins
flew at great heights, up to 20,000 feet, and this fact,
which made it difficult or even impossible for their com.-
manders to know where their bombs were dropped, made
it difficult also for the ground observers to follow the move-
ments of the airships with certainty. It is not impossible
that the and one or two other ships came overland,
but if they did what happened to their bombs ? Could
they all have found a resting-place on moorland wastes
remote from habitation t
Nor is there any information about attacks on British
ships. Patrol vessels off the Humber engaged a Zeppelin
and fired a total of fifty rounds of ammunition, but there
is no official record of bombs being aimed at these vessels
or at any others off the East Coast during the night of
August 2ist/22nd.
The raid was ineffective, but it had one very dis-
turbing feature, and that was the height from which the
attack near Hull was made. At 20,000 feet the Zeppelins
had nothing to fear from the night-flying aeroplanes with
which the defence squadrons were equipped, none of
which could get near this 'ceiling'. Nor did the airships'
commanders need to concern themselves overmuch with
the searchlight or gun defences.
1917] END OF DAYLIGHT RAIDING
^he Last Daylight Aeroplane Attack
Before the last of the Zeppelins had landed in North
Germany, fifteen Gothas were on their way to England.
Four of them turned back with engine trouble, but the
others came in over Margate about 1040 a.m. and, after
dropping five bombs, continued in a south-westerly direc-
tion. They did not, however, hold this course long because
naval aeroplanes from Manston were already approaching
their height. The Gotha pilots therefore turned south-
east and attacked Ramsgate with thirty-four bombs.
Seven of these fell on hospitals and some of the others on
shop and house property. They killed eight men (2 soldiers)
and one child, and injured twelve men (9 soldiers), two
women, and seven children. There is little doubt that
the bombs were dropped without much discrimination,
because the raiders had been given such a reception from
the moment they came overland that they had as much
as they could do to think of their own protection. The
anti-aircraft gun-fire with which they were met when they
crossed was accurate and shells burst among the Gothas
from the outset. Then the aeroplanes came up and pur-
sued the bombers as they turned for Ramsgate. Two of
the raiders were quickly brought down by gun-fire, one
of them falling in the sea, and the other, in flames, between
Westgate and Ramsgate. From the Gotha which fell in
the sea, a member of the crew was rescued and it was
learned from him that the intention of the raiders was to
separate after striking the coast near the North Foreland.
One detachment was to continue up the Thames Estuary
to bomb Sheerness, and the other southwards to attack
Dover. ^ The accuracy of the gun-fire and the presence of
British aeroplanes brought about a change of plan, and
the bombers, after the attack on Ramsgate, went out to
sea again, pursued by naval aircraft, and recrossed the
coast at Deal. Under vigorous gun-fire they went on to
Dover, where they arrived about 11. 10 a.m., and six of
^ It is now known that the official objectives were (i) Southend
(alternative Sheerness), (ii) Chatham, (iii) Dover.
58 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
them dropped a total of nine bombs which seriously
damaged seven private houses, an inn, and a school. The
casualties were two soldiers and one woman killed, and
five soldiers injured. Some of the gunners who fired on
the Gothas saw one of them fall in the sea and claimed it
as a victim of their fire, but it was more probably shot
down in combat by Flight Sub-Lieutenant J. Drake. The
Gothas were continuously attacked over Dover, and across
the sea to the Belgian Coast, by naval and Royal Flying
Corps pilots, but no others were seen to fall. Naval pilots
from Dunkirk had many fights both with the Gothas and
with enemy single-seaters apparently sent up to escort the
bombers home. Although the Dunkirk pilots did not succeed
in sending down any of the bombers, they claimed to have
destroyed five of the fighters. Exclusive of the Dunkirk
aeroplanes, a total of seventeen Royal Naval Air Service
and one hundred and twenty Royal Flying Corps pilots
went up in search of the raiders, a commentary, once
again, on the energy dissipated by the defence. It is fair
to add, however, that had the bombers persisted to
Sheerness instead of turning back they would have been
caught by overwhelming numbers and would not have
escaped so lightly.
The Germans realized that inland daylight raiding had
now been made so difficult that it was not worth while to
continue. After this attack on the 22nd of August, there-
fore, the daylight campaign was abandoned. 'Although,
'after the August raids', says Major von Biilow, 'the
'daylight raid tactics had to give way to the moonlight
'raids, this was due to no abatement of the fighting spirit
'of the squadron, but must be ascribed to technical reasons
'and to the improvement in the British anti-aircraft
'defences.'^
The drawbacks associated with a purely defensive policy
in the air are well brought out by the results which
followed the daylight bombing of England. No. 3 Kampf-
geschwader^ which could not muster thirty aeroplanes for
any one attack, twice induced the British Government to
^ In Die Luftwacht.
I9I7] PROFIT AND LOSS 59
withdraw fighting squadrons from the Western front, was
responsible for the formation of three first-class fighting
squadrons for service in England, compelled an increase
in, and a drastic reorganization of, the anti-aircraft gun
defences, and, during active operations, called into action
anything up to ten times its own strength in aeroplanes.
And it should be remembered that the fighting squadrons
withdrawn at a critical time from a vital part of the
Western front were given no opportunity to meet the
enemy, that the formation of the new fighting squadrons
in England, together with the re-equipment of certain
other existing squadrons, diverted skilled pilots and first-
class aeroplanes from service in France, and that few of
the great number of British pilots who went up on patrol
even so much as saw the raiders. It is a fact, also, that
the Germans compelled us to reshape the defence system
to meet the daylight raids and then, by changing over to
night attack, stultified much of our plan. Above all, the
daylight bombing of English cities was mainly responsible
for the British Government decision, of July 191 7, to
double the air services.
While, however, it is important that the various results
of the bombing campaign should be clearly stated, it
would be wrong to infer that all, or any, of them were,
or indeed could have been, foreseen by the Germans, who
will probably read of them with surprise. The results
did not flow naturally from preconceived plans because
the knowledge and circumstances of the time did not make
such plans possible. The Germans did not, for instance,
work out what would be the effect on the defence system
in England of a change from day to night raids and then
proceed to shape their campaign accordingly. They
changed to night attacks because they were forced to
do so, partly because of improvements in the defences
in the London area, and partly because of what Major
von Billow has called 'technical reasons'. These may be
assumed to have connexion with wastage, during the
daylight campaign, of aeroplanes and personnel, and their
replacement by inferior equipment and less-experienced
crews.
6o AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
The Moonlight Campaign
A night raid during the period of full moon had been
made on London on the 6th/7th of May 191 7, but this had
been an isolated occurrence without particular significance.
The aeroplane attacks by moonlight which began on the
2nd of September were something quite different. It was
the same Gotha squadron, No. 3, which was responsible
for the night attacks, but it was later reinforced by a
Flight equipped with the so-called 'Giant' aeroplanes
{Riesenflugzeug 501). Many types of Giant aeroplanes
were built by Germany during the war. The largest of
them, constructed by the Siemens-Schuckert firm, had
six engines of 300 horse-power each, but all the others had
from three to five engines, of the Mercedes, Benz, or May-
bach type, ranging from no to 265 horse-power: their
speeds in still air were from 70 to 85 miles per hour. The
Giants which were responsible for raiding England usually
carried a crew of five (two pilots, one ofiicer observer, and
two machine gunners), and bombs totalling about i,ooo-kg.
in weight.^
The moonlight campaign was opened with an attack
on Dover. At 11.5 p.m. on Sunday the 2nd of September
two aeroplanes, flying low, appeared over the town without
warning, dropped their bombs, and disappeared before
any searchlights or guns could get into action. Fourteen
bombs, two of them converted 9* 84-inch trench-mortar
shells, weighing 91 kg., were traced, and they killed one
officer, and injured one officer, three men, four women,
and two children. The damage, to houses, a stable, and
a timber-yard, was estimated at ^3,486. About half an
hour before Dover was attacked a raid had been made on
Calais, and the bombing of Dover was probably subsidiary
to the Calais attack.
Next night, the 3rd of September, with the weather
conditions still exceptionally fine, the bombers came again,
this time with more serious intent. At 10.35 P-J^* two
* Technical data about the various Gotha and Giant types of aeroplane
are set out in Table III, pp. 1 10-13, Deutschen Luftstreitkrdfte im
Weltkriege (Neumann).
1917] THE MOONLIGHT CAMPAIGN 61
aeroplanes crossed the coast at Westgate and dropped two
bombs at East Northdown Farm, Margate, and five on
St. Peters, but the only damage caused was to window-
glass. One of the raiders then went out to sea, but the
other apparently continued up the Thames Estuary and
there joined one or more Gothas which were heard passing
over Eastchurch at 11 p.m. Ten minutes later bombs
began to fall in Chatham, and two of the twenty-six which
we traced hit the drill hall at the naval barracks in which
several hundred men were sleeping. A terrible scene fol-
lowed, and when the victims of the raiders came to be
counted it was found that one hundred and thirty naval
ratings were dead and eighty-eight wounded. The re-
maining bombs which fell on the town destroyed a house
and damaged property and, in addition, killed a naval
rating and a woman, and caused injury to three men
(including one naval rating and one soldier), three women,
and two children. None of the enemy aeroplanes was
visible from Chatham at any time and no anti-aircraft
guns came into action: seven rounds were fired at one of
the bombers on its way out at Herne Bay. So far as could
be made out at the time, other Gothas had, mean-
while, come into the Thames Estuary and had passed to
Sheerness, which was attacked with twelve bombs about
1 1 p.m. Some of these narrowly missed important targets,
but none of them inflicted damage or casualties. The
anti-aircraft guns in Sheppey fired on the enemy aero-
planes, which were momentarily seen from time to time
without the aid of searchlights. One bomber was caught,
fleetingly, in the beam of the Whitstable light, but had
passed into darkness again when seven rounds had been
fired. Sixteen aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps went
up, but none of their pilots saw anything of the raiders.
It is a point of interest that the combination of bright
moonlight and dark clear sky made the task of the search-
light personnel difficult and the beams of the lights had
little power. From a consideration of all the reports at
the time it appeared that the total number of raiders was
ten, but it is now known that only five set out and that
one of these turned back with engine trouble. Actually,
62 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
very exaggerated numbers were reported from many
places ; all British aircraft were noted as 'hostile' and their
number was overrated.
Although the British pilots had had no opportunity to
attack the enemy, the happenings of the night had pro-
foundly changed the outlook for the defence. Three
pilots who took the air were making a pioneer effort.
Major G. W. Murlis-Green, commanding No. 44 Squad-
ron, equipped with Sopwith 'Camels', chafed at the
thought that he must keep his pilots on the ground while
the night attacks were in progress. No. 44 Squadron had
been formed to fight the daylight raids, and contemporary
opinion considered that the unstable Sopwith 'Camel',
quick to respond to the controls, was entirely unsuited
for night work. Major Murlis-Green, however, sought,
and was given, permission to try the 'Camels' at night.
During the attack on the 3rd of September, therefore,
three pilots of No. 44 Squadron (Major Murlis-Green,
Captain C. J. Q. Brand, and Lieutenant C. C. Banks) took
off. They got into the air safely, patrolled for forty
minutes, and then made good landings. The news spread
at once and other day-fighting pilots began to practise
night flying. By a coincidence, while the pilots of No.
44 Squadron were in the air demonstrating that un-
stable single-seater fighters could be flown at night, two
pilots in France, also in 'Camels', were making the same
discovery.
13 In a raid on the following night, the 4th/5th of Septem-
ber, London was reached, and a new feature was the spread-
ing of the attack over a period of time. The moon, two days
after the full, was bright and the wind blew moderately
from the south-east. Once again very exaggerated reports
about the numbers and ubiquity of the bombers were
received, showing how great was the tendency, at night
and with nerves tense, to over-estimate. When, after the
raid, the reports were carefully sifted and co-ordinated, it
seemed that the bom.bers totalled twenty-six aeroplanes
and that they had crossed the coast, in seven groups,
between 10.20 p.m. and 12.10 a.m. According, however,
to particulars published by Major Freiherr von Biilow,
1917] LONDON ATTACKED 63
who quotes German official records, only eleven aeroplanes,
all Gothas, set out, and two of these had to turn back with
engine trouble. The same writer mentions London as
the objective, but bombs also fell on Dover and Margate,
on Tiptree and Inworth in Essex, and on Orford and
Aldeburgh in Suffolk. The attacks on London began at
1 1 p.m. on the 4th of September and were fairly continu-
ous up to 11.58 p.m. There was a pause until 12.30 a.m.
when another attack was made, followed by a second
interval of quiet until 12.50 a.m., when a final group of
bombs fell on the capital. The total number of bombs
traced in London was fifty-seven, five of which did not
explode, and the casualties were 8 men (including 3
soldiers), 7 women, and i child killed, and 25 men (8
soldiers, and one sailor U.S.N.), i constable, 23 women,
and 7 children injured. In addition, 2 men and i woman
were killed at Dover and 6 men (3 soldiers), 6 women, and
3 children injured at Dover and Margate. One of the
first bombs on London fell in an unoccupied factory
at Stratford which had, up to a short time before, been
used as an internment camp for German civilians. Most
damage to London was caused by one Gotha which came
in alone over Hampstead about 11.50 p.m. The first
bombs from this aeroplane wrecked a building in Castle
Street belonging to a firm of Oxford Street drapers and
damaged a cigarette factory nearby. The next group,
four 50-kg. bombs, seem to have been aimed at Charing
Cross Station. One bomb fell near Charing Cross Hospital
and shattered most of its windows and did minor damage
to twenty-four shops. The casualties, hereabouts, were
3 killed and 5 injured. The second bomb destroyed the
back of the Little Theatre, without inflicting casualties,
the third exploded harmlessly in the gardens near the
Hotel Cecil, but the fourth wrecked a tramcar on the
Embankment near Cleopatra's Needle and killed 2 men
and a woman, and caused injury to 8 men (3 of them
soldiers) and to one woman. The base of the Obelisk, the
southern bronze sphinx, and parts of the Embankment
nearby, were chipped and scarred. The marks are there
to-day, one of the few remaining visible reminders of the
64 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
bombing of London. The final attack on London which
began about 12.30 a.m. also caused serious casualties,
mainly in Gospel Oak, Primrose Hill, and Paddington;
the Islington Workhouse in Upper Holloway was partly
wrecked.
The bombers were met, during their passage across
England, by anti-aircraft gun-fire. A Gotha was occasion-
ally found by the beams of a searchlight, but for the most
part the gunners could see the bombers without the aid
of the lights. Although none of the gunners had more
than a fleeting opportunity to fire, it is clear, from the
movements of the raiders as observed by us, that they were
sometimes made to change their course and, in one instance,
were forced to turn back when approaching from the east
along the Thames. About eight hundred anti-aircraft shells
were fired, but only one hit was reported. The commander
of the gun at Borstal was convinced that a shell from the
gun hit a Gotha which was flying on the Kent side of the
river and that the aeroplane was destroyed. No wreckage
was found, although the River Medway was dragged from
Rochester Bridge to Hailing, but the German records
show that one Gotha was, in fact, lost during the raid
under unknown circumstances. Eighteen pilots of the
Royal Flying Corps went up, but only two of them caught
a glimpse of an enemy aeroplane at different times. In
each instance a few rounds were fired, but the quarry was
quickly lost. Three 'Camel' pilots patrolled over London
between 11.27 P-^- ^-^^ a.m., but did not see any of
the Gothas which attacked the capital.
The opening of the German night campaign caused
grave concern. At a meeting of the War Cabinet on the
5th of September Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts was
requested 'to hold an investigation into the last two
'nights' raids and favour the War Cabinet with his views
'as to the provision of protection for the civil population
'in the future, and his proposals as to carrying the air war
'into Germany at the earliest possible moment'. Lieu-
tenant-General Smuts lost no time. He consulted the
various experts and, on the 6th, submitted a paper to the
War Cabinet in which he set down the main aspects
1917] GENERAL J. C. SMUTS 65
of the problem. I He laid stress on the point that the only
proper defence against the night attacks was an offensive
aimed at the enemy's air bases. 'Our aeroplanes', he said,
'afford no means of defence at night as they find it impos-
'sible to see the enemy machines even at a distance of a
'couple of hundred yards. In the recent night raids they
'have been sent into the air, but to no purpose, and they
'might just as well have remained on the ground.' Two
measures of defence, he continued, would be tried in the
London area. The first would be the installation of more
powerful searchlights with a view to blinding the enemy
pilots, temporarily, and so making it difficult or impossible
for them to navigate. The second measure would be the
establishment of a wire screen suspended from balloons
'and intended to form a sort of barrage in which the
'enemy machine navigated at night will be caught'.
The memorandum, like the others prepared by Lieu-
tenant-General Smuts on the subject of air warfare, is of
some historic interest. Although, however, it was true
at the time the paper was written that the defending
aeroplanes had been of little account at night, the promise
of the pioneer flight made by the 'Camel' pilots on the
night of the 3rd of September had not perhaps been ade-
quately appreciated. The difficulty now was not very
different from that which we had had to overcome before
the Zeppelin had been defeated. It was not until the
importance of the part played by searchlights in the
scheme of aeroplane defence was realized that pilots
could look forward to attacking airships with some
assurance of success.^ Although bombing aeroplanes did
not form a target comparable with Zeppehns, and search-
lights lost some of their power on moonlight nights, the
point was that if the bombers could be illuminated the
fighting pilots could be expected to prove that the fighting
aeroplane would be no less effective by night than it was by
day. The defending aeroplanes might still do their part
even without illumination provided the searchlights' beams
were reasonably accurately concentrated on the sound
made by the enemy aircraft. If they did not search, but
' Appendix VII. 2 See Vol. Ill, p. 148. Also pp. 165-70.
2504.5 F
66 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
steadily followed the sound, the defending pilots, guided
to the meeting-point of the searchlight beams, would
have a good opportunity to pick up the enemy aeroplane
by the flame from its exhaust.
Major-General E. B. Ashmore, in his book Air Defence
(p. 54) has something to say about this aspect of the
question. 'As a result of these raids', he writes, 'it appeared
'to me that, although we should have to rely mainly on
'the gun barrage for a time, it would only be for a time
'and that, after some training and practice, a large number
'of pilots would follow the pioneers of the 3rd September
'and fly scouts at night. If the scouts could find the
'bomber it should be possible to repeat the 1916 success
'of the aeroplane in night defence.' He goes on to describe
how he cleared the aeroplane patrol zone of guns and put
additional searchlights in their place so that pilots would
be able to fly without risk from gun-fire and with an added
chance of finding their targets illuminated for them. The
outer gun barrage was, at the time, in the form of a cres-
cent on the east side of London with the points near
Hatfield in the north and near Redhill in the south. 'The
'guns taken out of the patrol zone, with the addition of six
'batteries of mobile guns from the east and north-east of
'England, were therefore used to extend the barrier which
'was eventually to form a complete circle round London,
'about ten miles out from the thickly populous area. None
'of our aeroplanes were to fly at night in the area just
'outside the gun barrier; the guns could be certain that
'any aeroplane heard there was hostile. On the morning
'after the London raid I produced my idea for a balloon
'apron barrage to be put up just outside London and
'inside the aeroplane patrol lines. The idea was at once
'approved by Lord French, and also by General Smuts,
'who was then the special adviser of the War Cabinet on
*air defence matters.' ^
Balloon Aprons
The idea of netting areas of the sky had been put
forward from time to time before and during the war. On
^ Air Defence, pp. 54-5.
1917] BALLOONS OVER VENICE 67
the Allied side sometliing of the sort had been tried at
Venice, and a Royal Flying Corps officer had been sent
to Italy, at the end of June 191 7, to report on the scheme.
It appeared that there were seven balloon stations at
Venice, each provided with ten balloons. At the begin-
ning of each moonlight period the balloons were inflated,
and they so remained while the possibiHty of raids existed.
When required for use, the balloons were hooked to cables
on winches attached to rafts which were towed at dusk
to allotted points. The balloons were let up to about
10,000 feet, at distances of just over 200 feet, around
Venice. Any enemy aircraft which descended to the height
of the balloons, or lower, ran the risk of fouhng the bal-
loons or the cables by which they were connected with the
rafts. I
Major-General Ashmore put forward his scheme for a
London balloon barrage on the 5th of September. Making
reference, in his memorandum, to the raids of the two
previous nights, he said: 'It is also shown that guns,
'defending machines, and such lights as we have at
'present, are quite ineffective as a reply. This being the
'case it will, I think, be necessary to divert production
'from other objects to meet the new danger.' He went
on to suggest the balloon barrage and he proposed that
between the balloons a cross cable should carry weighted
wire streamers to form a so-called apron. He asked that
as many observation balloons of the Caquot type as could
be spared should be sent home from France, and that
orders should be given for one hundred small balloons of
^ A form of balloon and kite barrage was tried experimentally by the
Germans in the winter ofi9i4/i5, but nothing much was done with this
form of defence until March 1 91 7, when balloon-barrage detachments
were formed to protect important industrial estabhshments. Balloons (or
kites when the wind was strong) were let up to about 8,000 feet. The
cables had thin wires attached (called side-branches) carried by open wind
sleeves. The barrages were expensive to maintain, but they were continued
until the end of the war because their moral effect was considered to be
great. The effect was twofold, on the crew of the bombing aircraft and
on the people who were protected. See articles on Home Defence in Ger-
many in Die Luftwacht, May-October 191 8, by Major Grosskreutz (Army)
and by Captain Meine (Navy).
68 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
the type used in the defence of Venice. He proposed to
use the latter, each on a single light cable, over the water-
ways of the Medway and of the Thames.
The scheme was approved by the Government, and,
after some experiment, Major-General Ashmore was able
to state, on the 19th of September, that he was arranging
to instal two balloon aprons on the easterly borders of
London. Each apron would consist of five Caquot
balloons disposed in a straight line 2,000 yards in length,
with the balloons linked together by cable and anchored
to the ground at three points: wire streamers, 1,000 feet
long, were to be suspended from the horizontal connecting
cables.^ On the 22nd of September, in orders issued to
home defence pilots, it was stated: 'Balloon Aprons and
'other obstructions will be established on the line: east
'side of Lewisham — east side of Plumstead — one mile
'east of Barking — east edge of Ilford, east edge of Wanstead
' — north edge of Tottenham. No machines are to fly
'across this line during operations at a height less than
'10,000 feet.' The order went on to say that in the
London area anti-aircraft guns would fire, by sight and
by sound, on all enemy aircraft within the Apron Line.
At a War Cabinet meeting on the ist of October
Major-General Ashmore stated that the maximum height
of the balloons was, at that time, 7,000 feet. Five days
later he reported that the first of the aprons was in suc-
cessful operation, and that he proposed to proceed with
the full scheme for the installation of a cordon of twenty
such obstacles. The aprons, he said, would each be let up
nightly to heights varying between 7,000 and 10,000 feet
and thus present a line of streamers 1,000 feet deep over
a distance of 20,000 yards. He also put forward an estab-
lishment for a Home Wing of five balloon squadrons
which would require a total personnel of 3,587. The
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, agreed to these pro-
posals, and, on the 23rd of October, informed the London
District that approval had been given for 'the installation
'of a cordon of 20 Balloon aprons, approximately on the
^ As finally decided, however, three balloons instead of five were em-
ployed for each apron.
I9I8] LONDON BALLOON APRONS 69
'line, Tottenham, Ilford, Barking, Woolwich and Lewis-
'ham, subject to such modifications as experience may
'suggest.' According to a report of Lord French, made
on the 17th of January 191 8, three aprons were then in
operation, each consisting of 'three Caquot captive bal-
' loons 500 yards apart connected by a horizontal wire from
'which are suspended steel wires 1,000 feet in length at
^ '25 yards intervals.'
• In a memorandum dated the 1 5th of April 19 18 Major-
General Ashmore stated that seven aprons were in action,
and that the eighth was nearly ready. 'We have at last
'succeeded', he went on, 'in finding a good form of stream-
'hne balloon, larger than the ordinary Caquot. . . . We
'have tried experiments with small balloons, to go up in
'important places where an apron would not be possible.
'A suitable type and wire have been found and small
'balloons are being installed.' On the 27th of May, in
another report, it was stated that nine of the authorized
twenty aprons were in action, all east of London, eight
being north of the Thames and one to the south. 'These
'aprons', said Major-General Ashmore, 'are at present
'capable of attaining a height of 9,500 feet. Balloons of
1 'a new design are now in manufacture. With these it will
I 'be possible to raise an apron of an increased depth to
1 'some 12,000 feet. In my opinion, the balloon aprons are
I 'an essential part of defence; to do away with them would
I 'have the worst possible effect. Our aeroplane patrols
j 'would have to cover all heights instead of a comparatively
i 'narrow zone as at present. London would certainly be
'bombed from low heights at which considerable accuracy
I 'is attainable.'
j After the German night aeroplane attack on London
I on the 1 9th /20th of May 1 9 1 8 , during which eight Gothas
j were destroyed or forced down by defence pilots or by
I gun-fire,^ there was a confident feeling in England that
the German aeroplane menace had at length been over-
come. On the 14th of June the Air Council informed the
War Office that the tenth balloon apron would complete
the programme for the defence of London, 'a decision
^ See pp. 127-30.
70 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
'having been made that no further aprons will be formed.'
In other words, the balloon apron scheme was cut down
hy half. The position, when the war ended, was that eight
aprons were in position from Edmonton to the Thames,
and two from the Thames to East Wickham. The balloons
were of three types: (i) Caquots of 33,000 cu. ft. capacity,
capable of lifting the apron to 8,500 feet, (ii) Caquots of
40,000 cu. ft. capacity for a height of 9,600 feet, and (iii)
Italian balloons of 37,000 cu. ft. capacity which could
reach a height of 1 1,000 feet. It is of interest that the in-
tention, before it was decided to curtail the apron scheme,
was to produce balloons for an apron height of 15,000 feet,
and that heights of 20,000 feet were talked about.
Height-finding Instruments
Although the detailed developments of anti-aircraft
gunnery during the war do not come within the scope of
this history, it will be necessary to make a few general
observations on the subject. Aircraft introduced new
problems into gunnery. Naval or land targets are deter-
mined in two dimensions, but the positions of air targets
must be determined in three. This, however, would be
comparatively unimportant if it were not for the rapid and
variable movement of the target in the air. The older
methods of naval and military gunnery assumed that the
position and speed of a target did not appreciably change
during the minute or so required to calculate, from the
observations made, how the gun should be trained. The
first shots were then considered to be trial ones, the
observation of which would enable further immediate
corrections to be made. Methods of this kind, applied to
aircraft, would be useless for the reason that the target
could not be expected to remain within range long enough
to permit of detailed calculations. Furthermore, the
anti-aircraft guns must be ready to fire at targets made
invisible by clouds or by the shades of night.
The problem then was to design instruments to make
it possible to determine, with great rapidity, the position
of the target, visible or invisible. Until early in 1916
anti-aircraft gunnery was based on range, and various
i9i6] HEIGHT-FINDERS 71
types of range-finder, beginning with the horizontal Barr
and Stroud, were used. It was, however, difficult to pick
up targets in the wide expanse of sky, and even if a correct
range was obtained, by the time corrections had been
made and transferred to the gun sights the aircraft had
travelled so far that the information had already become
valueless. It was soon realized that what the gunner
chiefly required to know was the height of his target above
the ground. This may be understood if one remembers
that in order to determine how the gun should be pointed,
the gunner must know not only the range, but also the
angle of sight, that is, the angle, measured in a vertical
plane, between the line of sight and the horizontal. From
these two quantities the height of the target above the
ground is easily calculable. Conversely, if the height and
angle of sight are known, the range can be calculated.
Now the range, because the aircraft is moving rapidly, is
subject to constant change, whereas the height may be
expected to remain more or less the same for minutes
together. On this assumption, to any one gunner a know-
ledge of the height of his target, ascertained a few seconds
before he is ready to fire, will be as valuable as if he knew
the height at the moment of firing. Furthermore, the
height, once known, will serve as useful information for
all anti-aircraft guns in the neighbourhood. That is to
say, a single determination of the height by one instrument
will serve all local guns alike, whereas every gun would
require its own range-finder.
This consideration led to the replacement for anti-
aircraft gunnery of the range-finders, used in other forms
of gunnery, by height-finders. Two principles were em-
ployed in these instruments. The first, represented by
the Barr and Stroud Height- Finder, was essentially the
calculation of height from the range and angle of sight.
The Barr and Stroud range-finder with a base of two
metres was combined with a scale for measuring the angle
of sight, and a mechanical arrangement of gear-wheels
and cams calculated the height from these quantities. The
instrument was ingenious and, although the base was
short, heights of many thousands of feet could be measured
72 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
with all the accuracy that was required. The Barr and
Stroud Height-Finder was, however, expensive and some-
what elaborate and did not come into general use in the
war.
The second principle was suggested to the Munitions
Inventions Department in January 191 6, independently,
by Mr. G. T. Bennett of the National Physical Laboratory
and by Lieutenant J. M. Mansell-Pleydell, and it also
appears to have been discovered in France about the same
time. It is generally known as the 'Bennett' or 'Roof
principle, which can best be illustrated with reference to
a figure.
H'
Let us assume that ABH'H and CDH'H are two
sighting planes in use at the observing stations A and C
which are a known distance apart. The planes are hinged
horizontally along the parallel lines AB and CD. They
are rotated until the target, G, is sighted in both planes
simultaneously, when a reading of the angles HAC and
HCA will suffice to determine the height HT. AB and
CD being horizontal and parallel, HH' is also horizontal.
Therefore the height, HJ^ is constant for an object any-
where along the line HH' ,
In its practical appHcation, sighting tubes were pivotally
mounted on trunnions at two stations about a mile apart.
These trunnions, corresponding with the lines AB and
CD in the figure, were parallel the one with the other.
They were so mounted on fixed supports that the angles
HAC and HCA could be immediately read on a scale.
At each station were two men, one called the observer
T9i6] SOUND-LOCATORS 73
and the other the telephonist. As soon as an observer
sighted the target he reported to his telephonist who
communicated the information to the plotting-station.
When the telephonist at the plotting-station received news
from the second observer that he also was on the target,
he ordered 'stop' to both stations and each observer
at once reported the angle indicated on his instrument.
These angles were then transferred to a plotting diagram,
already prepared, and on this the height of the target
could be immediately read, and the reading was then
communicated, hy telephone, to the anti-aircraft gunners.
The whole process from the time of the sighting of the
target to the recording of its height, took about five
seconds. This particular type of finder, known as the
Bennett Height- Finder Telephonic Solution, was taken
up early in 191 6 by the Munitions Inventions Department,
which also developed other instruments different in kind,
but embodying the same principle. An electrical device
was also adopted which combined into a single automatic
operation the communication of the angles at the two
ends of the base and the calculation of the height. The
observers had only to keep the target in the planes of their
instrument and the height could be read off a volt-meter
placed in any convenient position near the guns. The
cost of the original Bennett Height-Finder was about £20,
but the electrical type, which required a somevv^hat com-
plicated installation, cost about ^£500. By the time of the
Armistice, the majority of the height-finders in use for
home defence were of the electrical kind.
Sound-Locators^
The development of sound-locators for finding the
direction of aircraft, audible but invisible from the ground,
began in 191 7. The idea was that if the approximate
position of night-flying aircraft could be indicated to the
searchlight personnel, it would not be long before the
target would be illuminated so that the height-finders and
^ The development of sound-locating instruments is summarized in an
article, 'Binaural Sound-Locators', by E. T. Paris, D.Sc, F.Inst.P., in
Science Progress for January 1933.
74 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
gun-sights could determine its exact position. Sound
waves travel in the air at about i,ioo feet per second, that
is to say, about ten times the speed of the w^ar-time Gotha
bombing aeroplane. What may be called the ^line of
sound' is the direction of the aircraft at the moment when
the engine noise which reaches the listener's ears left the
aircraft. But while the sound waves have been travelling
earthwards the aircraft has moved appreciably, say a
quarter of a mile or more. Furthermore, the air is not the
clear medium for sound which it is, on a fine day, for light.
The air is apt to play tricks with sound waves which are
refracted by the temperature lapse-rate in the atmosphere,
and by the variation of wind strength and direction with
height above the earth's surface. If the speed and direc-
tion of an aeroplane were known, it would be possible to
calculate its actual position at any moment from that in-
dicated by the sound-locator, or as is popularly known, to
'correct for the lag of sound'. The data for this calcula-
tion, however, were often unknown under war conditions.
The direction of an enemy aeroplane at night, for example,
could only be guessed and this, with the other variables,
made sound-location a very approximate affair. Neverthe-
less, the instruments evolved during the war were of great
value, especially when employed in close co-operation with
searchlights and as a help to the anti-aircraft gunners
subsequent to the adoption of barrage fire. It has some-
times been said that had it not been for the sound-locators
the German night aeroplane campaign would never have
been defeated. This is going too far, chiefly because it
is based on a belief that the barrage fire was far more effec-
tive than it was. When all allowances have been made,
however, it can still be said that sound-locating instru-
ments played a notable part in the effective development
of air defence.
To understand the principle of the locators, we may
begin by asking how, with the unaided ears, a definite
impression of the direction of a sound is obtained. There
is a delicate sense by which the reception in the two ears
is differentiated. A sound coming from the right will
reach the right ear a fraction of time before it reaches the
I9I7] THE CLAUDE ORTHOPHONE 75
left, and vice versa, w^hile one coming from direct ahead,
or behind, will reach both ears at the same moment. A
person w^ill usually turn instinctively towards a sound until
the reception in both his ears is identical and he will then
know that the noise comes directly from in front or from
behind. It is possible to distinguish between these alterna-
tives to some extent, but the distinction is not so readily
made as may be supposed. As the difference in sound
reception in the two ears is one of time, it is obvious that
if they were farther apart it would be still easier to deter-
mine direction. If two trumpets placed, say, five feet
apart, were connected to the ears by tubing, the effective
distance between the ears would be increased about ten
times.
Such was the principle of a binaural sound-locator,
known as the 'Claude Orthophone', used by the French
Army for detecting enemy guns and machine-guns. When
the design of sound-locators began in this country, under
the direction of Professor A. V. Hill in the Anti-Aircraft
Experimental Section of the Munitions Inventions Depart-
ment, the Claude Orthophone seems to have provided a
starting-point. The British instrument made use of two
pairs of trumpets. One pair, fixed parallel, at the ends of
a horizontal arm, rotated about a vertical axis under the
control of the listener who moved the trumpets until the
sound appeared to come from in front (or behind). The
listener then knew that the source of the sound was some-
where in the vertical plane symmetrically situated between
the two trumpets. The second pair of trumpets rotated
about a horizontal axis carried by the first pair. A second
listener adjusted the second set of trumpets until the sound
appeared to be directly in front of him, and thus obtained
the angle made by the direction of the sound with the
horizon. In other words, the two pairs of trumpets enabled
the observers to obtain the direction of the target in ele-
vation and in azimuth. Corrections then had to be made
for the so-called 'sound-lag', and these were effected by a
simple device, called a 'ring-sight', designed in the Anti-
Aircraft Experimental Section. The direction finally ob-
tained was signalled to the searchlight operators who at
76 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. i
once searched for the target. A defect of this type of
locator was the difficulty experienced in trying to eliminate
extraneous sounds, such, for instance, as came from nearby
motor-cars. The Munitions Inventions Department ex-
perimented with many other types of sound-locator during
the war, but only one of these calls for notice. This was
employed on the south-east coast and made use of a con-
cave surface cut into the face of a cliff. The sound waves
were collected by the instrument, at their point of maxi-
mum concentration. This type of locator proved of value
in giving warning of the approach of German bombing
aircraft from Belgium: they were sometimes detected as
far away from the coast as fifteen or twenty miles.
Barrage Fire
A period of quiet had followed the attack of the 4th/5th
of September, owing chiefly to a break in the weather.
It was during this time that the new scheme of anti-
aircraft gun-fire, to which reference has been made in the
extracts quoted from Major-General Ashmore's book,^
was devised. Two zones were established in which the
defence aeroplanes were forbidden to fly: one, the so-
called Silent Zone, was on the enemy side of the outer line
of guns, and the other was in the immediate London area.
Any aircraft heard or seen within these areas could be
treated as hostile and the anti-aircraft gunners could fire,
unhesitatingly, at sight or sound. There was much dis-
cussion about the form the fire should take and Lieutenant-
Colonel Simon and Captain A. R. F. Kingscote worked at a
scheme which aimed at placing a series of 'curtains' of shell
bursts in the path of the invisible raiding aeroplanes. The
scheme, when ready, allowed for barrage fire which would
give screens of shell bursts about 2,500 feet from top to
bottom. The screens could be ordered for five different
heights, varying between 17,000 and 5,000 feet and classi-
fied as 'very high', 'high', 'normal', 'low' and 'very low',
normal being what was known as the 'conventional' height
of 10,000 feet. The map used by the anti-aircraft gunners
was divided into numbered squares, and as the enemy
^ See p. 66.
I9I7] BARRAGE FIRE 77
aeroplanes were shown, according to sound-plotting, to
be about to enter a particular square, the controlling
officer directed vertical barrage fire on the face of that
square. As the bombers passed from square to square in
the barrage zones they would be met hy successive barrage
screens. If, however, a target was found hy a searchlight
beam, the barrage fire was to cease and direct shooting was
to begin. There was just enough opportunity to set in
train the preliminary arrangements connected with this
type of fire before the next series of raids began.
CHAPTER II
GERMAN AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN
igiy-igi8 {Concluded)
The Harvest Moon
The moon reached its first quarter on the 24th of
September 19 17, and on that night began a series of
attacks which remained more vividly than any others in
the memory of most of those v^ho hved through the air
raids on England.
14 On the 24th the moon set at 10.21 p.m., and by that
time the bombers were clear of the country. Sixteen
Gothas had come in at intervals from 7 p.m., at heights
of about 8,000 feet, between Dover in the south and
Orfordness in the north, with London for objective, but
no more than three had attacked the capital. The bombs
on London were scattered over a fairly wide area and
they destroyed houses and shops: fourteen people were
killed and thirty-six injured by bombs, and thirteen more
were injured by anti-aircraft shells. Most of the casualties
(thirteen killed, twenty-six injured) were caused by one
high explosive bomb which burst at the entrance to the
Bedford Hotel in Southampton Row. The crew of one of
the Gothas reported on their return that they believed
they had hit the Admiralty buildings, and, making allow-
ance for the darkness and for the height at which they flew,
they were little out in their reckoning. One of the bombs
from this Gotha fell in the Thames opposite St. Thomas's
Hospital, another in Dean's Yard, Westminster, and a third
in the Green Park near the Ritz Hotel. A bomb which
struck Burlington House passed through the roof of No. 9
Gallery into the basement and caused damage to the
building and to some statuary.
Outside London the greatest effect was obtained at
Dover, where fifty-five bombs fell. They killed five people
and injured eleven, and caused damage to houses, a chapel,
and a gas-works. Other bombs exploded at various places
in Kent and Essex, but, except at Leybourne camp, they
did no harm. On the camp, and on the nearby villages of
1917] THE HARVEST MOON 79
East and West Mailing, sixteen bombs were dropped:
two soldiers in the camp were killed and ten injured.
None of the thirty British pilots who went up during the
raid encountered the enemy, and although it seemed that
one Gotha was brought down by anti-aircraft gun-fire in
the Thames off Sheerness, the German records show that
all the bombers returned. One, however, crashed near its
home aerodrome, and as the evidence is strong that a
Gotha was hit over the Thames it is possible that the
aeroplane which crashed had received some damage.
Not long after the last of the aeroplanes had gone, the
east coast, from Norfolk to Yorkshire, was responding to
the alarm of Zeppelins. Ten airships, led by Fregatten- Map
kapitan Strasser, crossed the North Sea during the after-
noon of the 24th and kept a rendezvous off Flamborough
Head.^ According to our observation no more than five
of the airships dropped bombs on land, but the German
official records show eight Zeppelins attacking land targets
and two bombing ships at sea.
The Z.55 (Kapitanleutnant Flemming) came in at
BridHngton at 12.15 ^"^^ cruised, seawards of Scar-
borough, to Whitby. After circling Whitby she went on
searching, so it seemed, for the works at Skinningrove,
a favourite objective for airship attack. About 1.40 a.m.
Flemming bore down on Skinningrove from the direction
of the sea and dropped six bombs which exploded harm-
lessly four miles south of the works. The Z.55 was then
found by the Skinningrove searchhght, and anti-aircraft
gun-fire was opened, but the black paint on her underside
made it difficult for the searchlight operators to hold her.
While she was illuminated, however, she was seen by
Second Lieutenant W. W. Cook, a Royal Flying Corps
pilot in a B.E.2e, who estimated her height at 16,000 feet.
He gave chase, but a strong westerly wind was blowing
and the airship soon disappeared after she turned out to
sea. Additional bombs from the Z.55 fell in the sea near
Staithes.^
^ An eleventh airship, the Z.52, set out, but she had engine trouble and
turned back.
2 Flemming thought his attack was made on Hull. He refers to the
8o AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
The L.41 (Hauptmann Manger) attacked Hull. She
came in over Hornsea at 1.27 a.m., crossed to Beverley,
and then followed the railway to Hull, the usual way of
approach to the city by Zeppelins. The L.41 crossed
Hull, at full speed, from north-west to east and, at 2.40
a.m., dropped sixteen bombs which caused injury to three
women, but inflicted little damage. The airship passed
over the river and came in again above the east side of the
city, dropping four more bombs in a field at Marfleet.
She then went on towards Paull, where she came under
fire, after which she turned off in a north-easterly direction.
Four more bombs came from her as she passed near
Preston.^ Second Lieutenant W. W. Cook, who was
flying south after his brief pursuit of the X.55, saw the
Paull searchlight and then detected the outline of the
L.41, He was over Beverley at the time, at 14,500 feet,
with the Zeppelin at about 16,000 feet. He made for the
airship, but lost her as soon as the Paull searchlight was
switched off. He then steered for the coast in the hope
of finding one of the returning raiders and, after a trying
patrol, ten miles off the coast, he caught sight of an airship
at sea east of Hornsea about 3 a.m. He gave chase, but
could not force his B.E.2e to the height of the Zeppelin.
At a range of about 800 yards, however, he fired four
drums at the stern of the Zeppelin, but there was no
visible result and, after vainly pursuing her until he was
sixty miles out to sea, he gave up the chase and returned.
So far as can be judged his attack was made on the L.42
(Kapitanleutnant Martin Dietrich). This ship, which had
had engine trouble, turned home after dropping bombs
on what appeared to be shipping off the Humber, Dietrich
in his official report refers to aeroplanes being seen below
the ship, and although he does not say that he was attacked,
he found, on his return to his base, that there were two
bullet holes in one of the gas-cells. He gives his height,
searchlights and to heavy anti-aircraft fire, but he did not, apparently, see
the aeroplane.
^ Manger, in his report, says Hull was clearly outlined. He dropped his
bombs (one 300-kg., five loo-kg., ten 50-kg., and twenty incendiaries) in
two loads from 16,600 feet.
I9I7] ZEPPELINS ESCAPE 8i
when he dropped his bombs, as 18,300 feet. Second
Lieutenant Cook had been ill-rewarded for his two fine
attempts to attack the airships, and the escape of one of
them — the L.42 — may be said to be due to the fact that
the B.E.2e was outclassed in speed and 'ceiling' by the latest
type Zeppelins.
The L.46 (Kapitanleutnant Hollender with Strasser
aboard) came a few miles inland, south of Grimsby, and
eventually dropped the majority of her bombs near the
Lincolnshire village of Cuxwold. What attracted her
commander were lights showing on a landing ground of
the Royal Flying Corps, but the bombs fell in fields and
no damage was done. The L.46 then turned east and went
straight out to sea, south of Spurn Head, about 3 a.m.^
TheZ.55 (Kapitanleutnant d. R. Prolss) was making for
Sheffield, but strong head-winds impeded her and she
attacked the Boston district of South Lincolnshire; her
bombs fell in open country and caused neither damage
nor casualties.
The boldest flight was made by the L.35 (Kapitan-
leutnant Ehrlich) which was over land from 12.5 a.m. to
a little after 4 a.m. Her commander seems to have made
a determined effort to find a suitable target before
dropping his bombs. The night was cloudy and the Z.55
flew at a great height: it was, therefore, difficult to pick
out important objectives. About 2.30 a.m. the airship
was making direct for Barnsley, but lights to the south
brought about a change of course. These came from the
Parkgate iron and steel works and from Silverwood
colliery, north of Rotherham. They were not put out
until receipt of a late warning five minutes after the Z.J5
had altered course. The sudden extinction of the lights,
however, undoubtedly saved the works from severe
bombing. The best the airship commander could do was
to drop his bombs in a long line across the ground where
he judged the lights had been displayed.^ From Thurnscoe
' Hollender's report shows that he was attracted hy the lights, but he
thought they indicated the town of Grimsby. He was under the impression,
therefore, that his attack was made on the town.
^ EhrHch, in his report, says the target was well lighted and that the
2S04.5 n
82 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
to Ryecroft twenty-five bombs fell in succession, but they
missed their targets and the only damage was to glass and
to a wall.
There were no casualties for the whole raid, other
than the three women injured at Hull, and the material
damage, as mentioned, was slight. Nor is there any record
of ships at sea being attacked. In all, four naval and
thirty-three military aeroplanes were sent up, but only
Second Lieutenant W. W. Cook came within reach of the
enemy. All pilots were handicapped, as were the airship
commanders, by the low clouds and by the strong
westerly wind. One aeroplane, apparently blown out to
sea, was lost with its pilot and observer, and two other
aeroplanes crashed and killed an observer and injured a
pilot. So far as could be judged none of the Zeppelins flew
under 16,000 feet, a height at which they were safe from
the majority of the aeroplanes which ascended.
Next night, the 25th of September, an aeroplane attack
was made with London as the objective, but the bombers
J5 were not long over England. Fifteen Gothas came in
between 7 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. and they had all left again
by 8.35 p.m. Three of them attacked the south-eastern
districts of London, but the remainder bombed East Kent
between the North Foreland and Folkestone. The bombs
on Kent (about 34) damaged a house and injured a
soldier, but otherwise exploded without harm. In London,
Camberwell and Bermondsey suffered most, but the
casualties were not high if account is taken of the crowded
nature of the districts attacked. Six people were killed
and twenty injured as a result of the bombing, and three
were killed and three more injured by anti-aircraft shells.
Twenty pilots went up, mostly in B.E.'s and F.E.'s. One
pilot of No. 78 Squadron was fired at by a Gotha at
9,400 feet near Joyce Green, and he thereupon turned to
pursue the enemy aeroplane, the rearmost of three, and
kept up a running fire for ten minutes until she dis-
appeared. It is known that one of the Gothas failed to
lights were extinguished as soon as he began his attack. He was trying to
reach Sheffield, but the wind was too strong. He correctly estimated that
he was near Doncaster.
1917] ATTACKS ON LONDON 83
reach home and was, presumably, lost at sea. According to
German information this aeroplane was shot down by gun-
fire, but most of the anti-aircraft guns which came into
action fired by sound, and very few gunners so much as
obtained a glimpse of their target : none of them claimed
to have made a hit.
There was a respite for two days and then, beginning
on the 28th of September, raids were made on four
successive nights. Twenty-five Gothas and two Giant
aeroplanes (the first of this type to visit England) set out
on the 28th to bomb London, but fifteen Gothas turned Map 16
back because of heavy clouds, and one owing to engine
trouble. German accounts do not show whether any of
these reached England before deciding to give up the raid,
but according to our observation at the time about twenty
German aeroplanes crossed the coasts, although few of them
dropped bombs. The actual attacks were made, between
7.30 p.m. and 10 p.m., on the Thames Estuary, on the
counties of Kent and Essex, and on the district north of
Harwich. About forty- four bombs were traced; they
caused no casualties and little damage. Twenty defence
pilots left the ground, but owing to the thickness of the
cloud-banks they saw nothing of the enemy. Difiicult as
the conditions were, the anti-aircraft gunners claimed
some successes. Two aeroplanes which approached Deal
at 8.47 p.m. were heavily engaged by guns on shore and
in ships. The Deal gunners reported that a shell hit one
of the two bombers and that the damaged aeroplane
appeared to fall into the sea: what is certain is that the
enemy aircraft disappeared without dropping any bombs.
H.M.S. Marshal Ney also claimed that she had brought
down a bomber oil Ramsgate as it was coming in at
7.50 p.m. Yet another success was reported. Three
bombing aeroplanes which passed along the coast of
Sheppey were fired at soon after 8 p.m. and the anti-
aircraft gunners at Port Victoria and Neats Court con-
fidently stated that one of the bombers was shot down ofl:
Barton's Point. A search was subsequently made, but no
trace was found of any of the aeroplanes reported to have
been shot down. It is now known, however, that three
84 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
Gothas failed to return from the attack on this night and
the credit for their destruction may therefore be ascribed
to the gunners mentioned. The German bombing squad-
ron suffered yet more heavily, for it is also revealed that
of the Gothas v^^hich returned to Belgium six v^ere w^recked
on landing.
Although the attack next night, the 29th, w2ls less
17 ambitious in conception, London suffered heavily. Seven
Gothas and three Giant aeroplanes took part, all of them
v^ith London for objective. At the time, v^e were
under the impression that at least eighteen aeroplanes
crossed the coast and that many of them w^ere driven
back by gun-fire w^ithout dropping any bombs. Of the
total of fifty-five bombs w^hich we were able to trace,
thirty fell on various places in Kent, notably on Sheerness,
where one soldier was injured and the railway was damaged.
The Uplees Powder Works, north of Faversham, had a
narrow escape from four high explosive bombs which
buried themselves in the mud close to the works.
There were clouds over London and the visibility
generally was poor, but so far as could be judged the
capital was bombed by four aeroplanes between 9.10 p.m.
and 9.45 p.m. Most of the damage done was to house
property, particularly in the Notting Hill, Kingsland,
and Kennington districts. Two bombs which fell on
Waterloo Station did hurt to nobody, but they damaged
the permanent way and rolling stock. The casualties in
London, due to the bombing, were twelve killed and
sixty-two injured.
Nearly as much damage was done by anti-aircraft
gun-fire as by bombs. No fewer than 12,700 shells, in
barrage fire, were sent up by the anti-aircraft gunners,
about half of them by the inner and outer London
defences. They killed two people and caused injury to
twenty-four, and damaged 290 houses, about half of them
seriously. One Gotha was brought down in flames by
anti-aircraft fire as it was coming in at Dover, and another,
for some reason unknown, made a forced landing in
Holland. Thirty defence aeroplanes took the air, but there
were no combats.
1917] FULL MOON 85
On the 30th of September, with the moon at the full, Map 18
the activity began about 6.40 p.m. and continued, inter-
mittently, until ID p.m., when the last enemy aeroplane was
clear of the country. The bombers came in at intervals and
were heard over much of the coast-line between Dover
and Clacton. It was difficult to follow their movements,
but it was concluded that some twenty-five aeroplanes
took part in the raid, and that eight of them reached the
London district. It is now clear that the main raid was
made by no more than ten Gothas, and that there was
a subsidiary attack on Dover by one smaller type aeroplane.
It appeared to the various German crews that their attack
on London had been one of the most effective made up
to that time, and that the city, the Admiralty, and
Thameside warehouses, had been hit. In fact, the material
damage was comparatively slight (£y,6oo by bombs and
anti-aircraft gun-fire), and was chiefly caused to houses in
the east London area. The Midland Railway cleaning
sheds at West Ham were hit, and three locomotives, the
sheds, and nearby houses were damaged. Elsewhere,
Poplar (i killed, 9 injured) and Highgate (5 injured)
suffered most. The total casualties in the London area
were one killed and seventeen injured.
Margate was also bombed rather heavily (16 bombs), and
several houses were damaged : the casualties were 1 1 killed
(including 5 soldiers) and six injured. About twenty-six
additional bombs fell on various places in Kent, and three
at Thorpe Bay, Essex, but they were ineffective. The
smaller type bomber which attacked Dover dropped only
four i2-kg. bombs which slightly damaged the Dover
Engineering Works and injured one man.
Once again the anti-aircraft gunners were compelled
to fire by sound as the targets were seldom or never
visible. They fired a total of 14,061 rounds which killed
two persons and caused injury to fourteen in the London
district, and did minor damage to property. The Ger-
man crews, in their reports, make reference to the heavy
bombardment to which they were subjected, but there is
I no doubt that the barrage fire appeared to be far more
effective than in fact it was. It seemed at the time, for
86 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
instance, that the vigorous fire of the guns in the Chatham
area forced 'several' enemy pilots to abandon the idea of
proceeding to London. There is some evidence that one
Gotha turned back and bombed Margate, but most of
the bombers came overland across Essex, not Kent.
At a meeting of the War Cabinet held the following
day, Lord French brought forw^ard for urgent decision
the question of replacements for the 3-inch 20-cvv^t. guns
in the London area. The life of each gun was stated to be
no more than 1,500 rounds, and during the recent raids
a total of 27,300 rounds had been fired. He also urged
the provision of more guns to complete the London
barrage. It was decided that a committee, under the
chairmanship of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, should
meet the same afternoon to inquire into these questions,
and about the supply of anti-aircraft ammunition. ^
The War Cabinet proceeded to discuss the possibihty
of making air raids into Germany. The Press, it was stated,
had for some time been fostering a strong agitation for
reprisals, and it seemed that the feeling of the public
favoured immediate counter-attacks. Furthermore, al-
though the damage to life and property as a result of the
moonlight raids was small, the military consequences
were not inconsiderable. Mr. Winston Churchill, the
Minister of Munitions,^ made this clear when he placed
before the meeting a memorandum which showed how
the recent raids had affected the output of munitions at
Woolwich Arsenal ('typical of what was taking place over
a wide area'). The paper showed that for the night-shift
of the 24th/25th of September 1917 the position in the
filling factory was as shown in the table opposite.
It will be noticed that the loss of output was out of all
proportion to the percentage of employees who stayed
away from work.
^ The Committee consisted of Lieutenant-General Smuts, the Minister
of Munitions, the President of the Air Board, the Director-General of
Military Aeronautics, the Master-General of Ordnance, and the General
Officer Commanding London Air Defence Area. The First Sea Lord and
the Fifth Sea Lord also attended.
* Mr. Churchill became Minister of Munitions in July 1917.
17] WOOLWICH ARSENAL OUTPUT 87
Percentage
of hands
present.
A dual
Output.
Normal
Output.
per cent.
O'303-inch ....
27
140,000
850,000
7-62-mm. ....
47
60,000
300,000
Rifle grenade cartridges .
27
34,000
125,000
Next night, the 25th/26th, when the bombers were
over England only about ij hours, there was some im-
provement as follows :
Percentage
of hands
A ctual
Normal
present.
Output.
Output.
per cent.
o*303-inch ....
64
283,000
850,000
7-62-mm. ....
78
132,000
300,000
Rifle grenade cartridges
64
65,000
125,000
Although the raids took place at night they also affected
the day-shift output as these figures for the 25th of
September showed:
Actual
Normal
Output.
Output.
640,000
850,000
212,000
300,000
Rifle grenade cartridges ....
103,000
125,000
It was stated at the War Cabinet meeting that, owing
mainly to the attitude adopted by the Press, a feeling of
insecurity had been engendered in the capital, and that
if counter-attacks could be successfully organized there
was good reason to suppose that the morale of munition
workers in Germany might be equally affected. After
much discussion the Cabinet decided that the committee
which had been appointed to inquire into the anti-air-
craft gun problem should also explore the general question
of counter bombing attacks. The committee was directed
to report as quickly as possible, particularly on the ques-
tions of organization, the formations to be adopted, the
88 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
types of aeroplane to be used, the times most suitable for
the attacks, and the nature of the attacks by naval or
military aircraft.
Sir William R. Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, also undertook to see Major-General Trenchard
next day to find out whether it would be possible for
Sir Douglas Haig to spare one squadron, temporarily, for
long-range counter bombing. He accordingly wired to
the Commander-in-Chief as follows : 'Continuous aircraft
'raids on England are causing interruption in munitions
'work and having some effect on general public. Cabinet
'desire immediate action against those German objectives
'which can be reached from neighbourhood of Nancy.
'Send Trenchard over at once to me to discuss scale on
'which you can undertake these operations and necessary
'arrangements for them. Cabinet wish for at least one
'squadron to be employed and with least possible delay.'
The meeting of the War Cabinet, at which these
various decisions had been made, had not long broken up
when the German bombers were again over England on
the last raid of this series. The moon, one day after the
full, was above the horizon all night on the ist/znd of
October and the weather conditions generally were
good, although disturbances were on their way from the
Mapjg Atlantic. Eighteen Gothas crossed in relays between 6.50
p.m. and 10 p.m. and about eight of them succeeded in
reaching London, although two passed from Tottenham
to Woolwich without dropping any bombs. The others
dropped about twenty-eight bombs on Hyde Park,
Belgravia, Pimlico, Euston, Highbury, Haggerston, Shore-
ditch, Hoxton, and Edmonton, as a result of which ten
persons were killed and twenty-eight injured, and between
600 and 700 houses were damaged. In addition, thirty-
eight bombs fell on places in Kent, eight in the sea off
Landguard in Suffolk, and seven at Walton-on-the-Naze.
None of the bombs outside London caused casualties, and
the damage was slight.
Eighteen pilots went up, but they had no encounters.
Although no more than one gun detachment caught a
glimpse of the enemy (two aeroplanes), a total of 10,532
A LONDON GUN BARRAGE SCHEME (NIGHT)
ABOUT OCTOBER, 1917.
N ote. This type of barrage, usually known
as Linear,' a/lotted fuzes, bearings, and
quadrant elevations to guns so that fire
eould bo directed at a particular altitude
over a definite area. The barrages varied
in length and form according to the situa-
tion and number of the guns which eould be
brought to bear. The height of the barrage
eould be varied at will. Orders for this
form of barrage were given only oeaasion-
ally, usually to 'screen ' certain important
objectives or to catch raiding aeroplanes
whose courses were doubtful.
5a'
,Roml<td
* I
22
40^
1917] WEAR AND TEAR OF GUNS . 89
barrage rounds were fired. One woman was killed and
thirteen persons were injured by anti-aircraft shells in
London, and a soldier was injured at Landguard.
This attack served to emphasize the serious position
which had been reached with regard to the wear and tear
of the anti-aircraft guns, and to the heavy expenditure
of ammunition. It had been found necessary to cut down
the volume of fire directed against the raiders, and Lord
French, at a Cabinet meeting on the morning of the 2nd,
pointed out that some guns were already useless, and that
if the raids continued on the scale of the past week it
would only be a matter of a few months before the gun
defences of the London area ceased to exist. ^ Mr. Winston
Churchill reported that he had undertaken, on behalf of
his Department, to re-line twenty 3 -inch 20-cwt. guns
a month.2 The Cabinet decided that, as the situation
with regard to hostile submarines was improving, while
the air position was getting worse, the output of 3 -inch
guns for the next month should be placed at the disposal
of Lord French, and that four guns immediately available
for mounting in merchant ships should be diverted to the
London defences. Arising out of this decision the Ad-
miralty gave up sixteen 3-inch guns to help complete
the outer barrage and subsequently increased this number
to thirty- eight. 3
Another matter considered by the Cabinet was a
tendency of a section of the public, particularly in the
eastern quarters of London (which had suffered most in
the raids), to give way to panic. When the first raid of
the series had been made, on the 24th of September, a
concourse of people, estimated at about 100,000, had
rushed to take shelter in the underground railways. On
each subsequent night, whether raids were made or not, the
^ Orders were given, shortly afterwards, for reduced-charge ammu-
nition to be used by the guns in the London area. Following this order
a new type of barrage, supplementary to the barrage on the sides of the
squares, was devised. See map, facing.
2 The War Office also undertook to provide 30,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion a month and to build up, in addition, a reserve of 100,000 rounds.
3 Sixteen of these guns were taken from those which had been allotted
to merchantmen, and twenty-two were taken from Fleet reserve.
90 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
numbers grew to a maximum estimated total of 300,000.
People took up their places as soon as darkness set in, or
even before, prepared to camp out until all possibility
of danger had passed. They blocked the stairs and the
platforms, and the majority of them, it was said, did not
prove amenable to the efforts of the railway officials to
distribute them to the best advantage. The suggestion
was made at the Cabinet meeting that the feeling of panic
was fostered by publication in the newspapers of illustrated
articles depicting air-raid damage, and it was arranged
that the Prime Minister should see the editors of the
leading newspapers and ask them to cease to publish
descriptive accounts and pictures of air-raid destruction.
The Cabinet then passed to the question of the bombing
of Germany. Lieutenant-General Smuts reported that
his committee, appointed the previous day, had already
met and that the details of offensive operations were being
worked out with the least possible delay. He explained
that Major-General Trenchard was on his way from
France and would be available for consultation in the
course of the next few hours, but that meanwhile arrange-
ments had been made for one squadron of long-range
bombing aeroplanes to move to an aerodrome near Nancy.
The First Lord of the Admiralty reported that eight
naval Handley Page aeroplanes were also being sent to
operate from the same aerodrome.^
Later the same day the Cabinet met again to discuss
with Major-General Trenchard, who had arrived from
France by air, the points raised during the meeting of
the morning. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff
explained that, in addition to the Handley Pages, twenty
D.H.4 aeroplanes which were lying in cases ready for
dispatch to Russia would be made available for the raids
on Germany, and that twenty more, from the same source,
would beready within sixweeks. Major-General Trenchard
said that the aeroplanes would go to an aerodrome already
provided at Ochey, near Nancy, and he anticipated that
I The Handley Pages were withdrawn from the Yorkshire coast, where
they had been doing useful work in search of U-boats in the area of the
Tees.
I9I7] WAR CABINET MEETINGS 91
they would be ready to begin the bombing offensive six
days after arrival. The Prime Minister took the opportun-
ity to impress upon Major-General Trenchard the impor-
tance of making a success of the operations because of
the effect success or failure would have on the morale
of the people at home. As a result of the arrangements
arising out of these Cabinet meetings, a bombing wing,
the Forty- first, was organized to operate from Ochey: it
became the forerunner of the Independent Force. ^
While these decisions were pending, the weather was
unsettled and there was a lull in the bombing campaign
against England. South-eastern England, and London in
particular, had had a troubled time. Much of the bombing
had, by chance, been ineffective, but that was the only
thing about which there was cause for satisfaction. The
new form of anti-aircraft barrage fire had been of some
value in deterring the raiders, but was not so effective as
we thought at the time. Most of the thousands of shells
which lighted patterns across the sky exploded well
away from the swift-moving aeroplanes to which they
were, it seems, less of a menace than to the people and
property below. It must, however, be pointed out that
the public had not yet fully realized the necessity to take
cover from the shells as well as from the bombs. Further-
more, the nineteen French 75-mm. guns in the London
area had proved particularly dangerous because they fired
shrapnel and the shell cases fell to earth intact. These
guns were moved to Birmingham which was not, at the
time, considered liable to aeroplane attack.
The pilots who went up to fight the raiders had little to
show for their gallantry. They suffered the risks and the
discomforts without the compensation of striking a blow at
the enemy. Very occasionally a pilot found himself near
one of the bombing aeroplanes, but only for an instant.
A quick manoeuvre and the enemy was away, lost in the
darkness. The bombers were seldom seen from the ground
and were not, therefore, illuminated by searchlights, so
necessary if the pilots of the defence were to be given
* The activities of this wing, with those of the Independent Force, are
dealt with in Volume VI.
92 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
opportunities to attack. Apart, however, from these con-
siderations, there was the overriding fact that most of
the aeroplanes sent up to fight the enemy were not good
enough for the task. Only a fev/of the single-seater fighting
pilots had as yet mastered the difficulties associated with
manoeuvring and landing unstable aeroplanes at night.
Such types as the B.E.2C and others of the B.E. series
(except possibly the single-seater B.E. 12), the F.E.2b, and
the Armstrong-Whitworth, would have had no advantages
over the Gothas in close combat, and in any event their
comparatively slow speed and rate of climb, as well as their
low 'ceiling', gave them little chance to get within striking
distance.
^he October Airship Raid
5 Before the Hunter's moon brought out the aeroplanes
^ again, the German naval airship service made an attack
which has more of the stuff of curiosity and tragedy in it
than any other of its kind attempted during the war. On
the 19th of October eleven naval Zeppelins journeyed
across the North Sea: they were the L.41, L.44,
L.47, L.49, L.50, L.52, L.53, L.54, and Z.55. 1 As
they cruised westwards, the movements of six of them
were followed fairly closely by the Admiralty and, at
4 p.m., a warning was distributed from Whitehall in which
it was stated that the indications pointed to an airship
attack on districts in the midlands and in the north.
On the evening of the 19th Great Britain lay between
a centre of high pressure over the Bay of Biscay and south-
west France, and two low pressure areas over Iceland and
over Southern Scandinavia. The Icelandic depression was
deep and was rapidly approaching our north-western shores.
There was a superficial calm over England and the North
Sea, and up to about 10,000 feet the winds were light,
not greater than twenty miles an hour, but above that
height the strength of the wind doubled and, at about
20,ooofeet,agalewas ragingfrom the north and north-west.
At the height at which the Zeppelins moved across the sea
^ Two other ships, the L.42 and Z.5J, should have taken part in this
attack, but they could not leave the fixed sheds at Nordholz because of
cross-winds.
I9I7] THE SILENT RAID 93
there were no indications of the troubles to come, but as
they approached the EngHsh coast they cHmbed to 12,000
feet or so, where they met unexpected winds from the
north. To avoid aeroplane attack and anti-aircraft gun-
fire, they ascended still higher to 16,000 feet or more,
where they came within the grip of the gale.
The acoustic conditions were pecuHar and to listening
ears in England sound was deadened. The noise made by
the engines of the Zeppelins was possibly carried away on
the wind. Certainly they were almost inaudible from the
ground and there was a widespread belief that, to escape
notice, the airships drifted with the wind, across England,
with engines cut off. Because of this belief, and because
the London guns withheld their fire, the attack of this
night has usually been referred to as the 'silent' raid. It may
be said, however, that had the engines been stopped they
would have frozen at the heights at which the Zeppelins
flew: in several instances, indeed, when engines failed
through accident or negligence, they did immediately
freeze. It was not only from the upper air that sound
failed to carry. Bombs exploded with a deadened noise
and were often believed to have fallen far away when they
were quite near. The explosion of bombs at Hertford was
heard only faintly at neighbouring gun stations, and not
at all at Theydon Bois. Harwich heard nothing of bombs
at Wix, eight miles away, while people in the village of
Great Oakley, only three miles from Wix, estimated that
the bombs had exploded in distant Colchester.
The objectives allotted to the Zeppelin commanders
were industrial centres in the Midlands, but the wind had
already begun to exert its effect before the airships made
their landfall. A group of six came in between the Humber
and the Wash, and the remaining five crossed the coast
at various points in Norfolk. Only one ship succeeded in
going back direct across the North Sea. Of the others,
two returned to Germany along the Dutch coast or across
Holland, four passed over the trench system between
Ypres and Luneville, and the remaining four, the L,44^
L.4S, L.4g, and Z.50, were blown far southward over
France and never saw Germany again.
94 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
The ship which went home direct was the L,54 (Kapi-
tanleutnant Freiherr von Buttlar). She came in over
the Norfolk coast at Happisburgh about 8 p.m., cruised
southwards down the coast, passed inland south of Ipswich,
and went out again about 9.20 p.m. near Clacton- on-Sea.
We traced thirteen bombs from her, but they did no
damage. She hugged the coast as she moved northwards
again and, near Yarmouth, when flying at 5,000 feet, was
seen in the distance by a naval pilot who was nearly 4,000
feet higher. He dived to attack the ZeppeHn, but he
could not get into firing position because of her greater
speed, and although he pursued her out to sea for twenty
minutes he could not overtake her. Buttlar, the only
commander to take his ship home by way of the North
Sea, was enabled to do so because he flew at a height
untroubled by the gale from the north.
The two Zeppelins which went home by way of Holland
were the L.46 and The L.46 (Kapitanleutnant
Hollender) was over land, in Norfolk, for no longer than
twenty minutes and her twenty bombs inflicted negligible
damage. The L.4y (Kapitanleutnant von Freudenreich)
made a longer journey over England. She came in at
Sutton-on-Sea in Lincolnshire, went inland to Rutland,
and then south-eastwards to the coast again near Walton-
on-the-Naze. During her three hours' flight she dropped
seventeen bombs, without effect.
The Zeppelins which got back to Germany across the
trenches in France were the L.41^ L.52, and L.55.
The L.41 (Hauptmann Manger) came farthest inland.
She passed the Spurn at 7.5 p.m. and, two hours later,
was near Derby, where she circled for some time, but she
missed the city itself and, at 10.50 p.m., appeared west of
Birmingham and dropped her main load of bombs between
Netherton and Barnt Green. The only damage done was
at the Austin Motor Works at Longbridge, which had
first received warning of the raid when the airship was near
at hand and were still showing lights when she appeared.
Three of five bombs which fell near the works failed to
explode, but the others did minor damage, estimated at
j^5oo, and caused injury to one man. The L.41 then
1917] ZEPPELINS STRUGGLE HOME 95
steered a south-easterly course, passed over the Thames
Estuary, crossed a part of Kent, entered France near
Gravehnes, and finally passed over the British trenches
near La Bassee about 4.50 a.m.^
The L.52 (Oberleutnant zur See Friemel) made a
somewhat similar journey except that she did not get so
far inland. She came in at Mablethorpe on the Lincoln-
shire coast at 7.30 p.m., was near Northampton at 8.50
p.m., and then headed south towards London. She did
not, however, reach the capital, but turned off in an
easterly direction near Aylesbury. She dropped twenty-
nine bombs, mainly near Hertford (13) and on Waltham
Marshes (13), which injured a man and damaged some
cottages. Soon after the Waltham bombs fell, the Z.52
was seen by a Royal Flying Corps pilot, but he was in a
B.E.2e, and could not climb to the height of the Zeppelin
(15,000-16,000 feet). She crossed the French coast near
Etaples, was blown rapidly across France, and eventually
disappeared over the trenches, near St. Die, into Alsace:
she landed at her base at Ahlhorn in the afternoon.
The L.53 (Kapitanleutnant d. R. Prolss), the earliest
ship to come in, passed over the Norfolk coast at Blakeney
at 6.45 p.m., crossed Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, the Thames
Estuary and Kent, and then appeared over France. She
was at Nancy about 3 a.m. and finally went into Germany
near Luneville. Only eleven bombs from her were traced
on English soil, and the result was slight damage to an
inn. The Z.55 (Kapitanleutnant Flemming) was one of
the ships which passed near London. She entered over
the Lincolnshire coast at 7.30 p.m., dropped her first
bombs (6) at Holme, south of Peterborough, and then,
following the line of the Great Northern Railway at high
speed, dropped seventeen bombs between Hit chin and
Hatfield. A man was slightly injured and minor damage
was caused. The Z.55 then passed westwards of London
and finally out to sea at Hastings without dropping any
' In the circumstances the journey made by the L.41 showed that the
ship was well handled. Manger thought his attack was made farther north,
on Manchester, and he refers, in his report, to lighted factories. He
bombed from about 16,500 feet.
96 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
more bombs ; she eventually reached Germany by way of
Laon, but she suffered some damage on landing in a
clearing in a wood at Tiefenort.^
So much for those which reached home. The remainder
had remarkable journeys. The L.44 was commanded by
Kapitanleutnant Stabbert, an officer who has found
frequent mention in this history. She entered the Wash
at 7.30 p.m., passed west of Peterborough an hour later
and, soon after 9 p.m., was near Bedford. An engineering
works and a military training school, which had not
received warning, were showing full lights, and these no
doubt attracted the ten 50-kg. bombs which fell between
Elstow and Kempston: two men were injured in the
engineering works, where glass was smashed by the con-
cussion of the bombs, but the damage otherwise was slight.
By the merest chance, however, a large ammunition dump
in the neighbourhood narrowly escaped destruction.
Bombs bracketed the dump, but two of them failed to
explode. The next bombs from the L.44 fell i^^^r Leighton
Buzzard, but although they numbered ten and included
one of 300-kg., the damage was confined to window-glass.
It appeared that the Zeppelin was bearing down on
London, but she kept a south-easterly course, passed
over the Lea Valley and Epping Forest to the Thames
near Gravesend, dropped more bombs harmlessly near
Maidstone in Kent, and then went out to sea east of
Folkestone at 11.30 p.m. Twenty minutes later she was
over Boulogne and, after a long south-easterly journey
across France, appeared, at 6.15 a.m. on the 20th, near
St. Clement, where she came under fire from French anti-
aircraft guns stationed at Vathimenil. When first seen,
her height was estimated at under 12,000 feet, but when
fire was opened she began rapidly to climb until the
gunners were firing to reach a height of 19,000 feet. A
tracer shell pierced the Zeppelin which caught fire and
was destroyed with her crew.
* Although Flemming knew he passed west of London, his general
course was much farther south than, and not so far west as, he thought.
He was under the impression that he bombed Mappleton, Hull, and
Birmingham.
1917] DENMARK TO SISTERON 97
The L.45 (Kapitanleutnant Waldemar Kolle) bombed
Northampton and London. She left Tondern, near the
Danish frontier, at 11.25 a.m. on the 19th of October
and ended her career near Sisteron, in southern France,
at 10 a.m. on the 20th. As one of her crew put it, he had
travelled from Denmark to the Riviera hy w^ay of London
and Paris in about twenty hours. The airship came in over
the Yorkshire coast at Withernsea at 8.20 p.m. and, for
about an hour, circled without making much progress,
possibly because of the presence of aeroplanes which had
gone up an hour before when the L.41 had appeared over
the Humber. At 9.50 p.m. the L.45 was in the neigh-
bourhood of Leicester and she might have got no farther
if a Royal Flying Corps officer who found her had been
in a first-class fighting aeroplane. He was in an F.E.2b
at 14,000 feet when he discovered the L.45 about 1,000
feet above him. He fired three bursts which seemed to
enter the Zeppelin, but she soon outdistanced him. At
10.50 p.m. she had reached Northampton, in the neigh-
bourhood of which twenty-three bombs fell. One woman
and two children were killed in Northampton, but little
damage was caused. It is of interest that the crew of
the airship thought they had got much farther west
in England and believed, when they were attacking
Northampton, that their bombs were falling on Oxford.
The L.45 then followed the main line of the London and
North Western Railway into London, where seven bombs
fell. They killed thirty-one persons and injured forty-
seven. In addition, much damage to shops and houses
was caused in Hendon, Hampstead, Camberwell, and
Lewisham. One bomb fell in Piccadilly Circus, opposite
Messrs. Swan & Edgar's premises, and was responsible for
many of the casualties. Deceived by the long time which
had elapsed since the warning had been given, people had
gone into the open, and as the L.45 was neither seen nor
heard during her passage across the capital, they had no
opportunity to seek cover again: seven were killed (three
of them soldiers) and eighteen were injured (including
two soldiers, a sailor, and a police constable). Most
damage, elsewhere, was caused at Camberwell, where a
2504.5 H
98 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
300-kg. bomb destroyed three shop buildings and damaged
about two hundred houses; ten people were killed and
twenty-three injured. A bomb of the same weight ex-
ploded at Hither Green and killed fourteen persons and
caused injury to seven: twenty-six houses were damaged.
One of the helmsmen of the subsequently wrote
an account of his experiences. 'At about 11.30', he said,
Ve began to see lights below, and as the lights continued
'so it suddenly dawned upon us that it could only be
'the city of London that we were crossing in the air.
'Even KoUe looked amazed at the dim lights as Schiitz
'suddenly shouted "London!" It was then that we first
'realized the fury of the savage tempest that had been
'driving us out of our course. But Kolle clearly had but
'one thought — that was higher. So he released more bal-
'last and the bombs — first two sighting shots and then
'the rest. Over London! We had achieved what no other
'German airship had done since Mathy had bombed that
'proud city over a year ago ! And his last trip across the
'City had proved his undoing.^ Fortunately for us we
'were unseen; not a searchlight was unmasked; not a
'shot was fired; not an aeroplane was seen. If the gale
'had driven us out of our course, it had also defeated the
'flying defences of the city! It was misty or so it seemed,
'for we were above a thin veil of cloud. The Thames we
'just dimly saw from the outline of the lights; two great
'railway stations, I thought I saw, but the speed of the ship
'running almost before the gale was such that we could
'not distinguish much. We were half frozen, too, and the
'excitement was great. It was all over in a flash. The last
'big bomb was gone and we were once more over the
'darkness and rushing onwards.
Soon after midnight the L.45 was found, just south of
the mouth of the Medway, by Second Lieutenant T. B.
Pritchard in a B.E.2C of No. 39 Home Defence Squadron.
He was at 13,000 feet and estimated that the Zeppelin
' Mathy never crossed London on his final raid (ist of October 191 6);
he was brought down before reaching the capital.
^ From an article, 'In a German Airship over England', in the Journal
of the Royal United Service Institution for February 1926.
1917] THE L.45 CRASHES 99
was 2,000 feet above him. He opened fire and the ship
changed her course and ascended rapidly. She went out
to sea near Hastings with Second Lieutenant Pritchard
vainly pursuing her. He did not give up until she had
disappeared from his view well over the Channel. On his
return, the pilot, in a forced landing due to petrol shortage,
crashed near Bexhill and was injured. At a great height,
the L.45 sped across France. At dawn her crew were
surprised to see, against the distant sky, two other
Zeppelins (the L.4g and L.50). At 8 a.m. she passed over
Lyons, and her commander probably then realized where
he was, and he went off in a north-easterly direction with a
view to making a landing in Switzerland. By this time three
engines were out of action and no great headway could
be made against the wind. At 10 a.m. the L.45 was near
Sisteron, and as there was little petrol left her commander
tried to make a landing in the flat bed of the river Bueche
which was almost dry. The L.45 was, however, caught
in an eddy of wind as she touched the ground and one of
the cars, with two of the crew inside, was torn away. Two
other members of the crew jumped from the after car,
and the airship, thus lightened, rose again and was even-
tually dashed against the side of the valley, where the
remainder of the crew jumped clear. After they had set
fire to the ship the men marched away and surrendered
to the French. The long journey, mostly made at a great
height, had exhausted them, and to this fact the fate of
the ship was partly due. Some of the crew had been
repeatedly sick, and others complained of headaches and
giddiness, while some had been unable to keep awake.
Those whose duties kept them moving about the ship
suffered most: one man had both his feet frozen black.
The breakdown of one engine was due to a minor adjust-
ment being badly made by a mechanic who was ill during
the journey, and the breakdown of another was caused
by the careless closing of a radiator cap, as a result of
which the water was shaken out and the exhaust be-
came red hot. It would appear, also, that the attack made
by Second Lieutenant Pritchard over the Medway con-
tributed to the downfall of the L.45. Up to the time
100 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
when he opened fire, the ZeppeHn had been proceeding
in an easterly direction, and had she kept anything like the
same course would probably have reached home safely.
Instead she turned, and went off due south.
One of the engines of the L.4g (Kapitanleutnant Hans
Gayer) went out of action before she made the English
coast and, furthermore, her commander waited at sea for
sometime until the night became completely dark. The re-
sult was that the L.4g drifted much farther south than was
realized and she made her landfall at Holkham in Norfolk,
and not at Scarborough as her commander believed. Forty-
two bombs were dropped by the L.4g on various places in
Norfolk, but they did no more than kill cattle and cause
minor damage to farm buildings. Eventually, at 1 1.9 p.m.,
the L.4g passed over Folkestone, but her crew, to whom
the town was clearly visible, thought they were crossing
the Dutch coast. Next morning, about 8 a.m., she was
attacked near Neufchateau by a French squadron of five
Nieuports {Escadrille No. 152) and was forced to land. An
attempt was made by the crew to set fire to the ship, but
most of them had suffered from height-sickness and all of
them were so exhausted that they were in no condition
to resist French onlookers, with the result that one of the
latest-type Zeppelins fell intact into the hands of the
French.
There remains the Z.50 (Kapitanleutnant Schwonder).
She flew over Norfolk at 19,000 feet, dropped thirty
bombs which exploded harmlessly in the open, and was
then driven south by the high wind. One engine had
failed over the North Sea, and another broke down over
Norfolk, apparently because the mechanics were too ill
to give it attention. The Z.50 reached friendly territory
near Valenciennes, but her crew had lost idea where
they were and she recrossed the trenches again in the
Champagne. About midday on the 20th Schwonder saw
the L.4g on the ground below and, under the impression
that Belgium, or possibly Germany, was beneath him,
he gave orders to land. As he neared the ground, how-
ever, desultory rifle-fire was opened on his ship, and
aeroplanes with Allied markings were noticed. The nose
I9I7] OUT OF CONTROL loi
of the Zeppelin went up again, but when she had
reached a height of 10,000 feet an order was once more
given to land. She descended steeply and, as she made
to land, grazed the top of a wood with the result that
the forward car was torn off by the trees. Sixteen men
left the ship, some of them jumping from the side
gondola. Thus lightened, the L.50 shot into the air and
disappeared. She carried with her two of her crew who
had been stationed in the gangway, and two more who
were in the rear gondola. The latter were probably
injured because the car in which they were had crashed
against the trees and had been knocked out of shape. The
ship, out of control, became the sport of the winds.
French pilots pursued her, but she went up to 23,000 feet,
beyond their reach. She passed over Sisteron, and the
crew of the prisoners of war, watched her as she
swayed and dipped. At 5.30 p.m. the Z.50 crossed the
coast near Frejus, and she was pursued into the Mediter-
ranean, until nightfall, by French seaplane pilots. As
they turned for home, the airship was still careering help-
lessly southwards, and that was the last that was ever seen
or heard of her or her luckless passengers.
There were no casualties or damage inflicted by the
bombing other than what have already been noted, but
although the Germans had little to show for their appre-
ciable losses, it should be realized that things might have
gone very differently. The defence system did not have
much to do with the disastrous ending to the night's
attack. The searchlights and the guns were of small use,^
and not one of the seventy-three pilots who went up in
England was equipped with an aeroplane capable of
reaching the 'ceiling' heights of the Zeppelins. Had
it not been for the unusual meteorological conditions
there seems no reason why the airships should not have
bombed at their will and have escaped. It is true that there
* Searchlights were uncovered in the London area, but no guns came
into action; nor, in fact, were any Zeppelins seen. No more than twenty-
two rounds in all were fired in England, two by H.M.S. Albion in the
Humber, and the others by the guns at Cauldham (8), Cheriton (8), and
Lympne (4). The airships were also fired at over France.
102 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
could have been little discrimination of targets, and it is
true, also, that the height-sickness, from which most of
the crews suffered, impaired efficiency. The fact remains,
however, that had the Zeppelins come and gone without
let or hindrance, as they well might, the airship menace
would, once again, have become a very live one. The
Germans, no doubt, would have attacked during the
winter whenever the weather conditions appeared favour-
able, and we might have been forced immediately to re-
equip all the home defence squadrons with the best
existing type of single-seater fighter. We should have
been hard put to it to do this and would have found it
still more difficult to train, in short time, night-flying
pilots for this type of aeroplane. Because the October
Zeppelin raid proved a fiasco, it has been too lightly
dismissed as offering only additional proof that the airship
had long ceased to be a weapon of attack. With character-
istic doggedness, the Germans refused to abandon the idea
of raiding England with airships, but the disaster of the
I9th/20th of October could not be ignored, and we were
little troubled by Zeppelins afterwards.
Renewed Aero'plane A Hacks
At the end of October the aeroplane attacks were
resumed. On the 29th the moon was one day before the
full and the weather conditions over the Channel were
good, but a depression was spreading from the west and
the conditions were not favourable for an attack on
England: the sky became overcast and the wind in-
creased to gale strength. It appeared from the reports
of British observer posts that three or four detachments
of enemy aeroplanes, numbering perhaps ten in all, came
overland by way of the mouth of the Crouch, the Black-
water, and the Thames Estuary. No more than eight
bombs were dropped on Rawreth, Rayleigh, Hockley, and
Burnham, as a result of which two cottages were slightly
damaged. According to German information, however,
only one aeroplane, a Gotha, attacked England. Two
other Gothas set out to take part in the raid and possibly
1917] RENEWED AEROPLANE ATTACKS 103
came some part of the way to England, but they turned
back and dropped their bombs on Calais.
At 4.30 a.m. on the 31st of October two aeroplanes
dropped ten bombs, with no effect, on Dover, and six
more in the sea. On the evening of the same day, for Map
about two hours from 10.37 P'^"^-? relays of bombing
aeroplanes came in from the sea over Essex and Kent.
Twenty-two Gothas took part in the attack and we
followed their movements with fair accuracy. The objec-
tive was London, but the cloudy weather made the task
of the bombers a difficult one, while the barrage fire put
up by the anti-aircraft guns seems to have been effective,
especially in the London area, in turning some of the
attackers away. A few who got through to London
dropped bombs on riverside buildings south-east of the
city. Elsewhere attacks were made on Dover, Herne
Bay, and Ramsgate, on camps near Canterbury, and on
places scattered throughout Kent. The bombs which fell
in the London area (85) killed eight persons and injured
fourteen, but caused little damage except at Erith, where
house property suffered. One person was killed and six
were injured by anti-aircraft shells. Bombs on Kent (183)
caused one death and injuries to two people, but the
damage was inconsiderable except at Ramsgate, where
a gasometer was burnt out and much shop and house
property was demolished. Fifty defence pilots ascended in
southern England and a few of them had glimpses of some
of the raiders: there were two brief indecisive attacks.
How far hits were made by the anti-aircraft guns, or by
the aeroplane pilots, it is impossible to say, but one Gotha
caught fire and was destroyed on landing, and four more
crashed and were wrecked, apparently in Belgium. The
weather was not again favourable for aeroplane attacks
during the remainder of the Hunters' moon, which entered
its last quarter on the 6th of November.
In December the conditions were again generally
unfavourable, except on three nights when moonlight
coincided with fair weather. On the three nights attacks
were attempted. The first began in the early hours of the
6th of December and was notable for the great number
104 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
21 of incendiary bombs dropped. A total of 395 of these
bombs were released as against only twenty-eight of the
high explosive type. The objective was London, and
the aeroplanes which set out numbered nineteen Gothas
and two Giants. Three Gothas turned back with engine
trouble, but all the remainder attacked. Six of them
reached London, which was bombed fairly continuously
between 4.30 a.m. and 5.40 a.m.: a great amount of
damage was caused by fires, notably in Finsbury, Ken-
nington, and Whitechapel. The estimated monetary
damage in the London area was ^92,477, and the casualties
due to the bombing were two killed and seven injured.
Anti-aircraft shells killed a woman and injured eight
persons, and caused damage to 169 houses. Bombing
attacks were also made on Sheerness, Purfleet, Margate,
Ramsgate, Dover, Whitstable, and Herne Bay. Most
damage was done in Sheerness, where twenty-five bombs
killed four people, injured twelve, and demolished five
houses. The total number of bombs dropped outside
London was 147 (128 of them incendiary), but the only
casualties, other than those at Sheerness, occurred in
Margate, where thirty-one bombs were dropped and one
woman was killed and another injured. Thirty- four Royal
Flying Corps pilots attempted to intercept the bombers,
but there were no encounters. The anti-aircraft gunners,
however, had an appreciable success. It was clear that the
barrage fire turned some of the raiders away from London
and possibly also from objectives outside London. More
important still, two Gothas were shot down by gun-fire
in England: one landed near Canterbury and the other
on the aerodrome at Rochford, and both were destroyed
in flames after landing. Another Gotha was almost cer-
tainly damaged by gun-fire and was lost, probably in the sea
on the way home ; two more bombing aeroplanes, similarly )
damaged, made forced landings in Belgium, and a sixth, for |
some unexplained reason, crashed on its home aerodrome. j
The German crews were disappointed with the visible j
results of the incendiary bombs. 'A great deal of time', j
wrote Major Freiherr von Biilow,^ 'was spent over the
^ Die Luftwachty June 1927. |
I9I7] INCENDIARY BOMBS 105
'design of these incendiary bombs, on whose effect on the
'densely populated London area such high hopes were
'based. The bomb was a complete failure. During two
'night raids on England, on the 31st of October and the
'6th of December, 191 7, large numbers of these bombs
'were dropped, both times with no success. The sound
'idea of creating panic and disorder by numbers of fires
'came to nothing owing to the inadequacy of the material
'employed.'
The next December attack, on the i8th, was unexpected Map
because the moon was under five days old and gave little
light. The country, however, was under snow and this
helped to define some of the salient features, particularly
the course of the Thames, which could easily be followed
from the air. The attack was made by fifteen Gothas and
by one Giant, which reached London after the Gothas
and dropped, among others^ a 300-kg. bomb, the first of
this weight to fall from an enemy aeroplane on England.
It exploded in the roadway of Lyall Street, near Eaton
Square, and caused damage to the surrounding houses.
The other bombs dropped by this aeroplane were forty-
three incendiaries, but they inflicted only slight damage:
one of them fell in Buckingham Palace Gardens. Before
this attack, which was made soon after 9 p.m., six Gothas
had dropped high explosive and incendiary bombs on
London at various times between 7.10 p.m. and 8.30 p.m.
They killed eleven persons and injured sixty-two, and
caused damage to property estimated at ^318,000. Outside
London, Margate was the chief place to suffer. Here,
twenty-four bombs demolished a house, injured a woman,
and damaged a meeting-house, a school, and 222 houses.
Fourteen bombs dropped on places in Essex killed one
woman and injured three men, but caused no material
damage. Three of the forty-seven Royal Flying Corps
pilots who patrolled had encounters, and one of these was
successful. Captain G. W. Murlis-Green was attracted by
the exhaust flames of a Gotha near Goodmayes, Essex, and
as he approached, the German bomber was illuminated by
a searchlight. He attacked, but he could only fire short
bursts because the flash of his gun temporarily blinded him.
io6 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
One engine in the Gotha went out of action, but the
German pilot persisted on his course and dropped his
bombs on Bermondsey ten minutes later. He then made
for the coast which he reached at a low height about
8.20 p.m. The second engine then failed and the Gotha
fell in the sea near Folkestone : as it was being towed into
harbour it was wrecked by an explosion : the German pilot
was drowned, but the observer and the machine-gunner
were taken prisoners.
Over 10,000 rounds were fired by the anti-aircraft guns.
Again they . caused casualties (two killed, seventeen
injured) and minor damage to 240 buildings, but they
appear to have turned some of the bombers away from
London. There was good evidence that at least one
Gotha was hit by anti-aircraft gun-fire, and it is possible
that more were damaged because the casualties among the
bombers were high. In addition to the Gotha which fell
into the sea at Folkestone, another crashed, two suffered
damage through forced landings, two were destroyed by
fire when landing on their aerodromes, and two more were
damaged.
Warning the Public at Night
The unexpected attack of the i8th of December led
to the introduction of sound warnings at night. The raids
which began by moonlight in September had resulted
in many complaints from the public that the existing
procedure of sending constables about the streets with
^ake Cover placards was not sufficiently effective. It
worked well in the main thoroughfares, but the warning
was sometimes slow in penetrating to the side streets and
often failed to reach people indoors. Many householders
stated that they had made careful arrangements to move
their families, from upper floors especially, to places which
offered shelter, and they complained because they were
not given the warning which would enable them to do
what they could to protect themselves. It was objected
officially that imprudent people, startled by sound signals
at night, would rush about the streets in search of shelter.
I9I7] SOUND WARNINGS AT NIGHT 107
and suffer through falhng anti-aircraft gun shells or
through bombs. Furthermore, the noise made by ex-
ploding maroons was loud and was calculated to disturb
people unduly at night, especially those of nervous dis-
positions or in delicate health. These and other official
objections had been embodied in a memorandum on the
26th of October to the War Cabinet which had eventually
decided that the existing arrangements for night warnings
should not be altered.
The raids at the end of October and at the beginning
of December 191 7 had renewed the public disquiet, but
still the Government refused to sanction sound warnings
by night. Then on the i8th of December a difficulty
arose. The attack on London had developed so swiftly
that the Commissioner of Police had had insufficient time
to send out the constables of the metropolis with their
Take Cover placards. Within eight minutes of receipt
of the preliminary warning. Air Raid Action had been
ordered, and the Commissioner, after consultation with
the Home Secretary, had decided that the maroons
must be fired as it was impossible to warn the general
public effectively in any other way. Once night signals
had been employed, the retention of the arrangement, so
strong was public opinion on the matter, became inevitable.
Even so, the Government did not go all the way to meet
public demand. It was first decided that the maroons
should be fired, when necessary, up to 11 p.m., but that
they must not be used after that hour if the Commissioner
of Police believed that he had sufficient time to mobilize
the staff required to disseminate the warning in the
ordinary way. This decision was made public by a notice
issued by the Commissioner on the loth of January 1918.
Local authorities, however, pressed for an extension of the
time limit to midnight and, in the middle of February
191 8, this extension was approved. The next step came
with the approach of summer time, which would put
'midnight' back to 1 1 p.m. by Greenwich time. On the
advice of the Commissioner of Police, the Home Secretary
decreed, in the middle of March 191 8, that the maroons
should be used, henceforth, at any hour.
io8 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
Observer Posts
From December 191 7 the police throughout the
country took over many of the observer posts. The
arrangement of these posts in cordons has already been
explained.^ They were connected, wherever possible, with
the appropriate Warning Control head-quarters by direct
line, but some of them employed the telephones of specified
private subscribers which were reserved for military use at
those times when the observer posts were occupied. The
code word Airbandit ensured a clear line for any message
to and from the Warning Control. Under the original
scheme the posts were manned by military personnel,
unfit for active service, who were organized in fourteen
companies as part of the Royal Defence Corps. The
arrangement, however, had not proved satisfactory. Much
depended on the reports made by these military observers
who, although they spent a great part of their time in
idleness, had to exercise quick and cool intelligence when
raids were in progress. As the only reason they found
themselves in the observer posts was because they were
physically unfit for more strenuous service, it is not sur-
prising that many of them failed to reveal the qualities
desirable in an observer. In December 191 7, therefore,
General Head-quarters, Home Forces, suggested that,
except on the East Coast and in that part of the south-
eastern counties liable to sudden aeroplane attack, the
military observer posts should be replaced by police posts.
In the excepted areas continuous observation was essential,
but elsewhere it would suflfice if the posts could be manned
by the police when the preliminary warning of enemy air
activity was issued. The suggestion was approved, and the
police gradually took over the majority of the observer
posts and thus relieved twelve of the fourteen military
companies. The two observer companies Royal Defence
Corps retained were No. 15 for England, and No. 16 for
Scotland. A coastal cordon had also been established, when
the war ended, from Peterhead in the north to Swanage
* Vol. Ill, pp. 172-3.
I9I7-I8] PUBLIC PROTESTS 109
in the south, manned by naval personnel and by coast-
v^atching troops.
The final aeroplane attack of 191 7 was made by one
Gotha and two Giants and seems to have been directed
against coastal towns in Kent. At 5.45 p.m. on the 22nd
of December the Gotha passed over Westgate and, fifteen
minutes later, landed in a field at Margate, where the
crew set fire to their aeroplane and surrendered to the
police. They explained that one of the Gotha's engines
had gone out of action and that the aeroplane had conse-
quently become almost unmanageable in the gusty wind :
the bombs had been dropped in the sea to lighten the
craft. The two Giant type aeroplanes carried a total
number of bombs weighing 2,000 kg., but none of these
fell on land: some of them were heard exploding in the
sea between Ramsgate and Sandwich. None of the eigh-
teen Royal Flying Corps pilots who patrolled saw anything
of the enemy.
igi8
The Air Council had been formed on the 3rd of January
191 8, with Lord Rothermere as Secretary of State and
President, and although Lord French, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Home Forces, remained entirely responsible
for home defence, the existence of an Air Council meant
that the collective judgement of all those directing air
affairs could be put forward authoritatively.
At a meeting of the War Cabinet held on the nth of
January, a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
War was considered upon the subject of resolutions re-
ceived from the inhabitants of Sheerness. These had
been passed at a mass meeting organized by the trade
union movement, and they included a protest 'against
'the continued refusal of the military authorities to provide
'suitable bomb-proof shelter and a greater measure of
'protection against enemy action ; also against the complete
'absence of warning at night of the approach of hostile
'aircraft'. It was also stated 'that any further delay in
'dealing with these matters would be an outrage upon the
no AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
'inhabitants and may prove disastrous'. Other resolutions
had reference to compensation for air-raid victims. The
questions raised had often been brought forward before,
and the attitude of the Government had been defined,
namely, that the provision of air-raid shelters was a matter
for local authorities but that, in general, it was undesirable
to encourage people to leave their homes to take shelter
elsewhere. A house offered a good protection against
bomb splinters, and the risk of heavy casualties was not so
great when people remained at home as when they were
crowded in shelters which could not be made proof against
a direct hit.
The points raised, however, by the Sheerness resolutions
prompted the War Cabinet to discuss the possibility of
large-scale attacks on London. There was talk of 500
bombing aeroplanes, and of fires being started on a scale
with which the Fire Brigade would be unable to cope.
Some divergence of view about the number of German
bombers available was disclosed, but the balance of expert
opinion was that really big attacks were unlikely. In the
result the War Cabinet decided to call for a detailed report
from Lord French on the air defences of London. In his
report,^ which was ready on the 17th of January 1918,
Lord French, reviewing the scheme of defence against
airships, said: 'The Zeppelin menace cannot be said to
'have disappeared. Great improvements have been made
'in the speed, radius of action, and chmbing power of the
'latest type of Zeppelins, while their visibility has been
'reduced by camouflaging the underparts of the envelope
'with black dope. The return of warm weather will
'probably be the signal for renewed Zeppelin raids, but
'in view of the recent increases in the defences of London
'and the south-east of England it is probable that they will
'direct their attacks on the north-east coast or Midlands.'
Lord French then proceeded to deal with the question
of countering the daylight aeroplane raids, and he showed
how the reorganization of the gun and aeroplane defences,
together with the re-equipment of the defence squad-
^ The map, accompanying the report, which set out the scheme of
defence for London and south-east England, faces p, I.
I9I8] A REPORT BY LORD FRENCH in
rons with first-class fighting aircraft, had caused the
enemy to give up these raids in favour of night attacks.
The diflftculties in the w^ay of efiicient defence at night,
he pointed out, w^ere many. Only expert pilots could fly
the unstable single-seater fighters in the dark. Nev7 type
fighting aeroplanes had been evolved and fifty had been
delivered to the eight squadrons in the south-east of
England, but it v^ould take time for the pilots to become
proficient in night-fighting. The need to provide anti-
aircraft gun protection for w^idely dispersed vulnerable
points in London and the south-eastern areas made it
difficult to arrange an adequate zone for the operation of
the large number of Royal Flying Corps squadrons dis-
posed between London and the East Coast. The anti-
aircraft scheme of fire was based chiefly on sound and
it was, of course, impossible, when firing at sound, to
distinguish friend from foe. Lord French recognized
that, to increase the areas reserved for aeroplane operations,
modifications in the disposition of the fixed guns would
probably be necessary, but it was, he stated, 'at present
'difficult to determine the ultimate relative value of guns
'and aeroplanes as weapons of defence, and to what extent
'such modifications will be justified'. He proceeded to lay
stress on the importance of the searchlight. The small
6o-cm. searchlights supplied for home defence had been
effective against the old-type airships, but had proved to
be useless against the latest type Zeppelins and against the
high-flying aeroplanes. A few 150-cm. lights had been
obtained from a French firm, and it was expected that de-
liveries of a considerable number of British-made 120-cm.
searchlights would begin in the near future. A new type
of carbon which would greatly increase the range of the
lights was also being manufactured, and sound locators
which would enable the lights to be trained on an audible,
but invisible, target were being distributed, as were para-
chute flares to be fired from the anti-aircraft guns. 'These
'improvements', he said, 'will, it is hoped, have the effect
'of turning the scale in favour of the illumination of the
'target. It remains to be seen whether the guns or the
'aeroplanes will derive the greatest advantage.' Lord
112 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
French emphasized the need for a longer range anti-
aircraft gun firing a heavier shell than those in use.
Referring to the balloon aprons he said that three were
in operation and that it was hoped to complete the re-
mainder, up to the authorized total of twenty, at the rate
of four each month. The aprons could ascend to a height
of 8,000 feet, but the provision of larger-type Caquot
balloons would enable them to be raised to 10,000 feet.
Their main effect was a moral one, but they tended to
keep enemy pilots at heights which made it impossible
for them to drop bombs with accuracy of aim. In addition
to these various measures, three hundred Lewis guns had
been installed at vulnerable points to keep enemy aircraft
from descending below heights at which anti-aircraft
gun-fire ceased to be effective, and arrangements had
been made to equip with high-angle mountings the
machine-guns with the Home Defence Garrison and with
Field Army troops. Finally, to help to establish the height
and movements of enemy aircraft, wireless-fitted aero-
planes patrolled given areas: the observers signalled their
information to receiving stations which were in direct
telephonic communication with the area head-quarters.
When Lord French's report was received by the War
Office, it was considered necessary, before the adequacy
or otherwise of the existing defences could be assessed,
to arrive at an agreed estimate about the number of
German bombers which might be made available for raids
against England. The matter was therefore referred to
the Chief of the Air Staff and it was ultimately agreed
that, looking ahead to the early summer of 191 8, 118
bombers was the maximum number which need be allowed
for, and of these it could be reckoned that no more than
eighty would at any one time reach this country. Lord
French was informed of this estimate and he was asked to
say what additional strength, if any, he would require
to ensure the defeat of an attack by eighty aeroplanes.
He thereupon set out his total requirements as follows:
349 anti-aircraft guns; 623 searchlights; and 264 aero-
planes. These figures represented an addition of 300
searchHghts which, it was stated, should be of the 120-cm.
I9I8] UNDERGROUND HANGARS 113
type; of 100 guns, which should be of more than 3-inch
calibre; and of 40 aeroplanes.
Lord French's reports, with a covering memorandum
by Sir Henry Wilson, who had succeeded Sir William
Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff a few
days before,^ were considered by the War Cabinet on the
27th of February. Sir Henry Wilson, in his memorandum,
recommended that, in view of the importance of main-
taining the morale of the capital of the Empire, home
defence requirements for anti-aircraft guns should be
given precedence over the demands of the British Expedi-
tionary Force.2 On the other hand, because of the great
importance of superiority in the air in the battle which it
was anticipated would begin before long on the Western
front, the Royal Flying Corps in France should continue
to have precedence over home defence for aeroplanes.
These recommendations received the approval of the War
Cabinet.
It is of interest, as reflecting the serious view taken of
the night aeroplane attacks, that the Air Council, at their
meeting on the 22nd of January 191 8, decided to construct
underground hangars at home. Major-General Trenchard
pointed out, during the discussion, that it was undesirable
to do this in France because the squadrons on the Western
front had to be kept mobile, but that this objection did
not apply at home. A beginning was therefore made at
Manston where the air station was, at the time, being
expanded : the construction of five underground hangars
was approved, but after work on them had been in progress
some time it was decided that two only should be com-
pleted.
Night raiding began again on the 28th of January 191 8, ^^p 23
when bombing aircraft came in at intervals between 7.55
' On the 20th of May 1918 Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson
succeeded Lord French as Commander-in-chief, Home Forces, in conse-
quence of the appointment of Lord French as Viceroy of Ireland.
^ Sir Douglas Haig was, at this time, pressing for additional anti-aircraft
guns for the defence of the aerodromes of the bombing squadrons in the
neighbourhood of Nancy.
2504.5 T
114 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
p.m. and 10.25 p.m. The sky was overcast and there was
ground mist in England as there was also in Belgium, and
some of the Gothas which had been ordered to attack
could not leave their aerodromes. In the end thirteen
Gothas and one Giant set out, but six of the Gotha pilots
turned back because of the mist and poor visibility
generally. It seemed at the time that about nine aero-
planes reached and attacked London, but the reports of
the German crews show that the capital was bombed by
three Gothas and by one Giant. The remaining four
Gothas attacked Ramsgate, Margate, Richborough, and
Sheerness. Houses were damaged at Ramsgate and also at
Sheerness, where two men were killed and five injured,
but otherwise there was little damage outside London.
All the bombs which fell on the capital were of the high-
explosive type and at least forty-four were traced, notably
in the eastern districts, in the City, Holborn, Vauxhall,
Hampstead, and in Long Acre. A great number of houses
were destroyed (monetary damage ^173,000), and the
casualties were high, 51 persons being killed and 136
injured as a result of the bombing. In addition, people
who mistook the warning maroons for bombs rushed in
panic to the air-raid shelters at Bishopsgate Goods Station
and at Mile End railway station, and in the stampede
fourteen of them were killed and fourteen injured, mostly
women and children. Finally, anti-aircraft shells caused
injury to eleven people and damage to 311 houses.
It is of interest that bombs fell close to three Thames
bridges. One exploded on the river-bank near Vauxhall
Bridge, another burst on a barge moored alongside London
Bridge, and a third fell in the river near the centre of
Waterloo Bridge. This last-named bomb exploded close
enough to damage lamps on the bridge itself, and it is
possible that some damage was also done to the foundations
of the bridge.^
The majority of the casualties in London were caused
by the bombs which came from the Giant. According to
^ Expert opinion seems to be against the view that there was any con-
nexion between this bomb and the sudden subsidence years afterwards
which led to the demolition of the old Waterloo Bridge.
I9I8] AIR-RAID SHELTER DISASTER 115
German information this aeroplane carried bombs to a
total weight of 1,200 kg., two of them of the 300-kg. type.
One bomb from the Giant exploded in Messrs. Odhams's
Printing Works in Long Acre which were being used as
an air-raid shelter. It was presumed that this bomb was
of 50-kg. weight, but as no 300-kg. bombs were traced, it
is almost certain that it was a bomb of the heavier weight
which caused the devastation at Messrs. Odhams's premises.
The crew of the Giant make reference in their report to a
big fire which broke out after one of the 300-kg. bombs
had been dropped, and although they thought they were
at the time 'close to the Admiralty', there seems little
doubt that the fire they saw came from Long Acre. That
the bomb inflicted such heavy damage was largely a matter
of chance. The building was a substantial one with three
concrete floors, up to nine inches in thickness, between
the roof and the basement where the people were shelter-
ing. Where bombs had previously made hits on buildings
of similar construction the damage had been confined to
the upper floors. Messrs. Odhams's building, however,
was not directly hit. Unhappily the bomb crashed through
a pavement light alongside the building, and the whole
force of the explosion was directed into the basement.
The lower part of the main walls and the adjacent sup-
porting piers of the building were shattered, with the
result that the immediate super-structure caved in and
pulled out the upper floors. The outbreak of fire which
followed added to the agony of those imprisoned in the
debris: thirty-eight of them were killed and eighty-five
were injured or burnt.
On its inward journey to London, the Giant had
encountered two of the patrolling pilots of the Royal Flying
Corps. One of them attacked and caused the German pilot
to alter course. For a time the Giant was lost in the darkness,
but it was found near North Weald by Second Lieutenant
J. G. Goodyear of No. 39 Squadron. This officer pursued
and attacked the bomber and the ensuing fight, though
brief, was intense. A hit in the engine put the British
aeroplane out of action and another bullet wounded the
Royal Flying Corps observer. Having met and overcome
ii6 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
this challenge, the pilot of the Giant pursued his course
direct to London, but, near Chingford, he flew into a
balloon apron. The German aeroplane presumably took the
obstacle in its flight, and, by some chance, escaped damage.
The apron itself suffered considerably and it seemed that
parts of two apron streamers were carried away by the
Giant. ^ Fortune assuredly favoured the German crew be-
cause another pilot, who found and pursued the enemy
bomber on its outward journey, was unable to get his
gun to work when he had placed himself in a favourable
position for attack.
The Royal Flying Corps, however, did not go entirely
unrewarded. The bombing of Hampstead was done by
a Gotha which was discovered as it was leaving London
again by two patrolling pilots who engaged it steadily and
eventually brought it down in flames at Wickford: the
German crew of three were killed.
Nearly 15,000 rounds of ammunition were fired by the
anti-aircraft guns, most of them in a new pattern of
barrage fire known as the polygon, which aimed at the
consecutive encirclement of the bomber by an irregular
screen of bursts. There is evidence that some of the
German bombers were induced to alter course on the 28th
as a result of the polygon barrage, and it seems clear that
at least one of them was turned away from Woolwich
Arsenal. There is, however, no record that any of the
bombers was hit by the anti-aircraft guns and, except the
one shot down by aircraft at Wickford, all the bombers
returned to their aerodromes, where four were damaged
on landing.
Map 24 No Gothas took part in the next attack, made on the
night of the 29th/30th of January. We knew at the time
that three Giants came overland, but thought that they
were also accompanied by a few smaller type aeroplanes;
it is now clear, however, that British aircraft were mistaken
^ A member of a Gotha crew, taken prisoner during a subsequent raid
on the I9th/20th of May, gave the information that a Giant aeroplane,
presumably the one here referred to, hit a balloon cable and, as a result,
one plane was damaged. The Giant fell some hundreds of feet before the
pilot was able to regain control.
I9I8] ^GIANTS' OVER LONDON 117
for those of the enemy. Actually four Giants started,
each loaded with a total of 1,000 kg. of bombs, but one
had engine trouble and turned back soon after leaving its
aerodrome. Two of the others reached the London area,
but the third was turned away from the capital by the
barrage fire at Billericay and dropped its bombs on
Rawreth, Thundersley, and Rayleigh, and in the sea off
the Blackwater and off Margate: three houses at Rayleigh
and a farm building at Rawreth were damaged.
One of the two Giants which approached London was
attacked at 12,000 feet by a B.E.12 pilot of No. 37 Squad-
ron. The British aeroplane received many hits and, so far
as could be judged, the Giant was also hit, but whether
this was so or not it is certain that the bomber turned
off to the west and dropped its bombs hurriedly. They
fell mainly on Isleworth, Kew, and Brentford, and
damaged houses and killed ten persons and injured ten
more. On its homeward flight this Giant was attacked
near Gravesend by a pilot who put a burst of 100 rounds
into it before he had to break off the fight through being
temporarily blinded by the flash produced when one of
his tracer bullets struck the propeller of his aeroplane.
The second Giant which attempted to attack London
was frustrated by patrolling pilots. It was discovered near
North Benfleet, Essex, as it came in, and was pursued and
attacked by four pilots with such effect that the full load
of bombs was dropped near Wanstead, where they ex-
ploded harmlessly. The Giant, still under attack, turned
back immediately, but although pursued and inter-
mittently fired at throughout its journey to the coast
near Eastchurch, suffered no visible damage and disap-
peared in the darkness over the sea.
The next moonlight raid was made on the i6th of Map 25
February by five Giants which carried a total of 4,250 kg.
of bombs, among them one weighing 1,000 kg., the first
of its kind to be dropped on England. Two of the five
bombers reached London. One dropped the i,ooo-kg.
bomb on the north-east end of the Chelsea Hospital built
by Sir Christopher Wren. An officer of the hospital staff
was killed with his wife, her sister, and two children : three
ii8 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
other children were taken alive from the debris. Many
neighbouring buildings, including the Chelsea Barracks,
were damaged. The second Giant attacked Woolwich and
Beckenham with two 300-kg. and eight 50-kg. bombs.
Those which fell on Beckenham exploded in allotments
and in a park and caused neither damage nor casualties,
but the bombs on Woolwich killed seven persons, injured
two, and damaged several buildings, among them the
Garrison Church.
The only bombs dropped outside London fell harmlessly
near St. Margaret's Bay, east of Dover. The Giant
responsible for this attack had trouble and, with three of
its engines out of action, only just succeeded in reaching
the Belgian Coast. We traced no bombs from the remain-
ing two aeroplanes and, although we knew they were near
the coast, we could not discover that they came inland.
26 An attack next night, February the 17th, was made
on London by one Giant. From reports at the time it
appeared that many German aeroplanes took part in the
raid, but Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes were again widely
reported as hostile and some of them suffered attack by
the anti-aircraft guns. The noise made by the engines of
the Giant also contributed to the confusion. For instance,
as the bomber approached the Nore about 10 p.m. on the
17th it was heard quite plainly at Southminster, some
thirteen miles to the north, and was naturally reported
as another aeroplane coming in near Southminster. The
Giant entered London from the south-east and dropped
nineteen 50-kg. bombs between Lee and St. Pancras railway
station. Most damage was inflicted by the bombs which
fell last, a group of six aimed at the station. People who
were sheltering from the attack under a railway arch found
themselves in the centre of the explosions, and twenty
persons were killed and twenty- two injured. Damage was
done to the booking offices, to stores, and to the Midland
Grand Hotel. Before the bombs fell at St. Pancras, casualties
and damage had been inflicted in Lewisham, Peckham, and
Southwark, the total casualties for the raid being twenty-
one killed and thirty-two injured, while the damage was
estimated at nearly ^40,000. Sixty-nine pilots, twenty-two
I9I8] A NIGHT OF MYSTERY 119
of them in Sopwith 'Camels', patrolled, but only one of
them came in contact with the bomber which, however,
was lost to view when the British pilot was blinded by the
flash from his gun after he had fired fifty rounds.^
The next night, the 1 8th/ 19th of February, was some-
thing of a mystery night. There were all the elements of
an attack on London except that there were no enemy
aircraft. Calais was bombed about 9.50 p.m. on the
1 8th and it is possible that one or more aeroplanes came
within hearing of the Kent Coast. However that may be,
warnings were distributed in southern England, and fifty-
five pilots ascended on patrol. The Royal Flying Corps
aeroplanes were soon being reported as German and fire
was opened on many of them. In all, about 4,000 rounds
were fired by the anti-aircraft guns, mostly in the London
area. These alarms and excursions reveal how sensitive
the nerves of the public, and of some of those responsible
for the protection of the public, had become.
There was quiet until the night of the 7th of March Map 27
which was moonless, but was made light by an aurora
borealis. Six Giants started, but one of them turned back
because of engine trouble before it reached the English
coast. Three of the remainder reached London and one
got as far as Luton, but the fifth did not progress beyond
Billericay in Essex. One of the seventeen bombs which
fell on London weighed 1,000 kg. and hit No. 67 Warring-
ton Crescent, Paddington. It wrecked much of the street
and killed twelve persons and injured twenty-three.
Twenty-three houses were demolished, or very seriously
damaged, and 400 more suffered damage of some kind.
The other bombs also inflicted considerable damage,
mainly in St. John's Wood, Whetstone, Hampstead, and
Battersea, in which places nine more people were killed
and fifteen injured. The bombs outside London fell
chiefly in fields, but one which exploded in Herne Bay
damaged an hotel and a few houses. Owing to the absence
of a moon, the raiders seem to have had difficulty in
^ It was about this time that an anti-flash device was fitted to the
muzzles of the machine-guns : the proportion of tracer bullets was reduced.
See p. 150. ■ • •
120 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
finding their way, nor did any of the forty-two Royal
Flying Corps pilots who patrolled see anything of them.
The bombers were occasionally caught in the beam of a
searchlight and they were compelled, from time to time,
to alter course on account of the anti-aircraft barrage fire:
although there was no evidence that any hits were made
by the gunners, two of the Giants, for some unknown
reason, made forced landings on their return and were
badly damaged.
Zeppelin Disasters
Within a week there was a return of the Zeppelins.
After the attack on the igth/zoth of October 191 7, when
the German naval airship service had suffered so heavily,
Zeppelins had kept away from England. It is unlikely that
the Germans would have allowed so much time to elapse
before resuming the attacks had it not been that the naval
airship service had received a second crippling blow. In
the afternoon of Saturday, January the Sth, 191 8, there
were, in the sheds at the main base at Ahlhorn, the
Zeppehns L.4y, and L,58, and the Schiitte-
Lanz SL.20. Two cleaners were at work in the after
car in the Z.5J and six civilian employees were making
repairs to the Schiitte-Lanz, but, except these few work-
men and the guard, the sheds were empty. Most of the
airship and ground personnel, numbering about 1,000,
were in the adjacent barracks. Suddenly there occurred
a series of explosions, accompanied by leaping flames from
the sheds. The cause of the disaster is a mystery, but it
seems clear that it began in the double shed housing the
L.4y and Z.5J. The two cleaners in the latter ship, who
escaped with burns, testified that a fire followed a dull
report in front of the car in which they were working.
The flames spread rapidly, and within a minute the five
airships and three of the four sheds which contained
them had been destroyed. The remaining three sheds
had been damaged more or less considerably and some of
the men's quarters had been demolished. Fifteen men
were killed, thirty seriously injured, and 104 slightly
injured. It was believed for a time that the disaster had
I9I8] AHLHORN DISASTER 121
been caused by a British air attack, and when this possi-
bihty was ruled out it was freely rumoured that the
destruction of the base was an act of sabotage, a suspicion
which gained ground because it was known that there was
considerable disaffection among the station personnel. The
expert finding was that the disaster had been due to an
accident, and the suggestion was put forward that a piece
of roofing, made loose by the winter storms, had fallen
and damaged a fuel tank, and that the fire was possibly
started by sparks thrown off from bracing wires as they
were struck by the falling piece of roof. Some authorities
in Germany have never accepted this explanation and be-
lieve that the destruction resulted from an act of treason,
for which, however, there seems to be no supporting
evidence.
There is little doubt that this loss of four up-to-date
Zeppelins, together with the latest Schiitte-Lanz, put an
end for a time to the German airship raiding campaign. The
German naval command had prepared plans for a series of
attacks on England in which Zeppelins were to be sup-
ported by the German fleet, and were to operate in close co-
ordination with the military bombing squadrons stationed
in Belgium. Whether, in any circumstances, the plans
would, or could, have been put into effect is open to de-
bate, but after the Ahlhorn disaster they were not further
considered.
On the loth of March 1918 a new ship, the Z.6j, was Map?
commissioned and, two days later, she set out for the
midlands of England with four others, the Z.5J, L.54,
L.6i^ and Z.62, the whole under the personal command of
Fregattenkapitan Strasser. The L.54 (Kapitanleutnant
Buttlar) did not come overland, but dropped her bombs
among Grimsby trawlers in the North Sea, some of which,
equipped with anti-aircraft guns, opened fire on the
ZeppeHn.i The L.53 (Korvettenkapitan Prolss) reached
the Yorkshire Coast before 10 p.m., but did not cross and
* Buttlar thought he attacked Grimsby itself. He reported heavy anti-
aircraft gun-fire, and at least one shell exploded near the airship which had
a cell badly holed. Buttlar had to throw out water ballast and petrol to
lighten the ship.
122 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
soon went home again, ^ and although the L.61 (Kapitan-
leutnant EhrHch) passed over a part of Yorkshire we could
not discover that she dropped any bombs. ^ The damage,
such as it was, was done by the L.62 and L.63,
The former ship, commanded by Hauptmann Manger,
seemed to us at the time to make a good attempt to reach
and attack the naval airship sheds at Howden, but her
bombs (twenty-seven) were eventually dropped in fields
six miles north of Howden : an inn and some cottages were
damaged. 3 The newest ship, the L.63 (Kapitanleutnant
von Freudenreich), came in at Hornsea at 8.30 p.m. and
followed the railway directly into Hull, where bombs began
to fall about 9 p.m. Six exploded within the municipal
area of the city and sixteen more fell in fields at Sutton
and Swine. A few houses were damaged in Hull, where one
woman died of shock, but otherwise the bombs exploded
ineffectively.^
The failure of the raid was due chiefly to the weather
conditions which were entirely unfavourable. The clouds
were low and there was some rain, and as the airships
were navigated at heights between 16,000 and 20,000
feet it was impossible that targets could be selected. The
searchlights could not pierce the clouds, and most of the
anti-aircraft gun-fire was directed according to the sound
made by the engines of the Zeppelins. Apart from the
bad weather conditions overhead, there was much ground
mist and no more than ten pilots were able to get into the
air: they saw nothing. While the airships were attacking
Yorkshire, enemy aeroplanes were heard off the Kentish
Coast and there was some expectation, for a time, that
southern England would also be attacked, but the German
bombers raided Boulogne.
7 Zeppelins were out again on the 13th. They were the
L.52, and Z.56, but when they were on their way
^ Prolss thought he attacked Hull with 3,000 kg. of bombs. They fell,
presumably, in the sea.
2 Ehrlich reported that he attacked anti-aircraft batteries. He flew
over sparsely inhabited country and his bombs, perhaps, fell on waste land.
3 Manger thought he attacked Leeds and Bradford.
^ Freudenreich knew he was over a big city, but thought he was farther
west, at Leeds.
I9I8] A SURPRISE ATTACK 123
reports of strong northerly winds led to their recall by
wireless. Two of them, the Z.52 and Z.56, turned back,
but the commander of the L.42 decided to continue,
in spite of the order, because the opportunity seemed
promising. This ship, commanded by Kapitanleutnant
Dietrich, passed near warships about no miles east of
Whitby, but continued on her course and came in over
Hartlepool, unheard, at 9.15 p.m. We had followed the
movements of the three airships across the North Sea with
some difficulty, and because of uncertainty no warning
had been given to the north-east coast towns. In conse-
quence the industrial works in the area were showing
lights and, although the L.42 was flying at 18,000 feet,
her commander was able to pick out objectives for his
bombs, most of which were aimed at the docks. Twenty-
one bombs fell on West Hartlepool and destroyed or
damaged shops and houses, and killed eight persons and
injured thirty-nine. As the L.42 moved swiftly south
from West Hartlepool she was seen by Second Lieutenant
E. C. Morris (observer. Second Lieutenant R. D. Linford)
of No. 36 Squadron who was patrolling at 14,500 feet in
an F.E.2d. The Zeppelin, her bombs gone, had now
climbed to 20,000 feet and the British pilot went up after
her as high as he could. At 17,300 feet he had reached
his 'ceiling', but he followed the L.42 for forty miles out
to sea in the hope, which proved vain, that she might lose
enough height to enable him to attack. ^ Two of the Royal
Flying Corps defence aeroplanes crashed on landing and
one pilot was killed.
For a month there were no attacks from the air, but
when the next raid was made, again by Zeppelins, on the
I2th/i3th of April, it looked as though the German naval
airship service had once more become a serious menace.
Bombs exploded as far west as Wigan in Lancashire, and
in the manufacturing district€ of Birmingham, and the
^ Dietrich knew he attacked Hartlepool, and his report says the town
was taken hy surprise and that none of the lights was extinguished until
half his bombs had been dropped. The attack is fully described by Kor-
vettenkapitiin a.D. Dietrich-Bielefeld in an article in the Marine-Luftflot-
ten- Rundschau for June 1927.
124 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
two Zeppelins which took part each dropped about two
and a half tons of bombs, a greater load than we had hitherto
traced from any one raiding airship. ^ Furthermore, it was
again emphasized that the power of the Zeppelins to fly
at heights up to 20,000 feet made them almost immune
from gun or aeroplane attack.
8 Five airships set out, namely, the Z.60, Z.6j, Z.62, Z.6j,
and with Fregattenkapitan Strasser in command.
The L.60 (Kapitanleutnant Flemming), which came in
south of Spurn Head, was overland only about an hour,
and her commander judged that he had reached Leeds, but
his attack was made south of the Humber, where 34 bombs
fell, mainly at East Halton and Thornton Saxby, without
inflicting damage. ^ The L.64 (Korvettenkapitan Schiitze)
approached Lincoln, but did not attack the city which
was in darkness and therefore probably escaped notice.
At Skellingthorpe and Doddington, however, lights were
showing because the Lincoln buzzer, from which these places
received warning of air raids, had not been heard. The lights
attracted fourteen bombs which damaged an engine shed
and the railway track at Skellingthorpe, but inflicted no
damage beyond breaking glass at Doddington. Four more
bombs came from the L.64 at Waddington and Mere,
south of Lincoln, without effect.
The L.63 (Kapitanleutnant Freudenreich) also ap-
proached Lincoln, from the south-east, but the Braunce-
wall gun came into action against her and seems to have
attracted a number of bombs, some of them heavy ones
(300 kg.), but they fell in fields east of Metheringham,
after which the L.63 moved off rapidly southwards,
dropping six more bombs ineffectively at Fleet and Little
Sutton before she went out over the Wash.3
The airship which reached Wigan was the L.61 (Kapi-
^ The loads carried by the Zeppelins varied, but some of them, at this
time, set out with 3,000 kg. of bombs.
2 The L.60 carried 3,000 kg. weight of high explosive and attacked from
5,200 metres.
3 The log of the L.63 shows that the anti-aircraft gun-fire reached a
height of 5,000 metres. The bombs were aimed at batteries and search-
lights, but owing to clouds the effect could not be observed from the
airship. It was thought the attack was made near Grimsby.
I9I8] WHY LIVERPOOL ESCAPED 125
tanleutnant Ehrlich). She crossed the coast at Withernsea
at 9.30 p.m. and went out again a Httle south of her entry
point at 2.35 a.m. On her inward journey the Zeppelin
moved towards Sheffield, but passed well south of the town
and for some time subsequently appeared to be making for
Liverpool. Near Runcorn, however, she turned north and,
after dropping two bombs on Bold, began to attack Wigan
about 1 1.30 p.m. No air-raid warning had been communi-
cated to the town and the blast furnaces of the Wigan Coal
and Iron Company were in full blaze. There is not much
doubt that it was the lights which singled Wigan out for
attack. Eight bombs fell on Ince, on the outskirts of the
town, and they caused injury to a man and considerable
damage to cottage property and to the railway. Then came
fifteen bombs on Wigan itself which killed seven persons,
injured twelve, and damaged much property. The L.61
moved on to Aspull, where four 300-kg. bombs fell in a
field, but they damaged cottages by concussion, caused
injury to four persons, and were indirectly responsible for
a fire in a brewery. Two more bombs fell harmlessly at
Little Hulton and RadcHffe.
Ehrlich's flight was a bold one, more especially because
his report reveals that he had engine trouble on his
way in. He journeyed farther west, however, than he
realized and it may be said that had he known where he
was Wigan would have been safe from attack. The port
of Liverpool, with its great docks, was an objective of
first-class military importance, and every airship com-
mander looked forward to the night when the conditions
would be favourable for an attack on the city. Ehrlich
turned northwards to Wigan when he had come almost
to the outskirts of Liverpool, and the sole reason was that,
according to his plottings, he was near Sheffield. He
dropped his bombs on the lights of Wigan in the conviction
that he was attacking Sheffield factories.
The Birmingham district was visited by the L.62
(Hauptmann Manger) which was overland for six hours.
She came in across Norfolk at 9.30 p.m., dropped two
bombs near a searchlight as she approached Wisbech, and
eight more east of the aerodrome at Tydd St. Mary. A
126 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
pilot who was patrolling the area climbed after the airship,
which he described as 'sitting' over the aerodrome at
18,000 feet while she dropped her bombs, but she soon
eluded him, and, after circling near Wisbech again,
steered a course for Coventry. As she approached the city
she was fired on, and she dropped thirteen bombs which
exploded in the open south-east of Coventry. The L.62
then moved on towards Birmingham, and six bombs came
from her between Packwood and Monkspath. As she bore
down on Birmingham from the south, anti-aircraft guns
opened against her and she then turned and dropped her
remaining bombs, two 300-kg., on Hallgreen and Shirley.
Again the damage was negligible and there were no
casualties. The which had come within striking
distance of Coventry and Birmingham and of the con-
gested industrial area in between, had dropped 2|- tons
of bombs with no effect, and we were, it must be admitted,
fortunate to escape so lightly.^ As the L.62 moved east-
wards again. Lieutenant C. H. Noble-Campbell of No. 38
Squadron, who was patrolling the line Peterborough-
Coventry, sighted her at about 12.15 ^'^"> ^nd he followed
her for about an hour as she made for home. He had a
brief machine-gun duel with the ship and, as a result, he
received a wound in the head and damage to his aeroplane,
so that he had to make a forced landing at Coventry. The
airship crew were again aware, as they passed over Norfolk,
that aeroplanes were searching for them, but the ship
eventually passed out to sea south of Yarmouth without
any further encounters.
The weather conditions throughout the areas affected by
the raid were unfavourable for flying and many of the
defence aeroplanes could not ascend. No more than twenty
pilots were able to get into the air, but although a few of
them sighted the Zeppelins, the pilot of No. 38 Squadron,
already referred to, was the only one to get near enough
to attack.
There was a scare, of interest because of its origin, on
^ The log of the L.62 shows that she carried four 300-kg., fourteen
loo-kg., and twenty incendiary bombs. Of this load we traced twenty-
seven bombs.
I9I8] FALSE ALARMS 127
the night of the 26th of April. A FeHxstowe flying-boat,
returning from reconnaissance, lost its way and was heard
about II p.m. near the North Foreland. Anti-aircraft
gun-fire was opened, and as the flying-boat moved hesi-
tatingly up the coast towards its base, many reports were
made which seemed to show that several enemy aircraft
were off the Essex coast. Defence aeroplanes were ordered
into the air and soon some of these were reported as hostile
until, ultimately, air-raid warnings had been issued over a
wide area and work had come to a standstill in all muni-
tion factories in Kent, Essex, and in the London district.
A conference was held to discuss ways of avoiding inci-
dents of this kind, and various new instructions were issued
to the aircraft and anti-aircraft defences. The episode
suggests that the Germans missed opportunities. Except
for actual damage caused by bombs, the results of a scare
of this kind were not very different from those of a large-
scale raid, and it seems obvious that guerrilla air war-
fare as opposed to, or in conjunction with, bombing raids
in strength, must have made the task of the defence diffi-
cult and would have increased the moral effect of the air-
raid campaign.
l^he Final Aeroplane Attack
Before the next attack, which was the biggest and last
of its kind, the defences in the London area had again
been reorganized. With the object of enlarging the aero-
plane patrol zone, guns were cleared from the north and
east of the inner defences and used to strengthen the gun
barrier line. The searchlights on the north-east and south-
east of the inner defences became 'Aeroplane Lights',
whose task was to illuminate the bombers in the aeroplane
patrol zone. These lights were organized as four Aero-
plane Searchlight Companies, R.E., under an independent
commander, but so far as tactical training and operations
were concerned, they were placed under the appropriate
Royal Air Force squadron commander.
The last of the aeroplane raids took place on the Map 28
I9th/20th of May. In the light of the moon, from 10.42
p.m. on the 19th of May until about 1.30 a.m. on the 20th,
128 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
there was an almost continuous coming and going of
aeroplanes over Kent and Essex. As the progress of the raid-
ing aircraft was plotted, the paths which they made crossed
and recrossed until they seemed to fill most of a triangle
with one point at London and the others at Hythe in the
south and at the Naze in the north. With eighty- four
aeroplanes from the defence squadrons also in the air, it
was extremely difficult to follow the movements of the
bombers, but so far as we could make out about thirty-
four of them crossed the coast at various times, and of this
number apparently thirteen reached London. According
to German records, forty-three bombing aircraft started
and at least nineteen of them got to London. Seven
never returned to Belgium and the German authorities
presumed that some of these also reached and possibly
bombed London before they were brought down. The
forty-three were made up of thirty-eight Gothas, three
Giants, and two smaller-type bombers ('C'), and they
carried a total of 14,550-kg. weight of high- explosive
bombs. It is known that their objectives were Dover and
London, and that they left their aerodromes at intervals
of about five minutes and attacked independently of one
another.
So far as we could trace, seventy-two bombs fell on
London. They killed forty-eight persons, caused injury
to 165, and destroyed or damaged over 1,000 houses and
business premises. Outside London, thirty-six bombs
were dropped on various places in Essex and forty-nine
in Kent, but most of them exploded ineffectively: three
persons were injured at Faversham, and one at Dover,
where some damage was also done to property. In addition,
anti-aircraft shells killed one person and injured eight
more and damaged a few hundred houses. The total
monetary value of the damage caused in London was
estimated at ;£i30,733.
The outstanding feature of the raid was the success
achieved by the anti-aircraft defences — aeroplane and
gun. Over 30,000 shells were fired, and although most of
the fire was of the barrage-kind, by sound, and often wild,
it is clear that some of it was close and imposing enough
I9I8] FINAL AEROPLANE ATTACK 129
to keep many of the attackers away from London. Further-
more the gunners also destroyed three of the raiders. One,
which had bombed Sydenham and Catford, was shot
down in flames by gun-fire north-east of Foreness on its
way out and fell in the sea. Another, which came in over
the Essex coast near Wakering, turned back when it was
engaged by anti-aircraft guns, but was directly hit and
fell in the sea in flames without having dropped any bombs.
The third was one of a number which attacked the Folke-
stone and Dover districts. It was hit before it could drop
its bombs and fell in flames near Dover. The wreckage
of this aeroplane was found on the water next morning
and the body of one of the crew was recovered by a
trawler.
The defence pilots were equally successful. Nearly every
one of the eighty- four aeroplanes which went up on patrol
was capable of overtaking the raiders. Chiefly they were
Sopwith ^Camels', S.E.5a's, and Bristol Fighters,^ all
first-class fighting aircraft of their time. There were many
enemy bombers about and the British pilots had, by this
time, had opportunity to get accustomed to night-flying
conditions so that there were many encounters.
One Gotha, after dropping bombs on Rotherhithe, off
the Old Kent Road, and in Peckham, was found near
Maidstone by Major F. Sowrey of No. 143 Squadron who
fired two double drums of ammunition into it from under-
neath and wounded the pilot. The Gotha, however,
escaped into the darkness, but had not gone far when it
was attacked by a Bristol Fighter of No. 141 Squadron
(pilot. Lieutenant E. E. Turner; gunner. Air Mechanic
H. B. Barwise) and, further damaged, made an attempt
to land at the Harrietsham aerodrome: it crashed and only
one of the crew of three survived.
Captain C. J. Q. Brand, in a Sopwith 'Camel' of No.
112 Squadron, met an incoming Gotha over Faversham
at 8,700 feet, and with his first burst of fire put one of
the bomber's engines out of action. The Gotha turned
sharply, nose down, but was followed by the 'Camel'
^ 31 'Camels', 28 S.E.5a's, 14 Bristol Fighters, 8 B.E.ia's, and 3
B.E.izB's.
2504.5 K
130 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
pilot who kept up the attack and, within a short time, the
enemy aeroplane burst into flames. Captain Brand was
so close when this happened that his face was scorched.
He watched the Gotha crash near the sea wall close to
Harty Ferry where it was destroyed with its crew.
Another Gotha was first attacked on its inward passage
across Essex by Captain D. V. Armstrong in a Sopwith
'Camel' of No. 78 Squadron, but, although the British
pilot fired all his ammunition into the bomber from close
range, the Gotha continued on its way to London. It was,
however, seen over Hainault Forest by Lieutenant A. J.
Arkell and Air Mechanic A. T. C. Stagg who were in a
Bristol Fighter of No. 39 Squadron and were attracted
to the bomber by the bright light of the engine's exhaust
flames. They were at 10,000 feet and they promptly
attacked the Gotha at close quarters from underneath.
The Gotha began to lose height and when it was at 1,500
feet, still under attack, it burst into flames and crashed
into an open space at Roman Road, East Ham: two of the
crew threw themselves from the burning aeroplane as it
fell, and they, like the third member who went down with
his aeroplane, were killed. A seventh Gotha, forced down
by engine trouble after manoeuvring to avoid anti-aircraft
gun-fire, made a rough landing on farmland near Clacton
and one member of the crew was killed. There were, in
addition, many indecisive encounters and most of the
crews who returned safely to Belgium had lively stories
to tell of their reception over England. One Gotha
crashed near its home aerodrome on its return. This
attack ended the German aeroplane campaign. On only
three subsequent occasions, before the war ended, did an
enemy aeroplane cross the English Coast, each time without
dropping bombs. On the 17th of June one came in at
noon at a great height over Broadstairs and Margate,
another, similarly, on the 1 8th of July, and the last made
a brief appearance over Deal two days later. According
to the German authority. Major Freiherr von Biilow,
the pressure of events in France led to the cessation of
raids on England, and the bombing squadrons were ex-
clusively engaged, from May onwards, on the Western
I9I8] FINAL ZEPPELIN ATTACK 131
front. In August 191 8 the German High Command
ordered, 'on military and political grounds', that the
bombing campaign against Paris, as well as against London,
was to cease. ^
^he Last Zeppelin Attack
There was one more attack, hy airships, in which Map g
Fregattenkapitan Peter Strasser, the German airship
leader, met his end. In the evening of the 5th of August
the barometer was at 29-60 inches, and was falling: the
sky was overcast, and there was intermittent rain inland.
No air raid had before been attempted with the barometer
so low, and there is no doubt that the weather was un-
favourable for an attack by Zeppelins. In the afternoon
of the 5th, the L.53, L.56, 1,63, L.65, and L.yo had left
the north German sheds for the Midlands. The Z.70,
the latest addition to the naval airship fleet, had only been
commissioned on the 8th of July and, with her seven
290 horse-power Maybach engines, was the highest-
powered Zeppelin produced during the war.
At 8.10 p.m. three of the airships were sighted from
the Leman Tail lightship. They were the Z.70, com-
manded by Kapitanleutnant von Lossnitzer with Fregat-
tenkapitan Strasser on board, and the L.53 and Z.65.
The other two ships were farther south, nearer the coast,
and were heard north of Yarmouth at 9 p.m. At 9.5 p.m.
a D.H.4 aeroplane left the Yarmouth aerodrome with
Major E. Cadbury at the controls and Captain R. Leckie
at the Lewis gun in the observer's seat, both of them
pilots of night-fighting experience. The visibility to the
northward above the clouds was exceptionally good, and
Major Cadbury sighted three Zeppelins about forty miles
away steering south-west at slow speed. As the D.H.4
moved to intercept them it must have passed near the
L.56 and L.63 which had turned north near Yarmouth
^ The detailed defence arrangements in the London Air Defence Area,
as they existed towards the end of the war, are well shown in two Operation
Orders by Major-General E. B. Ashmore, reprinted as Appendix VIII.
For the Warning Control Organization, as it was at the end of the war,
see Map, p. 134.
132 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
and were moving along the Norfolk coast in the direction
of the remaining three Zeppelins. Here is Major Cadbury's
report :
'Immediately on leaving Yarmouth, I sighted three
'Zeppelin airships to N.E. distant about forty miles, steer-
'ing west at a slow speed, and I gave chase.
'At approximately 21.45 the Zeppelins, which were
'flying in "V" formation, altered course North. At 22.10
'Zeppelin abeam 2,000 feet above us at 17,000 feet. At
'22.20 we had climbed to 16,400 feet, and I attacked
'Zeppelin head on, slightly to port so as to clear any
'obstruction that might be suspended from airship. My
'observer trained his gun on the bow of the airship and
'the fire was seen to concentrate on a spot under the
'Zeppelin | way aft.
'The Z.P.T.^ was seen to blow a great hole in the
'fabric and a fire started which quickly ran along the entire
'length of the Zeppelin.
'The Zeppelin raised her bows as if in an effort to escape,
'then plunged seaward a blazing mass.
'The airship was completely consumed in about f of
'a minute. A large petrol tank was seen to become
'detached from the framework and fall blazing into a
'heavy layer of clouds at about 7,000 feet below.
'On seeing the fate of their companion, the remaining
'two Zeppelins immediately altered course East and
'proceeded in that direction at a high speed.
'At this moment, my engine cut out completely, owing,
'I presume, to a temporary block in the petrol system.
'I managed to get my engine going again, and closed
'second Zeppelin. I again attacked bow on and my
'observer opened fire, when within 500 feet of airship.
'Fire immediately broke out in the midship's gondola. At
'this point my observer's gun jammed owing to a double
'feed which in the darkness could not be cleared. The
'fire on the Zeppehn became extinguished. I maintained
'contact with Zeppelin for approximately five minutes
'while my observer attempted to clear jam, but without
^ 'Z.P.T.' refers to the Pomeroy tracer bullet in use at this time,
known as the P.S.A. Mark II.
I9I8] DEATH OF STRASSER 133
^success. I was unable to use my front gun, as I had reached
^my ceihng.
'Course was altered to S.W. and after flying for twenty-
'five minutes at 100 m.p.h., and having passed through
'four layers of thick clouds, the lowest being about 5,000
'feet, I sighted flares of a night landing ground and landed
'at 23.05 at Sedgeford and reported to base.'
The Z.70 fell close to the schooner Amethyst near which
some of her bombs had already exploded. The second
ZeppeHn, which luck alone saved from destruction,
was the Z.65 (Kapitanleutnant Walter Dose). It was
known, long afterwards, that what appeared to be an
outbreak of fire in the gondola of the Z.65 was a flash of
light temporarily revealed by the sudden raising of the
black curtain in the gondola by a member of the crew. It
was also known that the gas-bags of the ship were per-
forated by bullets from the D.H.4. Several other aero-
planes were in the neighbourhood, but none of them
could get close enough to attack.
So far as can be judged from the German official records,
the airship commanders were deceived by their wireless
reports into a belief that they were farther west than
they were. They believed they attacked batteries near
Grimsby {L.63) and King's Lynn {L.65), and also the
towns of Boston and Norwich (Z.56). No bombs
ere dropped on land, but if the German wireless stations
ere responsible for bombs falHng harmlessly in the sea,
it might fairly be said also that they saved other Zeppelins
from destruction, for had the airships come over land it is
difficult to see how they could have avoided encounter
with the many aeroplanes in their path fully capable of
attacking them at any height.
One of the ZeppeHns, the Z.56 (Kapitanleutnant
Zaeschmar), delayed her attack until some time after the
other commanders had turned for home. She was off
Yarmouth about 11.45 p.m. and dropped a number of
bombs in the sea near the town. She then came over land
north of Lowestoft, crossed the town, although her
commander was unaware that he was doing so, and then
went out to sea again, where another group of bombs fell.
134 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
No searchlights or anti-aircraft gun-fire opened on the
Z.56, and to this precaution the immunity of Yarmouth
and Lowestoft was probably due.
Through some acoustic peculiarity of the atmosphere
the noise of the explosion of the bombs dropped by the
various ships, all of them at sea, was heard at places up
to 1 15 miles distant. In each instance, it was assumed that
the bombs were much nearer than they were. For example,
the bombs which fell from the Z.56 off Lowestoft were
heard at Bedford, 95 miles away, and at Weedon, 115 miles
distant, but Weedon reported them sixteen miles to the
east. One result of the unusual acoustic conditions, which
made it appear that the Zeppelins were w^ell over land,
was that warning was given to a wide area in the
Midlands, where all air-raid precautions were taken.
Many pilots ascended on patrol from the inland aero-
dromes, but they saw nothing, and one of them was
killed owing to his aeroplane crashing. Two aeroplanes
attached to the Navy (Lieutenant G. F. Hodson in a
Sopwith 'Camel', and Captain B. G. Jardine and Lieu-
tenant E. R. Munday in a D.H.9) failed to return from
patrol, and were presumably lost at sea.
The death of Strasser at the head of his squadron, in
the last attempt by the Zeppelins to raid the towns of
England, was a fitting end. A good organizer and a natural
leader of men, he made and inspired the German naval
airship service. His aim, as his operation orders show, was
to inflict military damage, and if the achievements of his
service were sometimes different from what he hoped and
believed, those who have navigated the skies under com-
parable conditions will know how to make allowances.
Air-raid Shelters^
A problem which became of increasing importance as
the war progressed was the provision of shelter for the
civilian population when air attacks were threatened.
People in the East End of London, who were almost
^ A book setting out the effect of bombs on some of the London buildings
was published by the British Fire Prevention Committee in 1923 under
the title Air Raid Damage in London.
1917] AIR-RAID SHELTERS 135
always in the path of the raiders, knew that the small
houses in which many of them lived afforded little or no
protection even against bomb splinters or pieces of anti-
aircraft shell, or, indeed, against a moderate shock from
a distance. A small section of the population in the eastern
districts was also inclined to panic. It became clear
to the authorities, in the autumn of 191 7 particularly,
when the moonlight aeroplane attacks began, that there
would be a movement from the east of tens of thousands
of people in search of shelter on any night when an
attack appeared possible. Those who were urged by fear
to get under cover were not content to await the usual
warning before setting out. They had often to face long
journeys across London and knew also that there would
be competition for the best places, so they watched the
skies to see whether the atmospheric conditions and the
state of the moon appeared favourable for raiding, and if
they judged that an attack was possible they took their
portable and precious belongings, and a few things for
their comfort, and set their faces to the west.
It was chiefly towards the west they went because that
was not only the shortest way out of the danger area, but
one well endowed also with shelters. Most popular of all
were the ninety or so stations of the Underground railways,
and, soon after the daylight aeroplane campaign began in
the middle of 191 7, the Commissioner of Police was com-
pelled to make arrangements for police to be sent to all
Underground stations, when air-raid warnings were given,
to help marshal the crowds. The stations were usually closed
after the last trains had left, somewhere between midnight
and I a.m., but, with the authority of the War Cabinet,
they were reopened and lighted if warning of a raid was
given after the usual closing times. The cost of maintain-
ing the staff on duty, and of the additional lighting, was
met from the Metropolitan Police Fund. At times,
especially in the autumn of 191 7, the wanderers took
up their places long before a warning was given, and
they continued in situ, whether or not a raid took place
and irrespective of formal closing times, until they judged
that all possible danger was at an end. An extract from
136 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
a police report of a visit paid to Old Street Underground
Station at the end of September 19 17 will illuminate the
conditions of the time. 'It was difficult', says the report,
'to alight from the train and move along the platform
'because of the crowd. The rear ranks were sitting with
'their backs to the wall, and the front ranks standing. All
'the corridors were blocked, with barely room for one to
'move along in single file. The staircases were solid with
'people. I estimate that there were 3,000 people on the
'platform, and altogether not less than 10,000 in the
'station.'
The tunnels under the Thames, at Woolwich, Greenwich,
Blackwall, and Rotherhithe, also became favourite shelters
which kept police specially employed regulating the crowds.
Many people made their way into the western suburbs of
London, where they passed the night, and this practice,
which became marked in the summer and autumn of 19 17,
caused embarrassment in the districts which were visited.
The need for shelters, which would be at least splinter-
proof, distributed over different parts of London in order
to check congestion at particular points, was obvious. The
Commissioner of Police therefore decided to allow police
stations to be used as shelters, and Government Depart-
ments, and authorities in charge of other public buildings,
were invited to do the same and to exhibit a placard. Air
Raid Shelter^ outside the building as soon as the 7ake Cover
notice was issued, especially at night. As a result, accom-
modation was made available for about 900,000 persons,
but in many parts of London, especially the poorer
districts, the available shelter remained insufficient. The
Government, therefore, set up a committee, under the
chairmanship of the Home Secretary, to consider the
problem. Among the proposals which the Committee
investigated was one to build public dug-outs in the parks,
bat in their report dated the llth of October 1917 they
rejected this proposal because material and skilled labour
could ill be spared and because dug-outs, which would be
no more than splinter-proof, would not offer greater pro-
tection than a building. The Committee recommended
that the arrangements for using suitable buildings should
1917] LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY 137
be extended, and suggested that a Defence of the Realm
regulation should be made to empower competent
authorities to require any premises to be made available
as shelters during air attacks. The recommendations were
approved by the Government, and the necessary regulation
was included in an Order-in-Council made on the 23rd of
October 191 7. The opportunity was also taken to include
in the Order another regulation which empowered the
authorities to instruct owners to erect hoardings in front
of damaged property. This was done on the advice of
the Commissioner of Police in order that damaged build-
ings might not remain open to the gaze of passers-by or
sight -seers who would be reminded of the dangers of air
attack.
In the task of classifying buildings which might be used
as air-raid shelters, the Commissioner was assisted by a
committee of surveyors and of officers of the Royal
Engineers who concentrated first on the Bow Division of
the Metropolitan Police District and reported that there
were enough suitable buildings to accommodate all who
might wish to use them. The Committee proposed that
in such of the buildings as did not already offer adequate
protection, windows and other openings should be sand-
bagged under the direction of the local authority. They
suggested that the choice of buildings suitable as air-raid
shelters in other districts should be the responsibility of
local surveyors who could be guided by general rules
which the Committee would set out as a result of its
experience when surveying the Bow Division. The pro-
posals were approved and, on the 20th of November 191 7,
the Commissioner of Police issued full particulars by
circular to all local authorities in the Metropolitan Police
District. They were told that they might purchase sand-
bags, on an approved scale, at the rate of 2^d. each, plus
ten per cent., but shortly afterwards the Government
decided to issue sand-bags free of charge up to a total
cost of £25,000 (two million bags). The local authorities
fought hard to make the cost of labour and material, other
than sand-bags, a charge on national instead of local funds,
but their arguments were resisted by the Treasury, which
138 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
also refused to meet the cost of dismantling the shelters
after the armistice.
Outside London there was a considerable amount of
spasmodic work on the provision of air-raid shelters. In
the Midlands and the North, mine workings and colliery
drifts were sometimes used. In the Isle of Thanet, caves,
disused chalk pits, and other subterranean passages were
opened up and improved, often with the assistance of the
local military authorities.
The VI Brigade
An account of the organization of the defence squadrons
will be of interest to the service student. At the end of
1916 there were eleven squadrons and one reserve squadron
which made up the Home Defence Wing under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel F. V. Holt, who had his head-quarters at
Adastral House on the Victoria Embankment.^ At the
beginning of February 191 7, Lieutenant-Colonel Holt
went overseas and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel
T. C. R. Higgins, who continued in the command through-
out the remainder of the war.
In March 191 7 there was decentralization, the squadrons
being grouped into two wings. Northern and Southern,
controlled from Adastral House by what was newly called
the Home Defence Group Head-quarters. The next
changes were brought about as a result of the German
daylight aeroplane bombing campaign. On the 19th of
July, Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. R. Higgins proposed that
five additional home defence squadrons should be formed
for day fighting. He pointed out that the existing squadrons
were responsible for day and night fighting, for wireless co-
operation with coastal batteries, for wireless tracking, and
for certain specified duties in the event of an attempted
invasion. 'It seems evident', he said, 'that one squadron
'commander cannot sufficiently supervise the administra-
'tion, training, and operations entailed by these various
'duties which involve totally different classes of pilots and
'machines. Moreover, it is undoubtedly essential that the
'squadron commander of a day defence squadron should
* Formerly de Keyser's Hotel, afterwards rebuilt as Unilever House.
1917] THE VI BRIGADE 139
'lead his eighteen machines during a raid.' It happened that
on the day this letter was written, Lieutenant-General
J. C. Smuts made his report, dealing with problems of
home defence, to the War Cabinet. ^ In that report he
advocated the formation of three day-fighting squadrons,
and Government sanction was given to this proposal in
due course, the squadrons being formed in July and
August.
A further result of the report of Lieutenant-General
Smuts was the appointment of Major-General E. B. Ash-
more to command the newly organized London Air
Defence Area. In accordance with proposals put forward
by this officer the defence squadrons, in September, were
reorganized into a Home Defence Brigade made up of three
wings, northern, eastern, and southern. The Southern
Wing, for night operations, and the Eastern Wing, for
day operations, were in the London Air Defence Area. The
Northern Wing was to be confined to night operations.
In October the Home Defence Brigade, now renamed
the VI Brigade, comprised : the Northern Home Defence
Wing (Forty-sixth) with head-quarters at York ; the South
Midland Home Defence Wing (Forty-seventh), newly
formed with head-quarters near Stamford^; the North
Midland Home Defence Wing (Forty-eighth), which,
however, was not organized until January 191 8 (head-
quarters, Gainsborough) ; the Eastern Home Defence Wing
(Forty-ninth), with head-quarters at Upminster; and the
Southern Home Defence Wing (Fiftieth), with its head-
quarters at Adastral House, London.
When two additional fighting squadrons were sanctioned,
in December 191 7, for the London Air Defence Area, it
was stated they would be No. 141, raised from No. 61
Squadron, and No. 143, raised from No. 112 Squadron.
General Head-quarters, Home Forces, subsequently pointed
out that the organization of the defence squadrons in
^ See p. 42.
2 Owing to the creation in the Midlands of four new depot squadrons
to train pilots in night flying, including those for service overseas, it had
been decided to divide the Midland Home Defence Wing into two, North
and South.
140 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
the south-east of England into Southern (Fiftieth) and
Eastern (Forty- ninth) Wings did not conform with their
tactical disposition, and that the two additional squadrons
would bring the numbers in these two wings to ten active
squadrons and one training squadron, which appeared too
many for effective administration. The existing tactical
grouping of the defence squadrons was as follows :
(i) a group near London for the immediate protec-
tion of the capital;
(ii) another in Essex and Suffolk to form advanced
defences north of the Thames ;
and (iii) a third in Kent as the advanced defence south of
the Thames.
General Head-quarters proposed that each of these
tactical groups should constitute a wing, and that the
other three wings of the Brigade, in the Midlands and the
North, should be formed into a separate group with its
head-quarters at York. An additional wing was approved,
but not the regrouping at York. The Fifty-third Wing,
therefore, consisting of Nos. 50, 112, and 143 Squadrons,
came into being on the 8th of February 191 8, with its
head-quarters at Harrietsham in Kent.
On the formation of the London Air Defence Area
in August 1917, the operational squadrons which came
under the command of Major-General Ashmore were
those approximately south of the Wash. North of this
line the defence squadrons continued to be under the
control, for operations, of the Garrison Commanders of
the Humber, the Tees, the Tyne, and Edinburgh, who
gave squadron commanders information about the move-
ments of hostile aircraft, upon receipt of which defence
aeroplanes were sent on patrol. In May 191 8, however,
a Northern Air Defence Area, under Brigadier-General
P. Maud, was formed to operate in a similar manner to
the London Air Defence Area. When this was done the
operational squadrons north of the Wash were organized
into the Northern group of the VI Brigade, to work under
the orders of the G.O.C., Northern Air Defence Area. The
remaining operational squadrons of the Brigade formed a
I9I7] NIGHT TRAINING OF PILOTS 141
Southern Group under the control of the G.O.C., London
Air Defence Area.
At that time there were ten night-training squadrons
in the Brigade, and these continued to be under the direct
control of the General Officer Commanding the Brigade
who was responsible to the Director of Training at the
Air Ministry.
It has already been indicated that the VI Brigade had
duties other than that of protection against air attack.
One great responsibility of the Brigade was the training
of pilots in night flying. Up to February 191 7 pilots for
night work were chosen from those who had already
graduated in a day-training squadron. The course in night
flying was short and consisted chiefly of five flights in the
dark, and instruction in the use of the armament then em-
ployed against airships. From November 191 6 pilots had,
additionally, to pass through a course of firing Le Prieur
rockets at a target, resembling a Zeppelin, marked on the
ground, and in firing at toy balloons with a Lewis gun
from an aeroplane.
In February 191 7 the night -training reserve squadron
(No. 11) was transferred from Northolt to Rochford and
was renamed No. 98 Depot Squadron. At first pupils
were accepted after they had passed through an elementary
day-training squadron, but for various reasons this practice
did not prove satisfactory, and pupils were subsequently
sent direct to No. 98 Depot Squadron from schools of
military aeronautics. The tests which a pupil had to pass
if he was to be retained for home defence cannot be
described as exacting. He had to satisfy certain standards
in day flying, and, in addition, was required to make six
landings after dark, attain a height of 6,000 feet at night,
and remain flying at that height for an hour.
In February 191 7 No. 100 Squadron was formed from
pilots of the VI Brigade for night-bombing duty in
France. Few of the pilots had flown F.E.zb's, the aero-
plane with which No. 100 Squadron was to be equipped,
and they were therefore put through a hurried course of
training on this type of aeroplane before the squadron
went overseas. About this time it became clear that the
142 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
one depot squadron could not train all the pilots required
for home defence, apart from such as would be required
from time to time for overseas, and, in April 191 7, the
home defence squadrons began to take pupils for direct
training, a process which was recognized as unsatisfactory,
but had to be resorted to, temporarily, because No. 98
Squadron could not cope with the work.
Soon after No. 100 Squadron had gone to France, the
overseas experience of the pilots of the squadron prompted
additional training in night flying at home. Orders issued
to home defence squadrons in April 191 7 stated that all
pilots must be practised at night in reconnaissance, bomb-
dropping, and in flying in searchlight beams. In June it
became necessary to form a new depot squadron. No. 99,
to train pilots for overseas. The squadron was formed at
Rochford, but moved to Retford in the following month
and was renumbered No. 199 Depot Squadron, No. 98
becoming, at the same time. No. 198 Depot Squadron.
Meanwhile an additional Depot Squadron, No. 200, had
been created at Retford at the beginning of July. It was
not long before further expansion was necessary because
of increased demands from France for night-flying pilots,
and a new depot squadron. No. 192, was formed in Sep-
tember 1917.
At the end of 191 7 the depot squadrons were renamed
Night Training Squadrons, and four new ones, Nos. 188,
189, 190, and 191, were formed. ^ The home defence
squadrons became service squadrons, and, except No. 75,
all of them in the three wings in the south of England
were equipped by the end of the year with single-seater
fighters, the pilots for which came to them from the night-
training squadrons.
In the north the position was less advanced. Those
service squadrons which had B.E. type aeroplanes were
still training their own pilots who joined the squadrons
from schools of aeronautics. Pilots for the F.E. squadrons
received preliminary instruction in a night-training squad-
ron. The F.E. type aeroplanes were not, it was recog-
^ On the 1st of April 1918 two additional night-training squadrons
were formed, namely Nos. 186 and 187.
I9I8] DUAL-CONTROL ^CAMELS' 143
nized, effective weapons against raiding aircraft because of
their comparatively low ceiling. It was decided, therefore,
early in 191 8, to re-equip the northern service squadrons
with Avros fitted with 110 Le Rhone engines. Used as a
single-seater this type could reach a height of 18,000 feet,
and there was the added advantage that pilots who had
become accustomed to flying the Avro, with its rotary
engine, could soon learn to handle the Sopwith ^Camel'
and would therefore be available for transfer, if and when
required, to southern service squadrons.
The first night-fighting squadron for service overseas,
No. 15 1, was formed at Hainault in June 1918, and was sent
to France the same month, equipped with Sopwith
'Camels'. The introduction for training purposes, in
September 191 8, of Sopwith 'Camels' fitted for dual
control made it possible to pass out qualified pilots at an
increased rate and also considerably reduced the number
of flying accidents.
One difficulty in training night pilots in the south of
England must be noticed. Because of fear of causing
false alarms of enemy air attacks it was considered imprac-
ticable to send pupils on cross-country flights at night.
In May 191 8, therefore, dark goggles were introduced to
give the pupil-pilot the impression of flying at night. Wear-
ing the goggles he made a cross-country flight by day in a
two-seater aeroplane with his instructor as passenger.
Under a revised Air Ministry scheme of training in
June 191 8, pupils in the southern squadrons graduated
in training squadrons equipped with Avros, Sopwith
Tups', and Sopwith 'Camels'. They had to complete
twenty-five hours solo, including four hours night flying,
part of it on a service-type aeroplane. They had also to
pass tests in air navigation, wireless telegraphy, day and
night ground gunnery, and in the cross-country flight
when wearing dark goggles. After graduating, pilots
passed to service squadrons, where they had to complete
tests in advanced gunnery and in air fighting. When
they had passed these tests to the satisfaction of their
squadron commanders they were given their wings and
classified as Second Class Operations pilots. Their training,
144 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
however, was still incomplete. Up to June 191 8 orders
were conveyed to pilots already in the air by means of
ground signalling panels which could be read, so long as
the weather was clear, up to about 17,000 feet. From
June, however, this method of signalling was replaced by
wireless telephony, and a School of Wireless Telephony
was opened at Penshurst.^ To this school Second Class
Operations pilots from the service squadrons were sent.
When they had completed the course they returned to
their squadrons and received further instruction in night
fighting in service aeroplanes until considered by their
squadron commander to be fully qualified to ascend in
the event of a hostile air raid. They were then classified
as First Class Operations pilots and became available, if
and when required, for posting to night -fighting squadrons
overseas.
The VI Brigade, then, not only trained its own pilots
in night flying, but was responsible also for training
fighting, reconnaissance, and bombing pilots for night
work overseas. The brigade had other duties. It had its
assigned part in a scheme of defence to meet an attempted
invasion. So early as August 19 16, Emergency Flights had
been allotted for work with the then northern and south-
ern armies if an invasion were attempted. Up to January
191 7 the provision of reconnaissance aircraft was all that
was contemplated, but additional arrangements were then
made for the bombing of enemy transports. As time
went on the part which the squadrons of the VI Brigade
were expected to play in emergency expanded until, in
the final invasion scheme, they had to be prepared to
undertake reconnaissance, bombing of transports, photo-
graphy, co-operation with infantry by means of contact
patrol, and observation of fire for coastal batteries and
for field artillery. Liaison with the military commands
was maintained by what were called 'representative
officers' who were attached to the head-quarters of the
military force as technical advisers on air service questions.
^ By the end of the war the movements of home defence squadrons in
the air were controlled by Home Forces through a wireless transmitting
station situated at Biggin Hill, Kent.
igiy] COAST DEFENCE DUTIES 145
In 1916 and for most of 1917 the representative officers
were the senior squadron commanders in each mihtary
area, but in October 19 17 the senior wing commanders
undertook this duty except in the Scottish Command,
where the officer commanding No. 77 Squadron continued
to act as the representative officer. In December 191 7 the
units of the Training Division and of the Royal Naval
Air Service had been included in the invasion scheme to
provide reinforcements for the squadrons of the VI Brigade
should the necessity arise.
The responsibility of the home defence organization
to provide air observation of fire for coastal batteries
required much detailed work. The question had first been
raised by General Head-quarters, Home Forces, in Octo-
ber 1916 in anticipation that the guns to be mounted
in 19 1 7 would be capable of fire up to a range of 25,000
yards and would therefore need observation from the
air. At a conference between Royal Artillery and Royal
Flying Corps officers, held in November 1916, it was
decided that the Home Defence Wing should provide one
aeroplane and one wireless receiving station for each
9*2-inch battery on the East Coast and at Portsmouth,
and should arrange for landing-grounds within ten
minutes' flight from the battery. The Royal Garrison
Artillery was to provide officer observers and wireless
operators. Owing chiefly to a shortage of wireless equip-
ment, little progress was made with the scheme until
April 191 7, but during the remainder of that year much
was done and, by the end of 191 7, all 9*2-inch batteries
and a few 6-inch had been provided with wireless re-
ceiving stations manned by Royal Flying Corps operators.
About thirty men of the Royal Garrison Artillery had
been trained as assistant wireless operators, while an
average of six officers from each garrison had passed
through a course in air navigation. Some successful test
shoots had been made, but it was clear that little further
progress would be possible until the liaison between the
Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Garrison Artillery
became closer, and methods of observation had been
standardized. In January 191 8, therefore, a school of
2504.5 T
146 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
aerial co-operation with coast defence batteries was
formed at Gosport from a Flight of No. 39 Squadron.
The object was to make trials with the Golden Hill
Artillery School in various methods of observation, and
with range-finders, &c. By August 191 8 sufiicient
progress had been made, both in methods of observation
and in organization, to enable a system to be laid down.
This was embodied in a pamphlet. Co-operation of Aircraft
with Coast Defence Artillery^ issued the same month. By
November 191 8 wireless stations had been erected for
twenty-three batteries in the various garrison commands
from the Forth to Dover and Portsmouth. Observers
used an aircraft range-finder, designed by Dr. F. A.
Lindemann of the Royal Aircraft Factory, by means of
which the batteries could be expected to get their first
few rounds near their invisible target. The observer in
the air, within view of the battery and of the target,
read certain angles on his range-finder and transmitted
the results, by wireless, to the battery commander's
post, where the range and training were quickly plotted.
Once fire had been opened, the observer signalled correc-
tions by the clock-code, the imaginary twelve-six line
running from bow to stern of the target vessel.
The scheme was not tested in action, but its disadvan-
tages were not overlooked. In an enemy bombardment
of the tip-and-run kind there would have been little time
to get the aeroplane into the air and go through the
procedure of range-finding. The range-finder, even
allowing that the aeroplane was in position, required good
visibiHty to enable the readings to be made, but clear
conditions could not often be expected off the coast of
England. Furthermore, if weather conditions were good,
smoke screens would probably be laid by bombarding
vessels and so make instrument-reading and observation
difficult. Finally, if the air observer, in spite of these
various difficulties, could still obtain his angles, the degree
of error, at ranges up to 30,000 yards, and such ranges
had to be considered, would be great. The opinion of the
Air Staff at the end of the war inclined to the behef that
torpedo-carrying aircraft would prove the most economical
1916-18] AEROPLANES AND ARMAMENT 147
and effective method of dealing with long-range bombard-
ment from the sea, except at defended ports where
sufficient fixed guns might be retained to meet any
determined enemy efforts to approach within a range of
10,000 yards or less.
Some of these matters, important as they were, have
Httle to do with the story of the defence of the country
against enemy aircraft, but because the home defence
squadrons were responsible, it is right that some account
of their various additional duties should be given. It must,
however, be pointed out that the system had serious draw-
backs. The home defence squadrons existed to defend the
country against attack from the air, and it was not reason-
able to expect that they might be given many other duties,
entirely different in kind, and yet attain to proficiency in
all of them.
Aeroplanes and Armament
Up to the end of 191 6 the defence aeroplane was chiefly
the B.E.2C armed with a Lewis gun, firing, in the latter
part of 1 91 6, incendiary and explosive ammunition.
B.E.2e's and B.E.zd's fitted, Hke the 2c, with 90 horse-
power Royal Aircraft Factory engines, were also in use.
Towards the end of the year a few B.E.12 (140 horse-
power R.A.F. engine), B.E.i2a, and F.E.2b (120 or 140
horse-power Beardmore engine) aeroplanes were allotted
to some of the home defence squadrons. The B.E.i2's,
which were single-seaters, carried a Vickers gun on the
side of the fuselage, synchronized to fire through the
propeller, and a Lewis gun on a Strange gun-mounting.
The Vickers fired ordinary ammunition with one round
of Sparklet in five, while the Lewis was loaded with
incendiary and explosive ammunition. In 191 7 a few
F.E.2d's with Rolls-Royce engines of 250 or 275 horse-
power were also taken into use.
About March 191 7 the first suitable night sight was
invented by Sergeant A. E. Hutton of No. 39 Squadron.
Radium and luminous paint had been tried, but on dark
nights it proved too bright, and it failed to show up
when there was a moon. The Hutton sight was of the
148 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
bead foresight and V backsight type. The bead was
pierced with a pin-point hole and was illuminated by a
red electric bulb in the stem of the sight. The V backsight
was pierced by three pin-point holes, one in the extremity
of each arm of the V and one at the base, and was illumi-
nated by a green electric bulb, the source of the light for
both sights being a 2-volt battery of the kind used in
flash lamps. About the same time, the Strange gun-
mounting was superseded by an Admiralty Top Plane
Mounting, the invention of a naval officer, which had for
some time been in use in the Royal Naval Air Service : it
enabled the pilot to fire direct to the front over the top
plane by means of a Bowden cable attached to the control
lever of the aeroplane.
The F.E.2b aeroplane, a two-seater pusher, was fitted
with a Lewis gun on an Anderson mounting. A few
carried one-pounder pompom guns, and two had '45
Maxim guns, but none of these was ever in action
against the enemy.
Such was the position when the German daylight
aeroplane raids brought about a change. The immediate
result was the allotment of a number of Armstrong-
Whitworth (160 horse-power Beardmore engines) and
R.E.8 two-seater aeroplanes to some of the defence
squadrons. They were armed for day and night work
with one Vickers gun for the pilot fitted with a Constanti-
nesco gear, and a Lewis gun for the observer on a Scarff
Ring Mounting. For night work they made use of the
Hutton sight. These aeroplanes were soon replaced by
Sopwith Tups' (100 horse-power Monosoupape) and by
Sopwith 1 1 strutters (130 horse-power Clerget), the latter
a two-seater similarly armed to the Arms trong- Whit -
worth's and R.E.S's. Many attempts were made to fit
the Sopwith Tup' with a Lewis gun to fire over the top
plane, but little success was achieved. In their turn, these
aeroplanes were replaced by Sopwith 'Camels' (no horse-
power Le Rhone) and Bristol Fighters (200 horse-power
Rolls-Royce Falcon Mk.3). The Sopwith 'Camels' were
originally fitted with two Vickers synchronized guns, but
owing to the danger of firing explosive and incendiary
I9I8] LEWIS GUN EXPERIMENTS 149
ammunition in Vickers guns through the propeller, altera-
tions in some of the 'Camels' were made to enable two
Lewis guns to be fitted on Foster gun mountings : this was
done by moving the pilot's seat farther back. The advan-
tages were twofold. The Lewis guns could be loaded with
incendiary ammunition, when required, without danger,
and they could be fired at an angle of 45°. This latter
advantage was of some importance. Trials which had been
made at the Experimental Station at Orfordness had re-
vealed that a bullet fired from a Lewis gun at an angle of
45°, from an aeroplane travelling at 100 miles an hour, kept
a straight course up to 800 yards. The reason was that the
resistance of the air, under these conditions, equalled the
force of gravity. One of the home defence pilots, firing
a Lewis gun at this angle, obtained 90 per cent, of hits
on a towed target at ranges between 500 and 600 yards,
a degree of accuracy far greater than could be obtained
by direct firing.
In 191 8 some S.E.5a's (200 horse-power Hispano-Suiza
or Wolseley 'Viper' engine) were used for home defence.
They were fitted with a Vickers synchronized gun and
with a top plane Lewis gun on a Foster mounting. The
Bristol Fighter also had a Vickers for the pilot and a Lewis
on a Scarff Ring for the observer. For the Lewis gun
a 45° sight, fixed to the top plane, was used by the pilot.
When he had put his aeroplane into position, that is to
say when he had the enemy aircraft in his sights, he
signalled to his observer who aimed direct at the enemy
and opened fire.
A few Sopwith 'Dolphins' (200 horse-power Hispano-
Suiza engines) were used by home defence squadrons in
191 8, and in the latter part of the year Sopwith 'Snipes'
were tried and found suitable for night fighting. The
policy as the war came to an end was to equip all the home
defence squadrons with the Sopwith 'Camel'. The
objection to the S.E.5a and to the Bristol Fighter had
nothing to do with their fighting qualities once they
were in the air, but was solely that they proved diffi-
cult to land at night on small aerodromes. It seemed
to be established that the rotary or radial type engines
ISO AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
were preferable to stationary water-cooled engines for
night work, the ease with which they could be switched
off for landing proving an advantage in the dark. Aero-
planes fitted with these engines could also be flown off
the ground in an emergency at short notice in the coldest
of weather.
The position at the Armistice was that seven home
defence squadrons were completely equipped with
Sopwith 'Camels', six (in the north) with Avros, and two
with Bristol Fighters. One squadron only was mixed,
having Bristol Fighters and Sopwith Tups', but this
squadron was about to be re-equipped with Avros.
In September 191 7 several combats which took place
with enemy aeroplanes were indecisive, although it
appeared to the Royal Flying Corps pilots and observers
that their fire should have been effective. One reason for
this was undoubtedly due to pilots and observers under-
estimating the range of the German aircraft, a mistake
due to the comparatively large size of the enemy bombers.
Another reason was the blinding effect at night of the
flash of the gun. These difficulties were overcome. An
illuminated ring sight was constructed of such a diameter
that when placed at a suitable distance from the eye the
ring would exactly span a Gotha type aeroplane at a
distance of 100 yards. This sight, called the Neame Sight,''
illuminated by electric bulbs in a similar manner to the
Hutton Sight, was distributed to home defence squadrons
in December 191 7. Experiments at Orfordness led to a
solution of the second difficulty. A flash eliminator was de-
vised for fixing to the muzzle of the Lewis gun and, at the
same time. Sparklet ammunition was discarded. Although
it was efficient tracer ammunition, it was apt to explode
prematurely and blind the gunner for a time sufficient
to enable the enemy aircraft to escape. The incendiary
and explosive ammunition did not suffer this drawback and
was retained, but only for use against airships.
Many of the aeroplanes were fitted with magazines
electrically heated from a generator, because experience had
^ Invented by Lieutenant H. B. Neame, a member of the technical stalf
of the Air Ministry.
I9I8] HEATED MAGAZINES 151
shown that incendiary ammunition (Buckingham and
R.T.S.) did not always work effectively at low tempera-
tures. The most favourable temperature was 80° F., and
the magazine devised by the VI Brigade did not give a
rise in heat of more than 70° above atmospheric tempera-
ture, so that at a height of 10,000 feet, where the atmo-
spheric temperature was about 10° F. or below, the
magazine would heat the ammunition to an average heat
between 70° and 80° F.
In August 191 8 proposals of the Air Council that the
number of squadrons to be allotted for home defence
should be twenty had been approved. In October 191 8
sixteen squadrons were in England, two in Ireland, and
two had yet to be formed. As the German armies were
in retreat, however, the Air Council proposed that
five squadrons of Sopwith 'Camels' should be maintained
in France, 'in view of the heavy casualties and material
'damage caused by the enemy bombing of our back areas'.
One squadron. No. 151, had gone overseas in June,
another. No. 152, was about to be sent, and the Air
Council proposed to send three more, thereby reducing
the number of home defence squadrons to fifteen. The
Air Council also proposed that a proportion of searchlights
and sound-locators should go overseas with the squadrons
because, they said, 'it is considered that great benefit
'would accrue from the co-operation which would be
'obtained by keeping intact the various units which have
'trained together in the perfecting of aerial night defence'.
It was stated that all the Sopwith 'Camel' squadrons, at
home and in France, would be replaced by Sopwith
'Snipes' from January 1919 onwards. Finally, it was pro-
posed that the ten existing balloon aprons should be
reduced to one with the object of releasing about 2,500
men for duty with Royal Air Force units overseas.
The Army Council welcomed these proposals which
were duly approved. In a letter to the War Office, on
the 4th of November 191 8, the Air Council put forward
more comprehensive proposals, saying, 'in the event of
'the enemy becoming sufficiently disorganized to render
'him unable to make a further stand against the Allied
152 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
'Armies, the Air Council is of opinion that every avail-
'able resource at its disposal should be thrown into the
'battle with a view to assisting in the final destruction of
'the enemy military'. The Air Council proposed that if
and when the aforementioned situation arose, all the home
defence squadrons still in England should be sent to France,
together with all efficient aeroplanes and skilled pilots
on the strength of the training units. It was, however,
pointed out that this withdrawal would disorganize the
continuous supply of pilots to France and would not,
therefore, be put into effect until it became obvious that
a sustained output of pilots was no longer necessary.
Again the Army Council approved the proposals, which
received Government sanction on the 8th of November,
but hostilities ceased before any of them could be put
into effect, and the final reinforcement sent from the
VI Brigade to France was No. 152 Squadron, which went
overseas in October 1918.^
^he Air-raid Campaign — a Summary
The German air-raiding campaign has been surveyed
and it is now possible to examine the balance sheet. On
the question of morality little need be said here. Opinion
during the war was divided, certainly in Germany, where
some pleaded for air attacks on Great Britain directed
solely towards the breaking of the spirit of the civil popu-
lation, while others wanted the raids confined to objects
of military importance. Long before the aircraft bomb
was invented it was a military teaching that a nation
resorted to war to impose its will on another nation, a
statement of no great profundity, but one which has some
advantage over another, at one time in common currency,
that war is the sport of kings. Democracies, perhaps, get
the sort of war they deserve. So long as war was confined
' Sir Douglas Haig had also asked, at the end of October, for 1 50 anti-
aircraft guns and 150 searchlights. The reason was that, owing to the
advance of the British armies in France, about 2,000 square miles of new
territory had to be given protection from air attack. The guns and lights
were available only in the home defence organization and their withdrawal
was still under discussion when the war ended.
I9I8] AIR RAID STATISTICS 153
to strictly professional armies so long might a code of
manners survive, but as soon as it became an affair of
nations it w^as inevitable that popular clamour should
often override purely military considerations.
Those in Germany, however, who expected that air
attacks on cities v^ould cov^ the population of England
were disappointed. The raids were neither powerful nor
sustained enough to test such a possibility. Their effect,
in fact, was far otherwise. They led for the most part
to a stiffening of the national temper. They were often
used by the Government to stimulate recruiting and
the national effort generally, but there were times also
when the drive came from the opposite direction, when
the attacks acted on public opinion until the Government
were compelled to vitalize their air policy. The expansion
of the air services during the war, and, ultimately, the
creation of a separate service for the air, owed much to
the atmosphere engendered by the bombs which exploded
in English cities.
On military grounds, the air attacks were overwhelm-
ingly justified by the results. In 51 airship raids, 5,806
bombs I were dropped which killed 557 persons, caused
injury to 1,358, and inflicted material damage estimated
at ^1,527,585. There were 52 aeroplane attacks in which
2,772 bombs^ killed 857 persons, injured 2,058, and caused
damage to a total value of ^^i, 434,5 26. These figures are
important, but what mattered, from the purely military
point of view, was the diversion of men and material to
home defence. At the beginning of June 191 8 there
were in Great Britain, ready for action, 469 anti-aircraft
guns, 622 searchlights, 258 height-finders, and 10 sound-
locators (out of an establishment of 664), manned by
6,136 officers and men. The fighting strength of the
operational squadrons of the VI Brigade was 376 aero-
planes, although no more than 166 are shown as efficient
at the beginning of June 191 8. The brigade absorbed the
* About 196 tons. This is a British estimate which includes all the bombs
traced by us. German records show that more bombs were dropped, often
30 or 40 per cent, more, than we accounted for.
^ British estimate, about 74 tons.
154 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
services of 660 officers, 3,639 men, and 315 women. The
Balloon Wing, which worked the apron scheme, had a
strength of 82 officers and 2,573 men.^ Much material
and labour were required to build the aerodromes, gun
stations, air-raid shelters, &c., and tens of thousands of
rounds of ammunition were assembled. The cost of an
anti-aircraft shell varied, but it would probably not be far
wrong if ^2 was reckoned as the minimum all-in cost to
the Government of a 3 -inch shell. There were occasions,
when barrage-fire was employed, during which 20,000
rounds or more of anti-aircraft ammunition were fired in
one attack at a cost exceeding the material damage inflicted
by the enemy bombs. As the life of a 3-inch gun was
only some 1,500 rounds, the wastage of guns, reckoning
a volume of fire of 20,000 rounds, was at the rate of
thirteen or fourteen for the attack. When these various
figures are considered, the strength of the German striking
force should also be borne in mind. Up to May 191 8 the
greatest number of bombers which set out to attack England
was twenty-seven. For the final raid, on the I9th/20th
of May 191 8, forty-three started. The whole British
defensive organization was maintained to meet the threat
from this comparatively small striking force and the more
remote threat of occasional airship attacks.
Also of great military importance was the effect on the
output of munitions and of factories generally. This
was never confined to the places over which the German
airships and aeroplanes flew, nor within the limits of time
during which they were over this country. It often
extended to areas remote from the scene of the bombing
attacks, and endured long after the hostile aircraft had
left our coasts. Official figures for some raids show that
when an attack was in progress, seventy-five per cent, of
munition workers, in areas warned of the attack, ceased
^ The personnel figures quoted for guns, &c., are actual strength. They
were, for guns and searchlights in particular, much below the establishment
figures, chiefly because of the urgent need for reinforcements for France
resulting from the German spring offensive. The establishment figures at
the Armistice are given in Appendix IX, but the actual figures for this
date are not available.
1917] STRATEGY OF THE RAIDS 155
work, and that the output continued to be restricted for
about twenty-four hours after the raid had ended. ^
So far as concerns the strategical employment of the
enemy air raiding resources, it is possible to suggest mis-
takes made by the German High Command. There were
three periods when the Germans enjoyed an advantage
of which they failed to avail themselves fully. Up to the
autumn of 19 16 we were comparatively defenceless against
the Zeppelins, but the attacks were so spaced that we
were given time to get our breath in between, or, in
other words, the effect of one raid had worn thin before
we were subjected to another. It would have been of
important military advantage to the Germans had they
given airships priority of manufacture in the early days
and put attacks on England in the forefront of their mili-
tary policy. With the shooting down of Zeppelins in the
autumn of 1916, the airship threat temporarily lost its
sharpness, but the Germans once again took us by surprise
when they began to raid, in 19 17, with Zeppelins capable
of reaching heights of 18,000 to 20,000 feet. It was not
until September 191 7 that a single-seater fighter was
flown at night, and after this event a long time necessarily
elapsed before selected pilots could be given sufficient
training for night fighting on the unstable single-seaters.
There was a period during which the high-flying airships
could leave the defences, gun or aeroplane, out of their
reckoning; and when efficient single-seater fighters were
allotted to the home defence squadrons it was in the
London area and in the south generally that they were
distributed. To protect the industrial towns in the Mid-
lands and in the north there were no aeroplanes capable
of getting within reach of the new-type Zeppelins, and
the German High Command had a unique opportunity,
not only to inflict damage in those areas, but also to
embarrass those responsible for the air defence of the
country, who would have been hard put to it to equip
the northern squadrons with up-to-date fighting aircraft
manned by experienced pilots, and could, in any event,
have effected such re-equipment only at the expense of the
^ See the figures quoted on p. 87.
IS6 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
fighting line in France. The destruction of a number of
airships in the disastrous explosions at the Ahlhorn Base,
in January 191 8, saved us something, but, even so, there
seems to have been an unwonted timidity about the em-
ployment of the naval airships for attacks on England. The
naval airship service itself was eager enough, and it must
be assumed that the lack of drive was in higher quarters.
It was no doubt due, in part, to the disasters which over-
took some of the Zeppelins in the memorable raid of
October 191 7, disasters caused, it has been shown, by the
abnormal atmospheric conditions of that night.
Finally, the Germans again had the advantages of
surprise when they initiated the night aeroplane campaign
in September 191 7. It seems that they began this cam-
paign with no very clear idea of the objects they wished
to achieve. At first they aimed, apparently, at under-
mining the morale of the civil population, but, at the
beginning of 191 8, remembered the impending military
offensive in France and planned, rather half-heartedly,
attacks to reinforce the strength of the blow delivered on
the Western front. But the German bombing force had
dissipated some of its strength before the March offensive
on the Somme began. It should be remembered that the
German command had the initiative and that the place
and time and objects of the Spring offensive in 191 8
were of its choosing. A feature of that offensive was the
thought and foresight brought to bear on all the details
of the lengthy preparation. The general military situation
was such that night-aeroplane raids on London in the
autumn of 191 7, no matter how successful, could only be
in the nature of a serious nuisance. Provided always that
the Germans intended to employ part of their bombing
strength against England, and not to concentrate their entire
resources on attacks on military objectives on the Western
front, they should have held their hand. They should
have accumulated their bombing forces and prepared,
with the same acumen as they gave to their other pre-
parations, for a campaign against England timed to exert
its maximum effect when it would best help the military
offensive in France. Although, in the meantime, it is to
I9I8] ISLAND DISADVANTAGES 157
be expected that the anti-aircraft defences in England
would have been improved and strengthened, it would
be going too far to assume that, without the stimulating
effect of the September and October raids in 191 7, those
defences would have been adequate to meet a sudden
and determined onslaught in, say, February or March
191 8. We have seen that the German daylight aeroplane
campaign against London created profound disquiet and
led to demands being made on Sir Douglas Haig to send
fighting squadrons home at the moment when he was
about to begin his summer offensive in Flanders. A
German night-bombing campaign against London in
February or early in March 191 8 might have had results
leading to a popular clamour which the Government might
have found themselves unable to withstand. The with-
drawal of squadrons and material from the Western front
might again have been deemed necessary. Certainly, had
the attacks been continued and intensified after the blow
had fallen on the British Third and Fifth Armies in France,
the bombing would have struck at the morale of the people
in England at the moment when the situation on the
Western front was one of gravity. There can be no doubt
that because the night -aeroplane attacks on England were
not co-ordinated with the military offensive, they repre-
sented, to some extent, a waste of effort.
Finally, there is a matter of importance which the air-
raid campaign illuminated. That is that so far as defence
against air attack is concerned, an island state suffers a
great disadvantage because of the opportunities for con-
cealment and freedom offered by a sea approach. It is
of interest in this connexion to compare the attacks on
London and Paris. There were, in all, seven raids by
Zeppelins and eighteen by aeroplanes on the County of
London, as a result of which 594 people were killed and
1,708 injured. Paris was twice attacked by airships, and
on forty-four occasions by aeroplanes, and the casualties
were 278 killed and 636 injured.^ Whereas, however,
10 airships and 116 aeroplanes reached and bombed
^ The figures for the attacks on Paris are taken from Les Bomhar dements
de Paris, igi4~jgi8, by Jules Poirier.
iS8 AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN [ch. ii
London, only two airships and about fifty aeroplanes
succeeded in bombing Paris. One of the two Zeppelins
and sixteen aeroplanes were shot down. It is estimated
that some 500 German aeroplanes tried to reach Paris,
and the fact that so few succeeded is ascribed to the diffi-
culties of approach and departure. The German pilots had
to cross the Allied lines on their inward and homeward
journeys. They could not escape immediate detection,
and the warning was such that there was usually ample
time to deal with them during some part of their journey. ^
It was not possible for them, as in England, to come in
over one part of the coast and go out over another. Nor
did France offer such a wide choice of important alterna-
tive vulnerable targets as did England.
The need for look-out posts at sea, if the defence forces
were to have a reasonable opportunity to combat the
raiders, was felt in England during the war, and some
attempts, already noted in this history, were made to
obtain warning of the seaward approach of enemy aircraft.
What seems obvious, however, is that had the aeroplane
attacks gone on, or had the air raids in general not been
of the diversion kind, it would have been found impera-
tive to organize an elaborate system of warning posts at sea.
The difficulties in the way of the estabhshment of such
a system of observation would have been great, perhaps
insuperable, and if what has been said is well-founded,
the power of the air weapon to call into being intermin-
able defensive activities, which might become so elaborate
as to be almost intolerable, is emphasized. In other
words, the aeroplane is an offensive weapon, and the
advantage in war will go to that side which exploits its
offensive qualities with trained imagination and in most
determined mood. There must be defence aeroplanes
because the people will always demand them and because,
in any event, the enemy must be hampered as much as
possible, but, used defensively, the aeroplane is little
^ It is well to emphasize that the speed of modern aircraft is considerably-
greater than that of the aeroplanes with which the French had to deal
in the war, and increases of speed are equivalent to a shrinkage of the area
in which the defence can operate.
I9I8] DEFENCE MEANS OFFENCE 159
different from any other anti-aircraft weapon. In defence
it cannot exercise the initiative, and without the initia-
tive the pecuhar quahties of the air weapon, speed and
ubiquity, which give it the power to create a threat,
continuous in its force and Hmited only in its scope by
the radius of action of the aircraft, cannot be exploited.
That is to say, the only defence in the air likely to be
effective in the long run is an offensive more powerfully
sustained than that conducted by an enemy.
CHAPTER III
AIR OPERATIONS IN EGYPT, DARFUR, AND
PALESTINE, 1914-17
The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1913
[Map, p. 161]
When Great Britain declared war on Turkey on the
5th of November 1914, steps had at once to be taken to
safeguard the Suez Canal. The defences were organized
in three sections with their head-quarters at Suez, Ismailia,
and Qantara, and the initial defence arrangements were
completed by the 5th of December 1914. Towards the
end of the year the Sinai Peninsula was swept by heavy
rainstorms which filled the wells and pools of the desert,
bringing to the Turk the gift of water : his plans for an
early attack on the Canal were thereby greatly helped.
Air reconnaissances of the Turkish bases and lines of
communication to give warning of the enemy intentions
would, it was recognized, be essential and, on the 4th of
November 19 14, the day before war was formally declared
on Turkey, a Flight of aeroplanes had been dispatched
from England. This Flight, under Captain S. D. Massy,
who had from the end of 191 3 been in command of the
Indian Flying School at Sitapur, arrived at Alexandria
on the 17th of November with three Maurice Farman
pusher aeroplanes. Two Henri Farmans, old but in flying
condition, were also acquired from an Italian firm in
Cairo. A site for an aerodrome was chosen at Ismailia,
centrally situated for flying over the whole canal zone,
and Cairo contractors were given orders to erect sheds
to house the aeroplanes. The first reconnaissance flight
was made on the 27th of November 1914, and there-
after the area east of the canal defence zone to a
depth of about forty-five miles was under frequent sur-
veillance. In December reinforcements of an engineer
and mechanics for the Ismailia Flight arrived from the
Indian Flying School, Sitapur, bringing with them a
B.E.2a and two Maurice Farman aeroplanes, all three
I
1914] THE SUEZ CANAL 161
without engines, and from England came three pilots
with two Renault engines and miscellaneous stores.
Subsidiary landing-grounds were established and stocked
with petrol and oil in order that aeroplanes from Ismailia
might replenish their supplies when engaged on long
reconnaissances.^
The area that could be covered hy the aeroplanes was
limited, but Lieutenant-General Sir John G. Maxwell, the
Commander-in-Chief, had also at his disposal seven French
seaplanes which, operating from ships off the coast of Sinai,
could reach places outside the range of the aeroplanes.
These seaplanes — 80 horse-power Nieuports — under the
command of Lieutenant de Vaisseau de I'Escaille, made
many fine flights far inland over the Turkish military area.
The pilots were French and the observers British, and
their reports, which for fullness and accuracy compare well
with any among official records, gave much information
of military value. The seaplanes were flown chiefly from
the Aenne Rickmers (later called Anne), a former German
cargo vessel which had been re-equipped as an aircraft
carrier, but they also operated, from time to time, from
the Rabenfels, also a former German cargo boat (later
called Raven II), and from the light cruiser Doris. ^
Seaplane reconnaissances in December 1914, and in the
first few days of January 191 5, revealed increasing con-
centrations of Turkish troops at Beersheba and in its
neighbourhood, and this information from the air, coupled
with what was reported by agents, led the British com-
mand to conclude that the expected Turkish attack on
the Canal would not be long delayed. To take the edge
off the excitement in Egypt it was thought advisable, on
the nth of January 1915, to issue a statement to the
Egyptian press that an attack was imminent. Subsequent
air reconnaissances showed the enemy on the move and
revealed the direction of his advance. Armies which had
^ The landing-grounds were at Qantara Post; Suez; Mabeiuk 15 miles
east of Suez; Ras el Hagg 35 miles east of Suez; Er Riguro. (Zohra); and
Qatiya.
2 The work of the seaplane detachment is recounted in On se bat sur mer
by Paul Chack.
i62 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
of old set their faces towards Egypt from Palestine had
always followed the coast. There was no historical pre-
cedent for an invasion across the desert of Sinai, but the
road through El Arish, which had so often known the tread
of the invader, was within range of the guns of the
Allied warships and, with aircraft available to direct the
fire, the way of the Turkish troops could be made too
hazardous. The route from Ma'an (through Nekhl to
Suez) was also threatened by warships from off Aqaba.
The enemy, therefore, helped by the abnormal rains which
made water available in the pools, decided to move his
main body across the desert.^
The Turkish plan, so far as it can be elucidated, was to
get command of a part of the Suez Canal for long enough
to allow of ships to be sunk and such other action to be
taken as might close the Canal permanently.^ The main
body marched from Beersheba through El Auja and Bir
el Jifjafa on Ismaiha, with subsidiary columns moving by
El Arish on Qantara, and through Nekhl against Suez : the
object of the flank detachments was to keep the British
command in doubt about the main point of attack.
Up to the middle of January 191 5 the aeroplane
observers who reconnoitred the desert immediately east
of the Canal had little to report, but on the 17th of Janu-
ary the Turkish northern flanking column was discovered
at Bir el Abd. Next day a seaplane observer from the
Aenne Rickmers reported indications that there had been
westerly movements from Beersheba. He found an im-
portant camp north of the Gebel Dhalfa with a well-
defined track between the camp and El Auja, and he
concluded that much traflic had recently passed between
the two places. He went on to El Auja and found about
3,000 troops there. On the 19th the same observer was
over Beersheba and he discovered some 10,000 troops in
the neighbourhood, including 2,000 who were arriving
from Hebron in the north-east. He inspected part of the
^ A water supply, transported hy 5,000 camels, was also organized by a
German officer.
2 See Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine (MacMunn and Falls),
Vol. I, pp. 34-6.
I9I5] TURKISH ATTACK FAILS 163
track to El Auja, and although no troops were visible he
was certain that the track had been well used. On the
23rd of January the main enemy column was seen from
the air at Moiya Harab, where it had arrived from Bir el
Jif jafa. Two days later another column was reported from
the air near Bir el Mahadat, north-east of Ismailia, and on
the same day the southerly flanking column was found at
Mabeiuk, east of Suez. Bombs of twenty-pound weight
were carried on the reconnaissance aircraft and dropped
from time to time on the Turkish troops. The enemy
admits that at first the bombing caused panic among the
men, but claims that they soon got used to it. This may
be accepted because the dropping of bombs was merely
incidental and, in any event, the light-weight missiles
which were employed cannot be reckoned as effective
weapons when aimed at troops in the open on a sandy soil.
By the end of January it was clear from the air reports
that the main enemy attack might come at any moment,
and that it would be made on the British centre about
Ismailia. On the ist of February it was reported from the
air that the Turks opposite Ismailia were advancing, and
reinforcements were therefore moved to the bridge-head
defences. Next morning enemy parties made contact
with British outposts, and there was desultory fighting
throughout the day until, by the evening, touch had been
effected along a twenty-five mile front from Deversoir to
El Ferdan. In the early hours of the 3rd of February, by
moonlight, the first attempt to cross the Canal began.
Shadowy masses, bearing loads, were seen approaching
the British positions south of Lake Timsah. By the time
the attempt was fully under way, groups of men, carrying
pontoons and rafts, were advancing against a mile and
a half of canal frontage. They were met with rifle and
machine-gun fire and, as a result, most of the pontoons
and rafts were abandoned short of the water's edge. The
climax of the Turkish invasion, so long and elaborately
organized, was the passage across the Suez Canal of three
pontoons whose occupants were killed or taken prisoner.
That this was to be the climax was not guessed at the
time. At dawn there was an infantry assault, supported
164 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
hy field artillery, on the British positions, but the attack
was repulsed and the defence then awaited the next effort
which, it was assumed, would not be long delayed. There
was, however, no second attack. Aeroplane reports from
the 4th of February onwards told the unexpected news
that the Turks were evacuating their positions and camps
and, by the loth, the eastward withdrawal into the desert
was observed to be in full movement. There was some
spasmodic bombing of the retreating enemy troops, but
nothing important could be achieved because few aero-
planes were available.
Seaplane reconnaissances of the distant Turkish com-
munications were infrequent during February owing to
rough seas and poor visibility. On the 7th of February
a seaplane reached Beersheba and the observer had noted
about 20,000 men in and around the town, thus confirm-
ing reports, received by head-quarters in Egypt, that the
Turks had been reinforced. For a fortnight no further
air reconnaissance of Beersheba was possible, and Sir John
Maxwell was without news of what the enemy concentra-
tion was doing. He had been warned by Lord Kitchener,
the Secretary of State for War, not to risk a reverse, and,
in view of the uncertainties of the situation, and because
his forces were comparatively weak, he had decided not
to follow the Turkish retreat into the desert. On the
2 1 St a seaplane observer who got through to Beersheba
reported about 35,000 troops in the neighbourhood, and,
next day, aeroplane observers from Ismailia told of new
camps at Nekhl and at Bir el Hassana. Sir John Maxwell
concluded that another attack on the Canal might be
expected later, but no such attack was made. The Turks
were soon fully occupied elsewhere in a desperate defence
of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
The Gallipoli campaign also led to the withdrawal of the
greater part of the British troops from Egypt. The Royal
Flying Corps detachment, however, remained at Ismailia,
and the pilots and observers settled down to a series of
routine reconnaissances into the desert east of the Canal.
Three of the French seaplanes aboard the Aenne Rickmers
were sent to the Gulf of Smyrna at the beginning of
I9I5] THE FIFTH WING 165
March. ^ The two remaining serviceable seaplanes con-
tinued to operate, from the Rabenfels, from off the coast
of Palestine. By April they had been reinforced by three
additional French seaplanes, enough to ensure a limited
number of strategical reconnaissances.
On the 29th of April there was a clash between a patrol
of ICQ men of the Bikanir Camel Corps and a mixed body
of about 250 Turks and Bedouin. The enemy troops
were discovered by two reconnoitring Maurice Farmans
at dusk on the 28th at El Hawawish, thirteen miles east of
the Canal. On the air information the Camel Corps patrol
was ordered to attack the enemy encampment during the
night, but before the patrol reached El Hawawish the
enemy had broken camp. The Turks and Bedouin made
an attack on Bench Mark Post and then retired to Bir el
Mahadat, where they were found next morning by an
observer in a Maurice Farman. A message giving the
information was dropped from the air on British cavalry
near El Hawawish and, as a result, the enemy rearguard
was brought to action; the enemy losses were thirty
killed and twelve men taken prisoners. There were other
skirmishes of a similar kind but, apart from these, the
Sinai front was quiet for the remainder of the year.
In November 191 5 the Fifth Wing, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H. Salmond, arrived
in Egypt from England to take over responsibiHty for
all aeroplane co-operation. The Wing was made up of
Nos. 14 and 17 Squadrons and 'X' Aircraft Park.^ The
Wing head-quarters and the squadrons were concentrated
at Heliopolis, where an aerodrome was made, while 'X*
Aircraft Park took over a former Swiss iron foundry at
Abbassia, between HeHopoHs and Cairo. 'A' Fhght of
No. 14 Squadron was sent, on the 23rd of November, to
take the place of the original detachment at Ismailia,
1 On the nth of March the Aenne Rickmers, while operating in the
Gulf of Smyrna, was torpedoed by the Demir Hissar. The carrier was
taken to Mudros and there patched up. She returned later to Port Said.
2 No. 14 Squadron arrived with the Wing head-quarters and the Park
on the 19th of November. No. 17 Squadron did not disembark, at Alex-
andria, until the nth of December.
i66 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
which, since the 24th of March 191 5, had been known
as No. 30 Squadron. The detachment had left Ismaiha
in October for Mesopotamia, where it joined two Fhghts
which were aheady operating in that country as part of
No. 30 Squadron.
The Western Desert
[Map, p. 190]
The threat to the Canal had been warded off for the
time being, but on the western borders, where Egypt was
vulnerable to attack from the desert, there was cause for
anxiety. On the 14th of November 1914 the Sultan of
Turkey, in his capacity of Khalif, had proclaimed a Jihad^
or Holy War, on all those making war on Turkey or her
allies. In the western desert Sayed Ahmed, the Grand
Senussi, a powerful leader who had for long been in
conflict with the Italians in Tripoli, was drawn by his
religious sentiments into sympathy with Turkey. He was,
throughout 191 5, in close touch with German and Turkish
agents and his growing hostility culminated in November
191 5 in a series of hostile acts by his followers against
British posts on the coast and in the desert. The British
command in Egypt had, in spite of much provocation,
pursued a friendly policy towards the Senussi, but by
November 191 5 it was recognized that a state of war
more or less existed and, on the 26th, war on the Senussi
was formally declared. The British posts in the coastal
area west of Matruh were at once withdrawn and it was
decided to concentrate a mixed force, called the Western
Frontier Force, at Matruh. A detachment from 'A'
Flight of No. 14 Squadron, with two B.E.2C aeroplanes
(90 horse-power Royal Aircraft Factory engines), was
ordered to join this force. The detachment detrained at
the railhead at Dabaa, seventy-five miles east of Matruh.
The aeroplanes were there erected and were afterwards
flown to Matruh, whence the first reconnaissance was
made on the 5th of December. This and subsequent recon-
naissances gave useful information about the strength and
disposition of the Senussi and Bedouin forces, and the
1915] WESTERN DESERT 167
air observers also made sketches of the enemy positions.
The strength of the enemy forces, chiefly concentrated at
Wadi Majid south-west of Matruh, was estimated to be
about 5,000. It was decided to surprise this force by
making a night march from Matruh, and early on Christmas
Day 1915 the Western Frontier Force, about 3,000 strong,
moved against the enemy. Three days earlier, one of the
air observers had made, from over Wadi Majid, a careful
sketch of the enemy positions, and copies of the sketch
were used by the attacking commanders. The attack was
supported by the British sloop Clematis which, with the
help of aeroplane observation, dropped shells in the Senussi
camp at a range of 10,000 yards. The enemy was routed.
The main body fled westwards, leaving 373 dead and
quantities of ammunition and stores. Meanwhile, the
advance of a British" enveloping cavalry column had been
delayed by enemy mounted troops, and this delay enabled
the main body of the Senussi to escape. Had this not
happened the campaign might have terminated forthwith.
The concentration south-west of Matruh had been
dispersed, but another was reported near Bir Gerawla,
twelve miles south-east of Matruh, where large numbers
of Bedouin had assembled. Their camp was recon-
noitred and sketched from the air on the 28th of
December and, on the same day, a British column left
Matruh to attack. On arrival they found that the camp
had been hurriedly deserted and that cattle and stores
had been abandoned.
Meanwhile two other air detachments were keeping
watch for signs of Senussi activity. One, from No. 14
Squadron, had been at El Gharaq, Faiyum, from the 8th of
December 1915, to reconnoitre the approaches from the
Bahariya oasis, and the other, from No. 17 Squadron, had
gone to El Hammam, south-west of Alexandria, on the
1 8th of December, to keep the Moghara oasis under
observation.
In January 191 6 the operations against the Senussi in
the coastal area were continued. On the 19th an aero-
plane observer discovered the main enemy camp at
Halazin, twenty-two miles south-west of Matruh, where
i68 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. in
there were 300 tents, including, as the observer noted,
those of the Grand Senussi himself. The British column
was thereupon sent out from Matruh on the 22nd and it
came into action with the Senussi next morning. After
a sharp fight, lasting most of the day, in which the enemy
fought skilfully and with determination, the main body
once again escaped. The British losses were 312 (twenty-
one killed) while those of the Senussi were estimated by
prisoners at 200 killed and 500 wounded. Air reconnais-
sances on the 24th of January revealed that the enemy
had retired to a camp at Bir Tuta on the route towards
Barrani.
Sir John Maxwell decided to occupy Solium. The sea-
plane carrier Ben-my-Chree was sent from Port Said early
in February to co-operate in the movement, and on the
nth seaplane reconnaissances were made of Solium and
Barrani. On the 15th, reconnaissances by the Royal Flying
Corps showed that the Senussi had taken up a position
at Agagiya, covering Barrani, where they were attacked
on the 26th. In this action, in which a charge by the
Dorset Yeomanry had decisive effect, the Senussi were
heavily defeated and Ja'far Pasha, the Turkish commander,
was captured. The Senussi never again stood to meet a
British attack. Barrani was occupied without opposition
on the 28th of February, and preparations (especially of
a water supply) for the further advance on Solium were
made. For reconnaissance of the country between Barrani
and Solium, two aeroplanes were sent from Matruh to
Barrani on the 2nd of March. At the same time the
aeroplanes on detachment at El Hammam were trans-
ferred to Matruh, following to Barrani on the 8th, by
which date the concentration of the British at Barrani
was complete. The advance on Solium was made chiefly
by way of the inland plateau approached by passes
through the escarpments. Air reconnaissances revealed
small camps near the escarpments, but no signs that the
passes would be defended. The difficulties and gradients
of the main passes as they appeared from the air
were reported in some detail. As the British approached
Solium on the 14th of March, the Senussi troops with-
i9i6] THE SENUSSI ROUTED 169
drew from their main camp at Bir Waer, having first set
fire to their stores and ammunition, and they retreated
along the road to Tobruk. In the afternoon Solium
was occupied without opposition, and the news that the
Senussi were fleeing from Bir Waer was brought in by
an air observer. Thereupon the former Royal Naval Air
Service armoured cars,^ under the command of Major the
Duke of Westminster, were ordered to pursue the enemy,
and, after a fine dash across the desert, found the main
body of the Senussi at Bir Azziza and routed them, taking
three guns, nine machine-guns, and a quarter of a million
rounds of ammunition, without suffering any casualties.
This exploit was followed on the 17th by a spectacular dash
into Tripoli to El Hakkim, 120 miles west of Solium,
to rescue ninety-one prisoners from the Tara and the
Moorina.^ The prisoners were found in a state of starva-
tion and taken back to Solium. The occupation of Solium
ended the campaign on the coast. The Aulad Ali, who had
joined the Senussi, surrendered in large numbers, and
unrest in Egypt began to diminish. A half Flight of two
aeroplanes settled down at Solium to regular reconnaissance
of the routes into Tripoli, and to keep watch on reported
German U-boat bases along the coast. The Barrani air
detachment moved back to Matruh, whence routine
reconnaissances were made along the coast and into the
desert.
The detachment of No. 17 Squadron at Faiyum^ had
discovered the arrival of Senussi forces in the Bahariya
oasis on the nth of February 1916. These threatened
the Nile Valley in the Minya district and it was decided
to send a British force to Minya and to include in the
force a detachment of No. 17 Squadron in order that
watch might be kept on the approaches to the Nile from
Bahariya. On the 12th the Senussi camp in the oasis
^ The armoured-car squadrons of the Royal Naval Air Service had been
transferred to the Army in August 1915.
2 The armed boarding steamer Tara and the transport Moorina had
been torpedoed by German submarines in November 1915? and their
survivors landed and handed over to the Senussi.
3 No. 14 Squadron's detachment at Faiyum had changed stations with
No. 17 Squadron's detachment at El Hammam on the loth of February.
170 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. m
was bombed (eight 20-lb. bombs) by a pilot from Faiyum,
and when the camp was again reconnoitred three days
later it was found that the enemy had disappeared. What
the Senussi had done was to scatter among the local
inhabitants to avoid further bombing by the Royal Flying
Corps, but the inference drawn from the air report at
the time was that the enemy troops had fled. The staff
thereupon wished to learn whether the Senussi had re-
treated to Siwa, whence they had come, or whether they
had taken the southerly route by way of the Farafra oasis
to Lower Egypt. The latter oasis was reconnoitred on the
1st of March, and reported clear, after a six-hour flight
by Captain Lord George Wellesley who used an advanced
landing-ground about fifty miles south-west of Minya.
Although the Farafra oasis was unoccupied when Captain
Lord Wellesley appeared over it, it had, just previously,
offered cover to another Senussi detachment which had
moved on to Dakhla, where it had been reported by police
agents on the 27th of February. In order that Dakhla
might be kept under observation, the Minya air detach-
ment moved to Asyut and proceeded to establish advanced
landing-grounds from which the Kharga oasis, as well as
Dakhla, could be watched. Many reconnaissances were
subsequently made and some of them took their pilots to
a maximum distance of 225 miles from Asyut, a striking
example of the value of aeroplanes in a country tedious or
impossible for other forms of reconnaissance.
^he D at fur Operations
[Map, p. 171]
The safety of Egypt was menaced not only by the
Senussi. The desert operations were co-ordinated with
a projected attack on the Sudan by Ali Dinar, Sultan of
Darfur. This ruler had, with some thousands of his
countrymen, slipped quietly away from the Khalifa's
army just before Kitchener's victory at Omdurman, and
had eventually reached Darfur, where he had been
recognized as Sultan in 1899. Up to the outbreak of
war in 19 14, Ali Dinar had been left to go his own way,
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is
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i
3
Operations against the Sultan of DARFUR
March- December, 1916.
EGYPT
Miles 100
o
5
H A L If F A
Scale
200 Miles
D O N G O L A
Rongoia oj
Debba
B A E. F U R
KORDOFAN
QKuttum
^ ^ j.juaA
SuHtin Mli Oinar
killad htre
V -- -i.-''' '--ciUm Kedada )
\ - o^Jebel el HUla
cNyala
Um 5hangaj
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4^
.aEL OBEID
ErRahad
CnePABEO IH HISTORICAL SECT !0N (MILITAI*-' BHAHW)
3100/35
Ordnanoe Survey, 1935
i9i6] THE DARFUR OPERATIONS 171
but he was looked upon as fairly loyal to his British
neighbours in the Sudan. With the coming of war,
however, he was influenced by his religious affinities with
the Grand Senussi in the north, and his qualified allegiance
to the Sudan Government was ultimately undermined. In
the same week in February 1 9 1 6 in which the Senussi troops
advanced on the Bahariya oasis, whence they threatened
the Nile Valley, the forces of the Sultan of Darfur were
concentrated on the Sudan frontier. Ali Dinar had
previously announced his change of heart in an insulting
letter to Sir Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Egyptian
Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, in which he
told of his intention to invade Kordofan and to drive the
British into the sea.
General Wingate had replied briefly but ceremoniously
that he would be in Ali Dinar's capital before Ali was in
his, and when it became clear at the beginning of 191 6
that the Sultan of Darfur was about to carry out his
invasion threat. General Wingate proceeded to concen-
trate a force of about 2,000 men at En Nahud, ninety
miles east of the frontier of Darfur. In March 1916 he
visited Nahud and ordered the commander of the force,
Lieutenant-Colonel P. V. Kelly, to cross the frontier and
capture the wells of Um Shanga and Jebel el Hilla. So
long as these wells, which contained the only permanent
water supply between Nahud and El Fasher, the Darfur
capital, were in the hands of Ali Dinar, so long could he
raid Sudan territory at his will, fortified by the knowledge
that retaliation would be difficult or impossible. On the
1 6th of March 19 16 the Nahud column moved forward,
and by the 21st had taken, with only slight opposition,
the two wells. The Darfur army, consisting of about
5,000 riflemen with spear-armed auxiliaries, moved back to
El Fasher and preparations to attack it there were begun.
General Wingate was anxious to include in his attacking
force a detachment of aeroplanes, not only because of
the help they would afford him by reconnoitring and
bombing Ali Dinar's positions, but also because they
would provide a symbol of the might and power of the
British Army. The sudden appearance, out of the blue,
172 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [cii. iii
of flying chariots such as no one in Darfur had seen before
was calculated to impress on Ali Dinar's followers the
futility of resistance.
The difficulties in the way of the organization of an
air detachment were very great. It was anticipated that
the attack on El Fasher would begin in May, and the
aeroplanes would have to operate in May and June, the
hottest months of the year in that part of the world, when
temperatures of 120° in the shade must be expected.
There would be frequent hahoubs, or sandstorms, rising
almost without warning and drawing a dark and gritty
curtain across the sky to a height of 2,000 feet. The
rainy season, which would begin about the middle of
June, would bring torrential storms, but there would be
earlier heralds of wind and rain. The country, of scrub,
sand, and thorn jungle, was featureless, the existing maps
were known to be inaccurate, and pilots would have great
difficulty in finding their way about. Nor was there much
hope of their survival if they lost direction. The nearest
aeroplanes and personnel conveniently available were
those of Flight of No. 17 Squadron at Suez,^ and they
would have to be sent by way of Port Sudan, a sea journey
of 800 miles lasting four days, thence by rail for about
900 miles to the railway at El Obeid or Er Rahad (six days),
where they would still be some 350 miles from the front.
Camel and motor transport over the last part of the route,
and a chain of small depots, would have to be organized,
and there would be many score of minor problems
associated with the effective maintenance of a technical
detachment. Furthermore, time was pressing and there
would be no more than a few weeks in which to make all
the arrangements.
The many difficulties were met and overcome by
model staff work, by the willing co-operation, at all stages,
of the Sudan military authorities, and by the spirit
and adaptability of the Royal Flying Corps officers and
mechanics. Chief credit for the successful organization
must go to Major P. R. C. Groves, senior staff officer of
the Royal Flying Corps head-quarters staff in Egypt, who
^ Suez aerodrome had been opened by the Flight in February 191 6.
i9i6] AIR SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES 173
was in charge of the operation. This officer, accompanied
by Captain E. J. Bannatyne who was to command the
detached Fhght, went on in advance to Khartoum. They
arrived on the 5th of April and learned from the military
staff that Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force was advancing
on Abiad Wells, where it would be concentrated for an
attack on El Fasher to take place about the middle of
May. After making himself acquainted with the position
in Kordofan and Darfur, and after setting on foot various
preliminary arrangements. Major Groves went forward to
the field of operations.
Meanwhile an advanced party of No. 17 Squadron,
made up of three officers and fifteen men, with three
lorries, a tender and trailer, carrying petrol, oil, hangars,
tents, paraffin, bombs and other stores, had left Suez on
the 7th of April. On the 20th the main air detachment
of six officers and forty-one men, with four B.E.2C aero-
planes in cases, and additional stores, followed. The
military railhead was at El Obeid, but Rahad was chosen
for the Royal Flying Corps because it happened to possess
a locomotive hut big enough to house two aeroplanes.
By the 2nd of May the first aeroplane had been erected
in the shed at Rahad and had been given a test flight.
Under the energetic direction of Major Groves, lines
of communication to the Darfur front, depots, and landing-
grounds, were being established. With a small motor
convoy, loaded with selected stores, and guided by a native,
Major Groves had left Rahad on the 29th of April for
Nahud. The two 3 -ton Leyland lorries with the convoy
repeatedly sank to their axles in the sand and had to be
hauled and pushed out again by the sweating personnel.
The journey, made without rest between dawn and dark,
took six days. At Nahud the main field base for the air
detachment was established with shed accommodation for
the four aeroplanes. The material to build the sheds,
wood and corrugated iron, was supplied by the Sudan
Public Works Department and transported to Nahud by
hundreds of camels. Transport forward to the front from
Nahud was by camel. An advanced base at Jebel el Hilla,
1 10 miles from Nahud and about 290 miles from Rahad, was
174 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
set up, the two Royal Aircraft Factory tents, or hangars, to
house the aeroplanes being sent forward, with difficulty,
packed on fifty-six camels. Some of the camels pushed their
heads through the triangular sections of framework of the
hangars, carried in pairs on their sides, and they presented
a series of amusing pictures. Seventy miles beyond Jebel
el Hilla, at Abiad Wells, an advanced landing-ground
with one tent was opened. Intermediate landing-grounds
were also cleared and marked out at four places other than
those already named between the railhead at Rahad and
Abiad Wells. Along the whole route large cloth arrows,
as a guide to the pilots from the air, were laid out at
intervals of about thirty miles. Arrangements were made
to draw the attention of pilots to the directional arrows
by means of fires. Local officials, sheikhs, marmurs, &c.,
were given the duty of lighting the fires on receipt of a
warning that aeroplanes would be passing over: they were
to keep the fires going until the aeroplane was seen to
pass.
Apart from these major arrangements, many minor,
but not unimportant, details had to be considered. Sun
screens to protect the aeroplanes on the advanced landing-
grounds were designed, and special propeller screens were
made. The men were supplied with leggings, back pads,
mosquito nets, and tinted glasses, while the general stores
included insect poisons, well buckets, and fantasses^ for
holding water. As illustrating one of the difficulties
of the operation it may be mentioned that the loss of
petrol through evaporation was high. Although the petrol
tins were kept wrapped in grass matting the average loss
was fifty per cent.
By the i ith of May two of the four aeroplanes had been
flov/n to the advanced landing-ground at Jebel el Hilla
and the remaining two to the base at Nahud, where they
were held in reserve. The first reconnaissance of El Fasher
was made on the I2th of May by Lieutenant F. Bellamy,
and the unexpected appearance of the aeroplane had a
tonic effect on the Sudanese, Egyptians, and Arabs who
^ Fantasse^ an Arabic word adopted by the army. It was a small iron,
tank of 1 6 gallons capacity: each camel carried two.
i9i6] 'IRON HORSES' 175
made up Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force. ^ The pilot
landed at Abiad Wells and made a personal report of what
he had seen to the commander. Air reconnaissances of
El Fasher and its neighbourhood were maintained and
many propaganda leaflets were dropped. These were of
two kinds. It was known that Ali Dinar had been warned
hy agents that the invaders of his territory intended to
force the Christian religion on his people. It was essential
that this false rumour should be denied because otherwise
Ali Dinar might be tempted to destroy the wells in the
line of the British advance. Although this, as an act of
war, was forbidden by the Koran, there was no knowing
what Ali Dinar might do if his fanaticism was fanned by
a belief that an alien religion was to be forced upon his
people. An emphatic denial of the rumour was therefore
printed on small green handbills (the green of the Prophet),
which were dropped by the aeroplanes. Other leaflets
gave the information that aeroplanes would be dropping
bombs and expressed a hope that the old, the young, and
the women, would withdraw to a safe distance. Ali Dinar,
in answer to these leaflets, contrived to get a message
back in which he said: 'He did not care what the Sirdar's
*iron horses, that flew in the air, did.'
On the 15 th and i6th of May the British moved forward
in two columns to attack. Their first objective was Bir
Melit, sixty-eight miles from Abiad. It was believed that
water was available at Bir Melit and the Royal Flying
Corps was asked to reconnoitre the place and report on
this point, an important one which conditioned the
further advance. The reconnaissance was made on the
17th by Captain Bannatyne, who spent a total of nine
hours in the air on this day. When over Melit, the pro-
peller of the B.E.2C was hit by a bullet. Captain Banna-
tyne, however, attacked the enemy troops with his
^ 'For the first time astonished troops saw the beautiful sight of an
^aeroplane gleaming against a golden sunrise as it turned in a downward
'circle to land on the prepared stretch of ground. "The ship of the air"
'brought down the house. "By God ! our General is very clever," mur-
'mured the marvelling soldiery. . . .' Major A. J. Pott in People of the
Book, p. 163, which contains an authentic account of the Darfur operations.
176 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
machine-gun and he also dropped 20-lb. Hales bombs on
them. They fled, leaving the way open to the British.
The pilot dropped a message giving this information and
telling also of the presence of v^ater. As a result Melit
was occupied in force next day.
On the 22nd of May the advance was continued and
there ensued a pitched battle at Beringiya, in which the
Sultan's forces were defeated. Repeated sandstorms had
made flying diflicult for some days and air reconnais-
sances on the 22nd saw nothing. On the morning of the
23rd, however, when the Western Frontier Force was
advancing on El Fasher, the enemy rearguard of Baggara
horsemen was attacked with Lewis gun-fire by Second
Lieutenant J. C. Slessor, who immediately afterwards
came upon the remnants of the Dervish army, amounting
to about 3,000, rallying round Ali Dinar's banner in and
about the town. He at once attacked with bombs and
caused the enemy to disperse in panic, and the Western
Frontier Force entered El Fasher unopposed. Ali Dinar,
who had expressed his contempt for the iron horses that
flew in the air had a narrow escape. One of the bombs
killed his camel just as he was getting ready to mount, and
also killed two of his servants. Second Lieutenant Slessor
was himself wounded in the thigh. This final attack from
the air had a decisive effect. The morale of the enemy
troops was destroyed by this unexpected form of assault
and they broke into small parties, and later reports showed
that many died of thirst in the desert because they could
not bring themselves to return to El Fasher, where they
might again be attacked from the air. All danger to the
Sudan from the Sultan of Darfur was at an end, but
so long as the Sultan himself still remained at large he
would be a thorn in the side of the British. He was,
therefore, in due course, pursued by a small column and,
on the 6th of November 191 6, after an attack on his
camp at Jebel Juba, Ali Dinar was found dead with a
bullet through the head.
The small detachment of the Royal Flying Corps,
at the end of a long camel line not far from Central
Africa, had played a part in operations which had, with
i9i6] THE SINAI FRONT 177
little advertisement, added a territory nearly as large
as France to the Empire. In the final pursuit of Ali Dinar
the aeroplanes had not been employed. After the capture
of El Fasher the air detachment had been ordered to
return to Egypt, and it had eventually embarked at Port
Sudan on the 21st of June 19 16.
^he Sinai Front
[Maps, pp. 161 and l8i]
After the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in
January 191 6 Egypt took on a new importance. Con-
siderable Turkish forces had been made available for
operations against the Suez Canal and, therefore, to Egypt
the British troops from the Dardanelles must be sent.
The climatic conditions and the comparative quiet of the
Sinai front would combine to restore the health of men
who had suifered much from their privations at Gallipoli.
Meanwhile, it had been decided, in December 1915,
that the defence of the Suez Canal on its own banks should
be abandoned and that the line of resistance should be
pushed out about 11,000 yards into the desert to free the
canal zone from possible artillery fire. This reorganization
of the defence system entailed elaborate preparations, and
during the early part of 19 16 the canal area was a scene of
great activity.
The evacuation of Gallipoli and the new importance
of Egypt led also to a reorganization of commands in the
Mediterranean. Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald J.
Murray, who had been Chief of the Imperial General
Staff from September to December 191 5, was appointed
to the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force with instructions to move his head-quarters from
Mudros to Egypt to take control of the large forces
assembling for the defence of the Suez Canal, leaving
Sir John Maxwell in general command in Egypt with
specific responsibility for the defence of the Western
Frontier. This double control had disadvantages and, on
the loth of March 19 16, Sir Archibald Murray was in-
formed that the Government had decided to amalgamate
2504-5 N
178 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
the two forces in Egypt under his command and that Sir
John Maxwell would return to England.
New aerodromes, additional to Ismailia, were established
on the canal front at Suez and Qantara. In February
191 6 Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H. Salmond moved the
Fifth Wing head-quarters to Ismailia, where Sir Archibald
Murray also had his head-quarters. In the same month
the Suez aerodrome was occupied by a Flight (four aero-
planes) of No. 17 Squadron, and the Qantara aerodrome
by a Flight of No. 14 Squadron. The Qantara Flight was
made partly mobile with an establishment of eighty camels
for petrol and oil transport, and with sand carts for
dragging tents and spare engines. It is of interest that soon
after his arrival at Ismailia, Lieutenant-Colonel Salmond
began a course of lectures, on two days each week, for
military officers, to whom he explained the organization
of the Royal Flying Corps and its methods of co-operation
with other arms. The talks helped to create a spirit of
understanding and sympathy from the beginning, and it
may be said that the liaison between the Royal Flying
Corps and other arms in Egypt and Palestine was always
close, cordial, and informed.
In the first three months of 191 6 the main duties of the
Royal Flying Corps detachments were reconnaissance and
survey, with occasional bomb and machine-gun attacks
on Turkish posts in the desert. The air photographic
survey, the importance of which was stressed by Sir
Archibald Murray, was on a large scale and was made in
co-operation with the Topographical Section of the
Intelligence Branch. Air photographs were taken of
certain places already fixed by triangulation and the
photographs were then transferred to the i : 20,000 squared
map. With these maps, the air observers were able to give
pin-point references which, owing to the featureless nature
of the desert, would otherwise have been impossible.
The longest air reconnaissances in the early part of the
year were weekly ones to Hassana and Nekhl about 100
miles east of the Canal. On these flights extra petrol
tanks and, usually, bombs were carried in place of an
observer. Twice in February the Turkish waterworks at
igi6] GERMAN AEROPLANES 179
Hassana were damaged by a lOO-lb. bomb. On the 24th
of March the waterworks and camps in its neighbourhood
were attacked by six B.E.2C pilots (without observers)
with forty 20-lb bombs which hit tents and buildings,
but missed the reservoir.
On the nth of April a raid by mounted troops on
Jifjafa in the central defence section was made to destroy
a small Turkish force which had, for some time, been
boring for wells. A Royal Flying Corps detachment with
wireless-receiving equipment accompanied the column,
and special air reconnaissances kept the officer in command
informed of the situation ahead of him. The co-operation
was successful, Jifjafa was surprised, the wells and boring
plant were destroyed, and many prisoners, including an
Austrian engineer, were captured.
In the middle of April the first German aeroplanes were
seen over the Sinai front, a certain indication of its growing
importance.^ The arrival of German aircraft had been
known on the 7th of March when two seaplanes from the
aircraft carrier Ben-my-Chree had made a reconnaissance
of Beersheba and the observers had found and photo-
graphed an aerodrome with six hangars near the town.
The German air unit, which had come from Homburg,
was the 300th Squadron, equipped with fourteen Rumpler
(C.i) two-seater aeroplanes fitted with 150 horse-power
Mercedes engines. The Rumplers were faster and had a
better all-round performance than the B.E.2C of the Royal
Flying Corps. Not long after its arrival the enemy
squadron received a few Fokker single-seater fighters.
The German air service on the Palestine front thus
began in the spring of 1916 with a technical superiority
which it was allowed to retain until the autumn of the
following year, when, for the first time in the campaign,
a few superior British fighter aeroplanes (Bristol Fighters)
were allotted to this front. It was not the German policy
to relegate obsolete aeroplanes to subsidiary theatres of
war. Although Germany had virtually to sustain the air
^ Papers found on the Austrian engineer captured at Jifjafa on the nth
stated that aeroplanes would be flying over the Sinai front any time after
the 8th of April.
i8o EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
war against the Allies on all fronts, she was usually able to
allot to each the best contemporary type aeroplanes, even
though few. In other words, she acted on the conviction
that quality was more important than quantity. On the
Palestine front the German air service, although out-
numbered and handicapped by its long line of com-
munications for supply and repair, was usually able, until
October 191 7, to do whatever was strictly necessary with-
out effective interference from the Royal Flying Corps,
and had, furthermore, the means to make difficult, at will,
the work of the British pilots and observers.
The construction of a standard-gauge line from Qantara
towards Qatiya had been begun on the loth of March,
and within four weeks sixteen miles of railway had been
laid. That is to say, the railhead, early in April, had
passed beyond the advanced line of the canal defences
and it became necessary to establish protective posts in
the Qatiya oasis, for which Brigadier-General E. A.
Wiggin, 5th Mounted Brigade, was made responsible.
During the first three weeks in April air reconnaissances
indicated a westerly Turkish movement towards the
Qatiya area. There was activity along the northerly coast
road from Bir el Mazar, movement from that place to
Bir el Abd, and a general growth in the number of men
and camels at both places. On the 20th of April the
westerly movement seemed to be developing. It was
found on that day, by an air observer, that reinforcements
had arrived at Bir el Abd, and the aeroplane was heavily
fired on while the reconnaissance was being made. On
the morning of the 22nd of April a reconnaissance report
was brought in which added to the feeling of uneasiness
at Royal Flying Corps head-quarters. The view held
by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H. Salmond was that the
security of the army against surprise was the responsi-
bility of the Royal Flying Corps. When he pondered
the air report on the 22nd, in conjunction with the
reports of the previous weeks, and with other reports
of German air activity which showed that enemy re-
connoitring aeroplanes had, during the past days, given
particular attention to the Qatiya district, he became
i9i6] UNHEEDED WARNING i8i
convinced that a Turkish attack on Qatiya was about to
take place. The report which he had before him on the
morning of the 22nd uncovered Turkish movements from
a fresh direction. It showed that there were 200 men
at Bir el Mageibra, and that well-defined tracks led from
Bir el Mageibra to Bir Bayud, where 100 men and 30
camels were gathered at the well. The aeroplane had
circled over Mageibra at 700 feet, but had been un-
molested until, obviously at a given signal, heavy fire
had been opened by the Turkish troops, an indication
that they were a formed body of disciplined soldiers.
Lieutenant-Colonel Salmond, on the evening of the
22nd, made a special report at General Head-quarters,
probably in person. The only written record of its
contents is a note in a Royal Flying Corps diary which says
that he stated his opinion that 'Qatiya would be attacked
'on the night of the 22nd/23rd of April, or on the morning
'of the 23rd, by a force estimated at 1,000 men and three
'guns'.
This warning was to receive speedy justification,
although the strength of the attacking force was under-
estimated.^ There is, however, no record in the appro-
priate military war diaries of Lieutenant-Colonel Salmond's
report, nor is there evidence to show that action was taken
to pass on the warning to the forward commanders. Had
this been done it seems unlikely that the Turkish attack,
which took place on the morning of the 23rd, could have
met with the same success.
[Map, facing]
The Qatiya area came within No. 3 section of the
canal defence zone commanded by Major-General H. A.
Lawrence. On the 21st of April Brigadier-General E. A.
Wiggin's 5th Mounted Brigade was disposed as follows:
at Qatiya were the Worcestershire Yeomanry; at Bir el
Hamisah were the Warwickshire Yeomanry, less one
^ The total Turkish attacking strength, led by the German Colonel
Kress von Kressenstein, was 95 officers, 3,560 other ranks, 6 guns and
4 machine-guns, with horses and camels. See Military Operations^ Egypt
and Palestine (MacMunn and Falls), Vol. I, p. 170.
1 82 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
squadron; and at Romani were Brigade head-quarters
and the Gloucestershire Yeomanry. On the evening of
the 2 1st of April one squadron of the Worcestershire
Yeomanry moved into bivouacs at Oghratina to cover a
Royal Engineer party which had orders to prepare wells
as a preliminary to a further advance planned to be
made against Bir el Abd. The second squadron of the
Worcestershire Yeomanry joined the first at Oghratina
on the afternoon of the 22nd and they were replaced at
Qatiya by a squadron of the Gloucestershire Yeomanry
pending the arrival of one regiment of the Anzac Mounted
Division which had been ordered forward to reach Qatiya
on the 24th.
Brigadier-General Wiggin had all the mounted troops
at the disposal of Major-General Lawrence, and he had
been instructed that, as two days must elapse before he
could be reinforced with infantry, he was, in the event
of a heavy attack, to manoeuvre back upon Dueidar, or
upon the railhead (at that time west of Romani), where
he could be supported. It is possible that the mounted
force could have retired as planned provided adequate
warning of an attack was received, although the presence
of dismounted troops at Oghratina and at Qatiya meant
that a longer warning would be necessary than if mounted
troops alone had been concerned. There were, however,
British movements during the night of the 22nd/23rd
which favoured the Turkish plans. The aeroplane recon-
naissance report which had seemed to Lieutenant-Colonel
Salmond, on the morning of the 22nd, to be a final link
in the chain of evidence which pointed to an impending
attack on Qatiya, was rather differently interpreted at 5th
Mounted Brigade head-quarters. In the air report, which
had been dropped at Qatiya by message bag (at 7.20 a.m.),
it was stated that about 200 men together with camels
were at Mageibra. On receipt of the message, Brigadier-
General Wiggin had wired to head-quarters saying: 'If
'General Lawrence approves will go for them to-night or
'they will give me trouble.' Approval had been given by
telegram sent off at 9.30 a.m.
Accordingly, shortly after midnight, Brigadier-General
i9i6] THE ATTACK ON QATIYA 183
Wiggin rode out from Hamisah with two squadrons of
the Warwicks and one of the Worcesters to surprise the
Mageibra camp. While the yeomanry were moving
through the night, the Turks they sought to surprise were
Hkewise active, but their march, on a more southerly
track, was in the opposite direction, westwards towards
Dueidar. In consequence, when the yeomanry arrived at
Mageibra they found an empty camp, and after destroy-
ing it they rode back to Hamisah, which they reached,
somewhat tired after their sixteen-mile journey, at 9 a.m.
By this time the Turkish attack had already had appreci-
able success.
While Brigadier-General Wiggin had been away on his
fruitless expedition, the detachment at Oghratina had
been taken by surprise. Overwhelming numbers of the
enemy, who made their approach under cover of a sea
mist, had surrounded the yeomanry, had inflicted severe
casualties upon them, and after taking the survivors
prisoner (at 7.45 a.m.) had pushed on towards Qatiya.
This post was attacked in force about 9.45 a.m., German
air observers ranging Turkish guns on the camp. Attempts
were made from Romani, and by Brigadier-General Wiggin
from Hamisah, to relieve the Qatiya detachment, but they
proved entirely vain, and about 3 p.m. the post was
finally overwhelmed.
The Dueidar post, held by a detachment of the 5th
Royal Scots Fusiliers, had been attacked by great numbers
of Turks about 5.20 a.m., but the attack had been repulsed.
An air observer over the Dueidar area after the mist
had cleared, dropped a message at 8.26 a.m. to say that
the main body of the column which had assaulted Dueidar
was in retreat. The retreating column was attacked from
the air with bomb and machine-gun fire^ and was subse-
quently pursued by the 5th Australian Light Horse who
had arrived from Qantara about i p.m.
Air reconnaissances on the 24th reported that the Turks
^ Fifth Wing head-quarters, soon after its arrival in Egypt, had realized
that air attacks against troops and camels had great possibilities and had
arranged for aeroplanes to be fitted with machine-guns which could fire
downwards from the side of the fuselage.
1 84 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. iii
had withdrawn from Qatiya, and revealed also the line of
retreat. Bombing attacks were made next day on the
Turkish camps at Bir el Abd (seventy 20-lb. bombs) and
at Bir Bayud (twenty-six 20-lb. bombs). During the three
days of the affair at Qatiya, that is, on the 23rd, 24th, and
25th, the two Flights at Qantara and Ismailia, totalling
eight aeroplanes, were in the air for sixty-eight hours and
flew 4,000 miles. The explanation has been offered that
the object of the Turkish attack was a reconnaissance in
force to ascertain the progress of the railway line towards
Qatiya, but this statement is difficult to understand in
view of the fact that as much as, or more than, the fight-
ing reconnaissance discovered was probably reported by
German aeroplane observers who flew over the area.
Furthermore, it is known that the Turks were well
informed, through Bedouin who had access to the British
outposts, of the British positions and almost certainly
also of the progress of the railway. Be that as it may,
tribute must be paid to the enemy for the skill and
enterprise with which the action was conducted. Three
and a half squadrons of yeomanry had been totally lost on
the morning of the 23rd, and, although the general military
effect of the Turkish attack was only to delay the progress
of the railway for a few days, its moral value to the enemy
was important and was duly exploited (in conjunction
with news of the capture of Kut in Mesopotamia a few
days later) to impress the mixed races in Sinai and
Palestine.
In May the heat in Sinai became intense and, up to
July, precluded any major ground operations. Air activity,
however, was not lessened, more especiaUy because the
German squadron, operating mainly from an aerodrome
at El Arish, was increasing its sphere of operations and was
making occasional bombing attacks. By way of reply to
two air raids on Port Said at the beginning of May, the
town and aerodrome of El Arish were bombarded on the
1 8th. The aircraft carrier Ben-my-Chree, from Port Said,
co-operated with the monitors M.15 and M.23 and with
the sloop Espiegle. A Short seaplane was hoisted out about
i9i6] EL ARISH BOMBARDED 185
4.30 a.m. and for fifty minutes the observer gave correc-
tions hy w^ireless of the fire of the two monitors on the
aerodrome and on the enemy camps. Six Royal Flying
Corps aeroplanes v^ere timed to reach El Arish at 6 a.m.
to bomb the camps and to fight any enemy pilots in the
neighbourhood. The aeroplanes appeared to time, but
found no enemy aircraft ; the pilots dropped their forty
20-lb. bombs on the camps and on a marching column of
about 1,000 men, among w^hom three bombs exploded.
Photographs of El Arish w^ere taken and a reconnais-
sance w^as made of the town and camps.
Port Said was again bombed by German pilots on the
night of the 20th/2ist of May and, in reply, four B.E.2C
aeroplanes on the 22nd attacked five enemy camps with
forty 20-lb. bombs. A new aerodrome, with a half- Flight
of No. 14 Squadron, was established at Port Said as a result
of the German air attacks on the town. In order that
early warning of the approach of enemy aircraft might be
received, the aerodrome was in touch by telephone and
by wireless with the British garrison at Romani. On the
1st of June an enemy aeroplane, from about 8,000 feet,
dropped eight bombs on the camp of the ist Light Horse
Brigade of the Anzac Mounted Division. The results of
this attack are recorded and they show that one officer and
seven men were killed and three officers and nineteen men
wounded. In addition, thirty-six horses were killed and
nine wounded, while the remainder stampeded. On the
I ith an enemy aeroplane dropped eight bombs on Qantara
and another attacked the British garrison at Romani with
machine-gun fire. Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H. Salmond
planned an adequate reply which was made on the i8th
of June, when eleven B.E.2c's from Qantara, approaching
from the sea, attacked El Arish aerodrome from 600 feet.
Two of the aeroplanes carried observers, but the others,
so that a greater weight of bombs could be taken, were
flown as single-seaters. According to the observation of
the British pilots one German aeroplane on the ground
was destroyed and another damaged, and two hangars
were set on fire. In addition, one bomb of 20-lb. weight
fell among a party of soldiers, and another of loo-lb.
1 86 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
weight exploded in the middle of a Turkish camp.^
The British aeroplanes were subjected to heavy fire
from the ground and three of them were brought
down. From one w^hich fell in the sea the pilot was
rescued by a motor-boat. A second fell near the German
aerodrome, but the pilot. Captain R. J. Tipton, set fire
to his aeroplane before the Turks reached him. The pilot
of the third. Captain H. A. Van Ryneveld,^ was forced to
land on the sea-shore, the sump in his aeroplane holed by
a rifle bullet. He was seen by Lieutenant D. K. Paris, the
observer in another B.E.2C, piloted by Captain S. Grant-
Dalton, who went down and landed alongside, picked up
Captain Van Ryneveld, and successfully carried his two
passengers back to Qantara, a distance of ninety miles.
For a month after the attack the enemy airmen were
quiet and made only very occasional reconnaissance visits
to the British outpost line. Meanwhile, to give early
warning of German air activity to the British aerodromes.
Royal Flying Corps wireless stations were set up at front-
line posts in each of the four zones of the defences.
l^he Middle East Brigade
By June 1916, with the growth, actual and prospective,
of the Royal Flying Corps units in the Middle East, it was
decided to establish a central command in Egypt for the
administration, organization, and maintenance of all
Royal Flying Corps detachments in Egypt, Mesopotamia,
East Africa, and, in due course, Salonika. Accordingly,
on the 1st of July, the Middle East Brigade was formed,
under Brigadier-General W. G. H. Salmond, with Lieu-
tenant-Colonel P. R. C. Groves as his chief staff officer,
to include: the Fifth Wing (Nos. 14 and 17 Squadrons,
^ The only evidence, from the German side, is in Neumann's Die
Deutschen Luftstreitkrdfte im Weltkriege (pp. 520-1). The reference to
this raid says." 'When our aerodrome was in process of construction, the
'English airmen carried out a very vigorous and daring raid. At 1 1 o'clock
'in the morning they dropped their bombs, and, having descended to
'within ICQ feet from the ground, attacked us with machine-gun fire.
'However, they inflicted but little damage.'
^ Colonel Sir H. A. Van Ryneveld. He flew from London to Cape-
town in 1920.
i9i6] THE MIDDLE EAST BRIGADE 187
Royal Flying Corps, and No. I Australian Squadron), ^
the Twentieth Reserve Wing in process of formation (Nos.
21, 22, and 23 Reserve Squadrons), 'X' Aircraft Park, and
'X' Aircraft Depot, in Egypt; No. 30 Squadron and an
Aircraft Park in Mesopotamia ; and No. 26 (South African)
Squadron v^ith a section of an Aircraft Park in East Africa.
The Reserve Wing was being formed as a result of a
War Office decision in April 19 16 that a training organi-
zation should be built up in Egypt where the weather,
especially in the winter, would enable flying instruction
to proceed without appreciable interruption. The three
reserve squadrons were sent from England and arrived in
Egypt (Abu Qir) between June and September 19 16.
Not only were they to train pilots to meet the require-
ments of the Middle East Brigade, but they were also
to act as a general training establishment for the Royal
Flying Corps. The formation of 'X' Aircraft Depot, at
Abu Qir on the 26th of July, was made necessary by the
responsibihty of the central command in Egypt for the
supply of technical equipment and stores for all Royal
Flying Corps squadrons in the Middle East.^
In June it had been decided to withdraw No. 17
Squadron from Egypt for service at Salonika,where an Allied
advance was impending. No. i Australian Squadron took
over the aeroplanes and aerodromes of No. 17 Squadron,
the personnel of which were concentrated at Cairo. No. 17
Squadron left Egypt in transports for Salonika, by Fhghts,
on the 2nd and 17th of July.
The great expansion in the air service in the Middle
^ No. I Australian Squadron was (officially) renumbered No. 67
(Australian) Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, on the 12th of September
1 916. The Army Council had suggested at the end of 191 5 that the
Dominions might care to raise complete squadrons for service with the
Royal Flying Corps. Australia had accepted the proposal and the first
squadron. No. I Australian Flying Corps, numbering 28 officers and 195
other ranks, but without aeroplanes or technical equipment, had em-
barked from Melbourne on the 1 6th of March 1 916. The squadron
reached Suez on the 14th of April and the men were distributed for training
with the various Royal Flying Corps detachments. Most of the officers
were sent to England for final training.
^ For a review of the training organization, and of the supply and repair
system, in Egypt, see Ch. VIII, pp. 449-58.
1 88 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
East will be made clear as this history progresses, but so
that the reader may be aware of what manner of command
the Middle East Brigade was, it will be necessary to
anticipate a little. Most of the personnel required to
satisfy the demands caused by the rapid expansion were
obtained by combing through the armies in the four
theatres of war, and it was not uncommon to find, in any
squadron at any time, officers and men who had seen
service, on the ground or in the air, in all theatres of the
Middle East. This may seem an unimportant point, but
it meant that many of the squadrons were representative
of the whole Brigade, and this fact was responsible, in part,
for the sense of unity which undoubtedly pervaded the
Brigade. It became necessary to organize in Egypt train-
ing establishments, depots, and repair centres, which con-
tinued to expand to the end. of the war. A small training
class grew into a school of aerial gunnery; from another
class there developed a school of military aeronautics,
and separate schools came to be established for instruction
in artillery co-operation and in bombing. A cadet wing
was also formed in Egypt. The organization which was
built up at Abu Qir, Abbassia, Heliopolis, Ismailia, Suez,
Helwan, and Abu Sueir, called for the construction of
temporary and semi-permanent accommodation on a
large scale, and the Middle East Brigade came to have
its own engineer works officer who directed a small army
of native labourers. The aircraft depots at Abu Qir and
Heliopolis were equipped to make any kind of repair to
aircraft and engines, and 'crashes' of all kinds from the
various theatres of war in the Middle East were sent to
the depots to be rebuilt. As a result of the efficient
training organization in Egypt, the Middle East Brigade
came to be not only self-dependent, but it was able also
to supply trained pupils for other theatres of war.
The Brigade head-quarters w^as called upon to improvise
units for operations without guiding help from precedents.
New tactics had to be developed to suit the changing con-
ditions of mobile warfare in different theatres of war. The
Brigade head-quarters constituted a clearing-house for
ideas. The staff studied the operations in the various
i9i6] THE SENUSSI CONQUERED 189
theatres of war, and ideas which had been tried out with
success in one were at once passed on to the others. The
latest developments in aircraft co-operation with other
arms in France and England were received in Egypt and
were made the subject of cabled or written instructions
to the squadrons of the Brigade. Personal visits to the
various theatres were paid by Brigadier-General Salmond
and by his staff officers, and these visits helped to keep
squadrons abreast of the changing developments in Europe
as well as in the Middle East. Although the campaigns in
Egypt and Palestine, in Arabia, in Mesopotamia, Mace-
donia, and in East Africa, are narrated separately, the
reader should remember that the air organization in each
of these theatres took life and was sustained from a central
source in Egypt.
With the formation of the Middle East Brigade on the
1st of July 1916, the command of the Fifth Wing was
taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Joubert de la
Ferte with head-quarters at Ismailia. The disposition of the
detachments of the Fifth Wing were as follows : Ismailia^
Head-quarters and one Flight of No. 14 Squadron; Qan-
one Flight of No. 14; Port Said, detachment of No. 14;
Suez, one Flight of No. i Australian Squadron; Heliopolis,
Head-quarters and one Flight of No. i Australian Squadron
and a half- Flight of No. 14; Solium, half- Flight of No. 14;
SLudKharga oasis, one Flight of No. i Australian Squadron.
End of Western Desert Campaign
[Map, p. 190]
It will be seen that there had been changes in the
dispositions of the units in the western desert. In the
first week in May the air detachments had been withdrawn
from Solium and Matruh in the coast area, and from
Faiyum, for work in the canal zone. At the end of May,
however, rumours were circulated that German and Tur-
kish troops had arrived at Benghazi, and a half-Flight of
No. 14 Squadron was in consequence again sent to Solium,
where it remained for reconnaissance duties until the
25th of July when it was withdrawn to reinforce the canal
190 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
zone in anticipation of an impending Turkish attack on
Romani.
In the southern desert the Senussi forces, discouraged
by the defeat inflicted upon Sayed Ahmed on the coast,
had evacuated the important Kharga oasis at the end of
March 1916, and it had been reoccupied by the British
on the 15th of April. The air detachment of No. 17
Squadron based at Asyut, which had been responsible for
the reconnaissance of the Kharga and Dakhla oases, moved
forv^^ard to Kharga (Sherika) on the 20th of April and
afterwards worked in co-operation with patrols of Ford
light cars, by which the Senussi detachments were deprived
of communication with the Nile Valley. An episode may
be quoted from the records of the Kharga detachment to
illustrate the hazards of desert flying. On the 15th of
June two B.E.2C aeroplanes left for an advanced landing-
ground forty miles west of Kharga, from which they
were to make a reconnaissance of the Dakhla oasis on the
following day. Both pilots lost their bearings on the
journey to the advanced ground and they eventually
made a forced landing and settled for the night. When
they came to leave next morning, the engine in one of the
aeroplanes could not be made to start, and the pilot in the
second aeroplane flew off to get help. When he returned
on the morning of the 17th, there was no sign of the
disabled B.E.2C. An intensive search was subsequently
conducted by the Royal Flying Corps, by armoured cars,
and by camelry, but it was not until the 20th that a patrol
of the Imperial Camel Corps discovered the aeroplane
with its occupants dead. From a diary left by the passen-
ger, First Air Mechanic J. Garside, it appeared that the
engine had been made to start, and the pilot had there-
fore set out to find his aerodrome. After a twenty-five
minute flight, however, the engine had failed again and
a landing had been made. Once more the engine had
been made to work, but after another short journey it had
given out finally. The pilot. Second Lieutenant S. G.
Ridley, had died on the evening of the i8th, and Air
Mechanic Garside on the 19th or 20th, both of them
victims of the scorching desert.
i9i6] BATTLE OF ROMANI 191
It will be convenient here to look ahead and to sum-
marize the remainder of the campaign on Egypt's western
frontier. 'A' Flight of No. i Australian Squadron reheved
the detachment of No. 17 Squadron, as we have seen, at
Kharga (Sherika) on the 7th of July. The Australian
Fhght remained at Kharga until the 8th of November
and made reconnaissance journeys — many of long duration
■ — ^which covered the Bahariya oasis in the north (from
a landing-ground near Minya) and the Dakhla oasis in
the south. The Dakhla oasis was distant about 120 miles
from Sherika, and a refuelling ground was established
about fifty miles out, the fuel and oil being sent forward
by camels which had to set out five days in advance of the
time the reconnaissance was to be made.
In October the British moved out against the Senussi
in the Bahariya and Dakhla oases, both of which were
ultimately evacuated by the enemy. The Grand Senussi,
Sayed Ahmed, retired with the remnants of his forces on
Siwa, where they were attacked and defeated in February
1917. Sayed Ahmed was able to make his escape, but the
defeat nevertheless was decisive. A treaty was concluded
between the British and Ahmed's cousin, Sayed Idris,
newly recognized as head of the Senussi Confraternity,
and the western desert thereafter ceased to be a sphere
of military operations. Sayed Ahmed remained in the
desert, shorn of his influence, until August 191 8, when he
journeyed to Constantinople in an Austrian submarine.
^he Battle of Romani
[Maps, pp. 161 and 193]
Towards the end of June air reconnaissances had
reported an appreciable growth in the Turkish advanced
camp at Bir el Mazar, forty-two miles east of Romani.
In itself this increase was of no great significance, but
about the same time agents began to come in with
warnings of an intended Turkish advance down the main
road on Qatiya. Subsequent air reconnaissances, therefore,
kept special watch over the whole northern sector. Up
to the 1 8th of July the observers had little that was unusual
192 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
to report and, as the campaigning season was already far
gone, the British command in Egypt was incHning to the
behef that the anticipated attack on the Canal would be
postponed until the winter. On the 19th of July, however,
the patience of the air service was rewarded when at Bir
Bayud, Bir Gameil, and Bir el Abd, some 8,000 Turkish
soldiers, plentifully supplied with camel transport, were
discovered.^ The air reports next day showed that the
enemy troops had moved forward to Mageibra and
Oghratina where they were entrenching. There seemed
no doubt that the Turkish offensive was, after all, to be
launched.
Acting on the instructions of the General Staff, who
were anxious that the Turks should proceed with their
attack against the British prepared positions and so con-
form with the British counter-strategy which aimed at
envelopment, the Royal Flying Corps did nothing to
harass the enemy advance, but simply reported the further
Turkish preparations. The air observers told of reinforce-
ments on the move along the northern roads, and they
watched the rapid progress made in the fortification of
the line from Oghratina southwards. On the 25th of July
the beginnings of an advanced enemy aerodrome west of
Bir el Abd were discovered. On the 28th there was a new
development when three columns of enemy troops were
seen from the air to be moving in the direction of the
British outposts. They halted and were later observed
to be digging a new advanced line which, at Hod um
Ugba, was within five miles of the British positions.
Movements of reinforcements in the Turkish back areas
were reported on the 29th and again on the 30th, but after
that day all major movements ceased and it was con-
cluded that the enemy concentration had been completed.
The British command was puzzled at the time to find
an explanation for the slowness with which the Turkish
^ On this reconnaissance Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor, com-
manding the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, acted as observer.
He had gone up to have a look at the country, but he made a general
reconnaissance report which was very comprehensive. His shoulder was
grazed by a bullet fired from the ground.
i9i6] AIR RECONNAISSANCES 193
attack developed, but it was subsequently known that
the delay was due to the difficulty of moving heavy
artillery across the sandy desert. From the air reports it
was estimated, on the 31st of July, that the strength of
the Turkish and German forces assembled for the attack
was about 13,000.^
On the 29th of July the Royal Flying Corps had, under
orders, begun offensive operations against the enemy
troops. On that day two aeroplanes bombed the camel
lines at Bir el Mazar with ten 20-lb bombs. On the
morning of the ist of August aeroplanes co-operated with
monitors in a bombardment of the Turkish camps at
NegiHat and Oghratina, and in the afternoon of the same
day five pilots bombed the camps (fifteen 20-lb. bombs)
and also the head-quarters camp at Dhaba (seventeen
20-lb. bombs). Orders of Brigadier-General Salmond,
issued on the ist, instructed the Royal Flying Corps officer
at the landing-ground at Romani to send out, immediately
the Turkish attack began, the wireless signal 'Q' repeatedly.
On receipt of this warning an aeroplane was to go up from
Qantara to report the direction and weight of the enemy's
attack, and the observer was to indicate the main body of
enemy troops by dropping smoke balls on them. There-
after pilots were to use the landing-ground at Romani for
direct co-operation with the 52nd Division and with the
Anzac Mounted Division.
The full disposition of the Royal Flying Corps in the
Middle East on the ist of August was: Ismailia, Fifth
Wing head-quarters, and the head-quarters and one and
a half Flights of No. 14 Squadron; Qantara^ one Flight
of No. 14; Port Said, half- Flight of No. 14; Suez, one
Flight of No. I Australian Squadron; Heliopolis, head-
quarters and one Flight of No. i Australian Squadron;
and Kharga (western desert) one Flight of No. i Australian
Squadron. The orders issued on the 1st stated that
Qantara would act as a reserve for Romani in addition
to its work for the Section Head-quarters and the 42nd
Division, that Ismailia would act as a reserve for Qantara
apart from the work required by General Head-quarters,
^ The actual ration strength of the enemy attackers was 16,000.
194 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
and that Suez and Heliopolis would be the reserve for
Ismaiha. A wireless-fitted aeroplane was to co-operate,
during the attack, with the monitor M.15.
The Turks made their long-awaited assault on the night
of the 3rd of August. Throughout the 4th, when the
fighting developed fiercely, the air observers were able to
follow and report much of the tactical flow of the battle.
One observer, for an hour and a quarter, directed the
monitor M.15 on the Turkish camp at Hod um Ugba, on
which four direct hits were obtained. The more distant
reconnaissance flights reported no indications of Turkish
reinforcements approaching the front. By the evening of
the 4th the Turkish attack, made with boldness and skill,
had failed, and a British advance was ordered to begin at
4 a.m. on the 5th. On the morning of the 5th the enemy
fought rearguard actions, but the air reports left no doubt
that the main Turkish body was in full retreat and it
seemed to be clearly indicated that no stand would be
attempted short of the Oghratina positions. The Turks
did make a stand at Oghratina on the 6th of August, but,
in the afternoon of that day, observers reported that
although the Oghratina line was still held, the enemy
troops were draining away from it. On the 8th the line
was evacuated by the Turks, but there was evidence from
the air that rearguard actions might be fought to cover
Bir el Abd which was also being gradually evacuated.
Fighting with rearguards covering Bir el Abd took place
on the 9th, but this day's action may be said to have ended
the battle. Bir el Abd was found empty of enemy troops
on the 1 2th of August and, on the same day, the air
observers reported that the evacuation of Salmana was
proceeding. Next morning, the 13th, Salmana was occupied
by the British and the enemy withdrew to El Arish, but
left an outpost force at Bir el Mazar. The Turks had
suffered a severe defeat and had lost about four thousand
men taken prisoner, nearly a quarter of the force engaged.
The British casualties were 1,130, of whom 202 had been
killed. The threat to the Suez Canal had been finally
removed.
All the available aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps
i9i6] AIR COMBATS 195
had been drawn upon during the battle. They never
totalled more than seventeen at any one time, but the
pilots and observers made two or three service flights each
day while the action lasted. There were a few combats
with enemy pilots during the operations and as a result
six Royal Flying Corps officers were wounded (one fatally),
and one enemy aeroplane was shot down and seen to
crash. Another Royal Flying Corps aeroplane was brought
down by anti-aircraft fire twelve miles east of the British
lines. It was destroyed by the pilot who, with his observer,
walked to a British outpost.
Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor has recounted an
episode of which he was a witness on the iith of August.
He was making a reconnaissance on horseback of Bir el
Abd when he saw a British aeroplane under gun-fire over
that place. 'Suddenly', he says, 'the anti-aircraft fire was
'switched off and an enemy aeroplane swooped down on
'ours which was apparently badly damaged, but shortly
'steadied and came down about three-quarters of a mile
'south-east of my head-quarters. Captain Rhodes, my
'aide-de-camp, went off to locate the plane to give first
'aid, and I to head-quarters to send an ambulance. On
'finding the plane Captain Rhodes found that the pilot,
'Second Lieutenant E. W. Edwards, who was very badly
'wounded — I think seven bullets had hit him, one of
'which broke his lower jaw on both sides, another his
'shoulder — had gone off to get help for the observer who
'was shot through the chest and could not move. The
'observer. Second Lieutenant J. Brown, though in great
'pain, refused to have his wounds attended to until he had
'made his report, as he said they had some important
'information and he was afraid he would faint if his wound
'was touched. He very gallantly held himself together until
'he had dictated his report and verified it and then, his duty
'done, fainted and died two hours later.' The aeroplane
concerned in this adventure was a B.E.zc of No. 14
Squadron.
Now that the threat to the Suez Canal had been ended.
Sir Archibald Murray decided to transfer his head-
quarters from Ismailia to Cairo, where he would be in
196 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
close touch, with the many problems associated with
internal affairs in Egypt. At his suggestion the War Office
agreed that the troops on the Canal and in Sinai should be
organized as a corps command, to be known as the Eastern
Frontier Force. Lieutenant-General Sir Charles M. Dobell,
who was appointed to the command of the 'Eastern Force',
as it came to be called, took over the head-quarters at
Ismailia on the i8th of October and on the same day
General Head-quarters opened at Cairo.
Although it was not until the end of the year that
important military operations were resumed on the Sinai
front, there was little slackening of activity in the air,
where the German pilots continued to be aggressive. On
the 1st of September they bombed Port Said and caused
forty-six casualties (ten killed, thirty-six wounded), but no
damage to the port. One of the enemy bombs struck the
seaplane carrier. Raven II, wounding eight men and caus-
ing damage which made it impossible for the carrier to
sail on a projected expedition to the Red Sea. On the fol-
lowing day six B.E.2c's, flown as single-seaters, attacked
the Turkish, waterworks at Maghara with thirty-six 20-lb.
bombs. One of the bombing pilots had to make a forced
landing in the desert and another, who went down to
rescue the first pilot, hit a boulder and damaged his aero-
plane. Two other pilots then landed, picked up the two
officers, and flew back with them to the aerodrome at
Ismailia. On the 6th of September the German aerodrome
at El Arish was attacked with twelve 20-lb. bombs.
In the middle of September a cavalry raid on the enemy
outpost at Bir el Mazar was made. The British force
assembled at Salmana on the i6th of September, but as
the palm groves at that place offered poor cover, and
because the intention was to surprise the Turkish garrison,
the Royal Flying Corps was instructed to take special
measures to prevent German aircraft from making recon-
naissances. Accordingly, by moonlight on the night of the
1 5th/ 1 6th, two pilots dropped sixteen 20-lb. bombs on
the enemy aerodrome at El Arish, and, during the 1 6th,
air patrols were arranged with the object of intercepting
any enemy aeroplanes which attempted to reconnoitre.
i9i6] AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 197
The patrols were not successful. One patrolling aeroplane
was forced to land because of damage inflicted by a chance
bullet fired at long range hy a German pilot, and another
went down with engine trouble. The consequence was that
a German pilot found the way open to Salmana and he
discovered the cavalry concentration and dropped bombs
without, however, inflicting casualties. All hope of
surprising the garrison at Bir el Mazar had gone, but the
attack proceeded: it was delivered at dawn on the 17th
and found the Turkish troops well positioned and alert
and, after a short time, the action was broken off.
Ships of the East Indies Squadron had been off the coast
at dawn on the 17th ready to bombard the aerodrome
and camps at El Arish and targets on the El Arish-Bir el
Mazar road. The aircraft carrier Ben-my-Chree accom-
panied the ships with orders to send seaplanes to spot
for the sloop Espiegle and the monitors M.i^ and M.31.
The first seaplane rose at 5.24 a.m. and fourteen minutes
later six were in the air. One of them, a Short, was to
direct the fire of the monitors on El Arish, while another
Short had orders to watch the El Arish-Bir el Mazar
road for targets suitable for the fire of the Espiegle. Each
Short was escorted by two Sopwith 'Baby' seaplanes.
The attempted bombardment was defeated by German
aeroplanes. As soon as the Short with its two escorting
seaplanes appeared over El Arish, a German single-seater
fighter, presumably a Fokker, ascended and engaged them.
The enemy fighter, which was faster than the seaplanes
and skilfully handled, quickly shot down the two escorting
Sopwiths. One of them fell in flames and the other,
damaged, was forced to alight on the water. The German
pilot then attacked the Short, but after a sharp indecisive
fight the seaplane returned to the Ben-my-Chree. The
remaining three seaplanes, meanwhile, finding no move-
ments on the El Arish-Bir el Mazar road, had turned back
to the carrier, but on the way one of them — a Sopwith —
was hit by machine-gun fire from the ground and collapsed
when a forced landing was made on the sea : the pilot was
rescued by a trawler. Not content with their success in
defeating the attempted bombardment, the German pilots
198 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
attacked the ships with bombs, but they did not make
any direct hits. Although the attack on El Arish from
the sea had failed, it had been made clear to the German
air service that the aerodrome was unduly vulnerable. It
was therefore evacuated and the enemy squadron moved
back to Beersheba, as was discovered by the Royal Flying
Corps.
On the 13th of October a cavalry and camelry force
moved out from Bir Bayud to make a raid on the Turkish
post at Bir el Maghara, fifty miles south-east of Romani on
the northern spurs of the Sinai hills. Plans of the enemy
camp and of the approaches through the hills had been
compiled for the use of the attacking column from air
photographs. Aeroplanes, using an advanced landing-
ground at Salmana, co-operated with the column and
although there was mist the observers were able to say, by
dropped messages, what positions the enemy was holding.
The Turks were driven from their advanced positions on
the morning of the 15th, but after a fight which lasted
two hours the attack was broken off. When a signal was
displayed for the information of the air observers that the
column was about to retire, one of the pilots went down
to 200 feet and attacked the Turkish camps with bombs
and machine-gun fire. In all, forty 20-lb. bombs were
dropped on the enemy camps : one of them exploded in
a compartment of a reservoir which burst.
By November 19 16 the British force had covered more
than half the distance between Qantara and the Palestine
frontier. 'The desert, till then almost destitute of human
'habitation,' wrote Sir Archibald Murray in his dispatch,
'showed the successive marks of our advance in the shape
'of strong positions firmly entrenched and protected by
'hundreds of miles of barbed wire, of standing camps
'where troops could shelter in comfortable huts, of tanks
'and reservoirs, of railway stations and sidings, of aero-
'dromes and of signal stations and wireless installations, by
'all of which the desert was subdued and made habitable,
'and adequate lines of communication established between
'the advancing troops and their ever-receding base.' By
i9i6] DUTIES OF THE SQUADRONS 199
November, also, the menace from the Senussi in the
western desert had ceased to be serious.^ The Grand
Senussi had been forced to retire to the Siwa oasis and it
had been decided that the western frontier of Egypt could
be defended by a series of restricted patrols, a form of
defence which made it possible to transfer appreciable
forces from the western to the eastern front. The time
had come when Sir Archibald Murray could take another
step forward in Sinai. His plan was to secure El Arish as
a base for offensive action against the Turks in southern
Syria.
The movements of the air detachments in November
were as follows: 'A' Flight of No. 67 (Australian) Squadron
was brought back from Sherika, in the Kharga oasis, to
Qantara on the 8th. On the same day ^B' Flight of No.
14 Squadron was transferred from Suez to Ismailia to
take the place of 'A' Flight of the same squadron which
had moved forward to Salm.ana on the 4th. On the 24th
of November 'A' Flight moved to Mustabig, nearer
El Arish.
Instead of being required to watch a comparatively
straight front, the Royal Flying Corps had to protect
a line which, by the end of November, had reached a point
seventy miles east of the Canal in the northern sector,
extended in a wide semicircle back to the Canal at Qantara,
and continued thence along the Canal to the Red Sea.
Under these new conditions the main tasks of the
air service were: (i) reconnaissance of El Arish and its
lines of communication; (ii) adequate reconnaissance of
Maghara and its neighbourhood to prevent a surprise
attack against the British flank; and (iii) a routine patrol,
up to a distance of about forty miles east of the Canal,
of the central and southern sectors from Qantara to
Suez.
In addition to the daily reconnaissances there were
occasional bombing raids. On the nth of November an
attack on Beersheba was made by five B.E.zc's and by
one Martinsyde which had the aerodrome and the rail-
way station for objectives. A second attack, by a similar
^ See p. 191.
200 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
formation, was made at the same time on Turkish camps
at Bir Lahfan and at Magdhaba in the Wadi El Arish. In
retahation, one German aeroplane attacked Cairo on the
13th with ten light-weight bombs which did little damage,
but killed one soldier and thirteen civilians and wounded
twenty-five civilians.
In December the air detachments were concentrated
for the impending operations against El Arish. On the
19th the Fifth Wing head-quarters was transferred to
Mustabig from Ismailia and, hy that date, No. 67 (Austra-
lian) Squadron and No. 14 Squadron^ were operating
from the Mustabig aerodrome.
Early on the morning of the 20th, just when the pre-
parations for the advance had been completed, an air
observer came back with news that the hospitals and tents
had been moved from El Arish, and he stated his conviction
that the town had been evacuated. In the afternoon it
was further reported from the air that the Turks had
abandoned their positions at Maghara. It was clear that it
was no longer necessary to rely upon a methodical infantry
advance, and the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade were therefore
ordered to move on El Arish that night. On the morning
of the 2 1 St, air observers reported that the town was
completely encircled by the mounted troops and that no
resistance was being offered. El Arish was subsequently
found empty of Turks, and by the 23rd the first ship was
unloading supplies at the port.
Air reconnaissances revealed that the bulk of the enemy
forces from El Arish had retreated south-east along the
Wadi el Arish, and that a considerable body was encamped
at Magdhaba. On this information, Lieutenant-General
Sir Philip W. Chetwode, commanding the Desert Column,^
decided on the 22nd to advance on Magdhaba with his
^ Less 'C Flight which had left for operations in Arabia on the 13th of
November. See pp. 220-4.
^ The Desert Column, which had been formed on the 7th of December,
began with (approximately) the troops of what had been No. 3 section,
canal defences. The composition of the Desert Column varied from time
to time.
i9i6] ATTACK ON MAGDHABA 201
main mounted forces. On the same day the Turkish
camps were attacked by ten B.E.zc's of No. 67 (AustraHan)
Squadron and by three of No. 14 Squadron. A total of
six lOO-lb. and one hundred and twenty i6-lb. or 20-lb.
bombs were dropped on the camps and many hits were
made.
The attack on Magdhaba, which aimed at encirclement,
was made on the 23rd of December. One of the first aero-
planes over the Turkish positions drew fire from various
points along the bed of the Wadi el Arish, a useful indication
of the places held by the enemy. Early air reports also gave
the welcome news that there were no signs of reinforcements
on the move. At 10 a.m., however, a disquieting message
was dropped. This said that the Turks were withdrawing,
and to prevent their escape orders were at once given to
the 1st Light Horse Brigade to move straight on Magdhaba.
The mounted troops, however, were met with heavy fire,
and as it was obvious that no evacuation of the Turkish
positions had taken place, the troopers moved to the shelter
of the main wadi with a view to making a dismounted
attack along its bed. The air observer had been misled,
and it is now possible to say why. In the early morning,
while the British were still moving forward, attacks on
the Turkish positions had been made by pilots and
observers with bomb and machine-gun. It is probable
that the bombing undermined the morale of the Arab
soldiers with the Turkish forces. What is certain is that
many of them fled from their positions, and it was this
movement of demoralized troops which had deceived the
air observer.
The British attack was pressed with determination and,
by 4.30 p.m., all organized resistance had been ended and
the Turkish garrison, 1,282 strong, with a great quantity
of ammunition, was captured; the British losses were 146
(twenty-two killed). After destroying timber and stores
the British force marched back to El Arish. The Turks,
warned by the fate of the Magdhaba garrison, with-
drew the remainder of their posts from Sinai territory
before the end of the year, leaving the Peninsula to the
British.
202 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
THE ADVANCE INTO PALESTINE
1917
For a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that zvhich hath wings shall
tell the matter. (Ecclesiastes x. 20.)
^he Action of Rafah
[Maps, pp. 161 and 209]
At the beginning of January 191 7 an enemy force,
estimated at about 2,000 men with mountain artillery,
was entrenched at El Magruntein, south-west of Rafah.
The position had been discovered by the Royal Flying
Corps on the 27th of December and visual and photo-
graphic reconnaissances had been made thereafter until all
the enemy entrenchments and redoubts had been plotted.
From the 5th to the 8th of January there were extensions
of the defence lines which were closely watched from the
air. Meanwhile another position had been found at Weli
Sheikh Nuran on the left bank of the Wadi Ghazze, where
on the 7th a new force of about 1,000 men was seen.
Next day the air observers discovered that much work
had been done on the Nuran defences since the earlier
observation and that additional troops, estimated at about
500, had arrived.
This air information provided material on which
military plans could be based for an attempt to capture
the El Magruntein garrison which covered Rafah. The
Turks had suffered a heavy defeat at Magdhaba on the
22nd of December because they had left an unsupported
garrison within striking distance of British mounted troops,
but it appeared that the enemy command had been slow
to learn a lesson. The air reports showed that the troops
covering Rafah were also unsupported, the nearest body —
that discovered at Weli Sheikh Nuran on the 7th — being
ten miles distant. Although it was impossible, until the
railway and pipe-line had been much farther advanced, to
plan an action to occupy Rafah itself, Lieutenant-General
Sir P. W. Chetwode saw an opportunity for another raid
of the kind which had been so successfully made on
Magdhaba; he decided to command the raid in person.
1917] THE ACTION OF RAFAH 203
The Desert Column moved out of El Arish at 4 p.m.
on the 8th of January. To ensure surprise, air patrols
were maintained over the Rafah area until dusk to prevent
enemy airmen from reconnoitring the column, but, in fact,
no enemy aeroplanes appeared. At dawn next morning
the Desert Column was approaching the Rafah defences.
Aeroplanes, operating from an advanced landing-ground
at Sheikh Zowaiid, were flying over the Turkish positions
from 7 a.m., and the early observers reported the roads
east and south-east of Rafah clear of troops. When this
information reached Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel,
the General Officer Commanding the Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, at 8.30 a.m., he issued orders
which aimed at an encirclement of the Turkish positions,
to be followed by a direct assault. The Royal Flying Corps
had five wireless-receiving stations in use, four with the
Royal Horse Artillery and one at a Royal Flying Corps
report centre. Those accompanying the artillery were
transported on sand sleighs, the operators riding on horse-
back. Two aeroplanes, working on different wave-lengths,
were maintained in the air throughout the day, and,
especially in the afternoon when artillery-fire was directed
on specific targets marked on the map, the observers
gave valuable help to the gunners. Three Martinsydes,
escorted by three Bristol Scouts, bombed the aerodrome
at Beersheba: six enemy aeroplanes were wheeled out of
their sheds on the approach of the bombers, but only one
left the ground.
At 4.30 p.m., when the last aeroplane left the area of
the battle, the fight was still in progress, although the
Turkish position was enveloped. Five minutes before the
aeroplane left, an enemy column, estimated at about 1,200
men with six guns, had been observed marching to
reinforce the Rafah defenders. The column, when seen,
was between Shellal and Weli Sheikh Nuran, and this air
information confirmed the statement of an officer prisoner,
taken earlier in the afternoon, that a reinforcing regiment
was on the way. It was realized that if the Turkish
positions were not captured quickly the enemy reinforce-
ments might turn the scale against the attackers, and
204 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
orders were written directing that the engagement be
broken off, but before they could be issued a final assault
had been launched which proved entirely successful. The
garrison, numbering 1,635, including thirty-five officers,
among them the Turkish commander, was captured. The
British losses in this brilliant little action were 487
(seventy-one killed). The Desert Column, its main task
accomplished, withdrew, but when, next morning, air
reports revealed that the Turks had made no attempt to
reoccupy Rafah, a small force was sent back with all
available limbered wagons to bring in captured material.
The two actions at Magdhaba and Rafah provide good
examples of the value of air co-operation in the type of
warfare fought in the desert.^
Two days after the Rafah attack, the Commander-in-
Chief in Egypt was informed by War Office telegram that
the Government had decided to defer large-scale opera-
tions against Palestine until the autumn, and that the
general policy during the summer would be one of pre-
paration for the autumn campaign. Subsequently, how-
ever, when the Allied plans for the 191 7 Spring offensive
in all theatres of war were finally settled. Sir Archibald
Murray was asked to 'exert pressure' on the enemy with
a view to helping the offensives on other fronts.
Throughout January 19 17 the important areas in
southern Palestine, as far north as Er Ramie and as far
east as the Jordan, were reconnoitred from the air. The
enemy aerodrome at Beersheba was bombed five times
during the month, notably on the night of the I4th/i5th
by three aeroplanes, on the 15th by six, and on the i6th
by eleven aeroplanes. These bombing attacks probably
helped to persuade the German air service to vacate the
^ The Chief of the General Staff conveyed the Commander-in-Chief's
appreciation of the work of the Royal Flying Corps in a letter saying : 'He
'considers that the thoroughness and efficiency shown in the preliminary
'work, no less than the active participation taken by our aircraft in the
'final attack materially contributed to the defeat of the enemy. Thanks
'to the skilful patrolling on the eastern and south-eastern flanks of our
'force during the forenoon of the 9th, enemy reinforcements were located
'and ample warning of their advance was given to the General Officer
'Commanding the Desert Column.'
1917] THE TURKS DIG IN 205
Beersheba aerodrome, which it did about the middle of
the month. It was discovered, on the 29th of January,
that a new aerodrome had been constructed at Er Ramie.
Air reconnaissance showed that, after the action at
Rafah, the enemy concentrated his forces near Shellal,
and he proceeded with the fortification of his defensive
positions about Weli Sheikh Nuran which commanded
the junction of the roads from Tell esh Sheria to Beersheba
and Rafah. During January the positions were rapidly
extended in a southerly direction to command the two
main roads leading to the Wadi Ghazze from Rafah and
from Karm Ibn Musleh, and the positions continued to be
fortified until they constituted the most elaborate system
of defences which had been seen up to that time in the
Sinai-Palestine area. Every day the observers flew over
the Turkish defence lines, keeping watch on the progress
of the work: the squadrons operated, from the i8th of
January onwards, from a new aerodrome at Ujret el Zol.
The railway through Sinai, on which the British force
depended, was pushed forward methodically and, by the
1st of March, had reached Sheikh Zowaiid, to which
place the head-quarters of the Desert Column was moved.
Rapid construction of the railway was of great importance
and the Royal Flying Corps had been asked on the ist
of February to cease, for the time being, from making
bombing attacks on the enemy as they were calculated
to bring retaliation against the camps of the Egyptian
Labour Corps which was building the line. It had been
found that a few bombs dropped by German airmen
sufficed to induce panic among the native labourers, who
scattered widely, with a consequent appreciable delay in
their work. The order against bombing was relaxed on five
occasions during February, when attacks were made on the
German aerodromes at Beersheba and Er Ramie.
It was discovered, during February, that the Turks had
reoccupied Nekhl and Bir el Hassana with small detach-
ments, and three British columns were sent to attack these
posts on the i8th. The enemy detachment at Nekhl,
warned of the British advance by Bedouin tribesmen,
escaped, but the small garrison at Hassana was surprised
2o6 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
and captured. Aeroplanes, working from the aerodrome
at Ismailia, accompanied each column during the advance.
Meanwhile, preparations had been completed for an
attack on the main Turkish positions at Shellal, but on
the afternoon of the 5th of March, when all was ready to
begin, it was discovered from the air that the Turks were
evacuating the whole of their elaborate defences. Orders
were at once given to the Royal Flying Corps to hamper
the withdrawal by bombing. From the 5th to the 8th
inclusive, attacks were made, by day and by night, on
Beersheba, on Tell esh Sheria (where the wadi was crossed
by the railway), on the junction of the Beersheba railway
with the Jerusalem-Jaffa Hne, and on enemy cavalry and
infantry camps. In all thirty aeroplanes were engaged in
these operations and a total of 2f tons of bombs was
dropped. There is evidence that the bombing attacks
caused much annoyance and some casualties, but they
achieved no strategic results, and the Turkish forces duly
settled in new positions at Gaza and Tell esh Sheria,
fourteen miles north and north-east of Shellal. The enemy
withdrawal had been of a limited kind, but the Turks had
moved out of reach until such time as the railway could
be extended at least as far as Rafah.
While the further preparations were proceeding for an
attack on the new positions, the Royal Flying Corps made
daily tactical reconnaissances of the defences at Gaza, Abu
Hureira, and Beersheba. These were photographed and
from the photographs trench maps were prepared. The
construction of a branch railway line from the main line
at Et Tine through El Qastine towards Gaza was closely
followed, and the course of the railway from Sheria to
Junction station was plotted. Bombing attacks were made
on Junction station, on Ramie aerodrome, and on various
points along the railway north of the Wadi el Hesi. It
was during one of these attacks, on the 20th of March,
that Lieutenant F. H. McNamara, an Australian officer
of No. 67 (Australian) Squadron, won the first Victoria
Cross to be awarded to a flying officer in the Middle East.
The War Diary records : 'During an attack on the railway
'near Tell el Hesi, Captain Rutherford of No. 67 (Austra-
I9I7] LIEUTENANT F. H. McNAMARA 207
*lian) Squadron, on a B.E.2C, was forced to land with engine
'trouble. Lieutenant McNamara, on a Martinsyde Scout,
'descended under heavy rifle fire to his rescue, in spite of
'the fact that he had already been severely wounded in the
'thigh. He landed about 200 yards from the B.E.2C, but
'owing to his wound was unable to get out of the machine.
'Captain Rutherford ran to ask his assistance to re-start his
'engine. As this was not possible and as hostile cavalry were
'rapidly approaching it was decided to leave at once in the
'Martinsyde. Captain Rutherford climbed on the fuselage
'behind Lieutenant McNamara, but in taking off, the
'latter, owing to his injured leg, was unable to keep the
'machine straight and it turned over. The two officers
'extricated themselves and set the machine on fire.
'Meanwhile the pilots of two other aeroplanes, realizing
'the situation, attacked and held off the cavalry by
'repeatedly sweeping them with bursts of machine-gunfire.
'Captain Rutherford then assisted Lieutenant McNamara
'to the B.E.2C and lifted him into the pilot's seat. Then,
'still under heavy fire, he swung the propeller and climbed
'into the observer's seat. Lieutenant McNamara took off
'successfully and although weak from loss of blood,
'managed to fly the B.E.2C back to his aerodrome, a
'distance of seventy miles.'
An instance showing the incidental dangers which flying
over Palestine entailed may also be quoted. On the
24th of March Lieutenant W. E. L. Seward of No. 14
Squadron was over Er Ramie in a Martinsyde, acting as
escort for a reconnaissance B.E.2C., when the main petrol
tank in the Martinsyde was pierced by an anti-aircraft
shell. The pilot got back as far as a point on the coast
four miles north of Ashkelon before his engine failed. To
avoid possible capture of his aeroplane he landed in the
sea, but it happened that he came down within two
hundred yards of a Turkish post on shore and fire was
opened on him. He swam out to sea, gradually threw
off his clothing, and then swam southwards for four
hours, at the end of which time, cold and exhausted, he
scrambled ashore. He lay hid in the sandhills until dark-
ness set in and then he made his way, naked and barefooted,
2o8 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. iii j
along the beach, past Gaza, to the Wadi Ghazze, a distance I
of thirteen miles. During this journey he had five times to I
take to the sea to escape Turkish patrols. Towards dawn I
he scraped a hole for himself in the sand and he lay there,
weary but safe, for several hours, and then, soon after he
had resumed his journey, he fell in with a British cavalry
patrol.
l!he First Battle of Gaza
[Maps, pp. i6i and 209]
By the 21st of March 191 7 the railhead had reached
Rafah and the final preparations for the British attack
could be made. Sir Archibald Murray decided that the
direction of his advance must be along the coast, and his
attack, therefore, had the Gaza defences for objective.
The action was to be a cutting-out expedition, similar,
although on a larger scale, to the raids which had brought
success at Magdhaba and Rafah. The operations were to
be under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles
M. Dobell, commanding the Eastern Force, who was
instructed to gain the line of the Wadi Ghazze to cover
the advance of the railway, to take steps to prevent the
enemy from withdrawing unmolested, and to capture Gaza
and its garrison by a coup de main.
The Eastern Force comprised the Desert Column^
under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir P. W.
Chetwode, the Imperial Camel Brigade, the 52nd and
54th Divisions, and the 229th Brigade, which was the only
formation of the 74th Division as yet available. The
Desert Column was to make the attack on the 26th of
March, while the remainder of the Eastern Force, directly
under the command of the G.O.C., Eastern Force, moved
forward to be ready to give support if required.
Two Flights of No. 67 (Australian) Squadron moved to
an aerodrome at Rafah on the 25th of March and, during
the battle, the remaining aeroplanes of the Fifth Wing,
^ That is, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (less the
1st Light Horse Brigade); the Imperial Mounted Division (less the 4th
Light Horse Brigade); and the 5 3rd Division.
I
!
1917] FIRST BATTLE OF GAZA 209
now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Borton,^
operated from the Rafah aerodrome, but they returned to
their main aerodrome at Ujret el Zol (kilo 143) each night.
In the operation orders issued hy Sir Charles Dobell
on the 24th of March it was stated: 'A permanent contact
'patrol of one aeroplane will be maintained with the
'Desert Column, reporting direct to battle head-quarters,
'Desert Column. G.O.C. Desert Column will be responsi-
'ble for transmitting information received from this contact
'patrol to Eastern Force head-quarters, or battle head-
'quarters, as the case may be. Five aeroplanes will be detailed
'for general reconnaissance, reporting to battle head-
'quarters. Eastern Force; all information gained by these
'aeroplanes of movements of the enemy main body (at pre-
'sent in the Tell en Nejile-Huj area) or of his central
'detachment (at present in the Tell esh Sheria-Abu Hureira
'area), or of the approach of enemy troops from the Lydda-
'Er Ramie area, will be dropped at battle head-quarters,
'Desert Column, as well as at battle head-quarters. Eastern
'Force. Six aeroplanes will be detailed for co-operation
'with the artillery. A wireless-receiving station is allotted
'to the heavy artillery, three to each division, and two to
'each mounted division. Six aeroplanes will be detailed
'for patrol duties.'
A supplementary order, issued on the 25th of March,
stated: 'If during the attack on Gaza the enemy should
'make any forward movement in strength from the Tell
'en Nejile-Huj area or the Tell esh Sheria-Abu Hureira
'area, or from both, the O.C., Fifth Wing, Royal Flying
'Corps, will prepare immediate arrangements for sending
'out all available machines for offensive action against the
'advancing enemy troops, at the same time reporting his
'action to battle head-quarters. Eastern Force.' It was
made clear, however, that the duties outlined in the earlier
^ Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Borton had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel
P. B. Joubert de la Ferte on the 5th of February 1917. The strength of
the two squadrons (Nos. 14 and 67 Australian) which made up the Fifth
Wing is available for the 22nd of March 1 91 7. The return shows that
there were 21 B.E.2c's and e's, 14 Martinsydes, and 7 Bristol Scouts. Only
12 B.E.'s and 9 Martinsydes are shown as serviceable. In addition there
was a B.E. Flight on service in Arabia. See pp. 220-4.
2504.5 P
210 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
order of the 24th were to continue until definite instruc-
tions for air offensive action, if and when the opportunity
arrived, were given from Eastern Force head-quarters.
It is possible, from German and Turkish sources, to
throw more light on the disposition of the enemy reserves
before the battle began. In the early part of March, Gaza
was held by a weak garrison of two battalions and two
batteries. The Turkish i6th Division was at Tell esh
Sheria, fifteen miles south-east of Gaza, the Turkish 3rd
Division was in reserve at Jemmame, eleven and a half
miles east of Gaza, while at Beersheba was a cavalry
brigade and a weak regiment of the Arab 27th Division.
Had this disposition been maintained to the eve of the
battle, an important British success could not, it may be
asserted, have been prevented. The enemy forces, how-
ever, were redistributed as a result of information supplied
by the German air service. Day after day German aero-
planes flew over the British camps, and as they were able
to out-distance the aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps
they could not be prevented from making detailed
reconnaissances. It has been recorded that, 'according to
'the assertion of his Excellency Djemal Pasha, the Air
'Force had saved the situation during the First battle of
'Gaza'.^ This is true, as is made clear by the German Com-
mander Kress, writing in Zzvischen Kaukasus und Sinai
(Vol. I, pp. 26-9). Kress says that he concluded from the
excellent air reports which he received in the second half
of March that the British intended to make an attack in
the direction of Gaza. So impressed was he that he took
energetic action. Part of the Turkish i6th Division was
moved into Gaza from Tell esh Sheria, to give the garrison
a total of seven battalions, and the defences of the town
were also considerably strengthened with additional artil-
lery. Orders were given for the Turkish 53rd Division,
which had been maintained at Jaffa and Er Ramie because
of fears of a British landing, to march down the coast to
Gaza. One of the two regiments, making up this division,
was due at El Majdal, thirteen miles along the coast
north-east of Gaza, on the 26th, the day the battle opened.
^ Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkrafte im Weltkriege, p. 524.
1917] GERMAN AIR REPORTS 211
The other regiment apparently remained at Er Ramie.
Kress himself shifted his command post from Beersheba
to Tell esh Sheria in order to be nearer the scene of action
when the British attacked.
On the morning of the 26th of March, in a thick fog, the
British forces moved forward. The fog lifted at 7.30 a.m.,
but the visibility continued poor for another hour.
British and German aeroplanes were out early, their
observers trying, through the mist, to follow the progress
of the attack. Once again Kress was well served by his
air service. He records that about 8 a.m. he received at
his head-quarters at Tell esh Sheria a report from one of
his flying officers which told him that strong British forces,
amounting to about two infantry divisions, were advanc-
ing on Gaza from the south, and that a force of cavalry,
with armoured cars, had broken through between Gaza
and Tell esh Sheria. He promptly ordered the Gaza
garrison to hold out to the last man, gave instructions for
the regiment of the Turkish 53rd Division, due to reach
El Majdal that day, to continue its march to Gaza,
ordered the Turkish 3rd Division in the Jemmame area
to advance on the line Gaza-Ali el Muntar, the i6th
Division to move from Tell esh Sheria against the British
rear with its objective at the point where the Khan
Yunis-Gaza road crossed the Wadi Ghazze, and, finally,
instructed the Beersheba group to advance by way of
Shellal in the direction of Khan Yunis.
Had the Turks displayed the same energy and decision
in moving as Kress had shown in the orders he issued to
meet the situation, most of the Turkish reinforcements
would have been in action with the British near Gaza
before darkness fell on the 26th. There were, however,
many delays before the troops began to move, and the
most forward ones were ultimately checked by British
mounted troops and armoured cars, so that by nightfall they
had covered little more than half the distance to Gaza.
Meanwhile, from the time the fog began to Hft, the pilots
and observers of the Fifth Wing reported the progress
of the attack, co-operated with the artillery, maintained
patrols to counter enemy aircraft, and reconnoitred the
212 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
areas in which the Turkish reserves were known or
thought to be. The air reports (the first of which had
been received at battle head-quarters of the Eastern
Force at lo a.m.) showed that by ii a.m. Gaza had been
surrounded by mounted troops. The Ah el Muntar ridge,
however, which dominated the town, presented a formid-
able obstacle to the 53rd Division and was not wholly
captured until 6.30 p.m. A contact-patrol observer was
over this area at 4.10 p.m. and his subsequent report
showed that British infantry at that time were about 300
yards east of the Labyrinth, a maze of entrenched gardens
left of the Ali el Muntar ridge, but the report made no
reference to the ridge itself. After this observation had
been made the aeroplane continued on its way to see what
was happening at Huj and at Hureira.
At 4 p.m. the Anzac Mounted Division had reported to
Desert Column head-quarters that three enemy columns
were said to be advancing near Deir Sneid, and the message
asked that an aeroplane reconnaissance should be made
to verify this information. So far as can be ascertained,
the contact-patrol aeroplane which would in the ordinary
way have been sent to make a final survey of the Gaza area
before darkness fell, was diverted, as a result of the message
from the Anzac Mounted Division, to the Deir Sneid area,
where the observer discovered that about 2,000 Turks
were entrenching. At 4.50 p.m. a message was sent to
Desert Column head-quarters from the Imperial Mounted
Division which told of 3,000 Turkish infantry and cavalry
advancing from Huj in a south-westerly direction. An
air observer had flown over the Huj area just after 4.30
p.m. and he had seen these Turks, who had apparently
collected in the broken ground of the Akra area, debouch-
ing upon the uplands west of Huj. At 5 p.m. this column
(estimated at about 8,000 infantry) was seen by another
observer to be marching towards Gaza with its head
miles south-west of Huj. The aeroplane landed at 5.45
p.m. after dropping messages giving this information at
head-quarters. The Beersheba Group was also discovered
on the move from the air in the afternoon.
Sunset on the 26th of March was at 6 p.m. (Cairo
1917] FAILURE 213
time), and darkness in the latitude of Palestine follows
sunset with some rapidity. The position, as Eastern Force
head-quarters saw it, was that Gaza had not fallen and
that appreciable Turkish reinforcements were moving
against the British from the north and from the east.
Lieutenant-General Dobell was, from the beginning,
apprehensive of a strong enemy counter-attack against
the right rear of his force, and that he had grounds for his
anxiety is apparent from the orders issued by Kress to
which reference has already been made. Lieutenant-
General Chetwode, commanding the Desert Column,
concluded, as the sun went down with the Ali el Muntar
ridge still not completely captured, that he could no
longer leave the mounted troops with half their numbers
involved in fighting in the gardens of Gaza, while the
Turks attacked the other half from north and east. At
6.10 p.m., therefore, with the approval of Lieutenant-
General Dobell, he ordered that the mounted troops should
break off the action and retire across the Wadi Ghazze.
So began the withdrawal which sealed the failure of the
first battle of Gaza. After the orders to withdraw had
been issued there ensued some confusion and misunder-
standing,^ but, on the evening of the 26th, and during the
27th, the withdrawal proceeded, and by the 28th a position
had been taken up on the south bank of the Wadi Ghazze.
On the morning of the 27th of March air reconnaissances
reported strong Turkish columns converging on Gaza, and
when this information was received bombing aircraft were
at once sent out, but the pilots found that the enemy
had gained the shelter of the town and they therefore
attacked alternative targets of transport and bivouacs. In
the afternoon another Turkish column was reported near
Sheikh Abbas and it was attacked from the air with
machine-gun fire. On this day, also, the artillery observa-
tion of the Royal Flying Corps achieved good results. On
three occasions 60-pdr. batteries were directed on massed
bodies of Turkish troops, and appreciable casualties were
inflicted. In all, during the three days from the 26th to
^ See Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine (MacMunn and Falls),
Vol. I, Ch. XVII.
214 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
the 2 8th of March, there were twenty artillery co-operation
flights. Enemy aircraft, during this period, were active and
there were many combats, mostly indecisive. On the 26th
an enemy two-seater was driven down and seen to crash
on the Beersheba aerodrome, and on the 27th a British
artillery aeroplane was forced down with its two occupants
wounded, one of them fatally.
The British casualties in the first battle of Gaza were
just under 4,000 (523 killed), while those of the enemy
were 2,447 (301 killed, 1,061 missing). It has been made
clear that the German air service contributed appreciably
to the success of the Turkish resistance at Gaza. It was
able to give its vital help because the German pilots flew
faster and had better armed aeroplanes than those with
which the Royal Flying Corps squadrons were equipped.
Before the battle began the enemy air service had received
eight new Rumpler aeroplanes fitted with fixed syn-
chronized machine-guns,^ and also a few Halberstadt
fighters. The Rumpler pilots did not seek combat, but
this must be set down to a desire to conserve their aero-
planes and not necessarily to any lack of the offensive
spirit. Nor was it difficult for the Germans, because of
their superior speed, to avoid combat. In other words, the
Royal Flying Corps could not prevent the enemy from
making such reconnaissances as he was determined to do.
The Halberstadt fighting pilots, whose aeroplane was more
speedy and handier than anything flying against them,
took every opportunity to attack, and had they been more
numerous they might have made it impossible for the
Royal Flying Corps to do any useful work. As it was they
inflicted during March, and also during April 191 7,
appreciable casualties on the Royal Flying Corps without
any apparent harm to themselves. They demonstrated
on the Sinai-Palestine front what had been made clear in
air fighting in France, that numbers and courage may never
fully compensate, in the air, for inferiority of equipment.
Between the 9th of March and the 20th of April, although
it would appear that no more than two Halberstadts were
available at any one time, three British pilots failed to
^ Neumann, Die Deutschen Ltiftstreiikrafu im Weltkriege, p. 524,
1917] SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA 215
return from their missions, one died of wounds received
in air combat, and three officers were wounded in air
fighting. In the same period two German aeroplanes
were driven down and apparently wrecked behind the
enemy lines. Had the Fifth Wing had a few aeroplanes
comparable in performance with the Halberstadt, the
casualties would have been fewer and, no less important,
the squadrons would have had the means to prevent the
German pilots and observers from co-operating with the
Turkish troops. The Gaza garrison was strengthened
before the battle, and the Turkish reinforcements were
set in motion soon after the British advance began, solely
as a result of reports rendered by the German air service.
The margin between victory and failure in the battle
was extremely narrow, and had the British had local air
superiority victory could perhaps have been assured. In
April 191 7 the Royal Flying Corps in France was having
a difficult time, and it may be forcefully argued that no
first-class fighting aeroplanes could be spared for operations
in subsidiary theatres. The fact remains that failure to
take Gaza at the first attempt made a great difference to
the whole campaign in Palestine, and it is right to point
out the effect of air superiority on the course of events,
and to lay stress on the comparatively trivial resources
which sufficed to give that superiority to the enemy.
^he Second Battle of Gaza
After the first battle of Gaza there was a change in
British Government policy affecting the campaign in
Palestine. It will be recalled that although Sir Archibald
Murray had been instructed to exert pressure on the
enemy to help the Spring offensives on other fronts, he
had been given to understand that there would be no
serious operations in Palestine until the autumn of 191 7.
On the 30th of March, however, he was informed by
telegram from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
that his immediate task must now be the defeat of the
Turks south of Jerusalem and the occupation of that city.
Apart from this change in policy, which called for a
methodical and consolidated advance, it was clear that the
2i6 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
second attempt to take Gaza would be a wholly different
operation from the first. In March Gaza was a strongly
held outpost, but after the first attack on the city it had
become a strong point in an entrenched position which
extended for twelve miles from the sea as far as Abu
Hureira on the road to Beersheba. All possibility of a
coup de main had disappeared. It would now be necessary
to plan an operation approximating to siege warfare, com-
parable with those fought in France, in which artillery
support would play a dominating part. An operation of
this kind required careful preparation, and one unfortunate
result would be that the enemy would be allowed time in
which to strengthen his fortifications.
The main work of the Royal Flying Corps during this
preparatory period for the second battle of Gaza was
tactical and strategical reconnaissance, and co-operation
with the artillery. From air photographs a new map, on
the scale of i : 40,000, was made and printed in time for
the operations. Enemy pilots showed appreciable acti-
vity, and, on the 12th of April, twice bombed the Royal
Flying Corps aerodrome at Rafah, killing one ofiicer and
two men, and wounding seven men, without, however,
inflicting much material damage.^
The plans for the British attack included a frontal
assault by three divisions, instead of one as in March,
with the mounted force acting as a protective body on
the right of the infantry. When Gaza had been captured
the intention was to hold a position north and east of the
town with two divisions while the remaining division
cleared the town. The operation was to be made in two
stages. The first was to be a general advance to a position
^ At Rafah were Fifth Wing head-quarters, No. 67 (Australian) Squadron,
and head-quarters and 'A' Flight of No. 14 Squadron. The Advanced
Wing head-quarters and 'B' Flight of No. 14 Squadron were at Deir el
Balah. The strength of the Fifth Wing in serviceable aeroplanes, just
before the second battle of Gaza (14th April), was seventeen B.E.2c's and
e's and eight Martinsydes. By the 20th the strength had increased to
twenty B.E.2c's and e's, two Bristol Scouts, and nine Martinsydes. In
addition, there were five B.E.2c's and e's on service in Arabia. On the
20th there were eight B.E.'s, seven Bristol Scouts, and two Martinsydes
listed as unserviceable.
1917] A SECOND FAILURE 217
beyond the Wadi Ghazze, from which the actual attack
could be launched. The second stage was to begin as
soon as the necessary preparations were completed, but
only about one clear day between the two stages was
contemplated. During this brief pause a heavy bombard-
ment was to be made, in which warships were to take a
part. The intentions for the second stage of the operations
were later modified so as to leave the General Officer
Commanding the Eastern Force with a free hand.
The first phase began, and was successfully completed,
with no great opposition, on the 17th of April. On the
1 8th there was a continuous bombardment of the Turkish
positions by land and sea. On the 19th the direct assault
was launched, but although it was gallantly pressed, it
made little impression on the enemy chiefly because there
was insufficient artillery or ammunition to support an
attack on strong and well-defended positions. Orders were
issued for the advance to be renewed on the 20th, but it
became clear on the evening of the 19th that success was
no longer possible; a line forward of the Wadi Ghazze
was therefore consolidated. The British casualties from
the 17th to 20th of April were 6,444 (5^9 killed, 1,576
missing), while those of the enemy were 2,013 (402 killed,
247 missing).
The work of the Royal Flying Corps during the battle
may be briefly summarized. It consisted of co-operation
with the artillery, and of tactical and strategical recon-
naissances. On the 1 8th and 19th observation was impeded
by haze and cloud, and by the dust thrown up as a result
of the bombardment. Nevertheless, the air observers gave
fairly full information about the progress of the battle and,
from the 17th to 19th inclusive, made thirty-eight flights
in co-operation with the artillery and engaged sixty-three
targets, of which twenty-seven were enemy batteries. The
strategical reconnaissances revealed no Turkish reinforce-
ments moving to the battle area. The Royal Flying Corps
did a notable piece of work on the 20th. A reconnaissance
observer came back in the morning with the news that
about 2,000 infantry and 800 cavalry were assembled in
the wadi near Abu Hureira, apparently ready to make
2i8 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
a counter-attack on the British right. Four aeroplanes,
each carrying twelve 20-lb. bombs, were sent out at once
to attack the enemy concentration. The pilots found the
Turkish troops, still in massed formation, and attacked
them with good effect. The enemy soldiers scattered, and
no counter-attack developed. ^
An attempt by the German air service to cut off the
British water supply was made on the 19th of April. A
two-seater aeroplane, carrying two officers who had for
some time kept a careful watch on the progress of the
pipe-line, landed alongside the line about ninety miles
inside the British area. The officers laid a charge of
explosive and were successful in blowing up a few feet of
the pipe, a piece of which they carried away as a souvenir,
but the damage was repaired the same day. At the time
there were nearly a million gallons of water stored in
reservoirs at El Mazar and El Arish, and there was, also,
a good water supply in wells forward of the railhead. The
pipe-line, although still vital, no longer had quite the same
importance as when the advance across the waterless Sinai
desert was being made. An appreciable rupture of the
pipe-line during that period, combined with successful
bombing attacks aimed at bursting the reservoirs, would
have had the effect of stopping the advance, particularly
in connexion with the actions at Magdhaba and Rafah.^
^he Arab Revolt^
[Map, p. 219]
Of the Arab princes who, under various measures
of Turkish control, administered the fragments of an
^ In a telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on April the
20th, Sir Archibald Murray stated: 'Counter-attacks have been easily
'beaten off, one entirely by our aircraft. . . .'
2 The attack on the pipe-line was repeated by enemy aircraft on the
24th of May, when a part of the line was blown up near Salmana by officers
who landed in an aeroplane. Repairs were made within three hours. On
the 5th of August, in a similar attack, two lengths of pipe-line were
damaged near the same place.
3 For a detailed account of the Arab revolt see Military Operations,
Egypt and Palestine {MsLcMunn and Falls), Vols. I and II. Also Seven Pillars
of Wisdom y by Colonel T. E. Lawrence.
i9i6] THE ARAB REVOLT 219
Arab Empire, the most important was the Grand Sherif
of Mecca, Hussein Ibn AH, who ruled the Hejaz and was
guardian of Mecca and Medina, the chief Holy Cities of
Islam. For years before the war unrest had troubled
Arabia and many Arabs, dissatisfied with their position
in the Ottoman Empire, dreamed of freedom and of a new
Arab confederacy. The Sherif of Mecca was very friendly
to Great Britain and his goodwill was diplomatically
fostered. He had given a valuable indication of his
friendliness when, following the Turkish declaration of
a Holy War, he had refused to proclaim a Jihad from the
Holy Cities. By the spring of 19 16 British diplomacy,
aided by Turkish repression, had brought the Grand
Sherif to the point when he decided to take action to
expel the Turks from Arab territories. The Arab rising
began on the Sth of June 1916, and on the 28th British
ships, loaded with two mountain batteries, six machine-
guns, rifles, ammunition and stores, were in the port of
Jidda.
Meanwhile, at 9 p.m. on June the 9th, a naval bombard-
ment of the Turkish positions at Jidda had been opened.
Two days earlier the Ben-my-Chree had arrived oif Aden
and her seaplanes had begun a series of bombing attacks
on the Turkish positions in the Lahej delta. On the
morning of the 15th of June the carrier reached Jidda and
three of her seaplanes were sent away to reconnoitre,
photograph, and bomb, the Turkish positions. Two pilots
each dropped a 65 -lb. bomb while the third dropped one
of Ii2-lb. weight: the Turkish troops were also attacked
by machine-gun fire from the seaplanes. Arrangements
were made for the seaplanes to spot for the ships' fire on
the following morning, but this proved unnecessary. News
was received from Captain W. H. D. Boyle, R.N., the
officer in command of the naval operation, on board the
light cruiser Fox, that the Turkish forces in Jidda had
surrendered, and to his signal he added: 'Probably the
'seaplanes decided the matter.' 'One may fairly claim',
wrote Captain Wedgwood Benn, who took part in the
operations as an air observer, 'the capture of this city, by
'no means an unimportant event of the war, as a decisive
220 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
'result secured almost wholly by aircraft.'^ Although this
may perhaps be going too far there seems little doubt
that the resistance of the Turkish defenders, whose morale
had already been undermined by the ships' bombardment,
snapped when the seaplanes got to work. The capture
of Jidda, with forty-five officers, 1,460 men, 16 guns, and
useful stores, opened the way for supplies to be sent into
the interior. After the fall of Jidda, the Ben-my-Chree
returned to Port Said.
About three weeks later the weak Turkish garrison
remaining in Mecca after the summer move of the Gover-
nor-General to Taif also surrendered. Taif itself held out
until the 23rd of September 1916, after having been
blockaded for about three and a half months by a mixed
force of Bedouin and Meccan townsfolk. By the end of
September, indeed, the greater part of the Hejaz was
clear of Turkish troops although the railway to Medina
still remained intact in enemy hands.
There were, however, continuous rumours that Rabigh,
on the best of the two routes from Medina to Mecca,
might be seriously attacked by the enemy, and in October
a Flight of aeroplanes of No. 14 Squadron was sent from
Suez to Rabigh, together with a company of the Bedford-
shire Regiment who were to act as an aerodrome guard.
The combined detachment was, however, recalled before
it could disembark at Rabigh because the presence of
Christians seemed calculated to raise political and religious
controversy which the Sherif of Mecca thought might
hinder rather than help the Arab cause.
Growing Arab fears of a Turkish attack on Mecca
by way of Rabigh, however, overcame the political or
religious objections to British aeroplanes and, on the 13th
of November, a Flight of six aeroplanes of No. 14 Squadron
again embarked for Rabigh with a guard of about 600
Egyptian artillery and infantry. Three days later, with
naval help, the aeroplanes were put ashore and an aero-
drome was established. The possibility of an outburst of
anti-Christian feeling had to be guarded against, and the
mechanics did their work with rifles stacked ready for
^ In the Side-ShozvSy pp. 98-9.
i9i6] BOMBING THE RAILWAY 221
immediate use. The mere presence of the aeroplanes,
once they began to fly on reconnaissance, had a tonic
effect on the Arab forces, who had visual testimony of
the unusual engines of war at the command of their
S her if.
On the 24th of November a praiseworthy attempt to
cut the Hejaz railway was made by two Martinsyde pilots
who flew direct from Mustabig in Sinai to Qal'at el Hasa,
a journey which involved a five-hour flight covering about
350 miles. One pilot. Captain R. H. Freeman of No. 14
Squadron, attacked the railway bridge four miles south
of Qal'at el Hasa with two loo-lb. delay-action bombs
dropped from a height of 20 feet. One bomb struck the
bridge, but bounced off and exploded underneath. The
bridge remained intact, but part of the permanent way
was damaged. The second pilot. Lieutenant S. K. Muir
of No. 67 (Australian) Squadron, attacked Jurf ed Dera-
wish railway station with one loo-lb. and four 20-lb.
bombs, but scored no direct hits, although the bombs
fell close to and damaged their objective. On the return
journey, four 20-lb. bombs were dropped on a camp at
Asluj, hitting tents. The visibility was phenomxcnal and,
from one point, the whole of the Dead Sea, a strip of the
Mediterranean, and a part of the Red Sea, were visible
from the aeroplanes.
Early in December the Turks, who had been strongly
reinforced, renewed their attacks and defeated the Arabs
south-west of Medina. The enemy troops then established
themselves in the hills half-way between Medina and
Rabigh, with the two Arab armies, based respectively on
Rabigh and Yenbo, separated. The Royal Flying Corps
aeroplanes, operating both from Rabigh and Yenbo,
reconnoitred the Turkish movements and photographed
the enemy positions.
At one time it was feared that the Turkish advance
seriously threatened both Rabigh and Yenbo. In the area
of the latter port, indeed, the Turks pursued the Arabs to
the hills bordering the coastal plain, no more than six
miles from the town. When the position was critical, on
the loth and iith of December, seaplanes from the
222 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
Raven IP flew over the Turkish advanced forces and
attacked them with bombs and machine-gun, and these
attacks, coupled with the presence of the British ships
outside Yenbo, undoubtedly had some influence in induc-
ing the Turks not to press their attack. With the arrival
of Arab forces from the south and south-west, towards the
end of 1 916, the Turks again withdrew behind their line
of fortified posts covering Medina.
On the 1 8th of January 19 17 an Arab advance began
along the coast with the object of capturing Wejh, 180
miles north-west of Yenbo, the fall of which would
threaten the rear of the enemy forces in Medina, as well
as the Hejaz railway. It had also been decided to land a
small Arab force at Wejh, and on the i6th of January the
Anne had gone to the Red Sea to co-operate with the naval
forces. Preliminary seaplane reconnaissances down the
coast satisfied the senior naval officer, Captain W. H. D.
Boyle, R.N., that no Turks were marching south to
reinforce the garrison in Wejh. The landing was made
on the morning of the 23rd of January by a force of about
500 Arabs carried in the ships and by a naval landing party.
The original intention had been to make the attack on
Wejh in close co-operation with the Arabs advancing
along the coast, but as time passed and the Arab force
did not appear. Captain Boyle, anxious not to waste
precious days during which the Turkish garrison might
escape, had decided to attack with the few troops at his
disposal. His attack had to be based on air photographs
of Wejh which had been taken from seaplanes in Decem-
ber 1916, but before giving his final orders he flew over
the port in one of the Anne^s seaplanes and made a careful
reconnaissance. Two of the bombarding ships, the Fox
and Hardinge, were spotted for by two seaplanes, the
range being indicated by smoke bombs and corrections
being sent by wireless. An officer in one of the seaplanes,
' The J fine had left Port Said for the Red Sea on the ist of September
1 91 6, and for about two months her seaplanes had co-operated with the
ships of the Red Sea patrol, chiefly by means of reconnaissance and
photography and occasional bombing. The Anne was relieved by the
Raven II in the Red Sea at the end of October.
I9I7] AIRCRAFT CO-OPERATION 223
Lieutenant N. W. Stewart, a Royal Flying Corps officer
attached for observing duties, was killed by rifle-fire from
the ground. One day's bombardment sufficed: the main
body of the Turkish garrison slipped away from the port
during the night and Wejh was occupied by naval and
Arab forces on the morning of the 24th of January. The
advanced guard of the Arab tribesmen who had marched
along the coast to take Wejh came up with the Turkish
fugitives on the morning of the 25th and captured many
of them : only about one-third of the Turkish force which
had garrisoned Wejh eventually escaped. The fall of the
port marked the end of the co-operation of the Anne in
the Arab revolt operations and the carrier returned to
Port Said.
The Royal Flying Corps detachment continued to
operate from Rabigh until March 191 7, its main duties
being reconnaissance and photography of the Turkish
positions and of the approaches to Mecca from Medina.
On the 5th of March a British aeroplane flew for the first
time over Medina itself, and the observer made a recon-
naissance of the Turkish dispositions and took photographs,
but he dropped no bombs because of the city's sacred
associations. Three enemy aeroplanes were seen in the
air over Medina, but they made no attempt to attack the
British reconnaissance aeroplane. On the 17th the Flight
was transferred from Rabigh to Wejh, and from this base
reconnaissances of and attacks on various points of the
Hejaz railway were made: the aeroplanes used advanced
landing-grounds for the more distant journeys.
These advanced landing-grounds were chosen by Royal
Flying Corps personnel, and mixed detachments were sent
out to do what was necessary in the way of road-making,
clearing of the ground, &c.^ An episode will serve to
^ The Arab leaders also helped in the choice of likely sites. The war
diary of the Rabigh Flight contains the following message, sent by Emir
Ali to Major A. J. Ross, commanding the Flight, on the 2nd of March
1917: 'Respected Major Ross, we should prefer your coming out to us to
'inspect the spot we are about to select as an alighting place for the
'aeroplanes. Accordingly, have we sent to you Dakhl Bin Tallal and Atiya
'Bin Muheisin that you may set forth in their company to us. Moreover
'they have with them a trotting she-camel for your mount. We await you
224 EGYPT, DARFUR, AND PALESTINE [ch. hi
illustrate the difficulties of this incidental work. On the
15th of June Second-Lieutenant W. G. Stafford left
Wejh in a tender to supervise road making near a chosen
landing-ground at Gayadah (the war diary records that
the shade temperature on this day was 112°). It became
known on the 22nd that Second-Lieutenant Stafford had
left Gayadah three days earlier, by tender, with an air
mechanic, to return to Wejh. Search was at once made
for him, by air and by road, and the track of his car was
eventually found on the 23rd. The track was followed for
forty miles and the site of a camp was discovered with a
note that the officer and his mechanic had finished their
water and that they could not survive much longer. Later
in the day the tender was found deserted and further
search revealed no sign of the missing occupants. Both
of them were, however, brought in to Wejh on the same
day by Bedouin who had come upon them, in an exhausted
condition, lying out on the hills.
The Gayadah landing-ground was prepared in con-
nexion with a proposed Arab offensive against the Hejaz
railway at Al Ula, an objective which was bombed from
time to time by the aeroplanes. The military offensive
against Al Ula was, however, abandoned in favour of a line-
cutting expedition on a larger scale. The Royal Flying
Corps detachment was instructed to bomb the Hejaz
railway, and it moved to Gayadah, with three aeroplanes,
on the 7th and 8th of July, whence Al Ula was bombed
on the nth, 12th, and i6th, when the station building
and camps were hit. Sandstorms and rain made the work
of the detachment difficult, and, in a severe storm on the
afternoon of the i6th, the aeroplanes were so badly
buffeted on the Gayadah landing-ground that they were
rendered unfit for further active service. The Flight was
thereupon recalled to Egypt for refit, and it left Wejh
at the end of July, 1917, rejoining the parent squadron in
Palestine on the 15 th of August in time to take part in
the Third Battle of Gaza.
'at Bir Abbas. Therefore start on the day this reaches you. Accept my
'warmest regards.'
CHAPTER IV
THE FALL OF JERUSALEM
French Warfare
[Maps, pp. i6l, 209, and 239]
The second Gaza failure was followed hy six months
of trench warfare, during which there were important
changes in command and organization. Sir Archibald
Murray had made it clear to the authorities at home that
he would be unable to plan an effective invasion of
Palestine unless he received reinforcements of two addi-
tional divisions, and after the Second Battle of Gaza he
stated definitely that the strength of his forces precluded
further offensive operations for the time being. The
Government were anxious that the campaign should pro-
ceed and, although additional infantry divisions were not
yet available, reinforcements of other arms, particularly
of cavalry, were sent to Egypt. In June 191 7 the 60th
(London) Division was also transferred to Sinai from
Salonika. The Government, however, decided that the
new large-scale operations in Palestine should be directed
by General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, and Sir Archibald
Murray was so informed on the nth of June. The new
Commander-in-Chief arrived in Egypt on the 27th of
June and took over the command two days later. He made
a tour of inspection of the Sinai-Palestine front and
conferred with his subordinate commanders, and as a
result of what he saw and learned he cabled to London
an appreciation of the situation on the 12th of July, and
he set out his need for additional divisions (two), artillery,
aircraft, &c. He proposed to reorganize the forces on the
Palestine front to form two corps and one cavalry corps,
all directly under general head-quarters, and he asked for
three additional Royal Flying Corps squadrons. He would
then be able to provide one squadron for each corps, one
for general head-quarters, and also have at his disposal
one fighting squadron; he asked that the aeroplanes should
be of the latest type.
Brigadier-General W. G. H. Salmond had for some time
2504-5 Q
226 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
been pressing the director-general of military aeronautics
to provide him v^ith better fighting aircraft, and he had
been informed on the nth of July that the War Office had
decided to raise a fighter squadron (No. Ill) in Egypt.
The personnel were to be provided from the forces in
Egypt, but the War Office stated that equipment and
transport v^^ould be sent from England. On receipt of
General Allenby's cable of requirements the War Office
further decided that an additional (corps) squadron — No.
113 — should be raised in Egypt, to be equipped w^ith R.E.8
aeroplanes from England. The third squadron asked for
by General Allenby v^as not provided until February
1918.
In June 1 91 7 the War Office had offered to send to Egypt
two kite balloon sections if employment could be found
for them. The offer had been accepted and, in August,
the 2 1 St Balloon Company (Sections 49 and 50) arrived
and v^as attached to the Fifth Wing. In the same month
Flight of No. 14 Squadron, v^hich had been co-operat-
ing with the detachment in the Hejaz, arrived from
Arabia and re-joined the parent squadron at Deir el
Balah, where the whole of the Fifth Wing had been con-
centrated by the end of June.
The formation of No. in Squadron was not completed
until September, but all three Flights had settled at Deir
el Balah by the end of the month. No. 67 (Australian)
Squadron having moved to a new aerodrome at Weli Sheikh
Nuran on the 17th. On the 9th of September a special
service Flight of No. 14 Squadron had left for Aqaba, where
it operated under the administrative control of the Middle
East, Royal Flying Corps, and ceased to form part of the
Royal Flying Corps in Palestine.
No. 113 Squadron was formed at Ismailia. The first
Flight arrived at Weli Sheikh Nuran on the 23 rd of
September, and the remainder of the squadron had
reached the same aerodrome by the loth of October.
For better control of the air squadrons in the projected
Palestine campaign a new command was formed on the
5th of October. This was the Palestine Brigade which
included all Royal Flying Corps forces east of the Suez
1917] PALESTINE BRIGADE 227
Canal and 'X' Aircraft Park situated at Cairo. ^ At the
same time the Fifth Wing became a Corps Wing, and a
new Army Wing — the Fortieth — was estabhshed. The
Palestine operations began on the 27th of October and
on that day the Palestine air command was as follows:
PALESTINE BRIGADE
Brigadier-General W. G. H. Salmond, D.S.O.
(G.O.C. Royal Flying Corps, Middle East).^
H.-Q. Umm el Kelab
I
Ad. H.-Q. Deir el Balah
I
Fifth (Corps) Wing
(Lieut. -Col. A. C. Boddam-Whetham)
Deir el Balah
Fortieth (Army) Wing
(Lieut. -Col. A. E. Borton, D.S.O.)
Deir el Balah
No. 14 Squadron
(Maj. C. E. H. Medhurst)
Deir el Balah
16 B.E.ae's
I
No. 113 Squadron
(Maj. J.R.McCrindle,
M.C.)
Weli Sheikh Nuran
8 B.E.2e's
5 R.E.S's
No. Ill Squadron
(Maj. A. Shekleton)
Deir el Balah
6 Bristol Fighters
5 Vickers Bullets
3 D.H.a's
2 Bristol Monoplanes
I Bristol Scout.
I
No. 67 (Australian)
Squadron
(Maj. R. Williams,
D.S.O.)
Weli Sheikh Nuran
7 B.E.2c'sande's
5 R.E.S's
5 B.E.i2a's
1 Martinsyde.
No. 21 Balloon Company
(Maj. V. A. Beaufort)
Deir el Balah
I
49 Section
Sheikh Shabasi
50 Section
Wadi Ghazze
'X' Aircraft Park
(Maj. G. H, Padley)
Abbassia, Cairo
I
Advanced Aircraft Park
Qantara
^ On the formation of the Palestine Brigade, the Middle East Brigade
became Head-quarters, Royal Flying Corps, Middle East.
^ On the 5th of November Brigadier-General Salmond returned to
England on special duty and he was succeeded in Egypt and Palestine by
Major-General W. S. Brancker. Early in December General Allenby
recommended to the War Office a reorganization of the Royal Flying
Corps command in the Middle East, in view of the great expansion of
the air service. The head-quarters R.F.C., Middle East, should, he
recommended, be raised to the status of a division under a Major-General,
while the training group in Egypt, and the Palestine Brigade, should be
decentralized as separate commands, each under a Brigadier-General.
These recommendations were approved. Brigadier-General A, E. Borton
took command of the Palestine Brigade on the 14th of December, and
Brigadier-General P. L. W. Herbert of the Training Group. Brigadier-
General Salmond returned to Egypt on the 3rd of January 191 8 and took
over command (as major-general) of the Royal Flying Corps, Middle East,
from Major-General Brancker who went back to England.
228 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
During the six months of reorganization and prepara-
tion, the British forces on the Palestine front held the line
occupied after the second battle of Gaza. The enemy
meanwhile established himself strongly on the line from
Gaza to Abu Hureira and worked steadily on its improve-
ment and extension. He carried the Hureira defences
south and east to Qawuqa and across the railway.
The most important work of the Royal Flying Corps
during this period was photography. No detailed or
accurate maps of southern Palestine existed, and it was
necessary to map the whole area of projected operations.
In October, when the advance began, more than 500
square miles of territory in Turkish possession had been
photographed, and twenty sheets of a map to a scale of
I : 20,000 had been published for the use of the army.
Seventeen of these sheets had been compiled almost
entirely from air photographs, while the others included
much matter revealed by air photography. Apart from
the work of mapping, photography was continuous for
intelligence purposes. AU enemy works were photographed
at frequent intervals, and information about the Turkish
battery positions was methodically compiled. Until the
formation of the Palestine Brigade, the whole of the
photographic work on the Sinai-Palestine front was done
by the Fifth Wing photographic officer. Lieutenant H.
Hamshaw-Thomas, and two small squadron sections. The
difficulties which had to be overcome were many. There
was always a shortage of material, water was strictly
rationed, the dark room was an aeroplane case or tent
usually insufferably hot, and the personnel had to work
things out for themselves with no detailed guidance about
the development of air photography in England and
France. With the formation of the Palestine Brigade,
however, matters improved greatly. The wing establish-
ment was increased, two additional squadron sections were
sent to Palestine, the supply of cameras, apparatus, and
chemicals, became adequate, and huts were erected to
serve as dark rooms and plotting rooms. ^
* The monthly output figures for 1917 reflect the increase in equipment,
&c., after the Palestine Brigade was formed. For each month from January
I9I7] HELPING THE GUNNERS 229
Aeroplane wireless co-operation with the artillery also
increased steadily. At the end of September the number
of Royal Flying Corps wireless stations with the artillery
was thirty-one and all available wireless personnel had
been distributed. But as artillery reinforcements arrived
for the offensive, there came additional demands for
NUMBER OF WT. STATIONS WITH AR^TILlERY
— ro 4^ 4k o>
HOURS FLOWN FOR ARTILLERY CO-OPERATION
Wireless Co-operation Chart, 1 91 7
Palestine Brigade — Royal Flying Corps.
wireless stations, and the Royal Flying Corps therefore
trained men transferred from various units in the army
until, when active operations began in October, there
were fifty-three stations in the field, fully equipped and
manned. The 'Zone Call' system was introduced in
the figures were (a) negatives, (b) prints: {a) 277, Q?) 2,493; 320, 2,880;
2,557; 373, 3,286; 612, 4,200; 482, 2,594; 365, 2,702; 581, 6,432;
564, 8,469; 894, 21,126; 1,184, 14,714; 1,342, 24,113.
230 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
October.^ The diagram shows graphically the growth in
wireless stations throughout the year, and the hours flown
in co-operation with the artillery.
The air work during the time of preparation was
arduous. The B.E. type aeroplanes, owing to the heat and
to the weight which they had to carry, especially when
co-operating with the artillery, could seldom be induced
to climb above 5,000 feet, and they made good targets for
the numerous anti-aircraft gunners, especially in the Gaza
area. They made good targets also for the much superior
German aircraft, and fighting escorts had continuously to
be provided.
tJntil the autumn of 19 17 'contact patrol', or co-opera-
tion with troops on the ground, in the way in which it was
practised in France, had not been known in Palestine,
and an officer of experience in this activity was therefore
sent to instruct the corps squadrons, in each of which
a Flight was specially allotted for the work. Through
the months of September and October, these Flights, in
addition to their duties over the front, underwent an inten-
sive training in co-operation with infantry and cavalry
units which, apart from its technical advantages, led to a
good understanding between the squadrons and the arms
which they existed to serve.
The further operations in the air during the lull in the
campaign may be briefly summarized. In addition to the
photographic and artillery work already referred to, there
were daily tactical and strategical reconnaissances and
occasional bombing raids. By the end of May the Fifth
Wing was in possession of two De Havilland Scouts, and
in June there arrived some Vickers 'Bullets' and Bristol
monoplanes. These fighters had some usefulness in that
they made it a little more difficult for the enemy airmen
to reconnoitre, except from great heights, but their very
limited endurance prevented them from being used to
escort the long distant strategical reconnaissance aero-
planes. In September, however, for the first time on the
Palestine front, the Royal Flying Corps received aero-
planes which were as good as anything the German air
^ For an explanation of the 'Zone Call' see Vol. II, pp. 175-6.
1917] AIR SUPERIORITY 231
service possessed. They were Bristol Fighters, and
although they were few they spread a feeling of exhilara-
tion, not only among the squadrons, but also in the army.
On the 7th of October, by which time there were five
serviceable Bristol Fighters available, the first offensive
patrol was made. Next day a German fighter was shot
down within the British lines, the first enemy fighter to
be captured on the Sinai-Palestine front. Another was
shot down on the i8th and it may be said that before the
Palestine operations began the Royal Flying Corps had,
at long last, established local superiority over the enemy
air service.
The bombing during these months of preparation was,
in the main, conducted on the principle of returning to
the enemy four bombs for each one dropped in the
British lines. Two raids, of special interest, may be men-
tioned. It became known from agents' reports at the end
of April 191 7 that large quantities of stores had been
accumulated by the enemy at Tul Karm. The Vice-
Admiral of the East Indies and Egypt station was asked
to organize a seaplane attack to bomb the railway and to
destroy as many of the accumulated supplies as possible.
Owing to a shortage of seaplanes, the raid could not be
made until the 23rd of June when three Shorts from the
carrier Empress dropped six 65 -lb. and sixteen i6-lb.
bombs. Two of the 65-lb . bombs fell in the station build-
ings and the others nearby. In co-operation with this
attack, seven Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes bombed the
German aerodrome at Er Ramie to distract the attention
of the enemy pilots from the Tul Karm attack. Seventy-
three bombs of 20-lb. or i6-lb. weight were dropped, some
of which were seen to fall on the aerodrome. A feature
of this minor operation was its perfect timing. At a con-
ference between the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal
Flying Corps officers it had been arranged that the
bombing of the Ramie aerodrome should be made at
intervals between 5 a.m. and 5.30 a.m. and that the naval
seaplanes should attack Tul Karm and get clear again
before the bombing of the aerodrome had ceased. One
of the difficulties was that the Empress had to make her
232 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
rendezvous off a comparatively unknov^n coast, v^liile the
Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes had a long journey across
Palestine to their objective. Everything, however, passed
as planned and the naval bombing of Tul Karm coincided
v^^ith the Royal Flying Corps attack on the Ramie aero-
drome.
In the early morning of the 26th of June an attack by
eight aeroplanes, four B.E.2e's (flov^n as single-seaters)
and four Martinsydes, v^as made on a Turkish head-quarters
camp at the Mount of Olives, outside Jerusalem, w^hen
two Ii2-lb. and forty- four i6-lb. bombs were dropped:
four of the light-weight bombs struck the head-quarters
buildings. The return journey was exciting. North of
Beersheba the engine in one of the aeroplanes, a B.E.2e,
failed and the pilot was forced to land. It had been
arranged beforehand that if this happened another B.E.2e
should land to rescue the pilot while a Martinsyde stood
by to assist as necessary. Accordingly a second B.E. pilot
landed and helped the first in an attempt to start the
engine once more. This proved impossible and Very lights
were then fired into the disabled aeroplane, but it failed
to catch fire. While efforts were still being made to
destroy the B.E., the Martinsyde pilot, anxious as a result
of the delay, also landed, and by this time Bedouin were
approaching and they opened fire on the group. The
firing increased in volume and the Martinsyde, with the
second B.E. carrying the pilot of the first, took off again
hurriedly, leaving the derelict B.E. undestroyed. They
had not gone far when the engine of the B.E. also failed,
and a forced landing had to be made. It was now the
turn of the Martinsyde pilot to go down to attempt a
rescue, but when he had landed he found that he could
not get off again even with only one of the stranded pilots,
and finally the undercarriage of the Martinsyde was broken
on the uneven ground. The guns, ammunition, and
camera were taken from the derelict aeroplanes and buried
in the sand, and the three pilots set out on foot in the
hope that they would fall in with a British patrol. As luck
had it, they were found by a light horse patrol in the
afternoon.
1917] THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA 233
Meanwhile matters had not gone well with the re-
mainder of the original bombing formation. When the
two B.E.'s had first landed north of Beersheba, followed
by the Martinsyde, the remaining pilots had circled round
ready to give assistance, until it was seen that two of the
landed aeroplanes had flown off again. The time so con-
sumed was twenty-five minutes and the result was that
the two B.E.'s in the formation had insufficient petrol
left to get home again. They, also, had to be landed, but
at a spot which was outside the area normally patrolled
by the Turks. Two of the three remaining Martinsyde
pilots went down alongside, picked up the B.E. pilots,
and carried them back to the aerodrome with the inten-
tion of obtaining a supply of petrol and of returning to
salve the two B.E.'s. They reached the aerodrome safely
and set off again without delay, but when they arrived
over the stranded B.E.'s once more they found that a
Turkish cavalry patrol had ridden up meanwhile and had
already burnt one of the aeroplanes and partly destroyed
the other.
^he Third Battle of Gaza
[Maps, pp. 209 and 239]
At the beginning of October Sir Edmund Allenby
was told that the Government desired Turkey to be
eliminated from the war at a blow. If Turkey could be
decisively beaten in Palestine, and the Jaffa-Jerusalem line
captured by the British, it was considered likely that she
would break with her Allies. The Commander-in-Chief
thereupon issued his final plans for the attack. These
plans are fully set out in the official military history,^ but
their main features must here be summarized to help the
reader. The enemy positions ran from the sea at Gaza
more or less along the Gaza-Beersheba road for thirty
miles. Gaza itself, the key position, had, by this time, been
made into a heavily entrenched fortress, but elsewhere
the enemy held a series of strong supporting field works.
' Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, by Captain Cyril Falls, Vol.
II, Pt. I, Ch. II.
234 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
Lieutenant-General Sir Philip W. Chetwode, command-
ing the Eastern Force, ^ who had guided Sir Edmund
Allenby when he made his plans, had pointed out that it
would be fatal to take a half-bite at the cherry, that is,
to make an offensive with forces which might be able to
drive the Turks from the Gaza-Beersheba line, but would
be insufficient to press on rapidly until the enemy had
suffered a crushing blow. To attack Gaza would be to
attack at the enemy's strongest point, and would once
again mean a battle of siege warfare. It was unlikely that
anything more than a local success could be achieved, or
that the Turks could be prevented from taking up new
positions. Merely to drive the enemy from one position to
another was of no value.
The plan of operations allowed for an initial attack, in
full strength, where the enemy was weakest, that is, on his
left flank at Beersheba. It was an essential part of the plan
that the town should be taken rapidly and by surprise in
order that the Turkish command should not be allowed
time to readjust its forces. With the fall of Beersheba water
supplies would be made available and room would be given
for the deployment of the attacking force, on the high
ground to the north and north-west, for a further attack
on the Hureira-Sheria line. With the Turks thrown into
confusion by the surprise capture of Beersheba, and by the
subsequent advance of mounted troops in a north-westerly
direction against their communications, it was anticipated
that Gaza could be assaulted with a prospect of quick
success. The capture of Beersheba, therefore, was to be
achieved in one day.
It was impossible to conceal from the enemy that
offensive operations were being prepared, but it was
necessary to make every effort to deceive him, up to the
very last moment, into a belief that the main attack
would take place at Gaza.
The efforts so made, in the result entirely successful,
took various forms. To induce the Turkish command to
believe that a landing on the northern coast of Syria
^ Sir Philip Chetwode had taken command from Sir Charles Dobell on
the 2 1 St of April 191 7.
I9I7] DECEIVING THE TURKS 235
would be made from Cyprus, sites for camps were laid
out on the island and the garrison was instructed to show
as much activity as possible. At the same time inquiries
were made of local contractors about the provision of
rations on a large scale, faked wireless messages were sent
out, and reports were discreetly circulated that Cyprus
was to be used as a base for secret operations. These
somewhat elaborate attempts at deceit, however, did not
succeed. The enemy command duly received news of
activity at Cyprus, and of the rumours which were being
passed, and they therefore sent a German aeroplane to
reconnoitre the island on the 17th of October. The
observer brought back a report which satisfied the enemy
staff that no effective preparations for the reception of
large bodies of troops had been made.
On the other hand, a simple ruse succeeded beyond
expectation. A staff officer rode out into no-man's-land
with a small escort early in October on a pseudo-
reconnaissance. The party put themselves in the way of
a Turkish cavalry patrol who opened fire, whereupon the
staff officer pretended to be wounded and, making off with
the Turks in close pursuit, he hastily dropped his haver-
sack, freshly stained with blood from his horse. In the
haversack were papers and personal articles, and among
them was a faked report of a conference at British General
Head-quarters indicating that the main attack would
be made on Gaza with subsidiary flank operations by
mounted troops against Beersheba, and that a landing
would also be attempted north of Gaza. So cleverly had
the documents been prepared that the Turkish staff, as
has since been confirmed, was immediately deceived. It was
subsequently noticed that work on trenches in the Beer-
sheba area decreased appreciably while activity increased
on the Turkish right. Although the Turks later received
information which might have been expected to throw
some doubt upon the view that Gaza would be the main
front of attack, the idea had already become fixed and the
new information was discounted.
Every possible precaution was taken to prevent useful
air reports from reaching the Turkish command. The
236 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
German airmen, because they had disclosed the British
intentions when Gaza had first been attacked, enjoyed
a prestige which ensured that great attention would be
paid to their reports. All British movements were made
at night, the troops had orders to conceal themselves in
the wadis hy day and, wherever they were, to fling them-
selves face downwards and remain still if a whistle was
sounded to give warning of the approach of enemy aero-
planes. For the important days, when the concentration
against Beersheba was nearing completion, arrangements
were made to prevent, if possible, any German aeroplane
from getting through. Beginning on the 27th of October
a defensive patrol by pairs of aeroplanes covered the line
Gaza-Khelasa continuously from dawn to dusk. On
the 30th, just after the British concentration had been
completed, a German two-seater reconnoitring aeroplane,
favoured by patches of cloud, eluded the fighter patrol
and flew over the British back areas on the Beersheba
flank. Photographs of the British dispositions were taken
and many important visual observations were made, but
when the German airmen, their task completed, were
about to recross the lines, they were found by a patrolling
Bristol Fighter (pilot. Captain A. H. Peck, observer.
Captain J. J. Lloyd- Williams) and were shot down. The
two Germans tried to escape from their damaged aero-
plane, but they were wounded and were brought in as
prisoners. Their photographic plates, marked maps, and
notes, fell into British instead of Turkish hands, and the
enemy command was thus robbed of material which must
have led to a reconsideration of the British intentions, and
probably also to a change in the dispositions made to meet
the British offensive.
The orders issued to the Palestine Brigade, Royal
Flying Corps, defined the areas for tactical and strategical
reconnaissances. The tactical area of the XXI Corps
covered Gaza and the defence systems to the south, and
the tactical area of the XX Corps and of the Desert
Mounted Corps covered Beersheba and extended north-
westwards roughly to the Wadi esh Sheria. The area
north of the Wadi esh Sheria and south of a line Kh. el
I9I7] AIR OPERATION ORDERS 237
Rijm to about Tell en Nejile would, it was stated, be an
army wing reconnaissance area during the first and second
phases of the battle, but, after the capture of the Qawuqa
line, would be included in the tactical area of the XX
Corps and of the Desert Mounted Corps. The strategical
area was divided into six sub-areas, each of which was to
be reconnoitred two or three times daily from the opening
of the operations, to provide information about enemy
movements and concentrations. Photographs were to be
taken of the Gaza defences daily, beginning four days
before the assault, and a complete set of photographs to
cover the Beersheba defences was to be procured two days
before the attack on that town, in time for issue to the
XX Corps and to the Desert Mounted Corps during the
afternoon of the same day. A further series of photo-
graphs of Beersheba was to be taken on the day before the
attack in order to reach the troops by 10 p.m., that is to
say, with the latest information before the assault.
Operation orders issued to the Fifth (Corps) Wing were
for co-operation with the artillery, contact patrols, and
tactical reconnaissances. Those issued to the Fortieth
(Army) Wing provided, in addition to strategical recon-
naissance and photography, for special patrols to protect
the corps aeroplanes against attacks by enemy aircraft,
and to prevent the German air observers from recon-
noitring the British movements.
As part of the plan to deceive the enemy about the
area of attack, a bombardment, with naval co-operation,^
was begun by the XXI Corps against the Gaza defences on
the 27th of October. On the same day the Commander-
in-Chief became anxious about his future air superiority.
Reliable news reached him that the German air force on
the Palestine front was about to be increased to five
squadrons, and the information was that the reinforcing
squadrons had already passed through Rayak on their way
south. 2 His four Royal Flying Corps squadrons gave him a
^ The naval bombardment began on the 29th, two days after the land
bombardment. Seaplanes from the aircraft carriers Empress, City of
Oxford, and Raven II co-operated with the ships. See pp. 419-22.
^ Documents subsequently captured during the advance showed that
238 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
strength of seventy-two aeroplanes, many of them of poor
performance, and if he was correctly informed about the
impending increase in the German air strength, it seemed
obvious that technical superiority would pass to the enemy.
He therefore immediately cabled to the War Office asking
for two additional squadrons, one of D.H.4 bombing aero-
planes, and the other a fighting squadron made up of one
Flight of S.E.5's and two Flights of Bristol Fighters. The
War Office reply was disappointing. It stated that as
aeroplanes had to be provided for the Italian front it was
impossible to send Sir Edmund Allenby the two squadrons
asked for, but that his requirements would be kept in
mind.
The air preparation for the attack reached its intense
stage on the 27th of October, the day the bombardment
at Gaza opened. From air photography it had been
possible to publish, before the bombardment began, a list
of 131 Turkish batteries, with notes, compiled from sound
ranging, about the calibre of the guns. The list, kept up
to date by the issue of supplements, gave a very complete
idea of the enemy battery positions.^ Aeroplane and bal-
loon co-operation with the artillery, and with the ships
off the coast, directed against the Turkish batteries and
general defences, was continuous. ^ A surprise bombard-
ment of the Turkish railhead at Beit Hanun was made by
two 6-inch guns at a range of nine miles with the help of
during October 1917, the German squadrons, Nos. 301, 302, 303, and 304,
arrived in Palestine with fifty-six aeroplanes.
^ After the advance most of the emplacements were visited and com-
parisons were made with the lists compiled from air photography, supple-
mented by visual air reconnaissance. The lists were found to be remarkably
accurate. In the Gaza area twenty-three out of twenty-nine battery
positions had been accurately given, and in the Atawine area forty out
of fifty-one. The positions which had not been located had been taken up
during the battle and were outside the area which the Royal Flying Corps
had been ordered to photograph.
^ During the period October 27th to November 6th, the two balloon
sections observed for 116 separate 'shoots', of which all except five were
successful. Twenty-four were with ships. No. 49 Balloon Section had a
direct telephone line to the naval signalling station on the coast from which
the observations of fire, as given by the balloon observer, were converted
to the naval code and signalled to the ships concerned.
I9I7] BEERSHEBA CAPTURED 239
the balloon observers. Strategical reconnaissances of the
whole front and photography of specified areas proceeded
smoothly. Tactical reconnaissances, especially important
in the days preceding the attack, kept watch on enemy
movements, on alterations and additions to trenches and
wire, and on gun emplacements. No. 14 Squadron worked
on the XXI Corps front and No. 113 Squadron for the
XX Corps and for the Desert Mounted Corps.
The attack on Beersheba on the 31st of October met
with an overwhelming success. The surprise proved to be
complete and the town was captured the same day with
2,000 prisoners and thirteen guns. During the attack
messages were dropped from the air stating the progress
at intervals throughout the day; the number of tactical
reconnaissance flights was fifteen. Six batteries which
were active in the neighbourhood of Beersheba were
reported from the air and five of them were silenced by
the artillery with the help of air observation. Escorts for
the artillery and contact patrol aeroplanes were provided
by the Fortieth Army Wing, which was also responsible
for patrols to keep off enemy aeroplanes,^ for strategical
reconnaissance, and for photography.
Following the fall of Beersheba, preparations were at
once begun for an attack on the Qawuqa defences which
covered Tel esh Sheria and Abu Hureira. Meanwhile, on
the night of the ist/2nd of November, an attack on Gaza
was launched with the object of pinning down as many
Turkish troops as possible on that part of the front. The
first of the Gaza defence works to be assaulted was a
position known as Umbrella Hill and it v/as arranged that
two aeroplanes of No. 14 Squadron should attack active
hostile batteries, during the advance, with bomb and
machine-gun. The night was made brilliant by a full
moon and the pilots and observers had no difficulty in
picking out the landmarks in the Gaza area. They attacked
batteries, revealed by their flashes to be active, and it is
recorded that many of them were induced to cease fire,
and even though this cessation was no more than tem-
^ There were seven encounters with enemy aeroplanes in the four days
from the 28th to 31st, but the hostile pilots retreated.
240 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
porary it was of some help to the attacking troops who duly
captured their objectives. The battle at Gaza continued
throughout the 2nd with appreciable success. There was
a good example on this day of the fruits of anticipation.
To cover the possible approach, once the battle began,
of a Turkish reserve division (the 7th) known to be in Deir
Sneid, the corps heavy artillery had been methodically
registered for barrage fire with the help of air observation.
On the morning of the 2nd large bodies of Turkish troops
were seen advancing on Sheikh Hasan from the north-east,
and the pre-arranged barrage was at once put down by the
whole of the corps heavy artillery on a line of 3,000 yards,
with the result that the enemy troops were scattered after
suffering heavy casualties.
At dawn on the 6th of November the attack began on
the important Qawuqa defence system. It was made by
three infantry divisions, supported by yeomanry on their
right, and a break-through was effected. The Turkish
resistance was on the point of crumbling. Next day, the
7th, the centre of immediate interest shifted to the coastal
sector where, for two days, there had been an intense
bombardment by artillery of the XXI Corps and by ships
off the coast, as a result of which the enemy had withdrawn
a part of his forces. On the morning of the 7th the
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade passed through the
deserted ruins of Gaza towards Beit Hanun. On the 8th
there was a sweeping advance along the whole front and
the Turkish troops were in precipitate and confused
retreat.
Before the Turkish retreat began, all new enemy works
discovered from the air were entered on maps of which
photographs were taken: prints were distributed to the
various commands either by air or by dispatch rider. The
photographic section of No. 67 (Australian) Squadron
was mainly responsible for this work, and with the help
of a special staff at Weli Sheikh Nuran was able, through-
out the battle, to provide the various army staffs with prints
within four or five hours of the time that the plates were
exposed over the Turkish lines. The artillery co-operation,
both by the corps squadrons and the balloon sections, was
1917] AIR ATTACKS ON TROOPS 241
notable from the ist to the 7th. During that week ninety-
seven artillery flights were made by aeroplanes and 126
targets were engaged, fifty-nine of which were Turkish
batteries. In the same period sixty-one targets were
engaged with the help of balloon observation. Strategical
reconnaissances by aeroplane observers of the Army Wing
covered the main Turkish area.
The employment of the Royal Flying Corps for offen-
sive operations against forces in retreat had been a subject
for frequent discussion at air head-quarters. One of the
advantages which the existence of training units in Egypt
conferred on the general officer commanding the Royal
Flying Corps in the Middle East was that he could, when
judged desirable, draw upon those units to form an inde-
pendent bombing reserve under his own hand. For the
third battle of Gaza a Flight, called *B' Flight, consisting
of ten aeroplanes, 3.E.2e's and B.E.i2's, was especially
formed from No. 23 Training Squadron in Egypt and,
under the commander of that squadron, had arrived on
the 30th of October at Weli Sheikh Nuran, where it
remained until disbanded at the beginning of December.
It will be remembered that machine-gun fire from the
air had been used against the enemy at Qatiya in April
1916, and again at El Fasher in Darfur during the cam-
paign against Ali Dinar in May of the same year. Offen-
sive action against ground troops was also a feature of the
actions at Magdhaba and Rafah, but it was at the third
battle of Gaza, with the formation of a special reserve
bombing unit, that the offensive idea was given definite
expression. From this time onwards to the end of the
campaign the Royal Flying Corps developed more and
more its offensive activities against troops on the ground.
In the afternoon of the 7th of November 191 7, when the
cavalry had already passed through Gaza, an air observer
gave warning that Turkish troops in considerable numbers
were hurriedly withdrawing along the roads running north-
wards through El Majdal and Beit Duras. The major part
of the air service was promptly diverted to an offensive,
with bomb and machine-gun, against the retreating enemy.
A new German aerodrome at *Iraq el Menshiye was twice
2504.5 R
242 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
bombed on the 8th. During the first attack, by eighteen
bombing aeroplanes with an escort of six, a hangar was
set on fire and bombs were seen to explode among seven
aeroplanes on the landing-ground : the railway station
near the aerodrome was also bombed and hits were made
on rolling-stock. In the second attack the station suffered
more damage, and when later the place was captured it
was discovered that the Germans had been compelled
to burn aeroplanes and equipment which could not be
transported : the charred remains of five aeroplanes were
found. It is known also that three German aeroplanes
were destroyed as a direct result of the bombing and that
others were damaged.
There was an instance when a pilot who had lost his
bearings made an attack on British troops whom he
mistook for the enemy. There were other instances,
happily rare, of a similar kind during the campaign. In
fluctuating open warfare this was a danger which had
constantly to be guarded against. Owing to the rapid
expansion of the air services and to wastage in pilots and
observers, it could not be avoided that important missions
had sometimes to be entrusted to flying officers who had
had little experience of active service conditions and whose
training had been of a comparatively superficial kind. A
civilian may be taught to drill and to fire a rifle or machine-
gun and also learn discipline in a few weeks, but that will
not turn him into a soldier equipped to deal with the
emergencies of active service. A civilian may similarly
be taught to pilot an aeroplane, to make simple routine
observations from the air, or to handle a camera, but
that is only a beginning. The air personnel who are called
upon to work in co-operation with an army require to be
highly trained. The ideal military air observer should,
it may be said, be staff-trained. That ideal will never be
possible in war when a nation has to raise a citizen army
on the basis of a small volunteer service, but it is right to
point out one among the limitations which such a method
of making war must always entail.
After the bombing of their landing-ground at Menshiye
on the 8th of November, the German airmen concentrated,
I9I7] BOMBING OF ET TINE 243
pending a further retirement, at an aerodrome at Et Tine,
but they were given Httle peace. On the 9th of November
a bombing attack (with a total of four 1 12-lb., four loo-lb.,
ninety-eight 20-lb., and twenty-two i6-lb., bombs) was
made by twenty-two aeroplanes, with an escort of
fighters, on the aerodrome at Et Tine and on the con-
gestion of troops, transport, and material in the neigh-
bourhood. This attack had remarkable results. When Et
Tine was captured, three damaged aeroplanes, a damaged
field gun, and many dead Turks were found, but these
results were of minor importance in comparison with the
moral effect of the bombing. Particulars are available from
the German side and they merit study. Although the
Turks had been streaming back in some confusion, they had
revealed an underlying stubbornness, but the bombing
attack on Et Tine caused a panic which spread its poison
through the whole of the Turkish Eighth Army. The
German commander Kress writes as follows: 'On the
'afternoon of the 9th of November there broke out a panic
'at Et Tine, the main ammunition depot and railhead
'behind the Eighth Army, among the large number of
'troops there assembled, transport columns and trains,
'mechanical transport, aircraft personnel. This did more
'to break the heart of the Eighth Army and to diminish
'its fighting strength than all the hard fighting that had
'gone before. Several bombing attacks by powerful enemy
'flying formations had caused explosions in the big dump
'of munitions at Et Tine, had cut all telegraphic and
'telephonic communication and created wild excitement,
'when suddenly news spread that hostile cavalry had
'broken through the main Turkish line and was moving
'against the head-quarters of the Eighth Army at Et Tine.
'Although this rumour was false and fantastic, it caused
'such agitation that many formations began to retreat
'without orders and broke into flight. A great number
'of ofliicers and men could not be stopped till they had
'reached Jerusalem or Damascus. Baggage and supply
'columns, in particular, having lost touch with their
'troops and head-quarters staffs owing to the numerous
'changes in location of the latter in the course of the battle.
244 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
'fell into indescribable confusion. The results of the panic
Vere especially serious, because not only had all telegraphic
'and* telephonic communication been destroyed, but
'almost all the horses of Army head-quarters had also
'stampeded, so that head-quarters was unable to send out
'orders to the troops. Thanks to the devotion and energy
'of a number of German and Turkish officers, order was
'in a measure restored the following day. But on the
'evening of the 9th the rumour spread in Jerusalem that
'the English had broken through our line and captured
'the head-quarters of the Eighth Army. As may easily be
'imagined this rumour caused considerable agitation in
'the city.'^
This picture of the Turkish Eighth Army in retreat
offers a good example of the power of the air weapon to
create temporary panic and chaos of which the full fruits
can be won only if the troops on the ground are in a
position to strike quickly. As shall be told later in this
history, the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies suffered
a series of organized air attacks in September 191 8, of
which the British troops were able to take full advantage.
The two Turkish armies were shattered and the maximum
effects, moral and material, of air attacks were obtained
because the British forces were already in pursuit of the
defeated enemy and were in a position to exact full toll.
While the Turks were retreating, after the third
battle of Gaza, all activity by the German pilots ceased.
Bombed on their temporary aerodromes by the Royal
Flying Corps, and harassed on the move by lack of trans-
port, by the congestion of traffic, and by the general
confusion, the German air squadrons suffered severely.
The result was that the Royal Flying Corps pilots and
observers flew at their will while the British advance was
in no way subjected to hostile attention or attacks from
the air. The effect on the Turkish Eighth Army of the
bombing of Et Tine has been stated, but it should be
pointed out that this attack was only one of a kind. From
the 7th to the 14th of November, while the retreat was in
progress, the air squadrons dropped about seven hundred
^ Zwischen Kaukasus und Sinai, Vol. I, p. 51.
1917] GERMAN PILOTS INACTIVE 245
bombs, mostly of 20-lb. weight, on targets other than
aerodromes. Notable raids were on Junction Station on the
loth and 12th, and on a troop train and a congestion of
troops north of Lydda on the 14th. Air reconnaissances
during the retreat, many of them made from a low height
to draw Turkish fire in broken country which aided
concealment, kept touch with the main enemy move-
ments. The attack on Junction Station on the loth, and
on troops and rolling-stock in its neighbourhood, was
made by thirteen aeroplanes, with escorts, and much
destruction resulted, but there was also a secondary attack
on the railway bridge over the Wadi es Sarar near the
station, and although the attack was abortive, it deserves
mention. If the bridge could be broken the two lines to
Jerusalem and Beersheba would be cut off from the railway
centre of Lydda, and the Turkish retreat would be impeded
and much rolling-stock left derelict. Orders were given that
two aeroplanes, each carrying two 112-lb. bombs, were to
attack the bridge from a height of 500 feet or less. The
attempt was made by Second Lieutenants H. I. Hanmer
and H. L. C. McConnell. 'We decided', wrote the former
pilotj'to try and reach Junction Station before the high fly-
'ing raid had stirred up the hornets' nest which, from re-
'ports, weknew must be assembled at the station. Difficulty
'in getting the bomb gear fixed, and then delay in adjusting
'the detonating gear, successfully prevented us from
'leaving until the other raid was well on its way. The
'detonation problem appeared at first insuperable : nobody
'in the squadron knew the correct procedure, but a young
'observer who had been in the artillery thought he knew
'and was allowed to carry on. Eventually, half an hour
'late, two B.E.'s struggled off the aerodrome with their
'bombs. Our plan of attack was that we should each have
'two runs at the target dropping a single bomb each time,
'and I was to make the first attack. Junction Station was
'fifty miles north of our line at Gaza and consequently all
'the country was new to us both, and the bridge was not
'easily located at first. As a result of the previous raid the
'Wadi Sarar was black with Turks seeking the only available
'shelter. We proceeded to carry out our task. None of the
246 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
'bombs exploded. McConnell was brought down a quarter
'of a mile from the bridge, was taken prisoner, and even-
'tually died in Damascus of his wounds, and I was hit
'while making my second approach. I had a fortunate
'escape, for the bullet, after piercing a longeron and
'twisting my flying belt buckle in two, embedded itself in
'a corner of my cigarette case, causing a jagged end to be
'driven into my ribs.'
Meanwhile, General AUenby pursued the Turks as
rapidly as his difiiculties of supply would permit, and he
proceeded to concentrate his forces for an attack on the
important Junction Station where, according to the air
reports, new Hnes of defence were hastily being made.
The attack on the station took place on the 13th and 14th
of November, and resulted in its capture with quantities
of useful military stores and an unlimited water supply.
The strategic result of the occupation of the station was
the separation of the Turkish forces : the Eighth Army
was in full retreat to the line Jaifa-Lydda, while the XX
Corps of the Seventh Army fell back to a position near
Khulda, astride the Junction Station-Latron road. The
pursuit continued: Ramie and Lydda were occupied on
the morning of the 15th and Jaffa was taken at noon on
the 1 6th. The Turkish Eighth Army, as reported from the
air, eventually stood along a position behind the Nahr
el Auja, while the Turkish Seventh Army assembled in
the Judaean Hills to cover Jerusalem. General Allenby
decided to contain the Turkish Eighth Army along the
coast and to pursue and attack the Seventh Army in the
hills, before it had time to reorganize, and thus open the
way to the capture of Jerusalem.
Some of the Royal Flying Corps squadrons moved
forward. On the 17th of November the advanced Flight
of No. 14 Squadron went to an aerodrome at Julis and
was followed by the remainder of the squadron three days
later. No. 113 Squadron also moved to Julis, but by the
end of the month No. 14 had gone on to Junction Station
and No. 113 had sent a detached Flight to work with the
Desert Corps head-quarters from. Khirbet Deiran; the
191 7] TOWARDS JERUSALEM 247
remainder of the squadron moved to Deiran early in
December. One Flight of No. 1 1 1 Squadron (Fortieth
Wing) moved to Juhs on the 27th of November and the
remainder of the Wing had completed their moves to
Julis by December the 13th. The balloon sections w^ent
forward to Saris and Lydda.
From the advanced aerodromes the aeroplanes of the
corps squadrons daily reconnoitred the Turkish positions
along the front. There was a little artillery co-operation
with some of the few heavy guns which had been brought
forward: the batteries laid out ground strips as signals to
the air observers who dropped smoke bombs to indicate
Turkish targets.
General Allenby moved forward slowly through difficult
country towards the capture of Jerusalem. By the 21st
of November the ridge called Nabi Samweil (ancient
Mizpa), five miles from Jerusalem, was reached, but then
came a series of Turkish counter-attacks which temporarily
barred progress, and, for two weeks, while reliefs and guns
were being brought forward and the water and transport
supply was being reorganized, General Allenby held his
hand. He decided, meanwhile, to bring up the forces
which had been watching Hebron. They began to
move on the 4th of December, occupied Hebron with-
out opposition, and continued their advance towards
Jerusalem.
From about the 24th of November enemy pilots
again began to show themselves, and their aerodrome,
discovered at Tul Karm on the 22nd of November, was
therefore bombed by night and day on the 28th and 29th
of November. The bombing attacks were made by No. 67
(Australian) Squadron and by 'B' Flight,^ and during the
two days one hundred 20-lb. bombs were dropped. On the
6th of December the observer in an aeroplane which had
been making a strategical reconnaissance brought back
news that 1,200 Turks were detraining at Qalqilye. Four
Martinsydes were sent away at once with forty- four 20-lb,
bombs and the pilots found a congestion of troops near the
station; some of the bombs were seen to make direct hits.
^ 'B' Flight was disbanded on the 6th of December 1917.
248 THE FALL OF JERUSALEM [ch. iv
On the 7th of December the weather broke and there
followed three days of rain. In spite of the rain, however,
the main attack to capture Jerusalem was begun at dawn
on the 8th, and by the evening the Turks had lost their
hold on the city, in which, while the battle raged in the
mists of the hills, there was confusion and panic. On the
9th the Turks were streaming away eastwards and by
noon on that day British patrols were in Jerusalem. The
Royal Flying Corps pilots, hampered by the weather,
attacked the retreating Turks with bomb and machine-
gun. No. 113 Squadron was water-logged on its aero-
drome, but the commanding officer, Major J. R. McCrindle,
had tarpaulins laid on the ground and he just managed
to get into the air : he was able to make a reconnaissance,
but had to land elsewhere on his return. No other aero-
planes of this squadron were allowed to go up for fear of
crashing, as it would have been difficult to replace damaged
aircraft. No. 14 Squadron was also water-logged, but the
pilots, led by Captain F. A. Bates, contrived to get their
aeroplanes off by man-handling them to the top of a
small steep hill at the side of the aerodrome and giving
them a flying start. In this way the squadron flew fifty
hours on the 9th and dropped one hundred 20-lb. bombs
on the demoralized Turkish troops.^ One pilot of the
squadron was forced to land at dusk in the hills north-west
of Jerusalem. His aeroplane was undamaged, and after
spending the night with a Bedouin family, one of whom
helped to start the engine next morning, the pilot
returned to his aerodrome carrying his volunteer Bedouin
mechanic on the chance that he might have useful infor-
mation to give through an interpreter. Other air attacks
on the 9th were made by the Fortieth Wing squadrons,
many of them with machine-gun fire from low heights.
The attacks were maintained throughout the loth, nth,
and 1 2th.
On Tuesday the nth of December, General Allenby
entered Jerusalem on foot by the Jaffa Gate and he was
^ Subsequently, for about two months, the ^flying dive' down the hill-
side was a usual method of taking off. Men of the Egyptian Labour Corps
were harnessed to the aeroplanes which they dragged to the hill-top.
I
I
I
I9I7] ENTRY OF GENERAL ALLENBY 249
conducted to the steps of the citadel, where the notables of
the city awaited him. A proclamation was read, and after
the chief inhabitants had been presented, the commander-
in-chief passed out again the way he had come. The fall
of Jerusalem marked a stage in the Palestine campaign.
The Turks had been heavily defeated and the Turkish
armies had been saved from destruction only by the
difficult nature of the country. Twelve thousand prisoners
and more than a hundred guns had been captured and
the Turks had suffered further casualties of about 25,000,
as compared with a total of 18,000 British (2,509 killed).
Through the 3,000 odd years of its history Jerusalem has
been repeatedly besieged and blockaded, and it is recorded
that it has been captured or retaken from the invader
thirty-four times. Following as it did on the fall of Mecca,
the loss of the Holy City of Jerusalem was a blow to the
prestige of Turkey which had repercussions throughout
the world.
CHAPTER V
THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
igi4-March igi8^
[Map, p. 249]
The territory which was the scene of the Mesopotamian
campaign was known before the war as Turkish Arabia
and included the three Turkish vilayets of Basra, Bagh-
dad, and Mosul, with Baghdad as the capital and seat
of government. Mesopotamia is a Greek word meaning
'between the rivers', and although generally understood
in western countries as relating to the lowland regions of
the basins of the Tigris and of the Euphrates, the name
had no accepted geographical significance and was un-
known to the inhabitants. That is why, after the war,
the name disappeared and 'Iraq, the term in ordinary use
by the natives of the country, was adopted. There is
navigable access to the sea by the river Shatt al Arab, a
fine waterway more than one hundred miles long formed
by the mingled waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and
thus carrying the drainage of the whole of Turkish Arabia
as well as a large part of Persian Arabistan.
Sixty miles upstream from Fao, at the mouth of the
Shatt al Arab, lies the emporium and port of Basra,
inaccessible during the war to ships drawing more than
nineteen feet of water owing to the existence of a bar
outside Fao. Nor, in 1914, were there any quays or store-
houses at Basra, and vessels had to be unloaded in mid-
stream into native sailing craft called mahailas. Forty-six
miles up-channel from Basra is Al Qurna, legendary site of
the Garden of Eden, at the junction of the Tigris with the
old channel of the Euphrates, and ninety miles above
Qurna on the Tigris — the main line of communications
between Baghdad and the sea — is Amara. One hundred
and fifty miles beyond Amara is Kut, and another two
hundred and twelve miles by river is Baghdad. Between
Kut and Baghdad the river meanders greatly and the
' The student is referred also to the official history of the mihtary
operations, The Carnpaign in Mesopotamia^ 1914-1918, by Brigadier-
General F. J. Moberly, Vols. I to IV.
1914] CLIMATIC CONDITIONS 251
distance between the two places by land is no more than
one hundred and twelve miles.
Navigation of the Tigris, confined to vessels of very
shallow draught, is dependent upon the seasons of high
and low water which are fairly well defined. November
rains cause the first rise in the waters, and from January
to March the rivers run fairly full. The melting of the
snows in the Caucasus and in the highlands of Asia Minor,
in March, leads to another rise, and during April and May
the Tigris is at its highest. It falls in July and in August,
and thence to November is at its lowest. In the rainy
season between November and April, characterized by
sudden violent storms, the soil in Lower Mesopotamia is
converted into thick mud, hampering to all military
movements. When dry, the ground was capable of sup-
porting all except the heaviest military traffic. The season
between May and October is a time of extreme heat with
frequent sandstorms in the spring months, and a wind-
storm, called the Shamal, which begins to blow about
mid-June and blows intermittently for some forty days
with a velocity up to forty miles an hour.
Before Turkey entered the war in October 19 14 she
gave evidence of her hostility to Great Britain, and among
other acts she strengthened her forces in Lower Meso-
potamia. At Abadan, on the Persian shore thirty miles
from the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, are the installations
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in which the British
Government, because of the importance attached by the
Admiralty to the oilfields, had become shareholders. On
account of the known ambitions of Germany in this part
of the world, and because of information that agents
would attempt to raise a Jihad, or Holy War, in the
countries lying between Mesopotamia and India, one
effect of which would be to endanger the pipe-line from
the oilfields to Abadan, it was decided, after consultation
between the British Government and the Government in
India, to send a force from India to the head of the Persian
Gulf. The force, known as Indian Expeditionary Force
'D', and consisting of one Brigade, arrived at Bahrein
Island from Bombay on the 23rd of October 19 14, and
252 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
there anchored to await events. On the 31st of October
news was received of the entry of Turkey into the war, and
Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, in temporary com-
mand of the force, was ordered to proceed at once to the
Shatt al Arab to concert measures with the naval authori-
ties for an attack on Fao. This was duly made on the 6th
of November. The Fao garrison retired, after a short
bombardment, and on the 7th the landing party, leaving
one company to occupy the telegraph station, re-embarked
and proceeded upstream. On the 8th and loth they
landed again and formed a camp at Sanniya, two and a
half miles from the oil works, and there awaited reinforce-
ments. Two additional Brigades and the 6th Divisional
head-quarters arrived in the Shatt al Arab on the 14th
of November and, after two minor actions in which the
navy took part, Basra was taken on the 22nd. It was then
decided to push on to Qurna and this town was occupied
on the 9th of December, when 1,200 prisoners and 9 guns
were captured. In January 191 5, Turkish reinforcements
were concentrated at An Nasiriya, on the Euphrates, for
an attack on Basra. The attack, made by a mixed force of
about 20,000, took place on the 14th of April and resulted
in a sharp battle at Shaiba, west of Basra, in which the
Turks were routed with heavy loss, after which the enemy
retreated to Nasiriya.
The Government of India had meanwhile decided to
reorganize the Mesopotamian expedition as an army corps
under General Sir John E. Nixon, who had arrived at
Basra from India with his staff on the 9th of April 191 5.
Accompanying him was Captain P. W. L. Broke-Smith,
a Royal Flying Corps officer, whose duty was to make
arrangements for the establishment of a base aerodrome
and depot at Basra. Many urgent requests had been sent
by Major-General Sir Arthur A. Barrett, commanding the
6th Division, for aeroplanes. He had pointed out, on the 9th
of January 1915, that the rising of the waters, with conse-
quent difficulties of navigation, had limited his powers of
reconnaissance to a dangerous extent and that continuous
rumours of Turkish reinforcements, coupled with Arab
unrest, made adequate reconnaissance essential. It had.
I9I5] THE AIR DETACHMENT 253
however, been difficult for the Government of India to
respond. On the outbreak of war India had sent to Egypt
the only flying officers and material she possessed, and
when she appealed to England, following the calls from
Mesopotamia for aircraft, the reply was made that no
help could be given : nor could Egypt surrender what had
been lent to her. The Government of India thereupon
turned to Australia and to New Zealand, and the response
of those countries made possible the building up of an
air detachment for early dispatch to Mesopotamia. New
Zealand was able, as a beginning, to supply only one
flying officer. Lieutenant W. W. A. Burn, but Australia
already possessed the nucleus of a Flying Corps establish-
ment and provided four trained pilots (Captains H. A.
Petre and T. W. White, and Lieutenants G. P. Merz and
W. H. Treloar), about fifty mechanics, complete workshop
equipment, and mule transport. Both Australia and New
Zealand offered to bear all expenses connected with their
part of the detachment. The establishment for a FHght
and for an Aircraft Park was completed by volunteers from
Territorial battalions in India.
Captain Broke-Smith, after making himself acquainted
with the conditions and requirements at Basra, returned
to Bombay on the 17th of April to report and to organize
a Flight from the personnel already assembled there. He
re-embarked for Basra with part of the Flight on the 30th.
England contrived to send two Maurice Farman aeroplanes
(70 horse-power Renault engines) and, by the middle of
May, the establishment of an aerodrome on an old Turkish
camping ground at Tanouma, opposite Basra, was begun.
By the end of the month a collection of miscellaneous
stores, additional reinforcements, and two more Maurice
Farmans (without engines) from Egypt, had arrived. The
Maurice Farmans were old Longhorns which had seen
much service as training aeroplanes in India; engines for
them did not arrive until August.
^he Advance to Kut al Imara
By the end of May 191 5, preparations had been com-
pleted for an advance, assisted by naval sloops and armed
254 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
tugs, by the 6th Division, now commanded by Major-
General C. V. F. Townshend, from Qurna on Amara.
From a landing-ground at Sherish, near Qurna, the first
air reconnaissance was made early on the 31st of May, the
day the attack on the Turkish positions north of Qurna
began. This first appearance of the air arm in the campaign
was hailed with enthusiasm by the attacking troops as
they toiled through the heat. The enemy camps and
positions, and the amount of river transport available to
the Turks, were reconnoitred as far as Sakrika, twelve
miles from Qurna, and the information was plotted on a
map. The observers (reconnaissances were made by the
two available Maurice Farmans) also reported in person
to the Army stalf. The whole of the Turkish advanced
positions were captured on the 31st, and, next morning,
an air observer found that the enemy troops had aban-
doned the Abu Aran positions and were in full retreat.
He scribbled a message giving this news and placed it in
a can, with a streamer attached, which he dropped in the
Tigris for Major-General Townshend's head-quarters in
the sloop Espiegle. The message was retrieved and the
pursuit was ordered. Air reconnaissances, made on the 2nd
and 3rd of June from an advanced landing-ground at Abu
Aran, kept touch with the retreating enemy, messages
again being dropped in the river for the pursuing flotilla.
Early on the 3rd, Major-General Townshend, who had
transferred to the small river gun-boat Cofnet, called a
temporary halt, twelve miles from Amara, but at about
9.45 a.m. the pursuit was resumed, and the armed launch
Shaitan (Lieutenant Mark Singleton, R.N.) carrying Sir
Percy Cox, the chief political officer,^ was sent on well
ahead to scout. When the Shaitan came in the straight
reach of the river below Amara, enemy troops were seen
crowding into a barge attached to a steamer on the right
bank, but Avhen a shot was fired by the Shaitan the Turks
abandoned the barge and fled up the river bank on foot.
' Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Z. Cox had been Foreign Secretary in
India. His knowledge of the chiefs and of the politics of the Persian Gulf
area was considered unique and he had been sent from India, with the
original expeditionary force, to control all poHtical matters.
I9I5] AMARA CAPTURED 255
White flags were observed flying over Amara, but the
commander of the Shaitan did not stop to accept the
surrender of the town. Instead he pushed on rapidly
through the bridge and headed off the fleeing troops. On
being overtaken, they indicated their surrender and Sir
Percy Cox went ashore and disarmed them. Subsequently
the Turkish prisoners, numbering 1 1 officers and 250 men,
were forced to march back along the river bank to Amara.
Major-General Townshend arrived in the Comet in due
course and formally received the surrender of the town.
During the night of the 3rd of June the telegraphic
communications between Amara and Basra broke down,
and urgent dispatches, together with maps, were con-
veyed to Amara next morning by aeroplane. It was
established by air reconnaissances on the 5th that there
were no formed bodies of Turkish troops within twenty-
five miles of Amara. The British advance between the
31st of May and the 4th of June, made in a period of
great heat, had been notably successful and had been
achieved at a cost of 4 killed and 21 wounded, whereas the
Turks lost 120 killed and wounded, and 1,773 prisoners,
together with field and naval guns and many river craft
sunk or captured.
On the 9th of June the air detachment moved to Amara
and on the 14th a reconnaissance flight was made to Kut
al Imara (123 miles from Amara) by Major H. L. Reilly
(observer. Lieutenant W. W. A. Burn) who used an
advanced refuelling base at Ali Gharbi, 60 miles from
Amara. The Shamal was blowing and the visibility was
poor, so that Major Reilly had to fly for the most part
near the ground. The reconnaissance, however, was com-
pleted and a good report of the Turkish dispositions at Es
Sinn and Kut was made. The sketch-map made by Major
Reilly on this flight was amplified from time to time by
subsequent reconnaissances and was used by Major-
General Townshend when he planned his attack on Es
Sinn in September.
After the fall of Amara, General Nixon decided, in
spite of the sickness among his troops owing to the excessive
heat, to capture Nasiriya on the Euphrates, where there
256 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
were, according to his estimates, about 5-7 Turkish
battahons with a few guns. An air reconnaissance was
made of the Hammar lake district on the 19th of June in
one of the Maurice Farmans, but the aeroplane developed
engine trouble on the return journey and was thereafter
out of action. The second Maurice Farman, sent out to
reconnoitre Nasiriya next day, also had engine trouble and
became unserviceable. In July two 80 horse-power Gnome
Caudrons arrived at Basra and they were at once sent up
country, to Asani on the Euphrates, for reconnaissances
of the Nasiriya positions. These were made on the 21st
and 22nd, when the Turkish trenches were sketched from
the air and the general positions plotted on a map. These
reconnaissance reports gave Major-General G. F. Gorringe,
the attacking commander, his first comprehensive idea
of the enemy dispositions and of the local topography.
On the 22nd and 23rd, artillery fire was directed on the
Turkish entrenchments from one of the Caudrons. At
5 a.m. on the 24th of July the British attack was launched
along both banks of the Euphrates and, by 6.30 p.m., the
Turks were in full retreat; Nasiriya was occupied on the
25th.i
After further reconnaissances, which established the
precipitate retreat of the Turks northwards, the two
Caudrons were sent back to Basra on the 30th, but on the
way both pilots had to make forced landings. One of the
Caudrons eventually reached Basra, but the other never
arrived and reports received a day or two later stated that
an aeroplane had landed about twenty-five miles west of
Ghubaishiya and had been attacked by Arabs. The two
officers. Lieutenants G. P. Merz (AustraHan) and W. W. A.
Burn (New Zealander), armed only with revolvers, kept
up a running fight with the enemy and, it was said, killed
and wounded some of the Arabs before they themselves died
fighting side by side. A. punitive expedition which was
' General Sir John Nixon, in his dispatch covering this operation says:
*I have to place on record the excellence of the work performed by officers
*and men of the Royal Flying Corps, whose valuable reconnaissances
'materially assisted in clearing up the situation before the battle of the
'24th July.'
I9I5] AIR REORGANIZATION 257
sent out found no trace of the dead officers, but the
Caudron, hacked to pieces, was discovered a few days later.
The Gnome rotary engines with which the Caudrons were
fitted gave continual trouble because they were unsuited
to a hot and dusty atmosphere. After this experience
long flights between places on the lines of communication
were forbidden until aeroplanes with more reliable engines
should arrive.
Requests for more efficient aeroplanes had been made
from the beginning of the campaign. On the 12th of
June General Nixon had asked for adequate aircraft re-
inforcements, and the Viceroy had telegraphed a summary
of the general's report to the India Office and had urged
the provision of additional and better aeroplanes. At the
end of the month a reply was received that the War
Office had agreed to send to Mesopotamia two Flights of
the Royal Flying Corps from Egypt. The British Govern-
ment came to realize that India was in no position to
equip and administer the air detachment in Mesopotamia
and, early in August, decided that the War Office must
assume full responsibility and that subsequent demands
for aeroplanes, personnel, and material, should be made
direct to England. On the 5 th of August all officers on the
strength of the air unit in Mesopotamia were gazetted
to the Royal Flying Corps. The unit was to complete
No. 30 Squadron which had originally been formed at
Ismailia, Egypt, in March 191 5. On the 26th of August
four Martinsyde Scouts (80 horse-power Gnome engines)
arrived at Basra as a nucleus for the equipment of a second
Flight of the squadron, but it was not until the end of
October that the third Flight, that is to say, the original
Flight, with the squadron commander. Major S. D.
Massy, arrived from Ismailia. It has already been said
that the Gnome engine was unsuitable for work in the hot,
dusty atmosphere of Mesopotamia, and the Martinsydes
gave much trouble. At the beginning of September a
Royal Naval Air Service seaplane Flight, under Squadron
Commander R. Gordon, arrived at Basra from East Africa
to co-operate with the naval forces in Mesopotamian
waters. The Flight brought with it three 150 horse-
2504.5 s
258 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
power Sunbeam Short seaplanes (equipped with wireless
transmitting sets), but these proved unserviceable owing
to poor climbing capabilities, and to the difficulty of get-
ting an adequate seaplane run on the waters of the Tigris.
It was not until their floats had been removed, and
extemporized undercarriages substituted, that they could
be used effectively. Two of them were converted for use as
aeroplanes in October and, although the Sunbeam engines
gave trouble, the Shorts did good work.
Meanwhile, on the 27th of July, the Viceroy had tele-
graphed to the Secretary of State for India saying: 'Now
'that Nasiriya has been occupied the occupation of Kut
'al Imara is considered by us to be a strategic necessity.'
This further advance was eventually approved and General
Nixon ordered Major-General Townshend to concentrate
the 6th Division at Ali Gharbi for a movement up the
Tigris to capture Kut. The concentration was complete
by the 12th of September, the advanced Flight of No. 30
Squadron having arrived at Ali Gharbi from Amara on
the 7th with two Martinsydes, a Caudron, and a Maurice
Farman. The last-named aeroplane, however, was wrecked
on landing, and another of the aeroplanes was wrecked
a few days later.
The 6th Division began to move forward at dawn on
the 13th of September and instructions were issued to the
Royal Flying Corps to reconnoitre ahead as far as Shaikh
Saad. This reconnaissance reported, by message-bag
dropped at the head of the main column, that the way
was clear of Turkish troops to Shaikh Saad which was
occupied the same day. On the 14th Major Reilly recon-
noitred as far as Kut, and he brought back information
that the Turkish trenches on the right bank of the Tigris
at Es Sinn appeared deserted and that no guns were
visible in the emplacements. On the left bank there were
extensive camps and there were many lighters and steamers
in the river. ^
It was imperative that this information should be
^ It was afterwards known that when Major Reilly's aeroplane was
sighted, the Turkish troops at once went into covered trenches. The guns
were also covered to conceal them from air observation.
I9I5] AIR RECONNAISSANCES 259
checked because Major-General Townshend's strategy
entirely depended upon his knowledge of the Turkish
dispositions. A special reconnaissance by the naval flotilla
was therefore ordered and it was reported, in consequence,
that the Es Sinn positions were occupied by the Turks in
full strength. Major-General Townshend still thought it
desirable, before he issued his final orders for the attack,
that the Turkish trenches and emplacements should be
re-examined from the air. One of the two serviceable
aeroplanes — the Caudron — which accordingly set out to
make a reconnaissance on the morning of the i6th of
September was shot down by rifle fire from the ground,
but a second attempt in the evening, made by Major
Reilly in the sole surviving aeroplane, was successful
and the pilot's report and map showed that the enemy
positions were elaborately organized and strongly held.
In his book My Campaign in Mesopotamia (pp. 1 10-12),
Major-General Townshend wrote: 'Major Reilly carried
'out the reconnaissance I had asked for, excellently well.
'He was supported by the gun-boats, and he brought
'back a very fine piece of work — a map and detailed
'information. The appearance of large numbers of tents
'indicated reinforcements. It was seen that the enemy's
'Torres- Vedras-like line of earthworks, entrenchments, and
'redoubts of the most modern type extended for twelve
'miles all told, on both banks of the river. ... As soon as
'Reilly had completed his air reconnaissance and sketches
'I had ample and exact information. I issued Battle
'Instructions. . . . ' Three days before the advance began,
aircraft reinforcements arrived by lighter. They were two
Martinsydes, which meant that three aeroplanes were now
available, and there were, in addition, two naval seaplanes.
The attacking troops moved forward, in two columns,
on the 26th of September from Sanniyat to within four
miles of the Turkish positions, and the march was
resumed next day on both banks of the river. On the
morning of the 28th action was joined with the Turkish
forces covering Kut. At 11 a.m. telephonic connexions
between Major-General Townshend and the main British
attacking column were broken owing to insufficiency of
26o THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
cable, and throughout the remainder of the day the sole
means of communication between head-quarters and this
column was by air; visual signalling on the ground was
impossible on account of dust, mirage, and the flat nature
of the country. In the early morning one of the seaplane
observers was able to send back corrections, by wireless, for
the fire of a 5 -inch howitzer battery which was bombarding
the Turkish positions, but until the late afternoon it was
impossible for the seaplanes to get into the air again because
the direction of the wind did not permit of an adequate
run along the Tigris.^ At 5.30 p.m., however, both sea-
planes were able to get away, and their crews reconnoitred
the battle area and carried orders and maps to the forward
naval flotilla.
From after darkness on the 28th of September, Major-
General Townshend was without information about the
progress of the main enveloping column until the morning
of the 29th when an air observer brought back the news
that the Turkish forces had, during the night, evacuated
all their positions east of Kut and were in full retreat up the
Tigris towards Baghdad. Kut was entered the same day
and the Turks were pursued thence fifty miles up-river
to Aziziya, which was reached by an advanced column of
the 6th Division on the 3rd of October. The progress of
the Turkish retreat was reported in some detail by the
aeroplane and seaplane observers, who also discovered that
the enemy halted with the apparent intention to make a
stand at a prepared position astride the river at Ctesiphon.
Major Reilly made a reconnaissance of this position on
the 3rd of October and he reported that it was of a
formidable kind, with six miles of entrenchments on the
left bank of the river. By the 6th of October the aeroplane
Flight, with its three serviceable aeroplanes, had moved
to Aziziya. On this day the first reconnaissance of Baghdad
was made in one of the Martinsydes by Captain H. A.
Petre, who stated that he found the town nearly empty of
troops.
The fall of Kut, which brought the whole of the Basra
^ Both the Short seaplanes had been converted for use as aeroplanes by
the 22nd of October.
I9I5] BATTLE OF CTESIPHON 261
vilayet under British control, marked the end of a stage
in the campaign. The few aeroplanes available for the
initial phase of the operations had exerted an influence
out of proportion to their numbers. At Qurna, Amara,
Nasiriya, and, above all, at Kut, the aeroplane reconnais-
sance reports had provided the material on v^hich the
military plans had been based, and the small air detach-
ment must be accorded a share in the successes achieved.
Apart from the climatic and other hardships of the
country, common to all the troops, the air detachments
had their own technical and transport difficulties to over-
come. They had the use of a steamer and three barges.
One of the barges, 100 feet long, was fitted with a platform
deck and was employed, when towage could be obtained, to
take aeroplanes up-river to the advanced Flight, and to carry
damaged aircraft back to the Park for repair. One of the
two smaller barges, both of which were 60 feet long, was
fitted as a repair barge, with a power plant, and the other
as a stores barge with a photographic dark room. The
steamer was used almost entirely by the advanced Flight
until after the occupation of Kut when, together with the
ICQ ft. barge, it became a supply depot at Kut, where an
advanced section of the Aircraft Park was formed. The
shallow reaches of the river above Kut could not be navi-
gated by the steamer, and supplies for the Flight had to
be sent forward by other vessels as opportunity offered.
^he Battle of Cte siphon
The arguments and correspondence which resulted in
the decision to advance on Baghdad may be read in the
official military history of the campaign. ^ During six
weeks, subsequent to the fall of Kut, preparations for the
attack on the Turkish positions at Ctesiphon, covering
Baghdad, proceeded. In this period the long-awaited
aircraft reinforcements arrived. They were four B.E.2C
aeroplanes, four pilots, air mechanics, a complete repair
section, mule transport, and much-wanted miscellaneous
stores. The air units were in consequence reorganized as
^ ^he Campaign in Mesopotamia by Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly,
Vol. II, Ch. 13.
262 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
No. 30 Squadron and No. 4 Aircraft Park. The squadron
was made up of two Flights, 'A' and 'B'. 'A' FHght con-
sisted of the personnel and equipment on detachment at
Aziziya, with the addition of three officers transferred from
the Army to serve as observers. 'B' Flight went up-country
from Basra with two B.E.2c's on towed lighters on the
9th of November. The aeroplanes were erected at Kut
and were flown to Aziziya, where one of them was damaged
on landing.
Aeroplane reconnaissances gave Major-General Towns-
hend the only information obtainable about the Turkish
defences at Ctesiphon. It was revealed that there were
important inaccuracies in the existing maps of the Tigris,
but owing to lack of equipment and personnel a photo-
graphic survey from the air was impossible, and simple
instruments, to measure angles, were therefore fashioned
by which the pilots and observers could make a rough
survey by triangulation. The Maurice Farman aeroplane,
which was slow and gave a wide field of view, proved a
good medium for this work and, with the help of fine
weather and clear visibility, the Royal Flying Corps pro-
duced a map, not only of the Ctesiphon defences, but also
of the ground leading up to them, which proved valuable
in the approach marches and during the battle.
On the 13th of November two officers set out in a
Maurice Farman with orders to cut the telegraph wires
west and north of Baghdad. The aeroplane landed on hard
ground, and, before it could be brought to a standstill,
hit a post and was damaged. The observer had succeeded
in blowing up one telegraph post when fire was opened
by Arabs. An attempt was thereupon made to get away,
but the damaged aeroplane would not leave the ground and
the two officers were eventually captured by the Arabs. ^
As a result of this loss, long reconnaissances were, for the
time being, forbidden on the instructions of General Nixon.
By the i8th of November, Major-General Townshend
had concentrated his forces at Kutuniya, and on the 20th
^ The two officers, Captain T. W. White (pilot) and Captain F. Yeats-
Brown (observer), afterwards escaped from captivity. See Caught by the
Turks by Francis C. C. Yeats-Brown.
I9I5] DISCOVERY AND TRAGEDY 263
he began to advance on both banks of the river. Lajj,
nine miles from Ctesiphon, w2ls reached the same day, and
four aeroplanes were thereupon flown to Lajj from
Aziziya. Major-General Townshend asked for two air
reconnaissances to be made next day, the 21st, one of
Baghdad, and the other of the Ctesiphon positions. The
longer reconnaissance was undertaken by Major Reilly,
who failed to return, and the mishap which befell him was
a prelude to the tragedy of Kut. His flight, of which it is
now possible to reveal the details, calls for special attention.
When Major Reilly was flying about four miles east of
Ctesiphon his interest was caught by ominous alterations
in the Turkish dispositions, and he soon realized that
formidable reinforcements had arrived in the area. Im-
pressed with the importance of his discovery he did not
hesitate to abandon the Baghdad reconnaissance and to
make, instead, a close and detailed examination of the
whole Ctesiphon position. He had nearly completed his
study when, by ill luck, a chance hit from a splinter of
anti-aircraft shell put the engine in his Martinsyde out of
action. The pilot glided into the desert, choosing a spot
for landing as remote as possible from the enemy positions,
and he set out on foot to reach the British lines. He was,
however, hotly pursued by Arabs and eventually captured.
A Turkish account of this episode says : 'An aeroplane . . .
'was brought down and captured by means of machine-gun
'fire from the 51st Division. . . . The presence of the 51st
'Division, which turned the balance of success against the
'British in this battle [Ctesiphon] was ascertained in this
'fruitless reconnaissance and was shown on the airman's
'map. But the map containing this priceless information
'fell, not into the hands of the enemy commander . . .
'but into those of the Turkish Commander . . . Major
'Reilly's greatest gift to us was a sketch showing the course
'of the Tigris from Diyala to Aziziya. This little sketch,
'probably of small account to the enemy, was an important
'map in the eyes of the Iraq Command. For at head-
'quarters and with the troops there was no such thing as
'a map. . . .'^
^ The Battle of Suliman Pak, by Staff Bimbashi Muhammad Amin,
264 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Major- General Townshend might still have received
information about the Turkish reinforcements from the
special reconnaissance v^hich, it v^ill be recalled, he had
ordered of the Ctesiphon positions. Unhappily the result-
ing air report did not indicate the changes which had taken
place. The observer was one of the newly joined military
officers who had had little opportunity to study the
Turkish positions as they appeared from the air. He was,
in other words, untrained in air observation, and the pity
of it was that to him, and to none other, should be given
an opportunity so rare and a responsibility so grave that the
fate of thousands depended upon what he saw. The one
shall be taken and the other left. Had Major Reilly been
the officer who returned, Major-General Townshend would
have known that his troops, on the morrow, would be called
upon to face far superior enemy forces in well-prepared
positions. It is possible that a withdrawal could not have
been made without fighting, but it is reasonable to suppose
that Major-General Townshend would never have persisted
in his offensive had Major Reilly got back with his report,^
and the consequences of such a decision would have been
far-reaching: there might have been no siege of Kut.
On the morning of the 22nd the attack on Ctesiphon
began and fighting was severe throughout the day. The
only surviving Martinsyde aeroplane was lost through a
forced landing in the Turkish lines as a result of engine
failure, due to a hit from an anti-aircraft gun, but a con-
verted Short seaplane and a Maurice Farman were flown
over the enemy positions and the arrival of enemy reinforce-
ments was noted. Turkish counter-attacks on the 22nd and
again on the 23rd, made by superior numbers of compara-
tively fresh troops, left no doubt in the mind of Major-
General Townshend that it was useless and dangerous to
persist. The Turks had suffered heavily, but so had his
published hy the Turkish General Staff and privately translated for the
Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence.
^ The official military historian agrees with this supposition. He says :
'That General Nixon or General Townshend would have persisted in the
'projected attack against an entrenched position held by a force now so
'obviously superior in numbers seems improbable.' {The Campaign in
Mesopotamia, Vol. H, p. 59.)
I9I5] KUT BESIEGED 265
own force, which had had casualties of 4,500 (800 killed),
about one-third of its attacking strength. It took the
bitter and costly fighting of the 22nd and 23rd to make
clear the numerical superiority of the Turks, which would
have been realized before the battle began had Major
Reilly's air reconnaissance report reached Major-General
Townshend. Under cover of darkness on the 25th/26th
the British marched back to Lajj, where a day to rest the
troops was spent. By the 3rd of December the survivors
of the force were back in Kut. While the retreat was in
progress two converted Short seaplanes and two aeroplanes
— all the available aircraft — kept watch on the oncoming
Turkish columns, particularly for enveloping movements,
and a few bombs of loo-lb. weight were dropped on
massed Turkish cavalry and infantry. By the 30th of
November the aeroplanes and the seaplane barge had
arrived at Kut. Major S. D. Massy had also arrived there
from Basra on the 28th to take command of No. 30
Squadron. Meanwhile, measures were taken to withstand
a siege in Kut until the expected reinforcements from
overseas should arrive to relieve the town. The seaplane
Flight left for Basra on the 4th of December and the
three aeroplanes that could fly were ordered away on the
6th. They left next morning, but one which had engine
trouble had to land again at Kut. By that evening the
Turks had closed in on the town from all sides and the
siege had begun. There remained in Kut, of the Royal
Flying Corps, five officers, the majority of the rank and
file of 'A' and 'B' Flights of No. 30 Squadron, the lighters
belonging to 'A' Flight, and three unserviceable aeroplanes
(two B.E.2c's and one Martinsyde). The besieged in Kut
were bombarded and attacked during December, but the
Turkish divisions, after suffering heavy casualties in a
series of assaults from the 23rd to the 25th, settled down
to starve the British into surrender.
Attempts to relieve Kut
[Map, p. 249]
The decision to hold Kut until Major-General Towns-
hend's force, totalling 11,607 British and Indian troops
266 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
with 3,530 followers, could be relieved, was not disputed
hy the British and Indian Governments. To effect the
relief, a new force, called the 'Tigris Corps', was formed
under Sir Fenton J. Aylmer, Adjutant-General of the
Indian Army, to incorporate the remnants of the 12th
(Indian) Division and two divisions (3rd Lahore and 7th
Meerut) arriving piecemeal and incomplete from over-
seas. The 'Tigris Corps', hastily assembled, was ill-equipped
for its formidable task, and because of the urgency of
the need to relieve Kut was sent forward inadequately
organized. Indeed, owing to lack of water-transport 12,000
of the reinforcements could not be moved forward from
Basra.
The Tigris Corps began to assemble at Ali Gharbi. The
loss of skilled personnel, of equipment, stores, and of three
aeroplanes, shut up in Kut, crippled the Royal Flying
Corps, which could only muster two aeroplanes at Ali
Gharbi. They were a Maurice Farman and a B.E.2C, but
the former was out of action, through overhaul, for some
time, and up to the 4th of January, 19 16, when the first
attempt to relieve Kut began, Sir Fenton Aylmer had
only one old B.E.2C to do all the reconnaissance work he
required.
The leading troops of the 7th (Meerut) Division
marched out from Ali Gharbi on the 4th of January for
Shaikh Saad, where air reports indicated that there were
strong Turkish forces. The attack on these forces began on
the 7th and, two days later, the Turks, defeated, were in
retreat. The air observers, hindered by bad weather, had
reported a part of the progress of the battle, and they
followed the retreating enemy troops and noted that they
took up a fresh line of resistance at Ora, where they had the
protection of a wadi: a sketch of the new position was
made from the air.
The Kut relieving force followed the Turks and, on
the 13th, with the co-operation of naval gunboats,
attacked the Ora positions, which the enemy troops
evacuated during the night and next morning. Air
reconnaissance reports made it clear that the Turks
had fallen back no more than three miles to the Umm
i9i6] THE RELIEF FORCE 267
al Hanna lines, between marsh and river. A rough
sketch of these Hnes was made from the air, but sub-
sequent bad weather prevented the observers from supple-
menting such incomplete information as they had been
able to obtain when the Turks took up the position.
The Umm al Hanna lines were attacked on the 21st, but
the assault failed and the British troops withdrew to an
entrenched position, about 1,300 yards from that of the
enemy, and there settled down for about a month to the
stagnation of trench warfare.
The operations had been greatly hampered by the
weather. Soon after the attack on Shaikh Saad had begun,
the rains had set in. High winds and perverse currents
in the rapidly rising Tigris made river navigation difficult,
while the thick mud to which the soil was churned made
the progress of the troops on land laborious. The Royal
Flying Corps detachment suffered particularly as it moved
forward with the advancing troops from Ali Gharbi to
Musandaq, to Shaikh Saad, and then to Ora, where the
detachment arrived and settled on the i6th of January.
There was no time or opportunity during the advance to
prepare landing-grounds, and the two available aeroplanes
had to lie out in the open in wind and rain. Nor did the
mud make it easy for the aeroplanes to get off or land.
Although, in spite of the difficulties, reconnaissances were
made and the general dispositions of the Turks were
reported and sketched, there is no doubt that the attacking
troops were severely handicapped by the incomplete nature
of the information available to them.
During most of February, while the preparations were
being made for a resumption of the offensive, there
was only one aeroplane serviceable, but daily reconnais-
sances enabled the air observers to watch the construc-
tion and progress of new Turkish positions behind the
Umm al Hanna lines. In a telegram on the 26th of
February to the Army Commander,^ Lieut enant-General
Aylmer said: 'I must confess that I have been disappointed
^ Lieutenant-General Sir Percy H. N. Lake, the Chief of the General
Staff, India, had succeeded General Nixon in command on the 19th of
January, 1916.
268 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
'with the action of the Cavalry Brigade on the whole.
'Though an absolutely flat country like this, with no
'cover, where every movement not only of a cavalry mass
'but of a patrol can be seen at many miles, certainly does
'not give a Cavalry Brigade much chance of distinction,
'the Turkish regular Cavalry has certainly suffered in the
'same way. I have, perhaps, not called on my cavalry to
'push home reconnaissances regardless of loss as aerial
'observation has generally been available and is better.'
Aircraft reinforcements had been sent forward to
Lieutenant-General Aylmer from Basra, but they had had
ill luck. It will be recalled that the two naval Shorts had
gone to Basra for refit at the beginning of December 191 5.
On the 17th of January 1916 there arrived at the port
additional aeroplanes for the Royal Naval Air Service,
namely, two 140 horse-power Voisin biplanes. The Royal
Naval Air Service unit had the aeroplanes, but was short
of pilots, while the Royal Flying Corps had the pilots but
no aeroplanes for them. It was decided, therefore, to
combine in a composite Flight for temporary duty with
the Tigris Corps. No tug was available to tow the stores
barge upstream until the 31st of January, when the move
from Basra was begun, the aeroplanes going by air. One
Short and one Voisin were wrecked on the way and only
two aeroplanes survived the journey to Ora, which was
reached on the 2nd of February, the stores barge arriving
two days later. With the arrival of the naval aeroplanes,
one of the two Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes, much the
worse for wear, was sent down to Basra for refit. Unhap-
pily the ill luck which had dogged the Composite Flight
continued. The one Short was damaged in a bad landing
on the 4th of February and the Voisin, after making three
reconnaissance flights, was forced down by engine trouble
on the 8th and was bogged for ten days. Another Short
which arrived on the 14th turned over on landing and
was wrecked.
In February, however, additional aircraft reinforce-
ments reached Mesopotamia. They were two steel Henri
Farmans (140 horse-power Canton Unne engines)' and
^ These all-steel aeroplanes proved extremely satisfactory, and they and
I
I9I6] AIRCRAFT REINFORCEMENTS 269
five Short seaplanes (225 horse-power Sunbeam engines)
for the Royal Naval Air Service and four B.E.2c's for the
Royal Flying Corps. Meanwhile, by arrangement between
the War Office and the Admiralty, it had been decided
that the Royal Naval Air Service detachment should be
placed under the orders of the G.O.C. in Mesopotamia,
and that the military authorities should assume full
responsibility for all administration, transport, and repair,
in connexion with the naval Flight. Accordingly, on the
28th of February, orders were issued stating that the Royal
Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service detachments
would be administered as one service under army orders,
and would be commanded by Wing Commander R.
Gordon.^ The two Henri Farmans were flown to Ora at
the end of February, and two of the four B.E.2c's on the
5th and 6th of March. On the 8th 'A' Flight personnel,
who had been sent from the front to Basra to refit, arrived
back at Ora with a workshop lighter carrying the remain-
ing two B.E.2c's, two Lewis guns, wireless sets, cameras,
photographic equipment, bombs, and general stores.
Meanwhile, the Turks had also been reinforced, from the
Dardanelles, by a German aeroplane unit which included
some Fokker single-seater fighters. On the 13th of Febru-
ary the first enemy bombs were dropped on the besieged in
Kut, and thereafter there were many sporadic bombing
attacks which inflicted no great material damage but sadly
affected the morale of the civilian population in the town.
The enemy aerodrome was located at Shumran Bend,
within sight of the Kut defenders, and Major-General
Townshend arranged to give warning, by wireless, when-
ever enemy pilots left the ground in order that aeroplanes
of No. 30 Squadron might be sent up to attack. There
were, however, no British aeroplanes available capable of
standing up to the Fokker. Indeed, as has been told, there
was, for a long time, only one serviceable aeroplane with
the forward troops. On the 5th of March one of the
their engines stood up to the climate well, as they did in the campaigns in
German South-West and East Africa. See Vol. Ill, Ch. I.
* Major P. W. L. Broke-Smith became staff officer for aviation to act as
technical adviser at General Head-quarters on all aeronautical matters.
270 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Voisins was shot down, and a message dropped by a
German pilot next day stated that the two officers had
been killed ; C^est le sort des aviateurs, c^est la guerre, the
message concluded. The observer in the Voisin, Captain
W. G. Palmer, had been the first officer to be trained as
a pilot in Mesopotamia.^ He was a staff college graduate,
and the air reports he had made of the Turkish defences
had often been the subject of special tribute in the military-
intelligence diaries.
^he Attack on the Dvjaila Redoubt
[Map, p. 269]
The main Turkish defence system covering Kut on
the right bank of the Tigris was the Es Sinn position. If
this could be turned the way to Kut would be open, and
the chances were that, immediately the Turks knew the
position had been turned, they would evacuate their
defences on both banks of the river below Kut.^ The key
to the Es Sinn position was the Dujaila Redoubt on its
right flank, some fourteen miles south-west of the British
lines on the same side of the river. Lieutenant-General
Aylmer decided on a bold strategic move. There was
reliable information that the water supply in the Dujaila
area was meagre and that, in consequence, a majority of
the troops detailed to garrison the redoubt were normally
encamped some five miles distant, by the banks of the
Tigris. Lieutenant-General Aylmer's plan was to move a
superior force, under cover of darkness, across the Turkish
front to attack the Dujaila positions and carry them by
assault before reinforcements could arrive: the operation
was to begin on the 7th of March.
^ A training school had been established at Basra in September 1915,
under orders of the Government of India that pilots must be trained in
Mesopotamia. The order was cancelled in 1916, when the War Office took
over the responsibility for the air detachment in Mesopotamia.
2 There is much evidence to support this statement, and the reader
might usefully refer to the account of the action in the official military
history, Mesopotamia Campaign^ Vol. II, pp. 314-49. It should be borne
in mind that the Turks, who were admittedly in a difficult position, had to
reckon with the possibility that the Kut garrison would make a sortie to
attack the rear of their defences.
i9i6] THE DUJAILA REDOUBT 271
It will be observed that surprise and time were the
elements on which success depended. The undertaking
was sufficiently formidable. It meant the movement of
20,000 men, with their impedimenta, for distances
ranging up to 16 miles. A night march of this kind, through
strange country, called for perfect march discipline and
for expert and detailed staff work, more particularly
as the attack was to follow immediately the march was
completed.
It was calculated that if the troops were assembled to
leave their rendezvous at 9 p.m. on the 7th of March,
they would reach their objective by dawn, alDout 5.45 a.m.,
on the 8th, a calculation which allowed a margin of one
hour for unforeseen delays. The march represented a
distance of from 12 to 16 miles, and some of the formations
taking part had already been on the move the night before.
Furthermore, the force was a mixed one, of British
and Indian troops, and this had some effect on march
discipline, while the staff work, mainly because of a
deficiency in staff training, did not always reach the
exacting standard which the operation demanded.
There were initial delays and some of the troops,
particularly the artillery, arrived late at the rendezvous,
with the result that the start could not take place until
10.22 p.m., so that the margin of one hour allowed to
cover the whole operation was more than consumed
before it began. There were other delays on the march, and
an hour after dawn the troops, already weary, were still
a mile or more short of their objective.
It has been asserted that because the marching columns
were thus overtaken by daylight, with still a long way to
go, the operation was doomed to failure. This is untrue.
The Turks had no reason to suspect an attack against the
Dujaila Redoubt and there was little fear of early discovery
from the air. Owing to the length of shadow cast by the
morning sun close observation from above was difficult
at this time of the year until after 8 a.m., and as it was
necessary for both sides to make the most of their slender
resources in aeroplanes it was not usual for air recon-
naissances to be made until the visibility ensured adequate
272 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
observation. So far, therefore, as enemy aeroplanes were
concerned, the commander of the attacking force could
justifiably assume that he would be reasonably safe from
detection until about 8 a.m. He might, indeed, have
extended this hour until 9 a.m. without being unduly
optimistic.
The element of surprise was exploded by the artillery.
It seemed to Lieutenant-General Aylmer, who had taken
up his head-quarters on a mound which gave a fair view
of the battle-field, that the Turks could not have failed
to see, from their redoubts, at least some of the British
movements, and as he had received a message which led
him to believe that the British infantry would shortly be
ready to attack, he ordered the corps artillery to open fire.
This they did at 7 a.m. against a camp of Turkish cavalry
and Arab irregulars south-west of the Dujaila Redoubt,
and all the Turkish defenders in the area were at once
startled into alertness. It is known that this was the first
intimation the Turks received that an attack was imminent,
and that the Turkish defensive movements were at once
set in train.
The British infantry were not, in fact, ready to go forward
until long after the artillery opened fire. The main body
was being formed for the attack in the Dujaila depression,
a process which consumed precious hours. Troops, trans-
port, artillery, and ambulance wagons had to be sorted
out within a strictly limited space, a task made more
difficult because of the tiredness of men and animals. In
the result it was not until 9.35 a.m. that the infantry
began their forward march to the assault.
The importance of the delay will be clear if we consider
the Turkish dispositions and movements. In advanced
positions at Bait Isa and Chahela, on the Tigris, covering
the Es Sinn defences, was a regiment (1,000 rifles) of the
35th Division with the remaining two regiments (2,000
rifles) of the division holding the Es Sinn Hne from the
Tigris as far as and including the Dujaila Redoubt.
Originally guarding the right flank of the redoubt were
Arab irregulars and a part of the Turkish cavalry brigade,
but when the British artillery had opened on them at
i9i6] A RACE FOR TIME 273
7 a.m. they had fled, thus leaving the flank open. In the
Dujaila area, but some distance behind the redoubt, v^ere
four battalions of the 2 Division (ist and 5 th Regiments),
while at and near the Hai bridge were three more batta-
lions of this division. Across the Tigris on the left bank,
available for reinforcing the Es Sinn defences, was the
SI St Division (4,000 rifles). On the same side of the river,
investing Kut, was the 4s th Division (3,000 rifles). The
forward defence systems on the left bank, at Hanna and
Sanniyat, were held by the s^nd Division (4,000 rifles).
As soon as the alarm was raised orders were given for the
Turkish troops in the advanced positions at Bait Isa and
Chahela to withdraw and move across to strengthen the
right flank about Dujaila. The battalions of the 2nd
Division were also ordered to Dujaila, while the S^st
Division was set on the move by ferry across the Tigris at
Maqasis.
The first British reconnaissance aeroplane left Ora at
7.43 a.m. and the pilot landed again at 8.58 a.m. He
had flown as far as the Shumran Bend and his observer had
examined both banks of the river. The air report had
little to tell. A camp had been struck at Shumran and the
troops were lined up nearby. In the important area, at
Dujaila, some four hundred Turkish infantry were seen
moving along trenches south-west of the redoubt, but
otherwise no activity was noted. The next aeroplane,
however, which had set out at 7.48 a.m., came back at
9.15 a.m. with important information. At 8.30 a.m. the
observer had seen tents being struck in the camp at the
Maqasis canal and, fifteen minutes later, in the same area,
had discovered eighteen Turkish companies moving
towards the Hghtly held Dujaila Redoubt, with the head
of the column some three miles west-north-west of the
redoubt. This column was, it can now be stated, made up
of the four battalions of the Turkish 2nd Division together
with two machine-gun and engineer companies. A later air
reconnaissance, made from 10.50 a.m. to 12.25 P-m., dis-
covered the movement of the s^st Division across the
Tigris at Maqasis. A part of this division, according to the
observer's report, was already across the river at 11. 15 a.m.
2504.5 T
274 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
and was on the move down the Maqasis canal bed, but
there still remained about 2,000 men waiting to be ferried
across in the pontoons and bellums which were being rowed
backwards and forwards. The Turkish movements con-
tinued to be reported from the air during the rest of the
day, sometimes under conditions of hail and rain. We need
not, however, consider the further reports in detail.
A belief has persisted in service circles that the failure
to press home the attack, and the consequent failure to
relieve Kut, would almost certainly have been avoided if
due attention had been paid to the information provided
by the air reconnaissance reports. One may imagine the
feelings of the air observers who looked down on the
Turkish defences and saw them lightly held, and then
watched the enemy reinforcements hurrying forward. The
drama was presented to them as a race against time in
which the British appeared voluntarily to be conferring
upon the enemy the advantage of an unrestricted start.
Now that all the relevant facts are known, however, it is
clear that what the air observers saw did not make, and could
not have made, any vital difference to the battle. It is true
that the air reports correctly gave the general position and
therefore provided much useful information for the head-
quarters staff, but apart from the fact that the first report
was not delivered until after 9 a.m., by which time the
Turkish reinforcements had begun to take their places in
the trenches, it is certain that the fatal delays in making
the British attack could not have been obviated by any
information, no matter how timely and complete, which
might have been received from the air. The absolute
need for vigour and dash had been firmly impressed upon
all concerned at a conference on the afternoon of the 7th
of March at Lieutenant-General Aylmer's head-quarters,
and was indeed obvious. Furthermore, at 8 a.m. on the
8th, the commanders of two of the attacking brigades had
represented to the general officer responsible for the whole
operation the dangers attending further delay and they
had urgently pleaded for permission to begin their advance
at once. This permission, however, was refused because
the general arrangements for the attack were still incom-
i9i6] BOMBING OPPORTUNITIES 275
plete. In particular, one brigade was at the time on the
move along the Dujaila depression, making its way to a
better position for deployment.
The reader may perhaps ask why the Turkish reinforce-
ments were not bombed from the air. They were clearly
seen marching into battle, and they were watched as they
ferried across the Tigris. Here surely was an opportunity
for the Royal Flying Corps to shatter the enemy columns,
or at least to delay their coming into action. In the light
of our later knowledge it is reasonable to assume that
successful bombing would almost certainly have turned
the scale in favour of the attackers. Nor is there much
doubt that if the action were fought again with the same
weapons, but according to modern ideas, all the available
aircraft would be diverted for bombing attacks on the
advancing reinforcements.
The total aircraft available were four aeroplanes of the
Royal Flying Corps, and two aeroplanes and three sea-
planes of the Royal Naval Air Service. To understand
the views at the time about the value of bombing
it will be necessary to recall the conditions under
which pilots and observers had to work. The demands
made by the corps staff for strategical and tactical recon-
naissance, and by the artillery for co-operation, could at
no time be fully met, and pilots and aircraft alike had to
be subjected to prolonged and severe strain. Furthermore,
the aircraft had to be left exposed in the open, and their
airworthiness rapidly deteriorated. For these reasons,
bombing was seldom undertaken. It was held that the
risk of loss entailed by flying low enough to ensure a
reasonable chance of a hit on the target was not generally
acceptable. The opportunity on the morning of the 8th
of March, however, was exceptional, but it is highly
doubtful whether the air commander was in a position to
assess the needs of the moment. It would appear that
except for what he learned from his air reports he knew
little or nothing of what was happening in the Dujaila
area. The vital time, when bombing would have been
most useful and might have been decisive, was when the
second morning reconnaissance aeroplane landed at 9.15
276 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
a.m. and reported the eighteen Turkish companies moving
towards the Dujaila Redoubt. The opportunity, however,
was missed, and the Turkish reinforcements were enabled
to get into position, unhampered, before the British
infantry attack was fully developed. The result was that
the infantry could make no appreciable headway, and as
the day wore on the opposition stiffened while the
attackers became more tired. By the evening Lieutenant-
General Aylmer decided that it was useless to continue.
The British column was far from its water and supplies
and could not be supported, and on the morning of the
9th, therefore, the withdrawal began. While the troops
who had come within sight of the guns of Kut, no more
than eight miles away, were marching with their backs to
the town they had set out to relieve, the aeroplane obser-
vers kept watch to report any Turkish attempts to pursue
or outflank them.
^he Advance Resumed
A month of inactivity followed. On the i ith of March
Lieutenant-General Sir G. F. Gorringe succeeded Lieu-
tenant-General Aylmer in command of the Tigris Corps.
Reinforcements began to arrive and preparations, impeded
by heavy rains and by floods, were made for a direct attack
on the Umm al Hanna position. Meanwhile, on the i8th
of March, bombs from a German aeroplane fell into the
hospital at Kut and killed six men and wounded twenty-six,
fourteen of whom died later. Major-General Townshend
asked, by wireless, that Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes
should retaliate by bombing the German aerodrome at
Shumran Bend, and also asked that an aeroplane should
be sent to drop smoke-balls on two big naval guns which
were being placed in position for the bombardment of
Kut. The smoke-balls would give him the range and
enable him to attack the enemy guns with his own 5-inch.
It was decided that the risk of sending the few available
aeroplanes to bomb the German aerodrome was too great.
The enemy fighting aircraft were superior in performance
to the reconnaissance aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps
and it was extremely doubtful whether any bombing of
i9i6] THE ADVANCE RESUMED 277
the Shumran Bend aerodrome could be made effective.
Lieutenant-General Gorringe was already hampered by his
inability to allot aeroplanes for artillery observation, and
he v^as indeed compelled to postpone his assault on Hanna
for a few days to permit of the arrival of three additional
aeroplanes on their way to join him. In reply to Major-
General Townshend's request, however, an aeroplane was
sent to co-operate with the Kut guns in their fire against
the enemy naval guns, and, as a result, the two Turkish
guns were so damaged that they never came into
action.
The attack on the Hanna position began at 5 a.m. on
the 5th of April and was immediately successful. The
Turks had evacuated the position during the night,
leaving only a rear-guard to man the front line. Within
two hours the five lines of the defence system had been
captured, but meanwhile the air observers who were
reporting the progress of the battle gave the information
that the Turks were strongly reinforcing the Fallahiya
position, 6,000 yards farther west, and also the Sanniyat
lines about the same distance beyond. The Fallahiya
entrenchments could be approached only over open
ground, and as a result of the great heat, of a mirage, and
of the air information that the position was strongly held,
the attack on it was delayed until the evening. The advance
began at 7.30 p.m. and, within a short time, the Fallahiya
trenches had been captured and consolidated.
The definite success of the 5th of April encouraged
a hope that the relief of Kut would not be much
longer delayed. There now remained only the Sanniyat
and Es Sinn positions in front of the relieving force. Two
trench systems, little less formidable, had been overrun
in one day and it seemed reasonable to hope that the same
skill and courage which had led to the fall of the first two
lines would suffice to carry the third and fourth. The air
reports had revealed that the Turks had no trenches on
the extreme left of the Sanniyat positions which had
previously been protected by flood waters from the
Suwaiqiya marsh, but had been uncovered by a re-
cession of the waters. The 7th Division, therefore, was
278 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
ordered to move, under cover of darkness, against the
Turkish left flank, but all hopes of a successful outflanking
movement w^ere quickly dashed hy the weather. The
Tigris, swollen with the melted snows from the Armenian
hills, rose rapidly, and at midday on the 6th of April it
reached the highest flood-level of the year. The Suwaiqiya
marsh was flooded and the wind, changing to north-west
and bringing rain and hail, blew the Suwaiqiya waters
across the right of the 7th Division, and the troops on
that front had to withdraw. At 4.20 a.m. on the 9th the
attack on the Sanniyat position was made, but Turkish
counter-attacks forced the British troops back. The
attacks were continued up to the 22nd, but the flooded
country greatly restricted and narrowed all movements
and none of the attacks succeeded : all hope of relieving
Kut was at an end.
Dropping Food in Kut
While the attacks were being made, the air detachments
continued to supply information about the Turkish
strength and reinforcements, and particular attention was
paid to the flooded areas which were frequently surveyed
for change. There was, in addition, some photography
of the Turkish positions and gun emplacements. The
chief work of the air service, however, was a gallant but
abortive attempt to supply the beleaguered garrison in Kut
with food. For some weeks miscellaneous articles such as
medical comforts, wireless parts, launch engine parts,
mails, newspapers, and money, had been dropped inter-
mittently into Kut from the air. On the 27th of
March, in answer to an urgent request from Major-
General Townshend, a millstone weighing 70 lb. was
successfully dropped by parachute. While the attempt
to force the Sanniyat positions was still in progress it
became urgently necessary to prolong the powers of
endurance of the Kut garrison. Major-General Towns-
hend reported by wireless that he would require at least
5,000 lb. weight of supplies to be delivered every day,
made up of flour, sugar, chocolate, salt, and Ghi (a clarified
i9i6] DROPPING FOOD IN KUT 279
butter used by natives of India for cooking). That amount
would give 6 oz. each to his 13,840 troops and followers
and 3,700 town Arabs. He stated that, after the 24th of
April, the besieged would be dependent on the air service
for all food except horse meat, the supply of which would
last until the 29th.
Orders were given to the air detachments to drop as
much food as possible in Kut, subj ect to the maintenance of
a limited amount of reconnaissance work and co-operation
with the artillery. Food dropping began on the 15th of
April. The available aircraft were eight B.E.2c's of No. 30
Squadron, and one Voisin and one Henri Farman aero-
planes, and four Short seaplanes, of the naval air unit.
Of these, four B.E.2c's, the two naval aeroplanes, and
three of the Short seaplanes, were used for food dropping.
The distance between the aerodrome at Ora and Kut was
twenty-three and a half miles. Bomb frames were removed
from the aircraft and a hastily designed apparatus, fitted
with a quick-release gear, was substituted. That used on
the aeroplanes consisted of a long bar pivoted at one end
and held by the release gear at the other. The B.E.2c's
carried a 50-lb. bag, lying fore and aft on each wing
against the fuselage, and two 25 -lb. bags between the
chassis struts, slung over the long bar above mentioned.
This distribution was found, after experiment, to be the
only possible one for the inherently stable B.E.2C, but
so loaded the aeroplane was difficult to fly, and the head
resistance set up by the bags was out of proportion to
their size and weight. The Voisin and Henri Farman
aeroplanes carried their total load (150-200 lb.) under the
fuselage without difficulty, but in the seaplanes the bags
(200-250 lb.) were held by a canvas band to prevent them
fouling the water. All the aeroplanes were flown as
single seaters and, to allow of a greater amount of food
being carried, the armament was left behind, the pilot
having to content himself, for defence, with a revolver.
In all, 140 food-dropping flights were made and 19,000
lb. -weight of food dropped between the 15th and 29th
of April,^ the biggest day being the 15th when 3,350 lb.
^ Kut acknowledged the receipt of 16,800 lb.
28o THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
of supplies fell in Kut. On the i6tli Lieutenant-General
Gorringe sent a message hy wireless to say that the
maximum quantity which the air service would be able
to drop in one day would be 3,350 lb., and he advised that
the daily ration to the garrison should be cut from 6
ounces to 4 ounces. Major-General Townshend at once
reduced the ration, but in his reply the same day he said :
'This puts a new light on the question. If they cannot
'put in 5,000 lb. a day I see nothing for it but that a
'steamer should run the blockade.' In the evening of the
24th a fine attempt by the Julnar, one of the fastest
steamers on the river, laden with 270 tons of supplies, was
made to run the Turkish blockade. Her screw, however,
fouled a chain which the Turks had stretched across the
river and she was captured.
The German fighters first began to attack the food-
laden aeroplanes on the 24th, and it became necessary to
provide an escorting aeroplane carrying an observer and
Lewis gun, thus cutting down the number of aeroplanes
available for food dropping. On the 26th a seaplane was
shot down in air combat, and on the same day the pilot.
Lieutenant D. A. L. Davidson, in an unarmed B.E.2C,
was wounded by a Fokker's machine-gun, and the
B.E.2C was damaged but was landed safely on its aero-
drome. Owing to the urgency of the need for aeroplanes
at the front three out of four Maurice Farmans which
had arrived at Basra from England were flown up-country
without delay on the 26th. They safely reached the forward
aerodrome in the wadi, but did not long survive. A storm
during the night of the 2nd of May wrecked all three as they
stood pegged down in the open.
Meanwhile, on the 26th of April, Major-General
Townshend, under instructions from Sir Percy Lake, had
opened negotiations with the Turkish Commander and,
on the 29th, after all guns and ammunition had been
destroyed by the besieged, a Turkish battalion marched
into Kut and the surrender was formally completed.
After the capitulation, some 12,000 prisoners were marched
700 miles into Anatolia, but over 4,000 of them failed to
live through their captivity. Of the forty-four Royal
i9i6] A TIAiE OF PREPARATION 281
Flying Corps non-commissioned officers and men with
the besieged, few survived the march. ^
^he Advance to Baghdad: Preparations
[Maps, pp. 249 and 300]
After the fall of Kut, the British and Turkish forces
were comparatively inactive until the end of 19 16. Both
sides were exhausted by the fighting, by the climatic
conditions of the country, and by the supply and com-
munication difficulties. The British Government, when
it authorized General Lake to negotiate the surrender of
Kut, had stated that the subsequent attitude of the
British forces in Mesopotamia must be defensive. The
Russians, however, were moving against Baghdad from
Persia, and he was asked to assist by keeping the Turks
on the Tigris occupied, and he was not, therefore, to
withdraw his force farther than might be necessary for
tactical reasons. An additional reason against withdrawal
was the possible effect on the Arabs, and on Persia and
Afghanistan. 2
An air reconnaissance on the 19th of May^ reported
that the Turkish troops had evacuated the advanced
positions on the right bank of the Tigris at Es Sinn, but
that the Sanniyat line was strongly held. On receipt of
this information, the British advanced along the right
bank, and on the 20th occupied the Dujaila Redoubt.
Subsequent air reconnaissances revealed that, except for
small rear-guards covering the bridges over the Hai river,
the country on the right bank of the Tigris was clear as
far as the Hai. The retention by the Turks of the Sanniyat
lines made transport on the Tigris impossible, and the
troops operating on the right bank towards the Hai river
^ The Australian air historian quotes an account of an officer prisoner
which says that only six men survived. See The Australian Flying Corps,
by F. M. Cutlack, p. 26. Official figures are not available.
^ In February 1916, the War Office had taken over the general direction
of the operations in Mesopotamia, but India remained responsible for the
administration of the force. This dual responsibility proved unsatisfactory
and, in July 1916, the Army Council assumed full control.
3 The Royal Flying Corps detachment had moved back to the aerodrome
at Shaikh Saad on the 6th of May.
282 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
had therefore to depend entirely on land transport and their
advance to occupy the positions evacuated by the Turks had
to be made gradually. The opposing forces settled down
on the Hai-Sanniyat front to trench warfare, but along
the strung-out lines of communication back to Basra
there was great activity and preparation. Railways were
built, the shallows of the river dredged, protective em-
bankments constructed, the hospital service was reorgan-
ized, and, in particular, the whole of the water transport
system was expanded and remodelled. In August 191 6,
Sir Percy Lake was succeeded in the command by Major-
General F. S. Maude, who continued and perfected the
preparations for a resumption of the offensive.
The operations to relieve Kut, especially the food-
dropping flights, had thrown a great strain on the air
personnel. Owing to the exposure of the aeroplanes to
the weather, and to the unsuitability of the aircraft,
particularly of the engines, to withstand the extremes of
the Mesopotamian climate, the officers and mechanics had
been compelled to work feverishly day and night to
maintain the aeroplanes in some sort of flying trim.
Aware that the starving garrison in Kut had reached the
stage when they depended entirely on such food as could
be dropped from the air, the men had worked unsparingly,
and pilots and mechanics who were sick to exhaustion had
spurred themselves to keep going so long as the urgency
remained. When the tension was over, and as the thermo-
meter mounted, there was much suffering among the
flying personnel. The war diary of No. 30 Squadron for
May records: 'From eight pilots in April, the Squadron
'Flights in the field suddenly dwindled to two pilots and
'finally to one pilot each. All the others went to hospital,
'more or less seriously knocked up, directly after the strain
'due to the feeding of Kut was over. The hot weather
'came on apace, and there were many admissions to
'hospital among the rank and file also.' Thus handicapped,
the flying detachment at the front had a trying time and
the enemy pilots, with their better equipment, quickly
asserted a definite superiority.^
' 'The superiority of the enemy planes . . . combined with a large
I9I6] REINFORCEMENTS 283
The Royal Naval Air Service detachment was withdrawn
from Mesopotamia at the end of June. The seaplanes had
proved unsuitable for work on the Tigris and they were
sent to Egypt, but the two naval Voisin aeroplanes were
handed over to the Royal Flying Corps, together with
miscellaneous spare parts and stores. On the 29th of June,
the day the naval air personnel embarked at Basra, there
arrived from Egypt a Naval Kite Balloon Section — No. 14
— with four balloons. These were welcomed for work
with the artillery, and the section was placed immediately
under army administration.^
On the 19th of July, by which time many new pilots
had arrived, the establishment of No. 30 Squadron was
increased from twelve to eighteen aeroplanes, and the
squadron was placed under the general administrative
orders of the Middle East Brigade, the head-quarters of
which was in Egypt. On the 31st, Major J. E. Tennant
arrived in Mesopotamia to take command of the squadron,
and he brought with him additional pilots who had been
trained in night flying and fighting.^ At the same time.
Major N. D. K. MacEwen succeeded Major P. W. L.
Broke-Smith as Assistant Director of Aviation. At the
beginning of August, No. 30 Squadron had thirteen
serviceable B.E.2c's, seven were being overhauled, and
seven more were being unloaded at Basra. Major
Tennant was now in a position to resume the offensive
against the enemy in the air and to augment the recon-
naissance and photographic work required by the army.
On the 13th of August a Fokker was shot down over
Shumran aerodrome, the first enemy aeroplane to fall
on this front in air combat, and, next night, the 14th, the
first of a series of intermittent night bombing attacks on
'reduction in the number of our pilots (due to sickness partly attributable
'to overwork) enabled the enemy in May and June to establish what was
'very nearly a mastery of the air.' (Sir Percy Lake, in his official dispatch.)
^ The kite balloons were used to direct the fire of the ships bombarding
the Turkish forward positions from the Tigris, and also worked with the
corps artillery.
^ An authentic account of the subsequent work of No. 30 Squadron is
given in In the Clouds above Baghdad, by Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Ten-
nant, D.S.O., M.C.
284 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
the German aerodrome was made. A notable attack was
that made on the 23rd of September, when Lieutenant
the Hon. J. H. B. Rodney and Second Lieutenant J. S.
Windsor, flying B.E.2c's as single-seaters, bombed the
aerodrome from under 100 feet and destroyed one aero-
plane and damaged another. A direct hit on an Albatros
on the Shumran aerodrome was also obtained by Captain
H. de Havilland, with a 20-lb. bomb, on the 2nd of Novem-
ber. As a result of the offensive against the German Air
Service the Royal Flying Corps regained air superiority,
and the work of co-operation with the army was enabled
to proceed with little or no enemy interruption. Other
bombing objectives were Arab strongholds, Kut, Baghdad,
and the pontoon bridges across the Tigris north of Kut.
The main work of No. 30 Squadron up to the time when
the military offensive was resumed was reconnaissance,
photography, and co-operation with the artillery. No
accurate maps of the area of the Tigris were available, and
the country had to be photographed, mile by mile, in
order that maps might be made. Of particular military
value were the maps, compiled from air photographs,
which laid bare the trench systems in the various Turkish
defensive positions. A systematic programme for the de-
struction of the Turkish gun-pits behind the Sanniyat
position was begun in August with the help of Flight
of No. 30 Squadron, under Captain J. H. Herring, which
moved forward to Arab Village, the headquarters of the
7th Division, on the 17th of August.
The reorganization of the forces in Mesopotamia had
progressed so well that, in the middle of October, General
Head-quarters moved from Basra to Arab Village. Except
for 'A' Flight, which remained at Shaikh Saad for bombing
operations, No. 30 Squadron had concentrated at Arab
Village early in the month.
About this time the question of the future military
operations in Mesopotamia was the subject of a triangular
discussion between the British Government, the Com-
mander-in-Chief in India, and Major-General Maude.
The British Government had, on the 28th of September,
defined the mission of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary
i9i6] PLAN OF OPERATIONS 285
Force as follows: 'To protect the oilfields and pipe-lines
'in the vicinity of the Karun river, to maintain our
'occupation and control of the Basra vilayet, and to deny
'hostile access to the Persian Gulf and Southern Persia.
'No fresh advance to Baghdad can at present be contem-
'plated, but it is the desire of H.M. Government, if and
'when possible^ to establish British influence in the
'Baghdad vilayet. This further advance should not be
'undertaken unless and until sanction for it is given. . . .'
After a long exchange of telegrams it was ultimately
agreed that Major-General Maude should advance his
left to the Hai river. It was impressed on him that as his
force could not be increased, he must avoid losses which
gave no adequate return. Major-General Maude made it
clear that his operations would be conducted in steps,
with a careful review after each step before the next move
was made. His first step would be to get a firm footing
on the Hai, after which he would be favourably placed to
act against the Turkish communications, and might also
force the enemy to evacuate the Sanniyat positions.
It was on this basis that the operations began, and it is
clear that no appreciable advance was contemplated at the
beginning. On the 15th of November the Tigris Corps
was formally disbanded and, in its place, the I Indian
Army Corps (3rd and 7th Divisions) and III Indian Army
Corps (13th and 14th Divisions) came into being. By
the end of the month the preparations were nearing
completion. For some weeks a steady stream of reinforce-
ments had moved up the Tigris, and ammunition and
supplies had been accumulated in the forward areas. The
troops had shaken off the ill effects of the hot weather and
were in good spirit.
Throughout the summer the Turks had methodically
strengthened their defensive positions. The most forward
system, at Sanniyat on the left bank, flanked on one side
by the Suwaiqiya Marsh and on the other by the Tigris,
had been much elaborated, while behind Sanniyat the
fifteen miles of hinterland as far as Kut had been traversed
by additional reserve lines. On the right bank of the river
the Turks still held the line to which they had withdrawn
286 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
in May after evacuating the Es Sinn position. This
Hne extended from a point on the Tigris three miles
north-east of Kut, across the Khudhaira Bend, and to
the Hai river two miles below its exit from the Tigris.
There the line crossed the Hai and ran in a north-westerly
direction to the Shumran Bend of the Tigris. There was
a pontoon bridge across the Hai near its junction with
the main river. This bridge was protected by a system
of entrenchments, and the Turks also occupied the line
of the Hai for several miles below the bridgehead position.
The weakness of the Turkish defence system was that the
Sanniyat position on the left bank was about twelve miles
downstream in advance of the forward defence lines on
the right bank. At Sanniyat the British trenches were
within 1 20 yards of the Turkish front line, while, on the
right bank, the British were about eleven miles upstream
of Sanniyat with advanced posts two miles from those of
the Turks opposite the Khudaira Bend, and with other
posts about five miles from the Hai.
The Offensive Of ens
[Maps, pp. 249 and 300]
By the 12th of December all was ready for the offensive.
The plan was to hold the enemy to the Sanniyat position
while a surprise march was made on the right bank to
secure a footing on the Hai. The bombardment at Sanni-
yat began on the 13th. The Royal Flying Corps on this
day was ordered to make reconnaissances to ascertain
whether Turkish reinforcements were within thirty miles
of Kut, and also to prevent enemy airmen from recon-
noitring the British movements. Two Martinsyde Scouts^
were kept ready to go up at once if and when enemy
aeroplanes were reported. One enemy reconnaissance was
attempted, but before the German aeroplane reached the
front it was attacked at close range and, possibly damaged,
went back immediately to its aerodrome, so that the
' Six Martinsyde Scouts had arrived in September 1916. They were
fitted with 120 horse-power Beardmore engines. The original Martinsydes
used in 1915 had 80 horse-power Gnome engines.
i9i6] THE OFFENSIVE OPENS 287
reconnaissance was never made and the British move-
ments, on the secrecy of which the success of the operation
depended, went undetected. The Royal Flying Corps
reconnaissances during the day reported no new enemy
concentrations or reinforcements. The aeroplanes of
Flight co-operated with the artillery of both the attacking
corps, and the kite balloons helped to direct the fire of the
bombarding ships at Sanniyat.
At 6 a.m. on the 14th the Hai was crossed without
opposition at two points. An attempt made by the Royal
Flying Corps before dawn to cut the bridge of boats which
spanned the Tigris at Shumran was unsuccessful. Without
this bridge the Turkish command would have found it
difficult to reinforce the right bank from the left, and three
pilots aimed eight 20-lb. and four loo-lb. bombs at the
target, but failed to get a direct hit. By continuous close
reconnaissances throughout the day, No. 30 Squadron
kept General Head-quarters in touch with the main
movements, British and Turkish. Signals of white calico,
with numbers to indicate the identity of the brigade or
battalion, were displayed by the various formations on
the ground, and a series of pre-arranged code letters added
to the ground strips enabled the infantry units to convey
simple messages to the air observers. There was some co-
operation with the artillery against fleeting targets and
there were attacks, with bomb and machine-gun, on
enemy troops. The cavalry had pushed on, during the
day, westward of the Hai towards the Shumran bridge,
but had been checked by infantry fire near the bridge.
In the evening the Cavalry Division withdrew to bivouac
at Atab, where two bridges had been thrown across the
Hai. The 39th Infantry Brigade with artillery and divi-
sional cavalry in support had advanced during the day
along the left bank of the Hai and had established them-
selves, by 3 p.m., on a line running north-eastward for
one and a half miles from the Umm as Saad ford. Infantry
patrols, meanwhile, had ascertained that the Turks were
holding the trenches across the Khudhaira Bend and those
covering the Hai bridge.
During the night of the I4th/isth of December,
288 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Captain J. H. Herring, while making a moonlight recon-
naissance to look for any Turkish movements which might
be taking place under cover of darkness, saw that the bridge
of boats, which had spanned the Tigris east of Shumran,
had been dismantled and was being towed upstream in
sections. Captain Herring, who had eight 20-lb. bombs
with him, attacked the towing steamer and the boats, and
twice returned to Arab Village for more bombs. He
dropped, in all, twenty-four 20-lb. bombs and so dis-
organized the line of boats that they were out of control for
six hours, and the result was that the enemy had no effective
communications between his forces on the left and right
banks of the river until the 17th, when the bridge was
re-established west of Shumran.
Major-General Maude ordered special air reconnais-
sances to take place at dawn on the 1 5th to ascertain the
disposition of the Turkish forces and any changes that
had taken place. On receipt of the air reports, which
showed that there was little movement but that the
enemy was in some strength south of the Shumran Bend,
Major-General Maude issued his orders for operations to
begin at 9 a.m. The III Corps was to throw its left
forward to a specified line and then push out patrols to
test the Turkish strength. The Cavalry Division, advanc-
ing to Kala Haji Fahan on the Hai river, was also to test
the Turkish strength in the entrenchments which formed
the western shoulder of the Hai salient, and was to send
strong patrols to reconnoitre towards the Shumran Bend.
The task of the I Corps was to make a systematic bombard-
ment of the Sanniyat position, and the naval flotilla was
asked to co-operate. By i p.m. the III Corps, meeting
with little opposition, had occupied its objective line.
At noon an air reconnaissance made it clear that the
Turks had few troops on the right bank of the river in
front of the III Corps and, at 1.20 p.m.. General Head-
quarters ordered the Corps to push on rapidly to an
advanced specified line;^ the troops had not quite gained
the whole of the new line when darkness set in. The
^ A note in the General Head-quarters Operations War Diary records:
'R.F.C. carrying out excellent work in reconnaissance and observation.'
i9i6] THE HAI SALIENT 289
cavalry, who had discovered that the Turks held the
western shoulder of the Hai salient in strength, returned
at dusk to bivouacs on the Hai.
On the 1 6th Major-General Maude further extended
his footing on the Hai, while the Sanniyat positions, as
well as the Kut and Hai salient areas, were effectively
bombarded with the help of the air observers. During the
day air reconnaissances were continuous, and thirty-two
20-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets, including
camps and barracks at Shumran, and Dahra.
Special air reconnaissances on the morning of the 17th
of December disclosed no important enemy movements
and no new works between Shumran and Kut, and con-
firmed that the right bank of the Tigris was clear of
Turkish troops outside the entrenched positions.
After studying his air reports, Major-General Maude
issued an order at 1 1 a.m. in which he outlined his future
intentions. Broadly summarized, his plan was to contain
the enemy at Kut and to the eastward, with the I Corps
and with part of the III Corps, while he manoeuvred
westward with the Cavalry Division and the remainder
of the III Corps to strike at the enemy's communications.
During the night of the 1 7th/ 1 8th aeroplanes bombed
the Turkish river craft east of Kut and a hit with a 20-lb.
bomb was made on a moored steamer. On the i8th the
Cavalry Division moved out to shell the Shumran boat
bridge, which it did in the afternoon with the help of an
aeroplane observer who dropped smoke-balls over the
bridge to indicate its position. The cavalry, who had
arrived late, had to withdraw again after a brief bombard-
ment and the bridge remained intact.
The 19th of December was spent in consolidation, and
in a redistribution of the troops. The advance had taken
the British within reach of the Turkish communications
west of Kut, and Major-General Maude judged that the
time had come for an operation to sever these com-
munications. A column was sent out on the 20th with
orders to bridge the Tigris at the brick kilns, about four
miles west of Shumran, and so get astride the Turkish
communications. The column found the enemy in
2504-5 U
290 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
strength on the left bank of the river, and as the poHcy
was to avoid heavy casualties the attempt to force a
crossing was discontinued and the column withdrew. Two
aeroplanes which co-operated with the column had an
encounter with an Albatros two-seater which was shot
down and crashed. One of the Royal Flying Corps aero-
planes was hit by fire from the ground and the engine
disabled ; the pilot, however, was able to land within the
British lines. The usual close and distant reconnaissances
were made and the air co-operation with the artillery in the
bombardment of the Sanniyat and Kut-Hai positions
continued.
On the 2 1 St of December, under special orders from
General Head-quarters, the Turkish depots at Bughaila
on the Tigris east of Kut were attacked by seven B.E.2c's
and three Martinsydes with sixty-six 20-lb. and Ii2-lb.
bombs. Buildings on the riverside were damaged and a
steamer was hit, and there is evidence that a panic pre-
vailed while the bombing was in progress. Bughaila was
attacked again before dawn on the 22nd by three pilots,
and, during the morning, by two more.
Until the middle of January 191 7, while consolidation
of the positions on the Hai proceeded, there was little
of importance to record. On the 24th of December an
air reconnaissance of the whole of the Tigris as far as
Baghdad was made and no massing of Turkish troops was
disclosed; this was the first visit paid to Baghdad by a
British aeroplane since the battle of Ctesiphon. On the
26th of December the weather broke, and for a fortnight
there was steady rain which led to a rise of the Tigris and
to the flooding of large tracts of country with the result
that the maintenance of supplies became diflicult.
The position of the enemy in the Khudhaira Bend had
become a menace to our communications with the Hai.
The Turks had control of the marginal 'bunds' on the river
and could, in flood-time, open these and swamp parts of
our line. Major-General Maude, therefore, decided to
clear the Khudhaira Bend, and operations began on the
7th of January and, by the 19th, after severe hand-to-hand
fighting, had been successfully completed. While this
1917] BAGHDAD BOMBED 291
fighting was in progress, the weather was misty and the
Royal Flying Corps could do little to help.
On the 20th of January, a fine day, three pilots bombed
the citadel at Baghdad where the Turks had a munition
factory. Two of the six lOO-lb. bombs dropped hit the
citadel, but they failed to explode. The pilots, during
their flight, made a detailed reconnaissance of the Turkish
positions at Ctesiphon, Diyala, and Baghdad, and of
shipping and railway movements, and the information
they brought back was added by General Head-quarters
to special maps which were distributed to the army
commanders.
On the same day there was a reorganization of the
Royal Flying Corps units. Major J. E. Tennant was
appointed Wing Commander in command of the Royal
Flying Corps in Mesopotamia, and the command of No.
30 Squadron passed to Captain H. de Havilland. The
appointment of assistant director of aeronautics was
abolished.
On the nth of January preparations were begun for
the reduction of the Hai salient and, by the 24th, the
British trenches had been advanced within 400 yards of
the Turkish front line. On the 25th, the enemy's front
line was captured along about 1,800 yards and, by the
28th, in spite of strong Turkish counter-attacks, we held
about two miles of the position to a depth of from 300-
700 yards. On the 27th, 'C Flight of No. 30 Squadron,
which had specialized in the work of co-operation with
artillery, had moved forward to a landing-ground at Sinn
Abtar, and, for the remainder of the action on the Hai,
helped to direct the fire of the artillery on the Turkish
batteries and trenches and on fleeting targets, and con-
tinuously reported the progress of the operations.
On the 1st of February, when the troops were assembled
ready to attack the Turkish third line of the Hai salient,
an aeroplane engaged in registering the artillery on enemy
gun-pits preparatory to the assault was attacked by a
Fokker which the British pilot. Lieutenant J. R. Burns,
shot down with a burst of five shots. The brief encounter
was watched by the British infantry, who saw the Fokker
292 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
crash just as they left their trenches to attack the Turks,
and they went over stimulated by the incident.^ On the
right, the Turkish third line was won and held, but on the
left gains which were made could not be maintained in
face of strong Turkish counter-attacks.
Next day the III Corps extended its left towards the
Tigris and, by the 4th of February, the last of the enemy
troops east of the Hai had withdrawn to the Liquorice
Factory in the western angle between the Hai and the
Tigris, and to the Dahra Bend. The Liquorice Factory — •
a nest of machine-guns — was heavily bombarded with the
help of aeroplane observation, and on the 9th the infantry
attack was renewed along the whole line. Next day, to
the accompaniment of a high wind and dust storms, the
Factory was captured and the general forward movement
continued. The discomfiture of the enemy was made more
acute by the success of an aeroplane observer who, at a
range of 9,800 yards, directed the fire of a 60-pounder
battery on the bridge at Shumran which was broken up;
direct hits were also made on a barge and on two gun-pits.
The advance continued in the Dahra Bend on the
nth and, by the evening, the left of the III Corps was
resting on the Tigris south of the Shumran Peninsula,
and the Turkish troops in the Dahra Bend had been
completely enclosed with their backs to the river. There
was no flying on the nth owing to the violence of the
gale (this was the only day during the operations when
the aeroplanes were kept on the ground), and there was
little flying on the 12th. But air reconnaissances on
this day disclosed that the damaged bridge had been
removed from the Shumran Bend, and that a collection
of pontoons about five miles higher up the river indicated
an impending new attempt to bridge the stream. The
air observers also reported on this day, and on the two
subsequent days, the digging of new trenches and gun-
pits.
By the 15th of February all was ready for a resumption
Among documents captured later was a Turkish message asking the
German aeroplane squadron to make arrangements to remove the debris
of the Fokker in which the body of the dead pilot was wedged.
1917] CROSSING THE TIGRIS 293
of the attack. Although the day was cloudy, rain held off
until the evening and the aeroplanes were able to co-
operate fully. The main attack was launched against the
Dahra Bend defences at 8.30 a.m., and the air observers
helped all day to direct the artillery against the Turkish
batteries across the river, and against all the possible ferry
places on both banks. Time and again pontoons, laden
with Turkish troops, were caught by the artillery, as a
result of wireless calls sent down from the aeroplanes, and
they were smashed before they could make the crossing.
By the morning of the i6th the whole of the Dahra Bend
had been captured with more than 2,000 prisoners.^
Crossing the Tigris
The right bank of the Tigris as far as Bughaila was now
clear of the enemy, but far back, down the left bank, the
Turks still remained entrenched in the formidable Sanni-
yat positions. Major-General Maude decided to attack
at Sanniyat with the object of directing the full attention
of the Turks to that front while he threw the III Corps
across the river in the neighbourhood of Shumran. The
first attack at Sanniyat was made on the 17th of February,
when the first and second lines of trenches were captured
on a front of about 400 yards, but could not be held.
Torrential rain on the evening of the i6th and on the 17th
made the country waterlogged and sent the yellow waters
of the Tigris swirling down in spate. For a few days there
were no active operations, but the preparations for the
bridging of the river at Shumran proceeded. A second
attack at Sanniyat was ordered for the morning of the 22nd
to cover the crossing of the river upstream which was
timed to begin in the early hours of the 23rd. On the
successful bridging of the Tigris, and the passage of the
III Corps across to the left bank, the whole strategy of
the operation depended, and the Royal Flying Corps was
^ The B.G.R.A. Ill Corps sent a telegram on the i6th to Lieutenant-
Colonel J. E. Tennant, saying, 'Please accept yourself and convey to your
'squadron warmest thanks of all artillery III Corps for constant and
'invaluable co-operation which alone rendered possible close support of
'infantry.'
294 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
asked to prevent any German aeroplane from leaving its
aerodrome on the 23rd to discover the British intentions.
The Royal Flying Corps was further requested to keep the
army commander, and the subordinate commanders who
were charged with the task of bridging the river, fully
informed throughout the 23rd of the progress of the opera-
tion, to co-operate with the artillery of the III Corps,
especially against any Turkish guns which threatened the
bridge, and to work with the artillery of the I Corps in
the attack on the Sanniyat defences.
The Sanniyat attack on the 22nd of February, in which
the aeroplanes duly co-operated, secured the first and
second enemy lines. On the 23rd, at dawn, the first aero-
plane flew across to the German aerodrome and, at any
sign of activity below, the pilot dropped a bomb. He
maintained his patrol until relieved in accordance with
a prearranged programme, and in this way, by a relay of
single aeroplanes, the German pilots were kept on the
ground until 5 p.m. when one succeeded in getting into
the air. By that time, however, any air reconnaissance the
enemy might make could only be of inconsiderable value.
The first British troops had crossed the Tigris by ferry at
7.30 a.m., and by 4.30 p.m. the bridge had been completed
and was open for traffic. It was a brilliant feat and may
be set down as one of the master strokes of the campaign.
By nightfall the infantry of one British division were across
the river and another division was ready to follow. At
Sanniyat the success had also been striking and the Turkish
third, fourth, and fifth lines had been won.
Retreat and Pursuit
As darkness fell on the evening of the 23rd there was
excitement in the British lines, and the Royal Flying
Corps officers looked forward eagerly to the morrow.
What they expected to find was the Turkish army in
precipitate retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant was
given a free hand by Major-General Maude. 'An army
'on the run over flat desert', he says, 'and the complete
'mastery of the air, one's wildest dreams had come true.
'The weary pilots got in to snatch a few hours' sleep,
I9I7] RETREAT AND PURSUIT 295
Vhile the mechanics spent the night loading machines
Vith bombs and overhauling engines.' ^
At 6.30 a.m. on the 24th of February the first pilot
returned to report the Turks in full retreat from Sanniyat.
At Shumran, however, the enemy held on tenaciously to
cover this retreat, and, as a result, the cavalry failed to
break through. Had they done so the Turkish army might
have been routed. Fourteen aeroplanes were available,^
but some of the air activity on the 24th had to be diverted
to co-operation with the artillery in the Shumran area
in an attempt to smash through the enemy defence, and
to reconnaissance in order to keep the British command
informed of the changing situation. But nine bombing
flights were made, during which sixty-six 20-lb. and two
65-lb. bombs were dropped on massed bodies of retreating
Turks. Major H. de Havilland, the commander of No. 30
Squadron, succeeded in getting hits, with 22 of the 24
bombs he carried on two trips, on massed infantry.
The enemy rearguards, which had fought so well and
so effectively on the 24th, withdrew during the night,
and on the 25th the British were in full pursuit. The
aeroplanes kept watch on the enemy movements and re-
ported throughout the day to the pursuing commanders.
The Turkish rearguard made a stand about eight miles
from Shumran, but was pushed back, after stubborn
fighting, to a prepared position two miles farther west.
The cavalry, which attempted to get round the Turkish
flank, was prevented from doing so by entrenched infantry.
The main enemy body, which had been discovered from
the air at Bughaila in the morning, was rigorously bombed.
Ten bombing flights were made and ninety-two 20-lb. and
two 65-lb. bombs dropped, and, although some of them
failed to explode, the general effects were demoralizing.
On the 26th of February the enemy retreated rapidly
and outstripped the pursuing infantry. Guns and much
material were thrown into the river, or abandoned. The
gunboat flotilla steamed up-river at full speed, and, after a
^ In the Clouds above Baghdad^ p. 84.
^ Two aeroplanes of No. 30 Squadron were on detachment at Nasiriya
to watch the Turkish force on the Euphrates front.
296 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
running fight, recaptured H.M.S. Firefly which had been
lost earher in the campaign. The rear ship of the Turkish
flotilla was sunk, the Pioneer^ burning fiercely but still firing
her guns, was run ashore, and the Basra^ with 700 Turkish
and German wounded as passengers, was run ashore hy
a badly wounded British officer who was a prisoner on
board. On this day the aeroplanes moved to the aerodrome
at Shumran, and their main work was reconnaissance and
message-dropping; only one bombing flight was made,
during which twelve 20-lb. bombs were dropped on troops.
Throughout the 27th the gunboat flotilla was in close
action, sometimes at point-blank range, with the retreating
Turks. Air reconnaissances located about 2,000 of the
enemy at Aziziya, with the British cavalry in touch, and
messages were dropped giving details of the Turkish
dispositions. One of the British pilots has recorded:
'Flying towards Aziziya the spectacle was amazing and
'horrible; dead bodies and mules, abandoned guns, wagons
'and stores littered the road, many of the wagons had
'hoisted the white flag, men and animals exhausted and
'starving lay prone on the ground. Few of these, if any,
'survived the attentions of the Arab tribesmen, hanging
'round like wolves on their trail. Further on I came up
'with the rear party on the march. Flying along about
'ten feet from the road, I mowed down seven with one
'burst of machine-gun fire; it was sickening; they hardly
'had the strength to run into the nullahs and fire back;
'those hit just crumpled up under their packs and lay still;
'others waved in token of surrender and supplication for
'rescue. . . .'^
On the 28th, a day of high wind, there was little flying,
but one pilot got to Baghdad and made a careful recon-
naissance. He reported three lines of partly constructed
trenches along the right bank of the Diyala river, with
redoubts between the river and the road. On the same
day the III Corps reached Aziziya, where a halt was made
to give time for the extended lines of communications to
be reorganized for the further advance. The I Corps
closed to the front, clearing the battle-field as it proceeded.
^ In the Clouds above Baghdad, p. 89.
I9I7] BOMBING THE TURKS 297
Great quantities of abandoned material lay scattered along
the eighty miles over which the Turks had retreated under
pressure, and marauding Arabs, in search of loot, descended
on the area and had to be dealt with. Since the crossing
of the Tigris, 4,000 prisoners, 39 guns, 22 trench mortars,
II machine-guns, vessels, barges, pontoons, and general
military stores had been captured.
By the 3rd of March No. 30 Squadron, with fourteen
aeroplanes, was concentrated at Aziziya. The workshop
barges, which proceeded upstream from Shumran on the
same day, found abandoned, about twenty miles up-river
from Bughaila, the old Royal Flying Corps barge which
had been lost at Kut, and in it were two aircraft engines in
good condition, some bombs, and miscellaneous aeroplane
stores.
The advance was resumed on the 5th from Aziziya.
The infantry reached Zor, after a march of eighteen miles,
and the cavalry got to Lajj, seven miles farther on, where
the Turkish rearguard was found and attacked in a dust-
storm which made the fighting confused and rendered
air co-operation difficult. Air reconnaissances were made
of the country between Lajj and Baghdad, and messages
giving some information of the enemy's dispositions were
dropped on the cavalry and on III Corps columns. The
aeroplanes flew forward to Zor from Aziziya, but two
of them were wrecked on landing in the gale. Next day
the forward march was continued with little opposition,
and the strong Ctesiphon positions, found unoccupied,
were passed. The gale had not died down, but air recon-
naissances of the Diyala positions and of Baghdad were
again successfully made.
On the 7th the advanced front came in contact with the
enemy along the Diyala river line which the air observers
had reported in some detail. As guns were brought for-
ward they were directed from the air on the enemy
entrenchments and battery positions. There was an in-
teresting attempt to cut the railway north of Baghdad in
order to prevent the enemy from evacuating his guns and
military stores towards Samarra. Two officers of the Royal
Engineers, carrying charges of dynamite, were piloted by
298 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Lieutenants J. S. Windsor and R. K. Morris to a bridge
at Sumaika, forty miles north of Baghdad. A good landing
was made near the bridge, but Arab horsemen appeared
before the engineer officers could reach the structure.
They realized that the charges of explosive they carried
would be insufficient to destroy the bridge, which proved
to be built of reinforced concrete, and that there was in any
event little chance of effecting their mission with the Arabs
riding down on them, and they therefore rushed back to
the aeroplanes, which got safely into the air. The two
pilots thereupon scattered the party of Arabs with
machine-gun fire.
After sunset on the 7th of March pontoons which were
launched in an attempt to get a footing on the right bank
of the Diyala were heavily fired on and they went drifting
downstream filled with British dead and wounded. Next
day a bridge was thrown across the Tigris, below the
Diyala mouth, and cavalry and infantry were passed across
to attack Shawa Khan, where entrenched positions,
reported by air reconnaissance, covered Baghdad from
the direction of the Euphrates valley. Shawa Khan was
taken, with little opposition, on the morning of the 9th,
and the air observers reported that the Turkish rearguard
had occupied another strong position a mile and a half to
the north-west, and about six miles south of Baghdad.
This position was still being attacked when night fell,
but the Turks went back in the darkness and were engaged,
on the morning of the loth, about three miles from
Baghdad railway station.
The work of the Royal Flying Corps during these
days of fighting before Baghdad was again reconnaissance
and a limited amount of artillery co-operation, but on the
9th a few bombing attacks were made on the German
aerodrome at Baghdad and on Turkish troops and camps
in the neighbourhood. Major de Havilland was partly
successful in blocking the railway north of Baghdad. He
obtained a hit on the station at Al Kadhimain with a 65-lb.
bomb which partly wrecked a train : forty-seven bombs in
all were dropped throughout the day.
The Turkish rearguard, south of Baghdad station, was
1917] BAGHDAD FALLS 299
attacked in a dust storm, but it was not until midnight
on the loth that the enemy retired. Meanwhile, on the
Diyala front, a bridge had been thrown across by noon,
and at nightfall, after heavy fighting, the troops on this
front were in touch with the Turks in their last position
covering Baghdad from the south-east along the Tel
Muhammad ridge.
Early on the morning of the iith of March, Baghdad
was entered amid signs of welcome from the inhabitants,
who had for some hours been at the mercy of looting
mobs of Kurds and Arabs. Although for a fortnight the
Turks had been removing military stores from the city,
quantities of damaged and undamaged material were
captured. No. 30 Squadron, which had moved to Bustan
on the 8th, flew on the nth to the former German
aerodrome at Baghdad, where were found thirteen engines
in fair condition — six of them Royal Flying Corps engines
which had been lost at Kut — and a wrecked Albatros
aeroplane. At Kadhimain were found also four more
damaged Albatros aircraft.^ On the Albatros lying on the
Baghdad aerodrome was a painted message: 'With kind
regards to our British comrades : the German airmen', and
on the fuselage had been written: 'God save the King.'^
In the advance which ended in the capture of Baghdad
— an event of moral importance in the war — the one avail-
able squadron of the Royal Flying Corps had exerted an
appreciable influence. It gave help, at critical times, to the
artillery, and inflicted material and moral damage as a
result of its sporadic bombing of the enemy troops and lines
^ These, which had been packed ready for removal by train, had been
damaged by German mechanics when, at 6.30 a.m. on the nth, rumours
had been received of the approach of British cavalry.
^ A German account says : 'The Army retreated in wild and indescribable
'confusion. The airmen had to fight a rearguard action. Every piece of
'their transport was lost along with all the rest of their materiel, and conse-
'quently the machines, for which there was now no longer any petrol, had
'to be burnt. And still the retirement continued. In order to relieve the
'pressure of the pursuing English forces to some extent, our airmen blew
'up bridges, drove locomotives, in short, did every kind of technical work
'which was required.' (Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War,
Eng. trans., p. 262.)
300 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
of communication, but the outstanding feature of its work
was reconnaissance. The country, flat and monotonous,
offered no vantage points from which the Turkish positions
could be viewed from the ground, but, on the other hand,
it afforded the enemy no scope to conceal his dispositions
from the air observers. At the beginning of the advance
the Royal Flying Corps pilots had quickly asserted their
superiority and they had flown thereafter without serious
opposition. The British troops went forward with the
knowledge that, to Baghdad and beyond, the Turkish dis-
positions and movements could not be hidden from the
British aeroplanes. Air superiority, with all that it implies,
is a condition about which attacking troops are acutely
conscious, and the knowledge that they, and not the enemy,
have that superiority makes a difference to their confidence.
In the advance to Baghdad the pilots and observers did
all that was asked of them, but their work would not have
been possible without the untiring spirit and skill displayed
by the air mechanics and by the transport personnel. The
aeroplanes were kept serviceable under the most primitive
conditions and in face of extreme climatic and physical
difficulties.
Baghdad and Beyond
[Maps, pp. 249 and 324]
There could be no pause after the fall of Baghdad. In
January 19 16 a Russian force of one infantry division
with Cossack cavalry, under General N. N. Baratoff, had
captured Hamadan on the Persian plateau and thereafter,
with a view to helping the British attempt to relieve
Major-General Townshend in Kut, had pushed rapidly
westwards. Russian patrols had got as far as Khanaqin,
on a tributary of the Diyala river 120 miles from Baghdad,
when the fall of Kut had put an end to the adventure and
Baratoff had been forced to withdraw. The Turkish XIII
Corps, advancing up the Diyala, had, by the summer of
1 91 6, driven him back to the Persian table-land, east of
Hamadan.
The advance of Major-General Maude to Baghdad in
1 91 7 brought about a change in the situation in Persia.
1917] BAGHDAD AND BEYOND 301
When Major-General Maude had entered and passed Kut,
on the 24th of February 191 7, the Turkish XIII Corps
had fallen back from Hamadan and, when Baghdad fell,
was in Kermanshah with the Cossacks on its heels. The
Turks were aiming to reach Khanaqin, and one of the
tasks of Major-General Maude was to send out a strong
column to capture the town before the Turkish XIII Corps
could arrive.
He had also, in order that Baghdad might be made
secure, to pursue his old opponents, the Turkish XVIII
Corps, which had retreated north of the city, and to
drive it from the area of the river dams, which, with the
approach of the flood season, it was essential the British
should control. It was, furthermore, necessary to capture
Falluja, on the Euphrates west of Baghdad, and so sever
the Turkish communications along that river, as well as
to obviate any possibility that the Turks might cut the
Euphrates embankments and flood the country. Major-
General Maude therefore, immediately Baghdad had
been captured, divided his forces into four columns, one
to follow the Persian road up the Diyala valley to Khana-
qin, another to move westwards to Falluja, and two to
advance along either bank of the Tigris.
Air reconnaissances on the nth of March — the day
Baghdad was captured — reported the Turkish rearguard
entrenched between the right bank of the Tigris at
Hassaiwa and the railway. The observers estimated the
force at 4,000 troops, with railway transport, but farther
north, at Mushahida station, a body of about the same
strength was encamped. On the morning of the 14th the
Turkish position was attacked, but before the infantry
and cavalry advanced two aeroplanes flew over the Turkish
defences and the air observers surveyed and sketched the
enemy positions. The pilots landed at the I Corps head-
quarters, and the air sketches and reports were sent
forward immediately to the advanced guard. After a day
of stubborn fighting, in scorching heat, the Turkish rear-
guard had been completely defeated and, by midnight,
the right bank of the river had been cleared of the enemy
as far as Mushahida station, which was in British hands.
302 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
The aeroplanes, which could be landed without difficulty
on the hard flat surface on the river borders, kept the
Corps staff in touch with the action throughout the day
and the observers indicated, by personal reports, many
targets to the artillery. When the Turks knew they had
been defeated they went back rapidly and touch with
them was lost. Air reconnaissances on the 15th were
hampered by gales and dust storms, but on the i6th the
observers reported that there were no enemy troops
within twenty-five miles of Mushahida, and that for still
another twenty miles to the north there were only
stragglers. It was not, however, desirable that the pursuit
of the Turks should be continued on the right bank of the
Tigris until the left bank had been cleared.
The column which set out to capture Falluja was
equally successful and the town was occupied on the 19th
of March, the Turkish troops retiring towards prepared
positions at Ramadi. Daily air reconnaissances for a
week before Falluja was taken surveyed the whole area,
especially the flooded districts, and, on the 19th, when the
town was entered, air reports kept the commander of the
column in touch with the progress of his troops.
Major-General Maude's attempt to occupy Khana-
qin was defeated by the skilful tactical handling of the
Turkish XIII Corps. On the 15th of March the Diyala
column, under Major-General Sir H. D'U. Keary, left
Baghdad and, after a surprise crossing of the river on the
night of the 1 7th/ 1 8th, took the village of Baquba on the
morning of the i8th. The occupation of this centre closed
one line of retreat to the Turkish XIII Corps by way of
the mountain path from Harunabad through Mandali.
Air reconnaissances of the Baquba area had been made for
some days before the Diyala column occupied the town.
On the morning of the 19th of March an air observer re-
ported that 500 Turks were moving on Baquba from Shahra-
ban, and that another 1,500 were approaching Shahraban
from Qizil Ribat. General Head-quarters concluded that
the mission of these reinforcements was to seize Baquba
in order to cover the retreat of the Turkish 2nd Division at
Khanaqin, and Major-General Maude therefore instructed
I9I7] THE DIYALA FRONT 303
Major-General Keary to conceal his strength and allow
the Turks to come on until he could deal rigorously with
them.
On the 2ist an early aeroplane reconnaissance^ reported
that about 1,000 infantry with transport were crossing
the Diyala at Lambarak, a movement which led Major-
General Maude to conclude that the enemy intended
to get to the Delli Abbas-Kifri road and so continue his
retreat towards Kirkuk.^ Major-General Keary was there-
upon ordered to make contact with the Turks and hold
them to their ground. Afternoon air reconnaissances
found a column, 2,000-3,000 strong, approaching Qizil
Ribat down the Khanaqin road, with other small columns
and encampments in the area. Two miles south of
Shahraban the Turks appeared to be holding an entrenched
position.
Major-General Keary moved forward, but, owing to
the numerous canals and streams which had to be bridged,
his advance was slow. On the 23rd he was ready to make
a frontal attack on the Turkish covering troops entrenched
south of Shahraban, but in the early hours of the 23rd the
Turks withdrew and Shahraban was occupied without
opposition at 7 a.m. It had been expected that the Russians
would reach Khanaqin on the 22nd, and an aeroplane had
been sent out on that day to find them, but the observer
had failed to discover any trace of them : it was known later
that the Russians had been delayed by snowdrifts in the
Pa Yi Taq pass.
When the Turkish covering force fell back on the
23rd from Shahraban, it took up a line of prepared posi-
tions farther north on the Jabal Hamrin ridge to cover
the approaches to the Kifri road. These positions were
attacked on the 25 th, but the broken nature of the country
made operations difficult and, as the Turks were well
entrenched and in some strength, there was little progress.
^ On the 20th 'B' Flight moved to Baquba to work directly under
Major-General Keary. Two aeroplanes flew to Baquba on the 20th and
another on the 23rd.
^ It is now known that the enemy was only moving supplies across the
river.
304 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
It had by now become clear that the safe passage of the
Turkish XIII Corps across the Diyala was assured, and it
soon became evident that the enemy intention was not
to move the XIII Corps back to Kifri, but to send it to-
wards the Tigris, where it could join up with the Turkish
XVIII Corps. Owing to the nature of the country, a
tumble of hills and nullahs intersected by canals, air recon-
naissance reports during the operations of Major-General
Keary's column could give only a general impression of
the Turkish strength and movements. In the featureless
desert country over which the aeroplanes had flown during
the advance to Baghdad, the few available observers, in
spite of the rapid changes in the situation, had had no
difficulty in following and reporting the operations. In the
broken Diyala country the same results could not be ob-
tained from rapid visual observation.
On the 2nd of April Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Tennant
set out from Baghdad in a Martinsyde to find the Russian
force and deliver a dispatch from Lieutenant-General
Maude to General Baratoff. In the Pa Yi Taq pass he
discovered a party of Cossacks and he landed beside them,
delivered his package, and then flew back to Baghdad. On
the same day a small British column, which had pushed
out to Qizil Ribat, met a Cossack patrol which had been
sent forward to establish contact. Within a few days the
Russians had taken over the line of the Diyala, and Major-
General Maude thereupon withdrew Major-General
Keary's column for operations up the Tigris towards
Samarra against the Turkish XVIII Corps.
Two columns were concentrated on either bank of the
Tigris, each with one Flight of aeroplanes. For work with
the right bank column, 'B' Fhght of No. 30 Squadron
was transferred from Baquba to Fort Kermea on the
8th of April, while 'C Fhght, which had been at Kasirin
since the 29th of March, moved to Kuwar Reach, the
riverhead for the left bank column, on the 7th of April.
The German air service, which had suffered the loss
of its aeroplanes and material during the advance to
Baghdad, again became active at the beginning of April.
Nine new fighters (presumably Halberstadts and Fokkers)
I9I7] GERMAN FIGHTERS 305
had been brought back from Germany by the air service
commander on this front, who had made a journey home
to speed up supphes,^ and, on the 3rd of April, one of
them, a Fokker, attacked a reconnoitring B.E.2C. In a
brief combat the two aeroplanes hit one another, wing-
tip to wing-tip. The Fokker fell out of control, but was
righted and flown back to Samarra, while the damaged
B.E.2C reached its aerodrome at Kasirin. The German
wireless announcing the combat, stated: 'Our aeroplane
'brought back a wing torn off the enemy plane and landed
'safely in our lines.'
With the appearance of the new enemy fighting aero-
planes, which were better than anything possessed by the
Royal Flying Corps on the front, it was clear that No. 30
Squadron might have difficulty in maintaining its work of
co-operation with the army. It had been foreseen that the
German air service would be re-equipped, and requests
had been sent to the War Office asking for up-to-date
fighters. Some Spads had been promised, but as it would
take some time to transport them from England, a few
Bristol Scouts were meanwhile transferred from Egypt as a
temporary measure. As soon as the Bristol Scouts arrived
at Basra from Egypt, the Aircraft Park at the base port
hurriedly assembled them for service. Two were flown to
the front from Basra (a distance of 750 miles) on the 5th
and 17th of April.
On the 8th of April the column on the right bank of
the Tigris attacked the Turkish positions covering Balad
station, which was captured after a sharpy engagement.
^ 'In the meantime I myself had been to Germany to speed up the
'deHvery of fresh supplies. I returned to Irak in April, 1917, with nine
'new Scouts. In order to confound the English by the unexpected appear-
'ance of a new type, I covered the 300 odd miles from the railhead of the
'Baghdad line to the front in one day. But even this rapidity was of no
'use. On the same day an English machine appeared at a great height and
'dropped a tin of cigarettes with the following message: "The British
' "airmen send their compliments to Captain S. and are pleased to welcome
' "him back to Mesopotamia. We shall be pleased to offer him a warm recep-
' "tion in the air. We enclose a tin of English cigarettes and will send him
' "a Baghdad melon when they are in season. Au revoir. Our compliments
' "to the other German airmen. The Royal Flying Corps." ' (Oberleutnant
Schiiz in The German Air Force in the Great War (Neumann), pp. 262-3.)
2504.5 X
3o6 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Next day Harba, farther along the railway in the direction
of Samarra, was occupied, but there followed a halt until
the column on the left flank could make progress. The
intention was that this column should force the Shatt al
Adhaim and drive the Turks holding the river towards
Samarra, but on the 8th of April, Lieutenant-General
Sir W. R. Marshall, the officer commanding the column,
was informed by General Head-quarters that air recon-
naissances had disclosed movements of the Turkish XIII
Corps from Delli Abbas in a south-westerly direction,
and that these movements must be carefully watched.
The Cavalry Division maintained close watch on the
enemy in the Delli Abbas area, and early on the morning
of the 9th, patrols from the division were in contact with
Turkish infantry moving in the direction of Diltawa. The
cavalry delayed the advance of the enemy troops who,
about noon, took up position along the line they had
reached north of the Khalis canal about Tijdari. Lieu-
tenant-General Marshall decided to transfer the bulk of
his force to strike at the right flank of the enemy. This
movement took place on the night of the loth and, next
morning, the Turks were taken in flank, and before evening
were in full retreat. 'C Flight had moved to a landing-
ground at Sindiya, and air reconnaissances and flights to
observe for the fire of the artillery were made throughout
the day. From the 12th to the 14th the Turks fought
a stubborn rearguard action in a position, south of Delli
Abbas, which had been reported from the air, but on the
15th Delli Abbas was entered and the enemy troops fell
back on the Jabal Hamrin range, but they were not pur-
sued : 'C Flight returned to Kuwar Reach the same day.
A B.E.2C (pilot. Captain C. L. Pickering, observer.
Lieutenant H. W. Craig) which set out on the 15th to
reconnoitre Samarra, where the German aerodrome was
situated, did not return, and it was known afterwards that
it had been shot down in a fight with a Halberstadt and that
the two officers had been killed. This old B.E.2C, numbered
4500, warped, scarred, and patched, and no match for a
fighter of the Halberstadt type, had had a remarkable career
in Mesopotamia. She had seen her first service in the battle
1917] B.E.2C 4500 3^7
of Ctesiphon in 191 5, had been flown out of Kut on
the day the siege began, and thereafter, except for brief
periods when she was being overhauled, had been flown
over the battle-fields to Baghdad and beyond. Exposed
without cover to sun, wind, rain, and sand, she had never
failed her pilots and had become something of an institu-
tion.
The time had come for the final advance on Samarra.
Lieutenant-General Marshall was ordered to leave sufii-
cient troops to contain the enemy in the Jabal Hamrin
positions, and to assemble a column at Duqma for an
advance across the Shatt al Adhaim. Air reconnaissances
on the 17th of April reported the Adhaim positions in
detail, and the observers made sketches of the Turkish
entrenchments and of the river bed.^ On the night of
the 17th the river was crossed and next day, in blazing
heat, the Turkish forces were attacked and defeated, air
observation of the artillery and ships' fire contributing
to the success.^
The enemy troops retired in disorder and, by 5.40 p.m.
on the 1 8th, had gone back fourteen miles. Meanwhile
there was intense activity on the right bank of the Tigris,
where the British column was at Istabulat awaiting the
order to push forward. The Turkish defences confronting
this column v\^ere surveyed from the air and were shown
to be formidable. 3 On the 21st of April the observers
were much hampered by enemy aeroplanes, and when
these retreated the heat prevented further work in the
air. As a result the British counter-batteries were unable
to deal effectively with the Turkish guns, which continued
throughout the day to shell the British infantry heavily.
The infantry, nevertheless, pressed forward up to noon,
^ An artillery report says : 'Captain G. Merton carried out reconnaissance
'of the Adhaim position, bringing back information which greatly assisted
'compilation of bombardment tables.'
^ A telegram from the III Corps artillery to the Royal Flying Corps
said: 'Many thanks from gunners for most valuable co-operation to-day.
'Three successive planes put in excellent work.'
3 'B' and 'C Flights and the head-quarters of No. 30 Squadron moved
to Barura on the river east of Istabulat station on the 20th. 'A' Flight
remained at Baghdad under the orders of General Head-quarters.
3o8 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
when, owing to the strong opposition and to the sweltering
heat, they were ordered to consoHdate their gains prepara-
tory to a renewal of the attack when the weather became
cooler. On the 22nd the advance was resumed and the
final Turkish position covering Samarra was captured.
While the fighting was in progress on the ground on the
22nd, there was an air duel, in full view of the troops,
between a Bristol Scout (pilot, Lieutenant M. L. Maguire)
and a Halberstadt, and the enemy aeroplane eventually
shed its wings and crashed behind Istabulat.^
The Turks retired during the night of the 22nd/23rd
of April and early air reconnaissances on the 23rd reported
no sign of enemy troops on either bank of the Tigris for
a distance of five miles north of Samarra, and that the
town appeared deserted. A message giving this informa-
tion was dropped on the advanced troops at 8.45 a.m.
and Samarra was entered, without opposition, at 10 a.m.
Meanwhile it had become clear that the Turkish XIII
Corps was about to attempt a counter-stroke against
the British right flank. An observer who flew over the
Shatt al Adhaim on the evening of the 20th of April had
discovered about 1,200 Turks with transport on the right
bank of the river. Next morning this force was reported,
from the air, as moving in three columns in a south-
westerly direction. Defensive measures were taken, but,
until the XVIII Corps at Samarra had been defeated, no
ofl:ensive action could be contemplated. With the rout
of the Turkish XVIII Corps on the 22nd and 23rd, how-
ever, it became possible to turn attention to the XIII
Corps. On the 23rd air observation revealed the head
of the Shatt al Adhaim column at Tulul en Nor, on the
right bank of the river, and a second large force of all arms,
about 4,500 strong, moving south-west, seventeen miles
behind the first column. The defeat of the Turkish XVIII
Corps on the Tigris, of which the XIII Corps staff pre-
sumably became aware during the day, apparently caused
a change of plans, because an air reconnaissance at 5 p.m.
on the 23rd reported that the leading column on the Shatt
^ Lieutenant Maguire was shot down, wounded, on the 28th of April
and died as a prisoner of war.
I9I7] SUMMER OPERATIONS 309
al Adhaim had halted and was entrenching a position at
Dahuba, which was sketched from the air. The position
was attacked next day, the 24th, and the Turks, defeated,
retired rapidly to Band-i-Adhaim, in a defile where the
river issues from the hills. The new line of entrenchments
was reconnoitred from the air, and, on the 30th, was
attacked during a fierce dust storm which prevented
flying until 4 p.m., when an air observer directed the fire
of a battery against the enemy whom he reported to be
retiring. During the night the Turks evacuated all their
positions and went back once again into the Jabal Hamrin
hills.
Baghdad was now secure. The two defeated Turkish
army corps had been driven back on divergent lines, the
XIII into the Jabal Hamrin fastnesses and the XVIII to
Tikrit. In the final weeks of the advance the operations
had taken place in a sweltering heat. The aeroplanes,
most of them warped and worn by their service during
the long advance, had had to cover a wide area in the
final phase and, although flying was confined whenever
possible to mornings or evenings, it had often been
necessary to send up the aeroplanes in the full blaze of
the noonday heat:^ many of them badly needed overhaul,
and two Flights of No. 30 Squadron were therefore con-
centrated at Baghdad. The remaining Flight was kept
at Sindiya, with six B.E.2c's and two Bristol Scouts, for
general reconnaissance of the Turkish positions. ^
Summer Operations
[Maps, pp. 249 and 324]
Throughout the summer, which was abnormally hot,
there could be little military activity. The positions which
had been gained in April were strengthened and held, but
the majority of the troops were withdrawn into reserve in
camps along the river banks, where they would be able to
obtain a measure of rest.
^ Aeroplanes of No. 30 Squadron flew 335 hours during April.
^ This Flight moved downstream to Jadida in June. The river had fallen
and the move was a precaution against the Flight workshops and stores
barge becoming beached until the autumn.
3IO THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
During the summer the aeroplanes of No. 30 Squadron,
flying before 9 a.m. and after 5 p.m., photographed
hundreds of square miles of enemy territory, and from
the photographs maps were compiled which were used
when active campaigning began again in the autumn.
Courses of instruction for pilots and observers, which
covered all forms of co-operation by aeroplanes with
other arms in accordance with the latest developments in
England and France, were given at Baghdad. There were
also lectures for artillery ofl[icers on the developments in
aircraft co-operation.
There were a few minor air operations in the summer
months. Towards the end of June, in retaliation for an
ineffective bombing attack by German airmen on Balad,
Baquba, and Samarra, the camps of the Turkish XVIII
Corps at Tikrit were attacked by six pilots, who hit tents
with some of their twenty-four 20-lb. bombs. At the same
time two Martinsydes bombed a ship previously reported
by reconnaissance to be aground north of Tikrit. Of eight
65 -lb. bombs dropped, one blew in the side of the vessel,
while another exploded in a nearby dump.
On the 15th of June, the head-quarters of the Royal
Flying Corps in Mesopotamia was re-formed as the Thirty-
First Wing, which remained under the general adminis-
trative orders of the Middle East Brigade. The advanced
Aircraft Park was brought forward from Shaikh Saad to
Baghdad.
In July a minor operation with the object of tightening
the hold on the Euphrates was attempted. The Turkish
advanced positions at Dhibban were captured on the 8th,
but an attempt on the Ramadi lines made on the nth
failed, chiefly because of abnormal heat and a blinding
dust storm. Four aeroplanes co-operated in the Ramadi
operations during the early morning, mainly with the
artillery. The shade temperature on this day reached 121°
(Fahrenheit) and three aeroplanes which had set out at
4.30 a.m. to bomb the Turks in Ramadi were forced down
because the water in their engines had boiled away and
the pilots were sick with heat.
When the operations on the Euphrates had begun, on
I9I7] AN AIR ADVENTURE 311
the 7th of July, two German aeroplanes had flown over
the Falluja area on reconnaissance. Aeroplanes sent out
to cut off the German pilots from their aerodrome at
Tikrit never saw them, and it was presumed the Germans
had landed at Ramadi and would fly on next day. It was
reported next morning, the 9th, that they had left
Ramadi, but air patrols again failed to find them. On
the loth, when the thermometer was registering a shade
temperature of 122° F., two exhausted German aviators
stumbled into Samarra and told their story. Soon after
leaving Ramadi one of the aeroplanes — an Albatros two-
seater — had been forced to land through engine failure
due to the heat. The other had landed alongside and,
after the first Albatros had been set on fire, the pilot and
observer had been flown away on the wings of the second.
With its load of four persons, however, the German aero-
plane would not go higher than 400 feet, and at this height
it was impossible to keep the engine cool, and a landing
became necessary. The four Germans sought shelter from
the heat under the wings of the aeroplane until 6.30 p.m.
when an attempt to 'taxi' the Albatros to the Tigris
was made. The engine, however, again gave trouble, and
eventually the aeroplane was burnt and the four airmen
set out for Samarra on foot. Two of them collapsed on
the way, but the others reached the British picquet line
on the morning of the loth. Armoured cars and cavalry
were at once sent out to rescue the two missing Germans,
but they were never found.
In June the Russians, because of the heat, had left the
Diyala river line and had gone back into the hills towards
Kermanshah, and the British had been forced to reoccupy
Balad Ruz. Regular air reconnaissances were made over
this front, and when, on the 7th of August, an observer
reported that the Turks were entrenching a new position
south-west of Shahraban, Lieutenant-General Maude
decided to send columns forward from Balad Ruz and
Baquba to reoccupy Shahraban. The columns set out on
the night of the 1 8th/ 19th of August and, after slight
opposition, took possession of Shahraban on the 20th and
established a new line. The Turks, whose positions and
312 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
movements had been reported from the air during this
minor operation, retreated into the Jabal Hamrin hills
whence they had come.
The aeroplanes were effectively used from time to time
during the summer to overawe tribesmen who were
surreptitiously aiding the enemy or actively impeding the
British forces. Occasionally native villages were attacked
with bombs and machine-gun fire, but usually peaceful
demonstrations by aircraft over the tribesmen sufficed to
bring about a change of attitude.
On the 13 th of August No. 63 (R.E.8) Squadron arrived
at Basra from England under the command of Major
J. C. Quinnell. The squadron had come from the bleak
coast of Northumberland and it reached Basra at a time
when the most intense heat-wave for many years was at
its peak. Many of the officers and men had seen service
in France and they were well trained and of good physique,
but most of them fell victims to the climate and to
the pestilences of the Persian Gulf. Sandfly fever, heat-
stroke, and other ailments took heavy toll and, within a
short time, of 30 officers only 6 remained and of 200 men
only 70. Three men had died and the remainder were in
hospital, while even the remnant were too badly shaken
to do much. Thirty, broken in health, were eventually
invalided to India without having seen anything more of
Mesopotamia than Basra. It was some weeks before the
aeroplanes and stores could be disembarked. The aero-
planes had to be erected in the open on the aerodrome at
Tanouma on the bank of the Tigris opposite to Basra.
Some temporary hangars, made of matting, were built by
the Royal Engineers to give protection from the sun, but
strong gales partly demolished the improvised hangars
after a few days, and the torn roofs, wrapping themselves
round the aeroplanes, caused serious damage. Difficulty
arose through the warping of spars and other wooden
parts, and wings and fuselages had to be stripped to remedy
the defects. The spruce engine bearers were found to
split in the great heat and new ones of ash had to be made
in the workshops. These happenings caused delay, and it
was not until the second week in September that a small
I9I7] FIGHTING ON THREE FRONTS 313
advanced party could be mustered and sent to Samarra
to prepare an aerodrome. The first R.E.8 of the squadron
reached Baghdad on the 14th of September and the second
two days later: during October the remaining aeroplanes
made their way to the front by Flights. The ill luck which
No. 63 Squadron suffered in the early stages continued
when the first reconnaissance of the Turkish lines was
attempted. On the 25th of September the two recently
arrived R.E.S's left Baghdad to reconnoitre the Turkish
positions at Tikrit, but they failed to return. It was known
afterwards that they had met a German Halberstadt
fighter over Tikrit, and that as one of the British pilots
was diving to attack the enemy the wing extensions had
folded back and the R.E.8 had crashed. At the same time
the engine of the second R.E.8 failed, and the pilot had
been compelled to land. The squadron lost a third aero-
plane on the 5th of October. On the 21st of October
Major Quinnell was posted to England and the squadron
was left in temporary command of Captain F. L. Robinson.
It was eventually taken over, on the loth of November,
by Major R. A. Bradley, who came from Egypt but had
taken part in the original flying operations before and
after the fall of Kut and therefore knew the country and
its conditions well. By the time Major Bradley arrived.
No. 63 Squadron was concentrated on the aerodrome at
Samarra: two of its Flights were equipped with R.E.S's
for reconnaissance, while the third had Spads, Bristol
Scouts, and Martinsyde Scouts, for fighting. ^ It was not
long before the squadron was ready and eager to play its
full part in the operations, and its subsequent record was
a fine one.
Fighting on three Fronts
[Maps, pp. 249 and 324]
Meanwhile, with a fall in the temperature in September,
the campaigning season had opened with a brilliant attack
on Ramadi. The main work of the Royal Flying Corps
had already been accomplished when the operations began.
^ During the autumn the old B.E.2c's of No. 30 Squadron were gradually
replaced also by R.E.S's.
314 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
That work had been photography of the Turkish positions
covering Ramadi, supplemented hy visual reconnaissances
and hy sketches. Since the abortive attack in July, the
Turks had strengthened their defences and had rein-
forced their troops on this front. 'B' Flight of No. 30
Squadron, with a photographic section, had moved to
Falluja on the 21st of September, five days before the
attacking force had been concentrated at Madhij. From
the air reports it was made clear that the Turks attached
importance to the defensive advantages of the Mushaid
ridge, four miles east of Ramadi. Along this ridge the
enemy held an advanced position to cover his main
defences which ran in a semicircle round Ramadi.
Major-General Sir H. T. Brooking, in command of the
Ramadi operations, made his dispositions to lead the enemy
to believe that the main attack would be directed against
the Turkish left on the Euphrates. His intention, how-
ever, was to make his principal attack on Ramadi from
the south, while he moved his cavalry across the Aziziya
canal to cut the way of retreat to Hit. The columns
— two infantry and one cavalry — moved out from the
British starting-point at Madhij in the evening of the
27th of September. On the previous day 'B' Flight of
No. 30 Squadron had moved forward to Madhij, from
which place it operated during the battle.
By nightfall on the 28th the Turks at Ramadi were
completely encircled with their backs to the Euphrates,
across which there was no bridge. The British movements
throughout the day were reported by contact-patrol
observers who dropped message-bags from time to time
on the divisional head-quarters, while extended air
reconnaissances kept watch for sign of any Turkish rein-
forcing movements, particularly from the direction of Hit.
At 3 a.m. on the 29th, in an attempt to break through
the net, the Turks attacked the cavalry astride the Hit
road, but they made no impression. At 6.15 a.m. the
British infantry assault began, south of Ramadi, and by
II a.m. the battle was over and the whole Turkish force
had surrendered. The captures included 3,454 prisoners,
13 guns, 12 machine-guns, launches, barges, ammunition.
I9I7] DIYALA OPERATIONS 315
and stores. The action at Ramadi affords an example of
an encircling operation perfectly planned and executed,
and the plans were based on the photographic and recon-
naissance information supplied by the Royal Flying Corps. ^
While the Ramadi victory was being won, a cavalry
column, on the right wing of the Baghdad army, moved
out from Balad Ruz and occupied Mandali on the morn-
ing of September the 29th. This centre had, for some
time, been used by the Turks as a supply station, and it
formed a potential base for a flank attack. In October
Major-General Maude continued to strengthen his
position on the Diyala front. In operations between the
1 8th and 20th of October the enemy was driven from the
left bank of the Diyala into the Jabal Hamrin hills, and
the town of Qizil Ribat was occupied. On the i8th
Flight and the head-quarters of No. 30 Squadron had
moved from Baghdad to Shahraban to take part in these
operations and, in addition to the usual reconnaissance
and contact-patrol work, pilots and observers made low-
flying attacks against the retreating Turks.
No German pilots had appeared over the Ramadi front
while the operations which resulted in the capture of the
town were in progress, but on the Diyala front, as well as
along the Tigris, enemy aeroplanes were reported from
time to time during October. In reply to this increased
activity, three Martinsydes bombed the German aero-
drome at Kifri on the i6th of October, but without
inflicting serious damage. One of them, with a bullet
through the petrol tank, was forced down, but the pilot
was picked up, after the Martinsyde had been burnt, by
Lieutenant J. B. Welman in one of the other bombing
Martinsydes.
After the operations of the 19th of October, the Flight
of No. 30 Squadron at Shahraban was withdrawn to
Baquba, where it was joined by a second Flight of the
squadron from Baghdad.^ The squadron settled down to
systematic reconnaissance and photography of the Jabal
^ All the reconnaissances, except those of a strictly local nature, were
made by air.
2 'B' Flight of No. 30 Squadron remained at Falluja on the Euphrates.
3i6 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Hamrin area and also made occasional bombing raids.
Military operations had usually been preceded by air
attacks on the enemy aerodrome opposite the front to be
attacked. On the 31st of October, when the I Corps was
about to attack on the Tigris front, six aeroplanes made
a bombing raid on the Kifri aerodrome on the Diyala
front with the object of deceiving the enemy. One
German fighter, which ascended as soon as the bombers
appeared, so damaged a B.E.2e that the pilot. Second
Lieutenant A. P. Adams, was forced to land. The leader
of the formation. Lieutenant F. Nuttall, in a Martinsyde,
went down to pick up the stranded pilot. Many Turks
were in the neighbourhood, but Second Lieutenant
Adams, who had destroyed his aeroplane, jumped on
Lieutenant Nuttall's Martinsyde as it was being taxied
along, and the two got into the air again after a burst of
machine-gun bullets had been fired to scatter a party of
Turkish troops in the way: the two officers reached their
aerodrome safely. The pilot in another Martinsyde,
Lieutenant J. B. Welman, was wounded in combat and
forced to land on the German aerodrome at Kifri. A
third Martinsyde was forced down by a hit from an anti-
aircraft shell. The pilot, Lieutenant C. Cox, landed safely
eighteen miles inside enemy territory, burnt his aeroplane,
and then set out on foot for the British lines. He success-
fully eluded Turkish patrols and covered the eighteen-
mile journey to safety in 6f hours.
Meanwhile the centre of military interest had shifted
to the Tigris. On the 22nd of October the 7th Division
reported that a reconnaissance patrol, which had marched
out from Samarra, had been fired upon north of Al Ajik,
and No. 63 Squadron was thereupon requested to find
out what this Turkish activity portended. The air recon-
naissance, made in the afternoon of the 22nd, reported
about 2,000 Turkish troops at Huwaislat, eight miles
north of Samarra, with another 2,000 and artillery in the
valley behind them. Later the same day it was seen from
the air that the enemy troops were entrenching in the
Huwaislat area. It seemed clear that the Turkish XVIII
Corps intended to strike at Samarra, and Major-General
1917] TIKRIT CAPTURED 317
Maude decided to attack before the enemy had time to
elaborate his entrenchments. The 7th Division moved
forward on the night of the 2 3rd /24th, but the Turks
left their positions at Huw^aislat and withdrew rapidly to
Daur, their movements being reported by No. 63 Squad-
ron. The Daur positions were attacked and captured on
the 2nd of November and the enemy went back to Tikrit,
forty miles north of Samarra, where air reconnaissances
reported that prepared defensive positions were held in
force. Next day the positions covering Tikrit were shelled
by heavy artillery, with the help of air observation, but
when it appeared that the Turks intended to make a
stand, orders were given to the British troops to withdraw
to Samarra on the 4th. Air reconnaissance on the 3rd and
4th, however, indicated that the camps in the Tikrit area
were being reduced in size and seemed to confirm reports
sent in by agents that the Turks intended to evacuate the
town. As a result, the instructions for withdrawal were
cancelled and instead an advance to occupy Tikrit was
ordered. The attack was made on the 5th and, after
heavy fighting, resulted in the rout of the enemy, who
retreated to a position astride the river at Fat-Ha with
an advanced post at Shuraimiya. In the action which
resulted in the capture of Tikrit, the pilots and observers
of No. 63 Squadron gave important help. They had not
long been at Samarra before the advance began and there
had not been much opportunity for liaison with other
arms, nor for the pilots and observers to get to know the
country. In the attack on Daur on the 2nd of November,
the contact-patrol work of No. 63 Squadron had not been
very successful and there had been misunderstandings with
the artillery. The Indian divisions engaged at Daur had
not previously co-operated with aircraft and sometimes
failed to answer the air observer's signals. Information
of several good targets sent down from the air had not
been acted upon by the artillery. On the 5th of November,
however, there was a marked improvement. The infantry
engaged on this day still showed some reluctance in
lighting flares to indicate their progress, but many more
ground strips were displayed by the attacking formations,
3i8 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
and the air observers had little difficulty in reporting the
progress of the attack. The main improvement, how^ever,
was in the aircraft co-operation w^ith the artillery. From
6.15 a.m. on the 5th three aeroplanes v^ere engaged on
this vs^ork, and the response to their calls for fire was
always instant and effective, with the result that the
Turkish defences and active batteries were accurately
ranged.'
On the 17th of November Lieutenant-General Maude
was taken ill with cholera and two days later he was dead.
He had led his troops from victory to victory and his
sudden death was a sad blow to the Army in Mesopo-
tamia. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Sir
W. R. Marshall, who had commanded the III Corps.
On the Tigris front the Turkish forces were out of
striking range, and on the Euphrates, where they occupied
Hit, they were also an appreciable distance from the British
at Ramadi. On the eastern front, however, the enemy
held Qara Tepe and the Jabal Hamrin passes on the right
bank of the Diyala, near enough to the British positions
for effective operations. Lieutenant-General Marshall
decided to surprise and destroy the Jabal Hamrin force.
His plan was to send an independent cavalry column up
the Adhaim river to cut the communications north of
Qara Tepe while the III Corps made a converging attack
on the town. The two Flights of No. 30 Squadron were
transferred from Baquba on the 2nd of December twenty
miles up the Diyala to Qalat al Mufti for co-operation
with the III Corps. 'C Flight of No. 63 Squadron was,
at the same time, moved from Samarra to Akab, at the
junction of the Adhaim with the Tigris, for work with
the cavalry. An advanced landing-ground for the Flight
was found at a place called Chai Khana, thirty-five miles
up the Adhaim.
The operations depended upon surprise for their full
success, and bombing attacks were made on the Kifri
aerodrome on the night of the 30th November/ ist
' An entry in the General Head-quarters War Diary says: 'A feature
*of the operations has been the co-operation between our aeroplanes and
'artillery.'
I9I7] FIGHTING AT JABAL HAMRIN 319
December, but without inflicting serious damage on the
German aeroplanes. On the ist of December, and again
next day, an enemy aeroplane succeeded in reconnoitring
the British dispositions and particularly the cavalry con-
centration at Chai Khana. The result was that the Turks
strengthened their hold on the passes over the Jabal
Hamrin to oppose the cavalry advance and, on the evening
of the 2nd, the general officer commanding the Cavalry
Division informed General Head-quarters that it was very
doubtful whether the cavalry would be able to break
through in time to co-operate with the attack by the
III Corps.
The III Corps attack began at dawn on the 3rd of
December and apparently took the enemy on this section
of the front by surprise. The opposition was feeble, but
the advance was delayed by inundations and by the
intricate nature of the country. Unfortunately the cavalry,
as had been feared, were unable to break through to cut
the Turkish communications and, during the night, the
Turks succeeded in withdrawing from in front of the III
Corps beyond Qara Tepe. The III Corps and the cavalry
followed up the enemy, who retired through Kifri, where
air observers reported that they had set fire to the coal mine
and to the coal dumps. No. 30 Squadron and Flight
of No. 63 Squadron, by close reconnaissance and contact
patrol, co-operated with the III Corps and with the
cavalry, and also made some bombing and machine-gun
attacks on the Turkish troops.
The cavalry pursued the enemy, but it was not the in-
tention of Lieutenant-General Marshall to fight the Turks
in a series of rearguard positions north of Qara Tepe, and
orders were given on the 5th of December for a with-
drawal next day, by the III Corps, to a line Sakaltutan
Pass-Qizil Ribat-Khanaqin. The cavalry division with-
drew down the Adhaim to the bank of the Tigris. On the
7th of December Flight of No. 63 Squadron returned
to Samarra, and next day the two Flights of No. 30 Squad-
ron went back to Baquba.
While the Qara Tepe operations were in progress on
the 5th of December, General Head-quarters received
320 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
reliable information that a convoy of i6o camels, carrying
supplies, was moving across the desert from Humr on the
Tigris to Haditha on the Euphrates. Their probable line
of route, and the times they v^ould be at various points
in the desert, were v^orked out by the Intelligence staff,
and the information wsls passed to No. 63 Squadron at
Samarra v^ith orders to attack the convoy. Two pilots
(Captain R. D. Simpson and Lieutenant J. H. Caldwell)
searched for the convoy in the morning, but found nothing.
In the afternoon, however, they discovered the column
and, from a height of 300 feet, dropped fifteen 20-lb.
bombs and fired ten drums of machine-gun ammunition,
with the result that many of the camels and some of the
men were killed or wounded, and the convoy was scattered.
This, although a minor incident, was of a kind calculated
to impress the enemy. The convoy, trekking unseen
across the desert, had its movements plotted in Baghdad,
1 80 miles away, and was then found and attacked through
the long arm of the air service.
There was a lull in the military operations after the
Qara Tepe attack. In the middle of December the
weather broke and wind storms damaged the hangars on
the aerodromes. Flying took place whenever there was
an interval of fair weather and bombing attacks were
made on the enemy aerodromes. From Kifri the German
air detachment had moved back to Tuz Khurmatli,
eighty-five miles north of Baquba. On the Tigris front
the enemy aerodrome was at Humr. On the 17th, 27th,
and 28th of December combined formations from Nos.
30 and 63 Squadrons attacked the Humr aerodrome.
The enemy resisted these attacks vigorously, but his
Halberstadt fighters were driven off. One British aero-
plane was forced down and the pilot in another was
wounded during the raids, which took toll of enemy
hangars and also damaged aeroplanes on the landing-
ground. At midnight on the 31st, when No. 63 Squadron
at Samarra were celebrating the coming of the New Year,
two German aeroplanes from Humr bombed the squadron
camp and destroyed the contents of the cookhouse, but
otherwise did no damage. In retaliation, twelve aeroplanes
I9I8] BOMBING AERODROMES 321
from Nos. 63 and 30 Squadrons dropped a ton of bombs on
the Humr aerodrome on the 3rd of January 191 8. There
were three combats while the raid was in progress, but
none of them decisive. On the 21st of January the
advanced German aerodrome at Kifri was attacked by
twelve bombers, and many bombs were seen to burst near
aeroplanes on the landing-ground. One of the bombers —
a D.H.4 of No. 30 Squadron^ — received a direct hit by
an anti-aircraft shell and was blown to pieces in the air.
On the 24th two German aeroplanes retaliated with an
attack on Baghdad which inflicted a few casualties in a
rest camp and in a casualty clearing-station. A reply was
quickly forthcoming. On the night of the 25th/26th
five pilots from No. 63 Squadron bombed Humr aero-
drome while five from No. 30 attacked Kifri. The pilots
left at intervals of half an hour throughout the night and
so spread the attacks over a period. During the raid on
Kifri the engine in a D.H.4 3^ Squadron (pilot,
Captain F. Nuttall, observer, Lieutenant R. B. B.
Sievier) caught fire at 1,000 feet. Although it was dark
a safe landing was made, and after the two Lewis guns,
with a supply of ammunition, had been taken from the
burning aeroplane, the pilot and the observer set a course
by the stars for the Diyala. They were cumbered by their
load and hampered in their march by the difiiculties of the
ground, but they covered twenty-four miles during the
night and reached the Diyala. The two ofiicers slept in a
ditch throughout the day, but when darkness came again
they could not progress farther owing to inundations. On
the second morning, however, they succeeded in signalling
to British patrols on the opposite bank of the Diyala and
they were brought in later by armoured cars.
Except for combats which resulted from the bombing
attacks on the German aerodromes, there was only one
encounter between British and enemy aircraft in January
191 8. This was on the 31st, when a German two-seater
which reconnoitred the Falluja aerodrome was pursued
and shot down within the British lines by two Spad pilots
^ No. 30 Squadron had only two D.H.4's, received in December 191 7
and January 191 8. Both were lost as stated above.
2504.5 Y
322 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
of No. 30 Squadron. The occupants, however, succeeded
in burning their aeroplane and, eluding cavalry patrols
sent out to intercept them, escaped to the Turkish lines.
Four Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes, forced down through
engine failure in enemy territory, were lost during the
month. The naked body of one pilot of No. 63 Squadron
was found by a desert patrol, with evidence that he had
fallen into the hands of Arabs, and the occupants of the
other three aeroplanes were made prisoners by the Turks.
At the beginning of January 191 8 a small British
column had pushed out as far as the Pa Yi Taq pass and,
on its return, had occupied Qasr-i-Shirin, where a landing-
ground and petrol dump were established. It was now
possible for an aeroplane, by landing at Qasr-i-Shirin to
replenish its fuel, to reach Kermanshah on the Persian
plateau. On the 23rd of January two R.E.S's set out from
Baquba for Kermanshah with dispatches for the British
Consul. They made the journey successfully and returned
next day with the consul's reply, which revealed that the
inhabitants of the villages on the Persian plateau were
starving. Partly for this reason, but chiefly because a
British military mission was being organized for expedi-
tion to Armenia by way of Persia, Lieutenant-General
Marshall decided to open the main trade route to Ker-
manshah. The garrison at Qasr-i-Shirin was increased
and small posts were established along the Kermanshah
road, on the repair of which native labour was employed.
The British military mission for Armenia owed its
origin to the change in the military situation on the borders
of Mesopotamia which had been brought about by the
Russian revolution. On the 22nd of December 191 7 the
Russian revolutionaries had opened peace negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk, but at that time an armistice between
Turkey and Russia was already in force. December 1917,
in fact, marked the end of Russian co-operation in
Mesopotamia. The consequences were far-reaching. There
were several thousands of German and Austrian prisoners
of war in Russian Turkestan and Trans-Caspia who might,
if Russia made formal peace, cross into Persia and re-enter
the war. Furthermore, the political situation in Persia,
i9i8] PERSIA 323
owing partly to Bolshevik propaganda, was extremely
unsettled.
An armoured car detachment, under Major-General
L. C. Dunsterville, with a number of officers for training
purposes, was therefore assembled at Baghdad for an
expedition to Armenia with the object of raising and
organizing local forces of Georgians and Armenians to
form a screen against Turkish or Bolshevik forces which
might threaten the Mesopotamian right flank. Major-
General Dunsterville, with the first part of his detachment,
left Baghdad on the 27th of January 1918. In the later
adventures of the 'Dunster force' aeroplanes played a
notable part.
Meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Stokes, Lieu-
tenant-General Marshall's chief intelligence officer in
Baghdad, was appointed to the staff of H.M. Minister at
Tehran. Lieutenant-Colonel Stokes had, for several years
before the war, been the Military Attache at Tehran and
was therefore well acquainted with the country and its
conditions. No. 30 Squadron was charged with the duty
of conveying this officer. The distance from Baquba is
430 miles, and the flight called for the crossing of a
mountain range rising to 12,000 feet. Much of the country
was wild and uncharted. The journey was made at the
end of January in an R.E.8 piloted by Lieutenant L. H.
Browning, who landed on the way at Qasr-i-Shirin and
Kermanshah. The 300-mile journey from the latter town
to Tehran was made for part of the way in a snowstorm.
When the R.E.8 landed at Tehran, Swedish gendarmerie
attempted to intern the aeroplane although it had been
stripped of machine-guns and other military armament.
Russian Cossacks, however, frustrated the attempt and,
some days later. Lieutenant Browning flew back to
Kermanshah, where he picked up Colonel Bicharakoff,
commander of a loyal Russian detachment, and flew with
the colonel as passenger to Baquba.
At the beginning of March the Royal Flying Corps in
Mesopotamia was reinforced by No. 72 Squadron, under
Major H. W. von Poellnitz, which had arrived at Basra
from England on the 2nd of March. The squadron was
324 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
sent, by detachments, for work on various parts of the
front. 'A' FHght, equipped with D.H.4's, S.E.5's, and
Spads, went to Samarra for attachment to the I Corps.
*B' FHght (Martinsydes) stayed at Baghdad to work under
the orders of General Head-quarters, and FHght
(Bristol monoplanes) was sent to Mirjana on the Diyala
river for work with the III Corps.
Victory on the Euphrates
[Map, p. 249]
It had been clear for some time that the Turkish forces
at Hit, on the Euphrates, had been steadily reinforced.
After the capture of Ramadi the Euphrates front had
been quiet, and the resources of the district had been
peacefully developed. But with the arrival of reinforce-
ments at Hit, the Turks in January had become active,
and Turkish patrols were pushed down the river as far as
Qubba and Nafata. Lieutenant-General Marshall there-
fore decided to capture Hit and its garrison. The advance
from Ramadi began on the 19th of February, when air
reconnaissances by No. 30 Squadron brought back news
that the Turks were evacuating their trenches south of
Hit and were taking up a prepared position on high ground
about two miles above the town at the Broad Wadi.
There was also a strong enemy force at Sahiliya. The
British intention was not to undertake serious fighting
unless a decisive blow at the enemy could be made, and
the advance against the strong positions indicated by
the air observers was therefore halted until communica-
tions could be improved and ample supplies accumulated
forward.
A concentration of aircraft for the further advance was
also made. On the 22nd of February No. 52 Kite Balloon
Section, which had been at Ramadi since the beginning
of January 1918,^ moved forward to Qubba. Next day |
^ No. 23 Kite Balloon Company (Sections 51 and 52) had arrived in
Mesopotamia in September 191 7. No. 51 Section went to Samarra. The
balloon sections practised co-operation with the artillery, and the balloons,
because of the fine landmark they provided, were particularly welcomed
by armoured cars patrolling the desert.
I9I8] VICTORY ON THE EUPHRATES 325
*B' Flight of No. 30 Squadron moved to Ramadi from
Falluja, and 'A' Flight of No. 30 Squadron and 'A' FHght
of No. 63 Squadron flew to Ramadi from Samarra and
Baquba. The composite unit, under the command of
Major H. de Havilland, was instructed to undertake a
vigorous bombing offensive against the Turks. The
squadron got to work on the day of its arrival, when ten
aeroplanes bombed and attacked with machine-gun fire
Turkish camps in the Hit-Sahiliya area. Seventy-five
20-lb. bombs were dropped: horses were stampeded,
transport disorganized, one aeroplane on the Hit aero-
drome destroyed and others damaged, and several hits
were made on camps. The bombing was continued on
the 24th, when seven pilots attacked Hit and Sahiliya.
The attacks on Hit were repeated through the night by
four pilots. There was no bombing on the 25th, but on
the night of the 25th/26th the camps at Hit were attacked
by three pilots, while Hit aerodrome was bombed on the
26th by five aeroplanes, and again during the night of the
26th/ 27th by the same number. As a result of these attacks
the German air detachment moved back from Hit to
Haditha. The intensive bombing ceased on the 27th of
February, when 'A' Flight of No. 63 Squadron returned to
Samarra. This left 'A' and 'B' Flights of No. 30 Squadron
at Ramadi, and these Flights continued to bomb the
enemy, but were mainly occupied with reconnaissance
and photography of the Turkish positions as far as Khan
Baghdadi. On the ist of March the head-quarters of
No. 30 Squadron moved from Baquba to Ramadi, and on
the 9th the squadron was transferred to a landing-ground
at Qubba.
Meanwhile, on the 8th of March, an air observer came
back with information that the Turks had evacuated
their Broad Wadi entrenchments north of Hit and were
moving back along the Sahiliya-Khan Baghdadi road.
The advance began at once and Hit was occupied on the
9th and Sahiliya on the following day. The Turks, how-
ever, were not permitted to retreat unmolested. The
country was unsuited to a rapid pursuit by armoured cars,
nor were adequate cavalry forces available. The Royal
326 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
Flying Corps, therefore, was given the task of harassing
the retreating Turks to the utmost. In the evening of
the 8th of March five R.E.S's of No. 30 Squadron
dropped thirty-three 20-lb. bombs on enemy columns
north of Sahiliya and scored eleven direct hits. The pilots,
when they had finished bombing, used all their machine-
gun ammunition, from low heights, against the crowded
troops and camels. From dawn to dusk on the 9th the
bombing was continued and one hundred and forty-seven
20-lb. or 25-lb. bombs were dropped and over 7,000 rounds
of ammunition fired. Transport was disorganized and a
scattered trail of dead and wounded marked the passage
of the aeroplanes. Next day — the loth — forty-five bombs
were dropped. By this time the air observers discovered
that the main body of the Turks had reached Khan
Baghdadi, where a position was taken up on rocky heights
running into the desert on the right bank of the
Euphrates.
Lieutenant-General Marshall, to make his hold on Hit
secure, decided to push the enemy beyond the Khan
Baghdadi position. The advance was carefully prepared,
complete photographs of the Baghdadi positions were
taken from the air, and from the photographs maps were
compiled which were used during the operations. No. 52
Kite Balloon Section was brought forward on the 15th of
March to Sahiliya.^ At Hit a concentration of aeroplanes
was made. In addition to the two Flights of No. 30
Squadron, which had moved from Qubba to Hit on the
nth, two Flights of No. 63 Squadron flew to Hit from
Samarra. They reached Hit on the 25th of March, where
their transport and personnel, sent in advance by way of
Baghdad, had already arrived.
The advance on Hit had shown the difficulty of
pinning the Turks to their ground. In an attempt to
prevent the enemy slipping away again, once the advance
on Khan Baghdadi began, a mobile unit of cavalry,
armoured cars, and Ford vans, designated the nth
' On the 26th of March the balloon was towed to a position seven miles
beyond Sahiliya and some useful observation was made during the battle
of Baghdadi.
I9I8] KHAN BAGHDADI 327
Cavaliy Brigade, had been formed and had reached Hit
on the 23rd of March. The brigade was to make a wide
turning movement against the enemy's right flank and
get astride the Khan Baghdadi-Haditha road, in rear of
the Baghdadi positions.
Major-General Brooking, in command of the operations,
had one great anxiety. He had caught the Turks at
Ramadi, but he reahzed that it would be difficult to do
so again. His only chance of doing so depended on his
receiving timely, accurate, and continuous reports of the
situation from the Royal Flying Corps. It was essential,
also, that the Cavalry Brigade under his command should
be kept equally fully informed of the changing situation.
One Flight of aeroplanes, therefore, was allotted to the
Cavalry Brigade, one Flight to the Commander, Royal
Artillery, and the remainder to head-quarters for general
reconnaissance and contact-patrol work. Major-General
Brooking established his head-quarters for the battle west
of the Aleppo road about six miles north of Sahiliya, at
a site chosen because it was near the only piece of ground
in the area suitable for the landing of aeroplanes.
The date fixed for the advance was the 26th of March.
The Cavalry Brigade moved during the night of the
25th/26th and soon after 5 p.m. on the 26th had got
astride the road behind the Khan Baghdadi positions.
The infantry assault on the first line of defence at Baghdadi
had begun early on the 26th, some time before dawn. As
soon as it was light, an aeroplane flew over the Turkish
positions, and the observer delivered his reports by
message bags which were received before 7 a.m. The
reports revealed that there were no signs of a Turkish
retirement and indicated the varying strength with which
the enemy forward positions were held. Guided by the
air reports Major-General Brooking issued his orders for
the attack to begin. At 10.30 a.m. air reconnaissances
gave the information that the Turks were withdrawing
from their first to their second line of defences at Baghdadi.
This second line was attacked, under cover of an effective
barrage, at 5.30 p.m. By this time the way of retreat was
already blocked by the Cavalry Brigade. The Turks
328 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
made a desperate attempt to pierce the cavalry screen
at 1 1 p.m. but were firmly held by machine-gun fire, and
next morning the enemy displayed white flags, and the
whole force, numbering about 4,000, was captured to-
gether with ten guns, machine-guns, and war material
of all kinds.
Khan Baghdadi was an outstanding success achieved
by strategy similar to that which had won Ramadi. But
the Baghdadi operations were more difficult, especially
the part allotted to the nth Cavalry Brigade. This
brigade had to make a night and day march across a barren
plateau, intersected by steep and rocky ravines, the
topography of which was only approximately known. It
would have been easy, as it would have been fatal to the
success of the battle, for the Cavalry Brigade to lose
direction, and it was due, in great measure, to the work
of the contact aeroplanes, from dawn on the 26th, that
the cavalry and armoured cars attained their objective.
When the brigade was being assembled at Baghdad, two
aeroplanes had been sent there to practise co-operation,
and this careful preliminary work was largely responsible
for the results achieved on the 26th of March. Through-
out that day the contact-patrol air observers guided the
Cavalry Brigade with precision. Messages were dropped
from time to time giving the brigade its position, telling
where water was to be found, and also giving information
about the progress of the infantry battle at Baghdadi and
about the enemy dispositions. Pilots landed alongside
Cavalry Brigade Head-quarters, whenever possible, so that
the observers might make their reports in person. The
movements of the brigade were also reported throughout
the day to Major-General Brooking.^ On the main front
the fire of the artillery was directed from the air, and
tactical and strategical reconnaissances kept the command
informed of the progress of the battle and of the Turkish
^ 'The whole show depended on my getting rapid and accurate informa-
'tion. I, having caught the Turks at Ramadi, felt that I could only do it
'again provided I got good and quick information, and not only to myself,
'but to my Cavalry Brigade. This I got through the Royal Flying Corps.'
(Major-General Sir H. T. Brooking in a personal letter to the author.)
I9I8] A DASH AND A RESCUE 329
movements. In addition, the enemy was vigorously
bombed and attacked with machine-gun fire. Twenty-one
such aeroplane attacks were made during the 26th on
troops, transport, camps, and river craft in the Khan
Baghdadi area. One hundred and sixty-five bombs,
chiefly of 20-lb. weight, were dropped and many direct
hits were made.
On the 27th of March the cavalry, armoured cars, and
the mobile column in Ford vans, pushed on energetically
along the Euphrates valley while the Royal Flying Corps
made contact patrols and harassed the enemy troops with
bomb and machine-gun. Haditha, with its ammunition
and petrol dumps intact, was captured without serious
resistance, and by the evening Khan Fuhaima was reached.
The bombing on the 27th was made by eleven aeroplanes
which dropped 3,014 lb. weight of bombs, mainly on
troops and transport. The pursuit of the demoralized
Turks was continued next day, when Ana was taken with
its main ammunition, petrol, and stores dumps intact.
During the seventy-three mile dash from Baghdadi along
the Aleppo road, only made possible by the capture of
the petrol dumps at Haditha and Ana, many additional
prisoners were captured, bringing the total for the whole
operation to 213 oflScers and 5,022 other ranks. Among
the prisoners were Nazim Bey, the Turkish commander,
and his staif.
Ana was the limit of the British pursuit, but a section
of armoured cars undertook a further spectacular dash
from Ana on a special mission. On the morning of the
25 th of March, the day before the battle began, Lieutenant-
Colonel J. E. Tennant, the Royal Flying Corps com-
mander, had taken Major P. C. S. Hobart, Brigade-Major
of the 8th Infantry Brigade, as a passenger in a D.H.4 to
make a reconnaissance of the Baghdadi positions. During
the flight the engine in the D.H.4 been put out of
action by machine-gun bullets fired from the ground, and
the pilot had been forced to land. The D.H.4 burnt
and the two officers were made prisoners. They were
taken to Nazim Bey, the Turkish commander, and, after
interrogation, were sent on to Ana. They were, however.
330 THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA [ch. v
allowed little rest and, mounted on camels, with an escort
of twelve Tartars on foot, were sent north again across the
open plain.
On the evening of the 27th, when the two officers
were already some distance beyond Ana, Major-General
Brooking sent a telegram to Brigadier-General R. A.
Cassels, commanding the nth Cavalry Brigade, saying:
'Get Tennant back.' When Brigadier-General Cassels
reached Ana on the morning of the 28th he learned that
the prisoners had left at 4 a.m. on the previous day. He
thereupon instructed eight armoured cars, under the
command of Captain D. Tod, to go along the Aleppo
road for one hundred miles, if necessary and possible, and
recover the two officers. The cars dashed forward and
many retreating Turks along their way surrendered and
were left on the roadside disarmed. At Nahiyeh Captain
Tod was informed by an Armenian that the party he
sought was a few hours ahead, and, proceeding with caution,
he eventually came within sight of the Tartar escort and
their prisoners at a point about thirty-two miles west
of Ana. The leading car, moving from dead ground well
in advance of the remainder, surprised and scattered
the guard with machine-gun fire while the two officers
made a dash from their camels for the cars which they
eventually gained. Fighting their way the detachment
got back to Ana and thence to Khan Baghdadi.^
Before and during the battle of Khan Baghdadi the
flying conditions had been excellent and the visibility
perfect. One pilot likened the scene from the air to
pictures of manoeuvre battles of the eighteenth century.
Every position stood out in the clear light sharply defined,
and from the aeroplane the whole battle area could be
surveyed. But during the night of the 31st of March/ ist of
April, when the remnants of the defeated Turkish army
were being brought in, a sudden gale struck the camps
on the Euphrates and within a short time hangars and
^ On the day Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant was captured the command
of the Wing was taken over by Major R. A. Bradley, who continued in the
command until the end of the war. Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant left
Mesopotamia for England on the 17th of April 1918.
I9I8] LUCK OF THE WEATHER 331
tents had been blown down and the camps flooded. The
kite balloons were whirled away and lost, three aeroplanes
were wrecked, and seven others were damaged. Had the
storm come a few days earlier, the Khan Baghdadi
operations must have been very seriously affected.
CHAPTER VI
AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA
igi6~March igi8^
[Maps, pp. 341 and 366]
For nearly five hundred years Macedonia was ruled by
Turkey. Its foremost seaport, Salonika, has always been
of strategic importance because it forms the outlet for
the ancient highway which branches off at Nis from the
still greater highway to Constantinople. The Nis-Salonika
route follows the valley of the Vardar through a rich
agricultural country, and Salonika is well placed to
become one of the greatest ports of the Near East. The
Turkish dominion extended into the Balkans far beyond
Macedonia, but Greece threw off Turkish rule in 1829
and Serbia won her freedom in 1867. Unsuccessful revolts
by the Bulgars, a Slavonic people, were marked by
atrocities, committed by Turkish irregulars, which roused
world-wide indignation and resulted in the intervention
of Russia. With the help of Romania, and, later, of
Serbia, Russia defeated Turkey and, by the Treaty of
San Stefano of March 1878, Bulgaria was constituted an
autonomous state to include most of Macedonia.
The treaty, however, was not allowed to stand. It had
been made clear to Russia by other interested Powers
that any settlement reached as a result of the war must
be approved by them, and in due course the treaty was
discussed and revised at the Congress of Berlin, where
Britain, in particular, raised objections about the extent
of the territory allotted to the new Bulgaria. The British
views ultimately prevailed and, by the Treaty of Berlin,
Bulgaria lost about two-thirds of what had been promised
her, and Turkey was allowed to retain dominion over
Macedonia.
There was comparative quiet, the quiet of effective
oppression, until 1906, the year of the Turkish Revolution
which was acclaimed in Macedonia and throughout the
^ The student is referred also to Military Operations, Macedonia, by-
Captain Cyril Falls.
I9I4] BALKAN WARS 333
Balkans generally. The new Turks, however, proved even
less docile than the old. The chief races making up the
population of Macedonia were Serbians, Bulgarians, and
Greeks, all of Christian religion, and when the new rulers
began to abolish racial distinctions in pursuit of an intense
nationalist policy there was a rising tide of anger in the
neighbouring countries at the treatment meted out to
those of their race and faith within the Turkish borders.
This anger culminated in the First Balkan War which
opened in October 191 2, and brought overwhelming
victory to the three Christian allies. Turkey was expelled
from Macedonia, but the victors were soon in disagree-
ment about the division of the gains, and their quarrel
led to the Second Balkan War in July 191 3, when Bulgaria
came into conflict with Serbia and Greece. Romania
joined in the alliance against Bulgaria, and Turkey took
the opportunity to recapture some of the ground she had
lost. Bulgaria, assailed from all sides, was overwhelmed
in a few days and the war was concluded by the Treaty
of Bucharest, signed on the 9th of August 1913.
By this treaty the frontiers of Serbia were extended to
include northern Macedonia to a line south of Monastir,
Greece acquired all southern Macedonia as far as the port
of Kavalla and including the town of Salonika, and
Romania received from Bulgaria a strip of the Southern
Dobruja on the shore of the Black Sea. Bulgaria herself,
largely as a result of Austrian backing, was allowed to
annex the valleys of the Upper Struma and Mesta, and
was given an outlet to the Aegean between Kavalla and
Dede Agach.
Such was the position on the outbreak of the European
War in 19 14. Greece had reason to be satisfied with what
she had acquired, but Serbia and Bulgaria harboured
disappointment, the former because she had been denied,
by Austria, a port in the Adriatic, and the latter because
her dream of a greater Bulgaria had been shattered.
When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on the
28th of July 1914, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania,
and Turkey, decided to remain neutral while Montenegro
joined with Serbia. It will be unnecessary to follow the
334 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
fluctuations of the early fighting on the Serbian front.
By December 1914 Serbia, as a result of the classic battle
of the Kolubara, had defeated the Austrians and had won
a respite during which she could reorganize her armies,
gravely exhausted after months of bitter campaigning.
Throughout the greater part of 19 15 the Serbian army
continued on the defensive. Meanwhile Turkey in
November 1914, and Italy in May 1915, had entered
the war, but although Serbia was pressed, from various
quarters, to resume the offensive, particularly after the
declaration of war on Austria by Italy, she held her hand.
Chiefly she was anxious about the attitude of Bulgaria
who was wooed, with territorial promises, both by the
Allies and by the Central Powers.
Although the sympathies of Bulgaria remained with
the Central Powers, it was obvious that she would not
allow those sympathies to dictate her policy, but would
watch, with an appraising eye, the progress of military
events. Before the summer of 191 5 had ended it was clear
what her decision would be. An Austro-German offensive
against Russia, which had begun on the 2nd of May,
pushed the Russians back headlong, and in so doing struck a
blow from which the Russian armies never fuUy recovered.
Danger from Russia had been removed for as long as
needed to be foreseen, and the German and Austrian
armies were left free to devote their offensive energies to
a campaign elsewhere. Nor had the British operations
against Turkey on the Gallipoli Peninsula produced any
prospect of an Allied victory to divert the mind of
Bulgaria from the glamour of German military might.
Germany decided that the time had come for a campaign
to crush Serbia. Turkey sorely needed munitions, and if
Serbia could be overrun, with the co-operation of Bulgaria,
it would be possible to send munitions through to Turkey
by way of the Danube and the railway through Sofia.
Germany did not doubt that Bulgaria would no longer
hesitate when she knew that she was assured of German
help and leadership. Nor was Germany wrong. An
emissary of Bulgaria left Sofia for Berlin early in August
and, on the 6th of September 1915, a convention was
I9I5] BRITISH AT SALONIKA 335
signed which defined the parts which Germany, Austria,
and Bulgaria would take in the attack on Serbia.
The Austro-German offensive, which began on the
6th of October, a week before Bulgaria openly declared
war, was directed by Field-Marshal von Mackensen, but
although the Germans and Austrians advanced steadily,
there is little doubt that the Serbian armies could have
been withdrawn more or less intact had not the Bulgarians
cut off the routes to the south. The Serbians were left
only one way of escape, to the Adriatic across the snow-
covered tracks of the Albanian mountains, and their
passage to safety was marked by an army of frozen dead.
The remnants were eventually reorganized, mainly on the
Greek island of Corfu, and by May 191 6 the Serbian
army had come into action again, 125,000 strong, on the
Salonika front. ^
Meanwhile, on the 5th of October 191 5, French and
British troops had begun to land at Salonika at the request
of M. Venizelos, the Greek premier. Greece and Serbia
had been bound, by a military convention, to help each
other in the event of an attack by Bulgaria, but Greece
had decided that, in the circumstances, she could fulfil
her obligation only if the British and French Governments
supplied 150,000 men, which was the number of troops
that Serbia had promised, under the convention, to
concentrate against Bulgaria: it was obvious at the time
that Serbia would be unable to do this because she would
require every resource to meet the Austro-German
threat. Although, however, the Allied troops were landed
at Salonika at the invitation of Greece, on the day they
went ashore M. Venizelos, finding that the King and the
Greek general staff definitely opposed his policy, resigned,
and it at once became clear that Greece would, at best,
be neutral, and, at worst, might take steps aimed at the
ejection of the Allied troops.
On the 14th of October 1915 Britain declared war on
Bulgaria, but by that time the British general staff held
the view that it was too late to do anything to save Serbia.
^ The strength of the Serbian army before the retreat began was stated
to be 420,000.
i
I
336 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
The French, however, thought otherwise, and ultimately
it was agreed that the Allies should take action on the
understanding that if communication with the Serbian
army could not be opened and maintained the Allied
forces would be withdrawn. The French, and later the
British, moved up-country from Salonika, but the Allied
forces proved too weak to open communications, and they
withdrew to Salonika to a series of entrenched positions
which had been completed by the end of December 191 5.
There ensued a period of stalemate, enlivened from time
to time by rumours of a German and Bulgarian offensive,
and by the unpredictable attitudes of the Greeks.
The arrival of a Zeppelin airship on the Macedonian
front early in 1916 had caused some excitement. The
first ship, the LZ.81, which operated from Timisoara, in
southern Hungary with orders to destroy the harbour
facilities at Salonika, was dogged by engine troubles and
was eventually replaced by the LZ.85 (Oberleutnant Ernst
Scherzer). This ship made her first attack on Salonika dur-
ing the night of the 31st of January/ ist of February 1916,
when the premises of the Banque de Salonique were hit
by an incendiary bomb and gutted with a loss of stored
goods valued at three million francs. Another bomb fell
alongside a British transport from which ammunition was
being unloaded and killed a few Allied soldiers and Greek
labourers: fortunately the ammunition escaped a hit. The
ZZ.55 successfully attacked Salonika again on the night
of the 17th of March, but her third attempt, made on
the 5th of May, ended in disaster. When she appeared
over the harbour about 2.15 a.m. she was caught in the
beams of a searchlight from the battleship Agamemnon
which opened fire and quickly scored a hit. The airship
began to descend slowly towards the mouth of the Vardar,
and as she came down she was struck by three shells
from the British torpedo-boat T,B.i8. She fell in the
marshland near the Vardar mouth and her crew, who
wandered about in an attempt to escape, were eventually
surrounded and captured by parties of French soldiers.
The airship attacks on Salonika had alarmed the polyglot
peoples inhabiting the port, and the destruction of the
i9i6] ZEPPELIN DESTROYED 337
which ended this form of attack, was more than
an episode. The Allies depended much on local labour
and on the trading activities of the town and could ill
afford to see that labour, and the life of the town generally,
disorganized because of the fear of air attack.
In April and May the re-equipped Serbian army landed
at Salonika from Corfu. The arrival of the Serbs led
the Bulgars to believe that an Allied offensive was im-
minent, and, to forestall the Allies, the Bulgars advanced
into Greek territory and occupied Fort Rupel and one or
two other works which commanded the line by which
the Allies might be expected to move. The Greek Govern-
ment, arguing that they could not treat one belligerent
differently from another, did not object to this occupation
of their forts, but the Greek people were less tractable
and there were many public protests. The Allies instituted
a 'pacific' blockade of Greece and presented demands,
ultimately accepted, that the Greek armies should be
demobilized and reduced to a peace footing. ^ Meanwhile
the Allies had begun to move forward, but there were
grave differences of view between the French and British
Governments, and between their general staffs, about
how far action should go. The French wished to under-
take a full offensive against Bulgaria, but the British
attitude was strictly defensive.
On the 9th of May 1916 Lieut enant-General G. F.
Milne, the commander of the XVI Corps, succeeded
Lieut enant-General Sir Bryan T. Mahon in the command
of the British forces, which had been placed in January
under the general direction, with certain qualifications,
of the French General Sarrail who had been appointed
Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up to the time when
Lieutenant-General Milne took command, such air
reconnaissances as the British staff required were partly
made by seaplanes from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal^^
^ The aircraft carrier Empress was with the Allied fleet in Milo Bay
during the period of uncertainty. See p. 374.
^ The Ark Royal had returned to Mudros in the middle of March 1916,
but five of her seaplanes had been left behind at Stavros to make a photo-
graphic reconnaissance in that area. See pp. 371-2,
2504.5 z
338 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
and partly hy British observers in French aeroplanes.
With the arrival, how^ever, of the Serbians at Salonika,
the French aeroplanes were w^ithdrav^n from the British
for attachment to the Serbs, and Lieutenant-General
Milne thereupon asked to be supplied w^ith tv^o Royal
Flying Corps squadrons. Meanv^hile, at the end of May,
naval aeroplanes v^ere sent to Thasos, v^here they were
joined by French aeroplanes for attacks on the lines of
communication on the flank of the Bulgarian army.^
The War Oflice decided that whatever aeroplanes were
provided for Salonika must come, in the first place, from
Egypt, and must form part of the Middle East Brigade
which was in the process of formation under Brigadier-
General W. G. H. Salmond. Accordingly, Lieutenant-
Colonel P. R. C. Groves was sent to Salonika from Egypt
to confer with the army staff, to survey the country, and
to make arrangements for the reception of a Royal Flying
Corps squadron and an Aircraft Park. Lieutenant-Colonel
Groves arrived on the ist of July. In his subsequent report
he stated that the French had a considerable air service in
the area, totalling some i6o aeroplanes. The enemy aero-
dromes, already located, were at Monastir, Hudova, and
Xanthe, and the enemy air strength, as calculated by the
French, was about fifty aeroplanes, but the service was
reported to be increasing. He made detailed recommenda-
tions and set out the arrangements he had already started
for the reception and distribution of the squadron and of
the Park.
While he was still in Macedonia, in July, an advanced
detachment of No. 17 Squadron arrived from Egypt and
took up quarters at Mikra Bay about four miles south-east
of Salonika. By the end of the month the squadron, under
Major E. N. Fuller,^ was completely installed and was
mainly equipped with B.E.2C and B.E.12 aeroplanes.
About this time the situation in Macedonia underwent
a change as a result of the entry of Romania into the war.
The sympathies of Romania had been with the Allies
^ See pp. 375-6.
^ The command of No. 17 Squadron was taken over hy Major J. H.
Herring on the 4th of February 191 7.
1916] A FORWARD MOVE 339
from the beginning, and by the spring of 1916 it was clear
that she would be ready to join in the war at the first
favourable moment. That moment had come in June,
when Russia opened the 'Brusilov offensive' which met
with success and led Romania to believe that an oppor-
tunity had arrived such as might never recur. The
Russians, who had reached the foot of the Carpathians
by the middle of July, would be able, so it appeared to
the Romanian general staff, to cross the Carpathians side
by side with the Romanian armies and overrun Hungary.
The Romanian Prime Minister informed the French
Minister at Bucharest that Romania was ready to join
the Allies on conditions, one of which was that she should
be protected against Bulgaria by Russian troops, or by an
Allied offensive from Salonika. After debate and delay
the Allies agreed to make an offensive in Macedonia to
facilitate the Romanian mobilization and concentration.
Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary on the 27th
of August 1916, and Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria
thereupon declared war on Romania.
In accordance with General Sarrail's plan for offensive
operations, arising out of the agreement with Romania,
the British forces, as a preliminary, took up new disposi-
tions and, by the 3rd of August, when these initial move-
ments had been completed, the British XVI Corps (27th
and 28th Divisions) was defending the lower Struma to
Lake Tahinos, and a front from Tahinos to a point near
Lake Butkovo. Left of this corps were French troops as
far as Kilinder, south of Lake Dojran, where British
troops, namely, the XII Corps (22nd and 26th Divisions),
again took up a front stretching as far as Chaushitsa,
north of Lake Arjan. Left of the British again came the
French and Serbs. The main line of communications of
the XVI Corps on the Struma front, so-called, was the
Salonika-Seres road. The XII Corps, on the Dojran
front, had direct rail as well as road communications.
From the 17th of August onwards the Bulgarians, as a
preparatory step in anticipation of the entry of Romania
into the war, and of the activity which must be expected
to follow, made an appreciable advance on both flanks
340 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
of the Allies in eastern and western Greek Macedonia.
In the eastern area the Greek Army Corps which extended
between Demir Hisar and Kavalla withdrew, and the
Greek garrison at Kavalla surrendered. By the end of
August Macedonia, east of the Struma, was in enemy-
occupation.^
Throughout the month of August the main work of
No. 17 Squadron at Mikra Bay was reconnaissance. On
the 3rd of September 'B' Flight of the squadron moved
to Avret Hisar to work directly for the XII Corps on the
Dojran front, while towards the end of the month 'A'
Flight went to Lahana for work with the XVI Corps.
From the beginning the superiority of performance of
some of the German aeroplanes was marked, and was,
indeed, to be noticeable until well into 191 8. What was
also apparent was the efficiency of the enemy anti-aircraft
gun-fire, particularly in the neighbourhood of Lake
Dojran, and the reconnoitring aeroplanes of No. 17
Squadron were often hit, though not seriously, at heights
up to 12,500 feet.
The Allied operations in Macedonia, to help Romania,
had begun towards the end of August, but Romania her-
self was quickly and effectively dealt with by the German
command. The Romanians had opened their campaign on
the 28th of August, but, confronted by the two most capable
German commanders of the war. Generals von Falkenhayn
and von Mackensen, the Romanian armies were over-
whelmed, and by the end of 1916 the greater part of
their country had been overrun. The hopes which had
been centred on her entry into the war faded, therefore,
as the campaign progressed until, with the overrunning of
Romania, the hopes were extinguished, thereby affecting
the Allied operations in Macedonia.
The main operations on the Macedonian front took
place in the area of Monastir, the principal town of
Macedonia after Salonika. The Allied pressure was such
that, in spite of German reinforcements, Monastir was
abandoned to the Allies during the night of the i8th of
^ For an account of the air operations on the Eastern Macedonian flank
by naval aircraft, see p. 376.
i9i6] REINFORCEMENTS 341
November 191 6. Early in December, however, General
Sarrail decided that as he could do nothing more to help
Romania, he v^ould cease his attacks and reorganize his
forces. As a result of adjustments and changes of dis-
position, the British, hy the end of the year, held the whole
area from the Aegean, at the Struma mouth, by way of
lakes Tahinos, Butkovo, and Dojran, to the Vardar at
Machukovo. On this line they were to stand throughout
most of the remainder of the war.
Meanwhile the Royal Flying Corps had settled down.
On the 20th of September the personnel of a wing head-
quarters, together with No. 47 Squadron and No. 17
Balloon Section, had disembarked at Salonika. On the
same day the Sixteenth Wing was formed under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. P. Dawes. No. 47
Squadron, under Major C. C. Wigram,i went to Mikra
Bay, where an Aircraft Park had been started by Major
A. Cleghorn.
In due course the Royal Flying Corps units were
redistributed. No. 17 Balloon Section moved to Kopriva
on the Struma front towards the end of October. The
Flight of No. 17 Squadron which had been working for
the XII Corps on the Dojran front returned to Salonika
on the 20th of October and its place was taken by No. 47
Squadron, which moved to Yanesh towards the end of the
month. Flight of the squadron was detached at an
aerodrome at Kukush, previously occupied by the French.
This Flight moved to Snevche at the beginning of Decem-
ber : it exchanged aerodromes again on the 20th of January
191 7 with 'B' Flight at Yanesh. Both on the Struma and
the Dojran fronts the squadrons were engaged on recon-
naissance and photography, and in the work of co-operation
with the artillery. In November the B.E.12 (140 horse-
power Royal Aircraft Factory engine), a single-seater of
better performance than any other aeroplane in possession
of the squadrons, came into use.
On the loth of December 1916 Lieutenant W. S. Scott
^ Major F. F. Minchin took command of No. 47 Squadron on the 1st
of January 1917. The history of the squadron in the war is told in Over
the Balkans and South Russia, by H. A. Jones.
342 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
of No. 17 Squadron, carrying a Greek officer as his observer,
reconnoitred the area of Drama to find a suitable piece
of ground on which he might later land with an agent.
During the homeward journey a German aeroplane from
Drama aerodrome attacked the British aeroplane, but was
shot down out of control by Lieutenant Scott and seen
to crash by the Greek officer. A week later the pilot set
out with his agent and landed successfully in the Drama
valley in a mist : the passenger disappeared into the fog and
the pilot flew away again. The same pilot landed a second
agent in the Drama area on the ist of January 191 7.
Four days later, seven aeroplanes of No. 47 Squadron
attacked dumps and camps at Hudova station, but one
pilot who was forced to land was captured, uninjured, after
destroying his aeroplane.
There were a number of combats, particularly with
reconnoitring German two-seaters. On the Struma front
Captain G. W. Murlis-Green, of No. 17 Squadron, fly-
ing a B.E.I 2, quickly achieved success. On the 13th of
December he had sent an enemy two-seater crashing into
a gully near Fort Rupel. On the 4th of January he shot
down an aeroplane in the British lines with its observer
wounded, and ten days later, in company with Lieutenant
F. G. Saunders, he helped to shoot down yet another
which fell near the squadron's aerodrome at Lahana.
No. 47 Squadron had similar successes; two-seaters were
shot down on the 23rd of December by Captain W. D. M.
Bell, and on the 19th of January 1917 by Second Lieu-
tenant C. ff. Denning, the victim of the latter landing
intact within the British lines. This squadron had, on
the 15th, lost an aeroplane which was acting as an escort
to a reconnaissance aeroplane, and a note dropped by a
German pilot, with two bombs, on the aerodrome at
Snevche stated that the two occupants had been killed
in combat.
About this time a German fighter pilot, who was to
prove an elusive adversary, began to have success on the
front. He was Leutnant von Eschwege, stationed at the
Drama aerodrome. On the 1 8th of February Captain
Murlis-Green and Lieutenant J. C. F. Owen, of No. 17
I9I7] GERMAN BOMBING SQUADRON 343
Squadron, flying B.E.iz's, set out for Drama to challenge
Eschwege, and as they arrived over the aerodrome they
found him climbing to meet them. Both B.E. pilots
dived, but Captain Murlis-Green's gun jammed soon after
he had opened fire, and v^hile the stoppage was being
rectified. Lieutenant Owen, who continued to fight Esch-
wege, was shot down by what appeared to be machine-gun
fire from the ground: Owen landed close to the Drama
aerodrome, and before his opponent landed near, he had
set fire to his aeroplane which was destroyed. It was said
that he was subsequently court-martialled by the Bulgars
for burning his aeroplane and that Eschwege defended
him with great stubbornness.^
^he German Bombing Squadron
There was alarm on the Dojran front on the 26th of
February. In the morning a V-shape formation of twenty
large-type aeroplanes was seen to be flying down the
Vardar, and almost before ground observers had had time
to realize that they were hostile, bombs were falling on
the French aerodrome at Gorgop on the right bank of the
river. Eight French aeroplanes were destroyed and four
were damaged. In the afternoon the raiders were signalled
again and they flew towards the railhead at Yanesh near
which was situated the head-quarters of the XII Corps and
the main aerodrome of No. 47 Squadron. No warning of
their approach was received at the aerodrome, but the morn-
ing attack on the French at Gorgop had suggested that
Yanesh, the chief Royal Flying Corps station in the same
area, might next be visited, and pilots were ready to take
the air rapidly. As soon as the German formation was
seen, pilots ran to their aeroplanes and were in the air,
climbing as best they could, while the enemy were still
moving towards Yanesh. The bombs, which were aimed
by the Germans at dumps and camps near the railhead,
including XII Corps head-quarters, but mainly at the
^ It would seem that Eschwege shot Lieutenant Owen down. See
War Flying in Macedonia, by Haupt Heydemarck, pp. 21-3. This book
gives an interesting account, from the German side, of some of the air
operations, mainly in Eastern Macedonia.
344 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
aerodrome, inflicted little damage. There were, however,
28 casualties, of which 16 occurred on the Yanesh aero-
drome (7 mechanics killed and I officer and 8 mechanics
wounded).
Early next day, the 27th, the bombers appeared again,
but they passed on their way, scattering people on the
ground to cover as they went, to Salonika, where the main
attack was made on Summerhill camp, north of the town.
The British military casualties were heavy: 115 were killed
and 261 wounded. As the raiders approached the city, the
available aeroplanes of No. 17 Squadron, seven in number,
ascended, and their subsequent attacks helped to break
up the German formation; an escorting Halberstadt
fighter was forced to land, its pilot being taken prisoner
by the French. On the return journey, when the bombers
passed near the aerodromes of No. 47 Squadron, there were
many engagements with the waiting pilots of the squadron.
The advantage, however, was with the enemy, and in the
many combats which took place the aeroplanes of No. 47
Squadron, which were of poor performance, were much
shot about, although there were no casualties.
Such was the opening of the German bombing campaign
on the Macedonian front which the Royal Flying Corps
was ill equipped to meet. The length of the British front
was about ninety miles and, except on the right wing
where naval aircraft operated, there were no more than
two squadrons to do all the work of reconnaissance, photo-
graphy, &c., required. There was no differentiation between
corps and army work. Whatever tasks were set, and no
matter how far behind the enemy lines, the pilots of these
two squadrons had to do them. Because of the losses sus-
tained by the French air service at Gorgop on the first
day of the German bombing squadron's activities, the
French could not undertake the patrol of their lines
between the Vardar and Isvor and they called upon the
Royal Flying Corps to help. No. 47 Squadron was in-
structed to extend its patrol area towards Gorgop, but
the squadron already had more than enough to do and
could give the French little effective aid.
The German squadron — No. I Kampfgeschwadar — ^had
I9I7] COUNTER-BOMBING 345
come from Bucharest after a bombing campaign against
Romania. It achieved a great measure of mobility because
it had a railway train attached in which the offices, stores,
&c., were housed. There was no warning of the arrival
of the squadron at Hudova aerodrome, and the first
that was known of its presence was when the bombing
formation approached Gorgop aerodrome on the 26th
of February. It was equipped with A.E.G's {Allgemeine
Elektrizitdts Gesellschaft) fitted with two 260 horse-power
Mercedes engines, Rumplers with two 150 horse-power
Benz engines, and Friedrichshafeners with two 260 horse-
power Mercedes. There were also one Gotha bomber (two
260 h.p. Mercedes) and some single-seater Halberstadt
fighters.
It happened that at the end of February, when the
bombing squadron appeared, Lieutenant-General Milne
had directed that plans should be prepared for an attack
by the XII Corps on the western shore of Lake Dojran as
part of a general Allied offensive. It was clear that unless
air reinforcements were received, aircraft co-operation in
the proposed attack would certainly be inadequate and
might be impossible. On the 4th of March eighteen
aeroplanes, made up from both Nos. 47 and 17 Squadrons,
attacked the aerodrome at Hudova. The bombing aero-
planes were those normally employed on the work of co-
operation with the artillery and consisted of Armstrong-
Whitworths and of B.E.2c's with 90 horse-power engines.
They would not carry observers and bombs, so they were
flown as single-seaters and protection was provided by
six single-seater B.E.i2's. Forty-five bombs were dropped
on or near the aerodrome, but apparently no important
damage was caused. In the afternoon of the same day
nine of the British two-seaters, with five single-seaters as
escorts, attacked the enemy dump at Cestovo, doing much
damage.
At 8.30 a.m. on the 4th the German pilots again visited
Salonika, where they dropped bombs on dumps and camps
at Dudular. Little damage resulted, but there were 64
casualties, most of them occurring at No. 29 General
Hospital. On the 12th the German bombing squadron
346 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
turned its attention to Vertekop, outside the British area,
on the Salonika-Monastir railway, and, once again, a field
hospital suffered most : among the victims were two British
nurses who were killed.
After the German bombing squadron had returned to
its aerodrome at Hudova, thirteen Royal Flying Corps
aeroplanes, with an escort of seven, dropped sixty-one
bombs, mostly of i6-lb. weight, on and about the aero-
drome. Many enemy fighters took the air on the approach
of the British aeroplanes and there was some fierce fighting
from which Second Lieutenant D. H. Glasson did not
return. In the afternoon there came retaliation against
Yanesh aerodrome, but the bombs just missed the target.
A note dropped at the same time gave the news that
Second Lieutenant Glasson had been shot in the stomach
and had died just before the German squadron set out
for Yanesh.
The activities of the German bombing squadron had
stirred the whole front and had made the position of the
Royal Flying Corps, with its inferior equipment, a difiicult
one. Not only could the German bombers brush aside
without much difiiculty most of the opposition with which
they had to contend, but they were, in addition, almost
untroubled by anti-aircraft gun-fire. On the whole
British front there were no more than sixteen anti-aircraft
guns.
Lieutenant-General Milne therefore wrote to Vice-
Admiral Sir Cecil F. Thursby, commanding the Eastern
Mediterranean Squadron, asking if naval aircraft could be
placed at his disposal. The vice-admiral, in reply, sent
four Sopwith two-seater fighters (i| strutters) and one
Sopwith Triplane at the end of March. Meanwhile the
organization of a composite fighting unit to include these
naval aeroplanes had been begun. Three B.E.iz's were
taken from No. 17 Squadron and one from No. 47 Squad-
ron, which also supplied two D.H.2 Scouts. Although
these aeroplanes were inferior in performance to the
Halberstadt fighters which escorted the bombers, and had
no advantages in combat over the bombers themselves, the
composite squadron was immediately successful. On the
I9I7] HELP FROM THE NAVY 347
iSth of March the German bombing formation twice
crossed the lines to make a raid, but the British fighter pilots
ascended in time to attack the bombers on their inward
journey and fought with such determination that the Ger-
man formation was broken, and the enemy pilots eventu-
ally went back the way they had come without attacking
any objective. Nor did they go back without loss. Captain
G. W. Murlis-Green, in a B.E.12, attacked from below
at 30 yards the rearmost of six bombers. Two drums from
his Lewis gun sufficed to cripple the bomber which crashed
in 'no-man's land' and was subsequently shelled. Shortly
afterwards, the same pilot found another formation of five
and, attacking in the same way, nearly repeated his earlier
success. After three drums of ammunition had been fired
into one of the bombers, petrol streamed from it and one
member of the crew fell across the side of the cockpit
over which he was still hanging as the bombing aeroplane
dropped down. The same officer next morning attacked
over Lake Dojran a two-seater reconnaissance Albatros
which crashed and caught fire. Another pilot of No. 17
Squadron, Lieutenant F. G. Saunders, also attacked the
German bombing formation. Using tactics similar to those
employed by Captain Murlis-Green, he fired into a bomb-
ing aeroplane which dived steeply, but he was himself
forced to land through damage to his aeroplane inflicted
by two escorting Halberstadts. On the 20th this officer,
flying on the Struma front, shot down an Albatros two-
seater which crashed in a ravine.
In the evening of the 28th of March the German
bombers, in a formation often, approached the aerodrome
of No. 47 Squadron at Snevche. By this time the naval
fighters had arrived on the front and, in company with
Captain Murlis-Green, they attacked and drove back the
raiders, who were given no opportunity to drop their bombs
and were pursued as far as their aerodrome at Hudova.
On the night of the 2nd of April, and again on the follow-
ing night, Hudova was attacked with 20-lb. Hales bombs and
with incendiary bombs. On the Sth the German bombers
came out again, but they chose an objective near the front
line, namely, the dumps and the railhead at Karasuli:
348 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
an ammunition train standing in the station with a load
of over 4,000 shells was hit and totally destroyed, and few
shells were left in the nearby ammunition dump which
blew up. The bombing took place at 3.15 p.m., and
it was not until 10.15 next morning that it was safe to
approach the railhead, where the few buildings had mostly
been destroyed. The fighters from the composite squadron
had got quickly into the air when the raiders were signalled,
but the British pilots had no opportunity to attack the
German formation before the bombs had been dropped.
The bombers were attacked on their homeward journey,
but the combats were indecisive: a British pilot was
wounded. On the 8th of April the bombers attacked
Yanesh railhead and its vicinity, but inflicted little damage.
Captain F. G. Saunders was wounded while attacking the
formation, but two other pilots forced one of the German
aeroplanes, a Friedrichshafener, which had been damaged
by anti-aircraft gun-fire, to land near the aerodrome at
Snevche: the crew of three, two officers and one mechanic,
were taken prisoners. On the 22nd the squadron from
Hudova bombed advanced bivouacs in the XII Corps
area and, once again, there were many combats, during
which a naval air observer was wounded.
The Royal Flying Corps flew their two-seaters with-
out observers and made retaliatory raids as opportunity
offered, usually with an escort provided by the com-
posite squadron. No. 17 Squadron thus attacked dumps
at Cestovo on the 23rd of April and at Cerniste two
days later, when an ammunition dump was blown up.
In the afternoon of this same day, the 25th, eight
bombers of No. 17 Squadron, with an escort of six
fighters, set out to bomb dumps at Bogdanci, but
when the British formation arrived over the lines, the
German bombers appeared on their way to make a
raid. There was an immediate clash, during which one
British aeroplane (Lieutenant G. A. Radcliffe) went
down in flames, and one Friedrichshafener crashed and
was destroyed by fire. When the German aeroplanes had
been dispersed, the British formation continued on its
way and bombed its objective. On the 28th the enemy
I9I7] DISASTER AT MARIAN 349
squadron attacked Royal Flying Corps aerodromes and
other targets, but without inflicting damage.
Meanwhile, as a further result of Lieutenant-General
Milne's request for help from the Royal Naval Air Service
in the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Sir C. F. Thursby
had given instructions for the organization of a special
bombing squadron for service in Macedonia. This
squadron, called 'F' Squadron, arrived on a previously
selected aerodrome at Amberkoj on the 29th of April.
It was equipped with Sopwith ij strutters, was com-
manded by Squadron Commander J. R. W. Smyth-Pigott,
and was to be employed for a counter-bombing offensive
under the orders of the Sixteenth Wing head-quarters.
With the arrival of 'F' Squadron the tables were turned.
Bombing attacks were made on most days, and sometimes
twice daily, on the dumps and camps behind the Dojran
front. During an attack on the aerodrome at Hudova on
the loth of May it was seen that the sheds and hangars
which had been erected subsequent to the arrival of the
German bombing squadron, together with the special
train in the aerodrome siding, had disappeared, and it was
concluded that the enemy bombers had left for some other
front. They were afterwards identified in Belgium.
On the nth of May T' Squadron left Amberkoj to
undertake an offensive from Marian aerodrome on the
Struma front. Raids were made against the aerodrome at
Drama and against stations and dumps in the Struma area.
One of the most successful took place on the 25th of May,
when an ammunition dump at Livunovo was destroyed.
Two days later, on the 27th, disaster overtook the
squadron. Five Sopwiths had been wheeled out on the
aerodrome at Marian and loaded with bombs for a pro-
jected attack, but the weather proved unfavourable and,
eventually, the aeroplanes were put back in the hangar,
where they were left in readiness to set off immediately
the weather conditions improved. In the same hangar
as the bomb-loaded Sopwiths were three single-seater
fighters, with four men at work on them. Suddenly there
was an explosion and within a few seconds the hangar was
a furnace. Other explosions followed as the bombs were
350 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
detonated, and the flames spread to a small nearby hangar
in which two aeroplanes were housed. Both hangars,
with their contents, were destroyed within three minutes.
In addition to the four men killed in the hangar, four
other mechanics and one soldier who were on the aero-
drome were wounded. It is impossible to say how the
accident happened. The armourer artificer in the main
hangar, who had expressed an intention to test the bomb-
release gears, was a man of experience and proved caution,
and the fan safety devices were supposed to render harm-
less any bomb dropped from a height less than 200 feet,
so that even if a bomb accidentally fell off its rack inside
the hangar no explosion should have resulted. Precautions
were taken to prevent the enemy from obtaining knowledge
of the disaster : signs of the fire were removed and talk
of the accident was forbidden. The activities of the air
services on the Macedonian front,' especially subsequent
to the arrival of the German bombing squadron, formed
a topic of general conversation wherever army officers met
together, but it was many weeks before rumours began to
spread about the Marian disaster.
^he Battle of Dojran
Meanwhile the preparations by the XII Corps for an
attack on the Dojran front, between the Vardar and the
lake, as part of a general Allied offensive, had proceeded
quietly. At the beginning of February No. 22 Balloon
Company, made up of Nos. 26 and 27 Sections, had
arrived at Salonika. Early in March the two sections
moved to the Dojran front and came under the orders
of the XII Corps, No. 26 Section working from a position
near Hirsova and No. 27 from Kalinovo. The baUoons,
which were employed mainly to facilitate observation for
the fire of the artillery, were frequently attacked by German
aeroplanes and were also occasionally shelled. The balloon
of No. 27 Section was shot down in flames on the 30th
of March, but its two occupants escaped by parachute.
The balloon was immediately replaced and the two sec-
tions continued to give help to the artillery, by night
as well as by day. A panorama of the country from the
1917] BATTLE OF DOJRAN 351
Vardar river to Lake Do j ran, photographed from one of the
balloons, was used by the XII Corps staff in connexion with
the plans for the offensive. There was also on the staff of
the balloon company an artist, Corporal W. T. Wood, who
made, from the basket of the balloon, many sketches and
pictures of the enemy lines which proved of value to the
Corps staff. ^ Towards the end of April German aircraft
were once more active against the balloons, on which they
made daily attacks. On the ist of May, when the balloon
of No. 27 Section was up in ballast at about 1,800 feet,
two Halberstadt fighters approached. Only one attacked
and, soon after opening fire, the German aeroplane was
hit by an anti-aircraft shell and fell out of control; it burst
into flames on reaching the ground.
The aeroplane observers of No. 47 Squadron gave most
of their time to the work of co-operation with the artillery.
That co-operation, however, was inadequate, and to under-
stand the general position it will be necessary to consider
the broad plans for the offensive. The object of the British
attack at Dojran was to draw enemy reserves from the
neighbourhood of Monastir in order to facilitate the main
Allied offensive which was to be made in that area. General
Sarrail had stated that this offensive would begin about
the 8th of April, and Lieutenant-General Milne had
completed most of his preparations by that date. The
British commander-in-chief was then told that the main
attack would have to be postponed until the 15th, and
later again that it must be put off until the 26th.
The British operations were timed to take place two
days before the main attack, and the artillery of the XII
Corps began preliminary wire-cutting fire on the 21st.
The postponement helped the artillery because it gave
more time for counter-battery work and registration, but
nothing like enough preparation was possible with the
resources at the disposal of the XII Corps commander.
The terrain was unsuited to ground observation. If aero-
^ Subsequently Mr. Wood also made many useful sketches on the front
of the XVI Corps. Some of his pictures of the Macedonian landscape are
printed as illustrations in The Salonika Front by W. T. Wood and A. J.
Mann.
352 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
planes could not be supplied, or if the balloon observers
were otherwise engaged, accurate registration, or fire for
destruction, was for the most part impossible. From the
British front-line trenches west of Lake Dojran the
country rose in a tumble of hills, broken by deep ravines,
to the dominating Grand Couronne on which was an
observation post that gave the enemy a view over the
British area, a view limited only by the conditions of the
atmosphere. Bounding this tumble of hills, and out-
stretched like an arm pointing into the British lines, was
the steep-sided T' ridge with its highest point over 2,000
feet, from which again almost unlimited observation of
the British positions was obtainable. Except in rare
instances the enemy did not need observation from the
air. His artillery observers could survey the ground all
day and every day at their leisure, and could, undistracted,
direct the fire of their batteries over the telephone.
Furthermore, the Bulgarian infantry could await de-
velopments in the belief that their defensive positions,
immensely strong because of their natural advantages, had
been made almost impregnable by military science. And
the troops holding the Dojran front were those of the
Bulgarian 9th Division, the finest in the Bulgarian army
and one which, by its record in the war, proved itself in J
training and morale inferior to none.^
On the morning of the 24th of April a Bulgarian soldier
deserted to the British and gave the news that his battalion
had been warned to expect an attack at 8 p.m. that evening. |
The information was at once conveyed to the XII Corps
commander, and by him to Lieutenant-General Milne, ]
but the British commander-in-chief decided to make no i
alterations in the programme for the attack. No great ! :
measure of surprise was possible owing to the preliminary 1
bombardment and because the preparations for the battle j *
could not be concealed from the enemy observation posts k
on the high ground. The attack began at 9.45 p.m., and li
it succeeded in attracting some enemy reserves — one of j]
* When in 191 8 the Bulgarian front was broken and the armies of the ;
Central Powers on the Macedonian front began to disintegrate, the 9th h.
Division maintained an unflinching resistance. j
li
j
I9I7] REASONS FOR FAILURE 353
the objects for which it was made. It had been planned,
however, as subsidiary to the main AlHed effort to take
place two days later, that is, on the 26th, but on that day
General Sarrail told Lieutenant-General Milne that the
main artillery bombardment could not begin until the
28th and that the infantry attack would follow later.
Bad weather, which brought unprecedented snow west
of the Vardar, caused a further postponement. In other
words the British attack on the 24th, which took heavy
toll of some of the best battalions in the British Salonika
army, was, through the inability of the French command
to keep to the pre-arranged plans, to some extent a waste
of effort.
The French artillery preparation was timed to begin
on the 5th of May, and Lieutenant-General Milne
instructed the XII Corps commander to continue offen-
sive operations at Dojran. The new attack, which took
place at 9.50 p.m. on the 8th of May by moonlight, was
by way of being a repetition of the attack on the 24th of
April, and it fared no better.
The main reasons for the lack of success were that the
enemy artillery was insufficiently countered and that there
was a paucity of information during the attacks. There
was also much confusion in the darkness because of the
difficulties of the ground, and the first of the two attacks
was made in face of the disadvantage that the enemy
knew when to expect it and was able to put down an
effective barrage before the infantry assaulted.
Adequate aeroplane co-operation might have gone some
way to eliminate the underlying causes for the failure.
To say this is to cast no reflection on the work of No. 47
Squadron nor on that of the balloon observers. They did
the utmost that was possible, and it should be remembered
that No. 47 Squadron had, during the preparatory period,
to play its part in countering the German bombing
squadron. Even, however, had it been possible to employ
the full strength of the squadron to help the artillery,
that help would still have been inadequate because it
had to be spread over too wide a front of very difficult
country.
2504.5 A a
354 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
So far as concerns the actual attacks, the Royal Flying
Corps could take no part. The infantry assaulted at night
because the enemy completely commanded the ground
and daylight attacks were out of the question. Had the
attacks been made just before dawn, however, it should have
been possible, once they were under way, for the artillery
to bring fire to bear with the help of the air observers.
It might have been possible, also, by direct observation
from above, supplementing that from the ground, to
keep the commands informed of the general progress of
the battle. Furthermore, much of the confusion, due to
the dark, would have been avoided if there had been just
light enough for the assaulting infantry to be aware of
what was happening in their immediate neighbourhood.
It should be remembered that the Bulgars employed an
unusually large number of searchlights along the Dojran
front and were able, at their will, to do something to
minimize the advantages, such as they were, of a night
attack.
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that a dawn
attack would have had elements of great risk. Had it
gone swiftly, and strictly according to time-table, there
might have been no disadvantages as compared with a
night attack. Had the assault, however, been held up
while approaching daylight laid bare the whole position
to the numerous enemy observers in the posts overlooking
the British area, failure was certain and the casualties
before and during extrication must have been very high.
Nor could the British commander-in-chief give much
weight to the air arm when he assessed the relative
advantages and drawbacks of dawn and night attacks,
because the aeroplanes at his disposal were nothing like
enough to exert an important influence.
On the 1 2th of May, after the second Dojran attack
had ended, the B.E.i2's of No. 17 Squadron were with-
drawn from the composite squadron and were flown to
the Lahana aerodrome in connexion with operations by
the XVI Corps in the Struma valley. There was, in
consequence, some reorganization on the Dojran front.
No. 47 Squadron gave up the aerodrome at Snevche and
I9I7] THE GREEK ARMY 355
the detached Flight ('B') moved to Yanesh, while a
Flight ('A') of D.H.2 Scouts went from Yanesh to Hadzi
Junas to take the place of the B.E.i2's of No. 17 Squadron
withdrawn to Lahana.
The British attacks, which had been planned as sub-
sidiary to the Franco-Serbian offensive, were still in
progress on the Struma front on the 21st of May when,
owing to the complete failure of the main offensive. General
Sarrail ordered that operations should cease. As a result
the British commander-in-chief put a stop to the attacks
in the Struma area. Furthermore, he decided that he
would not leave the troops of the XVI Corps to spend
another summer in the malarial valley, and he gave orders
that preparations to fall back on a summer line in the
hills should be begun. When the line was completed and
occupied, outposts were left on the enemy side of the
Struma.
In June the Allies, under French leadership, at last
took action calculated to put an end to the political
uncertainties in Greece. That unhappy country was
divided into two camps. King Constantine at Athens,
and the Royalists generally, although ostensibly neutral,
were really pro-German, whereas M. Venizelos had set
up at Salonika a Provisional Government which had
declared war on Germany and Bulgaria. Allied pressure
forced the King to abdicate in favour of his second son.
Prince Alexander, a step which roused some indignation
in Greece, but no armed resistance, and by the end of
June M. Venizelos had arrived in Athens to take over the
full reins of government. From that time onwards the
political atmosphere in the Aegean cleared and the Greek
army began to take its place beside the Allies in Macedonia.
Throughout the remainder of 191 7 there were no
major offensive ground operations on the Macedonian
front. There were a few minor raids, but the chief activity,
so far as the British armies were concerned, was in the air.
There were almost daily bombing attacks by Nos. 17
and 47 Squadrons, usually made by formations of seven
or eight aeroplanes. The more important targets were
Drama, Angista, and Porna stations on the Constantinople
3S6 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
railway; camps at Tushchulu north-east of Lake Butkovo,
and the Bulgarian Second Army head-quarters at Sveti
Vrac beyond the Rupel pass ; Dedeli, the head-quarters of
the Bulgarian First Army; depots at Petric, in the valley of
the Strumica, and at Cerniste, Platanenwald, and Cestovo
in the Dojran area; and the aerodromes at Drama,
Livunovo, Gereviz, and Hudova. A typical example of
these attacks may be given. On the morning of the 5th of
June seven aeroplanes of No. 17 Squadron crossed the
Belasica mountains at 6,500 feet and attacked the camps
at Sveti Vrac, on which 1,500-lb. weight of high explosive
and twenty-two small incendiary bombs were dropped.
Five sheds and nine tents were destroyed, some of them
by fire, and one 112-lb. bomb exploded in a mechanical
transport park. The pilots did their work in a leisurely
manner, taking careful note of the targets before releasing
their bombs, but although they were in the air over the
targets for nearly half an hour, within sight of the German
aerodrome at Sveti Vrac, no enemy pilots rose to meet
them. There were, however, many occasions when the
German fighters fiercely disputed the raids.
On the morning of the 9th of August enemy guns
opened accurate fire, without warning, on the aerodrome
of No. 17 Squadron at Orlyak, the opening rounds falling
on the officers' lines and on the hangars. An attempt was
made to move the aeroplanes, but the remarkable accuracy
of the fire made this impossible and two aeroplanes,
two hangars, and a workshop lorry were destroyed. The
shelHng lasted half an hour, during which 250 rounds fell,
but the personnel had sought shelter in a nullah and no
casualties were caused. The positions from which the
enemy guns were firing were quickly discovered in Kalendra
wood, and they were bombed by two aeroplanes and
shelled by XVI Corps heavy guns, with the result that the
bombardment ceased. The aerodrome at Orlyak was
evacuated by Flight which moved to Lahana. At the
same time 'B' Flight, which had arrived from the Salonika
aerodrome at the beginning of July, moved from Marian
to Amberkoj.
On the Bulgarian flank along the Struma, the Royal
I9I7] HELPING THE FRENCH 357
Naval Air Service from Stavros and Thasos, and a Greek
Bombing Squadron continued to operate.^ From the
enemy aerodrome and seaplane base at Gereviz, near
Xanthe, German pilots made frequent bombing attacks
on the aerodrome at Thasos. The Royal Flying Corps
co-operated with the naval pilots and with Greek pilots
in a series of attacks on the base. Five aeroplanes from
No. 47 Squadron together with seven from No. 17
Squadron assembled at Marian aerodrome and flew in
formation to Thasos, under the command of Major J. H.
Herring, on the loth of August. They arrived in the
evening and, next day, with three naval aeroplanes, made
two attacks on Gereviz, during which bombs of a total
weight of 3,374 lb. were dropped. In the morning raid,
one of the naval pilots, who was acting as escort, held too
far back and during an attack by three Halberstadt fighters
was wounded. Otherwise the raids passed without incident,
all pilots maintaining close formation which sufficed to
keep at a distance such German fighters as took the air.
The Royal Flying Corps pilots left Thasos immediately
after returning from the second raid and reached the
aerodrome at Salonika the same evening.
In the middle of August the Royal Flying Corps was
asked to help the French air service in the Monastir area,
where German pilots had for some time been aggressively
active. A number of aeroplanes from Nos. 17 and 47
Squadrons, under the command of Major J. H. Herring,
were flown to the French aerodrome north of Fiorina on
the 1 6th of August, but owing to high winds on subse-
quent days the full bombing programme which had been
arranged could not be fulfilled. On the 17th and i8th the
German aerodrome at Kanatlarci and billets in the area,
and on the 19th the dumps at Topolcani and head-quarters
buildings in Prilep, were attacked. During the night of
the 19th Major Herring bombed Prilep alone, and on the
morning of the 20th the head-quarters in the town was again
attacked by five bombers with an escort of three Nieuports
of No. 17 Squadron. A French escorting squadron failed
to find the British formation which was fiercely attacked
^ See pp. 401-2.
3S8 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
and had to fight hard to get back. One of the escorting
Nieuports, piloted by Lieutenant J. L. Bamford of No. 17
Squadron, was shot down over Prilep and the pilot was
killed. The only two-seater with the British formation, an
Armstrong- Whitworth of No. 47 Squadron, covered the
rear of the bombers and bore the brunt of the attack, but
although the pilot. Lieutenant F. W. H. Thomas, was
mortally, and his observer (Lieutenant H. A. Jones)
seriously wounded as soon as the fight began, the Arm-
strong-Whitworth maintained its position until its guns
were shot out of action, when it fell out of control with
the pilot unconscious. Lieutenant Thomas recovered
near the ground many miles behind the enemy lines and,
although semi-conscious and partly paralysed, piloted
the damaged aeroplane safely to its aerodrome, where he
landed fifty minutes after receiving his wounds.
The Nieuport fighters flown during the bombing attacks
from the aerodrome at Fiorina were French aeroplanes
temporarily loaned. The British types in use in Mace-
donia were inferior in performance both to the French
and the German fighters. Those with which Nos. 17 and
47 Squadrons were equipped were types which had long
since become obsolete on the Western front. For instance,
in September 191 7 the fighters at the disposal of the
squadrons were B.E.iz's, D.H.2's, and Vickers 'Bullets'.
A year before, that is to say in September 1916, Major-
General Trenchard had reported from France that the
B.E.I 2 was 'incapable of useful work against the hostile
fighters', and the D.H.2 had become outclassed in France
in the same month, while the Vickers 'Bullet' had never
been recognized as good enough for the Western front.
The Germans followed no such policy of allocating inferior
aeroplanes to secondary theatres of war. In Macedonia,
as on other fronts, new types usually appeared without
delay, and the result was that, with far fewer aircraft
than were available to the Allied armies, the German air
service could usually do what was essential. For the most
part the armies on the ground, Bulgar or German, had,
as we have seen, excellent observation posts overlooking
the Allied area, so that much of the work of aircraft
I9I7] THE TECHNICAL FACTOR 359
co-operation with artillery, &c., such as the Royal Flying
Corps had to do, was unnecessary. When air recon-
naissances were required, no matter how far over, the
Germans sent an aeroplane better in performance than
anything it was likely to meet.
There was an incident in September which illustrates this
statement. On the loth, a day of fine visibility, a German
aeroplane appeared over the front, high up, and began to
direct enemy guns on a target. Many fighters ascended,
but the best of them reached their 'ceiling' at about
16,000 feet, where they were still well below the German
aeroplane which, indifferent to the long-range machine-
gun fire coming from below, continued to direct the enemy
artillery for as long as was necessary. Thus is provided
another minor example of the importance of the techni-
cal factor in air warfare.
The battles of Coronel and of the Falkland Islands
illuminated the importance of speed at sea. But even at
sea, and still more on land, there may be obstacles, natural
or artificial, affecting freedom of movement which, in
any event, is confined, outside submarine warfare, to
two dimensions. According to how far the obstacles are
effective, so might technical or other superiority be dis-
counted. In the air, however, technical qualities have,
for all practical purposes, unimpeded scope. A difference
in maximum height (or 'ceiling'), which need be little
more than the effective range of contemporary aircraft
weapons, will enable a pilot to fly at his will in defiance
of any number of opponents. It may be emphasized once
again that air superiority cannot be assessed merely by
counting aeroplanes. It should, however, be made clear
that a spirited bombing offensive, subtly planned, waged
against vital enemy objectives, may go some way to throw
an enemy, temporarily better equipped, back on the
defensive. There is the all-important moral factor. So
long as an air force is imbued with the offensive spirit, so
long may it find ways to assert its will and thereby dis-
count something of the technical superiority of an enemy.
In the afternoon of the i8th of August a fire broke out
in the old town at Salonika and, swept along by a strong
36o AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
Vardar wind, roared through the Turkish quarter, leaped
the Rue Egnatia to the new town, and spread until it
reached the water's edge. By the morning of the 2 1st,
when the fire finally subsided, nearly half the city had
been destroyed and eighty thousand civilians had been
rendered homeless. The British military authorities, in
common with their Allies, helped to house and feed the
refugees. For the rest of the war Salonika, which had
provided colour and distraction for officers and men on
their occasional leave from the front, was mainly a place
of desolation.
The two Royal Flying Corps squadrons continued,
throughout the autumn and winter, to make bombing
attacks in the intervals of providing the necessary co-
operation for their respective army corps. Had the
Germans wished they might, by vigorous attacks when-
ever the bombers were signalled, have gone some way to
stop the raids. As it was, whenever they did attack with
determination, they usually took toll. On the 5th of
October, for example, four enemy aeroplanes attacked
the rear of a formation after it had dropped bombs
on Cestovo dump. The pilot of one of the bombers,
Lieutenant G. C. Gardiner of No. 47 Squadron, was
wounded in the leg, but he successfully landed his aero-
plane in which the engine had been shot out of action.
Again on the 29th, when five aeroplanes of No. 47 Squad-
ron were once more attacking the Cestovo dump, eight
Albatros and Halberstadt fighters rose to meet them from
the nearby aerodrome at Hudova and, in a fiercely con-
tested fight. Second Lieutenant P. D. Montague in a
B.E.12, and Second Lieutenant J. R. F. Gubbin with Air-
Mechanic T. H. Bury in an Armstrong- Whitworth, were
shot down.^
^ A subsequent message, dropped by an enemy aeroplane on Yanesh
aerodrome, read: 'On the 29th October, 1917, one of your comrades met
'with a hero's death in an air fight. He was buried with due honours and a
'memorial stone has been put up over his grave, but without an inscription
'as his name is not known to us. In order that we may make good this
'deficiency kindly inform us as to his name and the date and place of
'his birth.' This message, similar in tone to many others giving news,
from time to time, of missing personnel, referred to Second Lieutenant
1917] LEUTNANT VON ESCHWEGE 361
In November the enemy made a number of retaliatory
bomb raids and twice attacked the aerodrome of No. 17
Squadron at Lahana, but without causing damage.
Attacks on balloons were also intensified about the same
time. On the 28th of October the balloon of No. 17
Section was shot down in flames, but the observer escaped
by parachute. On the 9th of November the same section's
balloon was again attacked, unsuccessfully, but the obser-
ver, Captain C. H. Gimingham, was seriously wounded
and unable to toggle the harness on the parachute, with
the result that he fell away from it, after jumping, and
was killed. Once again, on the 15th, the section's balloon,
while up in ballast, was destroyed in flames. Because
of these insistent attacks, and because there were no
fighting aeroplanes which had the performance to over-
take the German pilots, it was decided to send up an
unserviceable balloon with 500-lb. of explosive packed in
the basket. Two detonators were fixed and contact wires
to the ground were arranged. On the morning of the 21st
of November the balloon, so loaded, was in the air when
a German aeroplane v/as seen to be approaching. The
observer, at the switch on the ground, waited until the
enemy pilot had dived within close range of the balloon
when he fired the charge, which immediately exploded
and caused the German aeroplane to break up. From the
wreckage the body of the pilot was recovered, and it was
learned, from documents found on the body, that he was
Leutnant von Eschwege, the foremost German fighting
pilot on the Macedonian front who, among his twenty
victories, had claimed many missing pilots from Nos. 17
and 47 Squadrons as victims. He came by his end as a
result of a legitimate ruse of war, but there was no rejoicing
among the pilots of the squadrons which had suffered
from his activities : they would have preferred that he had
gone down in fair combat. Among those he had killed
were some who had challenged him, even though he
had the advantage of an aeroplane which was an all-round
better fighting weapon than anything flying against him,
Montague. It was afterwards known also that Second Lieutenant Gubbin
had died of his wounds.
362 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
an advantage which he had the will and the skill to exploit
to the full. The Royal Flying Corps in Macedonia was
not much longer to suffer the handicap of inferior aero-
planes and, after the new fighters were taken into service,
regrets were often expressed that Eschwege was no longer
there to be challenged.
Bombing and counter-bombing continued, much of it
taking place at night, with pilots making two or more
journeys. In a German night attack on Yanesh aerodrome
on the 28th of November four mechanics were wounded,
but no material damage was inflicted. Occasionally com-
bined bombing attacks were arranged. In one, which took
place in daylight on the 15th of December, twenty-one
aeroplanes of Nos. 17 and 47 Squadrons, accompanied by
eight French escorting single-seaters, dropped 1,848 lb. of
bombs on the railway station and dump at Cestovo.
The first of the aeroplanes which were to change the
air position on the British front in Macedonia arrived
during the winter. Writing early in September to the
War Office, Lieutenant-General Milne had pressed for
an increase in the air service at his disposal. 'I am respon-
'sible', he said, 'for a wide extent of front, which entails
'heavy demands on the Flying Corps for reconnaissance,
'photography and artillery observation. In addition to
'this, offensive bombing raids are undertaken as often as
'possible, and there is constant fighting in the air with an
'enemy whose machines are more up to date than our own.
'I am anxious to widen the scope of the offensive measures
'undertaken by the Flying Corps, the more so as the size
'of my force precludes any other method of making our
'presence really felt in this country. ... I would strongly
'urge that the Royal Flying Corps in this country should
'be reinforced by a strong bombing squadron with a
'suitable proportion of the most up-to-date fighting
'machines, and I am of opinion that such a squadron, if
'properly used, would cause great damage to the enemy's
'communications and military establishments, and would
'in consequence have a lasting impression on his troops
'and on his people, who have as yet hardly realised the
'stress of war.'
I9I8] NEW FIGHTERS 363
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had replied
that all aircraft were required for operations on the
Western front, and that when those operations had been
concluded the question of the allotment of modern-type
aeroplanes to the Salonika force would be reconsidered. On
the I2th of October 191 7 the War Office telegraphed that
the establishment of the two squadrons in Macedonia might
be increased to twenty- four aeroplanes, but that only one
Flight in each squadron might be maintained as an up-
to-date single-seater fighter Flight. Nine S.E.5a's, it was
stated, had been allotted and would shortly be dispatched.
Up to the spring of 191 8, Lieutenant-General Milne had
to be content with these few S.E.5a fighters, together
with some Bristol monoplanes, as his aeroplane reinforce-
ment. The first of the S.E.5a's arrived about the beginning
of December 191 7, but it was not until February 191 8
that each squadron had four; nor were more than four
available to each at any time.
The main excitement in January 191 8 was connected
with the running aground of the cruiser Goeben after her
sortie, in company with the Breslau, from the Dar-
danelles. On the 2 1st of January the wing commander
was informed that Lieutenant-General Milne had received
a request for help from the navy, and it was agreed that
six bombing aeroplanes should be sent at once. Three
B.E.i2's of No. 17 Squadron left Salonika for Mudros,
two hours after the request had been received, and three
more, of No. 47 Squadron, flew down from the front
to Salonika the same evening and continued to Mudros
next day, A store of 112-lb. bombs, and a supply of
petrol, both of which were urgently needed at Mudros,
were sent by destroyer on the 21st. In response to a
further request from the naval authorities, four more
bombers set out on the 25th. The navy had also inquired
whether an aeroplane could be supplied capable of carry-
ing a 450-lb. depth-charge bomb. As the Royal Flying
Corps had no such aeroplane, the French were approached
and at once offered to lend an A.R. bomber if the Royal
Flying Corps would supply a pilot. This aeroplane was
flown to Mudros on the 28th by Lieutenant W. J. Buchanan.
364 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
By that time, however, the Goeben had left. She had
been attacked by the aeroplanes of Nos. 17 and 47 Squad-
rons, by day and night, as well as by naval aeroplanes, from
the 22nd to the 24th inclusive. On the 25th the weather
was bad and an attempted raid failed: gales continued
for the next three days and no attacks were possible, and
then, when the visibility cleared on the 29th, it was seen
that the Goeben was no longer aground. She had suffered
no appreciable damage from the 1 5 tons of light-weight
bombs aimed at her.^
When the aeroplanes returned to the mainland, the
bombing offensive in Macedonia continued unabated.
Aeroplanes of No. 17 Squadron occasionally joined those
of No. 47 in attacks on military objectives east of the
Vardar. On the morning of the 12th of February twenty
pilots from the two squadrons bombed the dump at
Cestovo and fires were started which were still burning
some hours later. Photographs taken next day showed that
a great part of the dump, presumed to have contained
ammunition, had been destroyed.
Meanwhile, on the Struma front, the two available
S.E.5a's of No. 17 Squadron, usually flown by Captain
F. G. Saunders and Lieutenant G. E. Gibbs, had made
clear to the enemy that the day of untroubled reconnais-
sance from a great height was at an end. On the 22nd of
January Captain Saunders forced a reconnaissance two-
seater to land on a hill-side within the Bulgarian lines,
and six days later Lieutenant Gibbs shot down another
two-seater which crashed in Bulgar territory, where the
wreckage was later bombed from the air. On the 31st,
when there was a parade of troops near Orlyak, an air
patrol was provided by Captain Saunders and Lieutenant
Gibbs. While they were in the air at 14,000 feet a recon-
noitring German two-seater approached the parading
troops. It was promptly attacked and eventually crashed
inside the Bulgar lines. On the 5th of February both
these officers, flying in company, attacked two enemy
aeroplanes and sent them down out of control through
the clouds. In the afternoon of the same day. Captain
^ See also pp. 410-14.
I9I8] AIR SUPERIORITY 365
Saunders ascended on receipt of a report that an enemy
aeroplane was working over the front Hne. He came up
with it and shot it down in flames, the pilot and observer
throwing themselves from the burning aeroplane at 8,000
feet. The air fighting in subsequent weeks was of a
similar kind. A few up-to-date fighters, in the hands of
experienced pilots, had sufficed to give the Royal Flying
Corps a high degree of local superiority. What was notable
also was that even when British aeroplanes of poor per-
formance were engaged on duties on which they could
easily have been attacked, no attempts were made to
molest them.
In the middle of February there was a great snow-
storm which severed telephonic communications along
the front and closed many traffic routes. A Bessoneau
hangar on the aerodrome of No. 47 Squadron at Hadzi
Junas collapsed under its weight of snow with the result
that three aeroplanes were destroyed and four damaged.
On the Struma front the enemy was forced, owing
to road blockages due to snowdrifts, to concentrate the
passage of supplies along the railway which crossed the
river by a bridge near Angista. Day and night bombing
attacks, which had for object the destruction of the bridge,
were made by No. 17 Squadron, but no direct hits were
obtained.
On the morning of the 27th of February two S.E.5a's
from No. 17 Squadron crossed the lines at 16,000 feet,
turned behind the mountains, and then dived for the
aerodrome at Drama. The enemy was taken by surprise.
Each pilot dropped two 20-lb. bombs, from a height of
100 feet, on the aerodrome, and then, going down within
a few feet of the ground, the pilots fired their machine-
guns against troops running for cover, and into the hangars.
Subsequently, for a few minutes, the pilots circled over the
aerodrome under desultory anti-aircraft gun and machine-
gun fire, but no enemy aeroplanes ascended to challenge
them.
By the spring of 191 8 the Germans had realized the
danger of sending two-seater reconnaissance aeroplanes
over the lines without protection. Such two-seaters as
366 AIR OPERATIONS IN MACEDONIA [ch. vi
were encountered from March onwards usually had escorts
of three or more Albatros fighters, although for long-
distance work, for which the German fighters had not the
range to enable them to give continuous escort, the two-
seaters, after being escorted part of the way, flew on to
their destination unaccompanied. On one occasion, on
the 13th of March, Captain G. E. Gibbs, while flying with
bombing aeroplanes to attack the Cestovo dump, sighted
a formation of seven Albatros fighters in the distance.
He flew off and unhesitatingly attacked them and he
ultimately shot down one which fell into Lake Dojran.
A week later the same pilot, in company with Lieutenant
A. G. Goulding in another S.E.5a, pursued and attacked
a reconnoitring German two-seater, flying alone. After
some time the observer in the two-seater stood up and
waved a white handkerchief in token of surrender. The
British pilots thereupon withheld their fire and shepherded
the enemy aeroplane to the ground, where it was captured
intact with its crew within a few miles of the lines.
On the 1st of April, the day of the formation of the
Royal Air Force, a fighting squadron. No. 150, was
formed in Macedonia, and Nos. 17 and 47 Squadrons
became corps squadrons, concerned mainly with the
business of co-operation with their respective corps,
although they were still responsible for long-distance
reconnaissance and for bombing operations. No. 150
Squadron, under the command of Major W. R. B. McBain,
formerly of No. 47 Squadron, took over ^A' Flight from
No. 17, and 'A' Flight from No. 47 Squadron. The third
Flight of No. 150 Squadron was formed independently
at the beginning of May. The aeroplanes taken over on
formation were S.E.5a's and Bristol monoplanes, with some
Nieuport Scouts which had been acquired from the
French air service. At the beginning of May the squadron
received a few Sopwith 'Camels'. Its record, as will
appear in a subsequent volume, was a fine one.
After the unsuccessful offensive in the spring of 191 7,
directed by General Sarrail,^ the armies in Macedonia had
^ General Sarrail was succeeded in the command in Macedonia on the
22nd of December 1917 by General Guillaumat.
MACEDON I A
I9I8] DIVERSE DUTIES 367
stood on the defensive. It has been made clear, however,
that, in the air, the offensive was maintained without
intermission. The two squadrons in Macedonia had unique
opportunities. Long after speciahzation was common on
other fronts, with separate squadrons for fighting, bomb-
ing, and long-distance reconnaissance, the pilots and
observers of Nos. 17 and 47 Squadrons did whatever was
required, whether hy the corps or by the army staffs.
Aeroplanes which had, perhaps, been employed on the
work of artillery co-operation in the morning, carried
bombs in the place of an observer in the afternoon and
took their station in a bombing formation. Other two-
seaters, notably the Armstrong- Whitworth with the 140
horse-power engine, were variously used for long-distance
photography or visual reconnaissance, for artillery co-
operation, and to provide escorts for bombing or other
formations. The two squadrons operated over the wide
front covered by the ninety miles of the British line, but
they were also called upon to supply detachments for
bombing attacks in the area of Monastir at one end of the
Macedonian front, and at Gereviz at the other, while
chance took them to the Dardanelles at the time when
the Goehen was aground. The life of those taking part in
the air war in the Macedonian mountains was filled with
interest and colour.
CHAPTER VII
NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITER-
RANEAN AND NEAR-EASTERN WATERS
igi6-March igi8
[Map, p. 422]
As a result of a naval convention which had been con-
cluded v^ith France in August 19 14, the command of the
Mediterranean had become a French responsibility. The
entry of Turkey into the war, however, had brought
about a change and the French naval authorities had
agreed to the withdrawal of the Dardanelles and Egyptian
areas from their control. Subsequently, because of the
threat to the Suez Canal, the Commander-in-Chief,
East Indies Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir Richard H.
Peirse), had been instructed to shift his head-quarters
from Bombay to the Canal, and in December 1914 he had
rehoisted his flag in the Swiftsure at Suez. He had been
given the responsibility for the defence of Egypt from
the sea, and it was not long before he proposed that his
sphere should be extended to include the whole coast road
from El Arish to Mersina, and, particularly, Alexandretta.
In this the French had concurred, and the French patrol in
the Eastern Mediterranean had accordingly been restricted
to the area between Mersina and Smyrna. When, how-
ever, the naval operations against the Dardanelles had
begun in February 191 5, the coast of Syria, and of
Palestine as far south as Jaffa, had reverted to the French,
at their request, and Vice-Admiral Peirse had received
instructions to act in conjunction with, or under, the
French admiral so far as concerned operations along the
Syrian coast.
The naval war in the Eastern Mediterranean again
changed its character at the end of 1915. In October
the Allied force had landed at Salonika, and a new theatre
of war had been opened. Subsequently, as a result of
the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, there was an
increasing concentration of troops in Egypt. There was
thus a shifting and an expansion of the responsibilities
i9i6] THE MEDITERRANEAN 369
of the Allied fleets for the security of the sea routes through
the Mediterranean at a time when German U-boats were
intensifying their activities. In December 191 5 repre-
sentatives of the Allied navies met in Paris to confer upon
the Mediterranean situation, and their discussions showed
that the French and British staffs were divided upon
the protective measures which should be adopted. The
British view was that shipping should be diverted to
definite routes patrolled by swarms of light craft, but the
French, convinced that German submarines were using
the deserted creeks of Crete and Asia Minor as operating
bases, wished to set aside old cruisers to search every creek
in the eastern basin. After much argument it was ulti-
mately decided that the Mediterranean should be divided
into eighteen areas, or zones, of which four were allotted
to the British, four to the Italians, and ten to the French.
The French Commander-in-Chief was made responsible
for arranging the general transport routes, and the senior
naval officer in each zone was given the duty of patrolling
the section of the route in his zone with such forces as he
had at his disposal. The Paris conference was followed
by another held at Malta in March 19 16, at which the
admirals with local commands in the Mediterranean
attended. At this meeting Vice-Admiral Sir John M. de
Robeck, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Squad-
ron, pressed for a redistribution of the zones on the plea
that his squadron could undertake larger responsibilities
now that it was free of the Dardanelles operations. In
the result the whole of the transport route from Malta to
Egypt was made a British responsibility, and the zone
allotted to the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron was
extended to include the coast of Asia Minor as far south
as Cape Alupo, the island of Crete, and Euboea. An
important recommendation of the Malta conference was
that all aircraft bases in the Mediterranean should be
placed under a central organization. No steps, however,
were taken to give effect to this recommendation, and
the Allied aircraft continued to be used according to
the particular ideas of the admirals of the various local
commands.
2504.5 B h
370 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
The Eastern Mediterranean in igi6
After the evacuation of the GallipoH Peninsula in
January 191 6, the strategic role of the naval force in the
Eastern Mediterranean w^as 'to watch the Dardanelles,
'and safeguard the Greek islands in our occupation, to
'maintain the blockade and submarine patrols in the
'Aegean, and to support the army at Salonika'.^ It w^as
also hoped, by offensive operations against the Smyrna
defences and against various points along the coast of Asia
Minor, to induce a state of mind which would prevent
the Turks from moving guns and men to other fronts.
With the ending of the Gallipoli campaign much of the
work hitherto undertaken by the Royal Naval Air Service
was no longer necessary, and Vice-Admiral de Robeck
stated that the air requirements arising out of the new
naval policy in the Eastern Mediterranean would be met
by one aeroplane wing at Imbros, one airship base at
Mudros, two seaplane carriers, and two kite-balloon ships.
Accordingly Wing Captain F. H. Sykes and his head-
quarters staff, together with No. 3 Wing, returned to
England.
No. 2 Wing, under Wing Commander E. L. Gerrard,
which comprised three Flights, each of ten aeroplanes,
remained at Imbros to keep watch on the Dardanelles, to
spot for ships of the fleet during bombardments of Turkish
gun positions, &c., and to bomb, as opportunity offered,
enemy aerodromes, camps, and other suitable targets. The
aircraft carrier Ben-my-Chree had been transferred from
the Eastern Mediterranean to Egypt,^ while tYi^Ark Royal,
with five 200 horse-power Short seaplanes and two
Sopwith seaplanes, was at Salonika, where she had been
sent in November 191 5 in consequence of the critical
situation in that area arising from the unsatisfactory
attitude of the Greek Government. 3 The kite-balloon
^ See Naval Operations, by Sir Henry Newbolt, Vol. IV, p. 128.
2 See p. 379.
3 The seaplanes in the Ark Royal were mainly used for reconnaissances
of the dispositions of the Greek army. Anti-submarine patrols were also
made over the Gulf of Salonika. On the i8th of January 1916 the carrier
i9i6] AIR REORGANIZATION 371
ship Canning was also at Salonika, and the Hector, the
second available vessel of this type, was lying in Mudros
harbour because, owing to the increased range of the
Turkish guns mounted near the coast, and to danger from
submarines, she was no longer of use for spotting operations
in the Dardanelles area.^ The airship station had been
moved from Imbros in October 19 15, and re-erected at
Mudros, but the S.S. airship had not been inflated because
it was thought that she would not be much use in the
weather to be expected during the winter months.
Such was the general air position when Wing Captain
F. R. Scarlett arrived in February 191 6 to take command
of the Royal Naval Air Service units in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Soon after his arrival he formulated
proposals for an expansion of the air activities. He
suggested that an additional wing should be added to the
command for offensive operations against the Turkish
railway communications, &c., in the Smyrna and Scala
Nuova areas. He also asked that the two kite-balloon
ships should be replaced by two seaplane carriers, one to
work on the right flank of the army at Salonika, and the
other to operate between Mersina, Adana, Alexandretta,
and Beirut. The Ark Royal, he pointed out, could no
longer, owing to the activity of enemy submarines, be
considered of value as a sea-going carrier, and he recom-
mended that she be brought back from Salonika and based
at Mudros as a repair and depot ship. Five of her seaplanes
had already been detached to a temporary base at Stavros,
at the request of the British mihtary authorities at
co-operated, particularly with the Havelock, in a bombardment of the
railway junction at Bodoma. On the 28th of January, when AlHed forces
occupied the Kara Burun area overlooking Salonika harbour, the Jrk
RoyaPs seaplanes remained in the air in wireless touch with the naval
squadron ready to observe for the fire of the Prince George if and when it
was judged that naval action was necessary. (See Naval Operations, by Sir
Henry Newbolt, Vol. IV, pp. 126-7.)
^ The Hector returned to England in May 191 6, and was converted as
an ammunition carrier. On the 24th of May the Canning landed her kite-
balloon section (No. 7) at Salonika for work on shore as a mobile unit with
the 22nd Division, and she sailed for England with the wreckage of the
Zeppelin which had been shot down at Salonika by the Agamemnon
on the 8th of May.
372 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Salonika, to make a photographic survey of the country
in that area.^
Wing Captain Scarlett further suggested that if a con-
tinuous air offensive was to be achieved in the Eastern
Mediterranean it was desirable that all naval air units
operating in the area should be under the orders of the
Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean, and he went on to
say that, unless this was arranged, *the effort can only be
'spasmodic and a very great deal of its effectiveness will
'thereby be lost'. Vice-Admiral de Robeck, when forward-
ing the proposals to the Admiralty, notified his general
concurrence, but said: 'I do not think it is desirable that
'all the units in the Mediterranean should be placed
'under my orders as suggested by the Wing Captain. The
'seaplane carriers based on Alexandria or Port Said must
'of course work under the orders of the Commander-in-
'Chief, East Indies, and during the time a seaplane carrier
'is based on Famagusta for operations on the Syrian coast,
'I think it would be advisable that she should be placed
'temporarily under the orders of the admiral commanding
'the French Syrian squadron.' With the views of the
Vice-Admiral the Admiralty agreed, and with regard to
the specific proposals, they stated that under existing
conditions it was not practicable to expand the air service
in the Mediterranean, and that the various units 'must
'be satisfied to work in restricted areas, however praise-
'worthy their intention to extend their operations may be'.
It was suggested that when seaplane carriers were required
for special operations in the Eastern Mediterranean they
might be borrowed from the Commander-in-Chief, East
Indies, who, at that time, had at his disposal the EmfresSy
Ben-my-Chree^ Raven 11^ and Anne, The Admiralty ap-
proved the retention of the Ark Royal as a depot ship, and
agreed to maintain No. 2 Wing at one Flight of two-seater
fighters (no horse-power Clerget Nieuports), one Flight
of reconnaissance aeroplanes (B.E.2c's) and two Flights of
bombers (Henri Farmans). They further stated that as
personnel and material became available two additional
Flights would be allotted to the Eastern Mediterranean.
* The Ark Royal returned to Mudros in the middle of March 1916.
i9i6] SMYRNA OPERATIONS 373
In March operations began in the Gulf of Smyrna with
the object of attracting Turkish forces, particularly
artillery, to that area where they would be more or less
immobilized. An advanced base had been established on
Long Island, inside the Gulf, and a British naval squadron,
assisted by French aircraft, started a series of bombard-
ments early in March. At the same time reports were
spread that an Allied landing was about to be made, and
the establishment of a French infantry division on Mity-
lene with a Flight of aeroplanes, and the setting up of
aerodromes on Mitylene and on Long Island, was calcu-
lated to give colour to these reports. The balloon ship
Hector was also sent to Mitylene to give spotting help to
the bombarding ships.
In the middle of March the French aircraft were with-
drawn from the Smyrna area to Salonika, and, to take
their place, a British detachment of aeroplanes, known as
'B' Flight, was sent from Imbros to Mitylene, with an
advanced detachment of two aeroplanes on Long Island.
As a result of the bombardments of Smyrna, and of the
open preparations for a landing of troops, Turkish rein-
forcements were diverted to the town and the defences
were strengthened with new batteries and entrenchments.
Among the guns mounted were some which commanded
Long Island and its approaches, and on the i6th of May
the monitor M.30 was hit and set on fire by a shell. The
landing-ground also suffered and the Bessoneau hangar
and one aeroplane were wrecked. As a result. Long Island
was evacuated and the air detachment was transferred to
Thermi on the island of Mitylene. A second advanced base
was opened at Khios at the end of June.^
On the 6th of April 19 16 the aircraft in the Eastern
Mediterranean were reinforced by the seaplane carrier
Empress^ temporarily placed at the disposal of the Vice-
admiral by the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, for
work with a detached naval squadron operating off the
Bulgarian coast. Consequent on reports that the enemy
intended to establish a submarine base on that coast, an
^ The island of Khios had been occupied by British forces on the 17th
of February 191 6.
374 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
aerodrome was selected on the island of Thasos to form
an advanced landing-ground from which naval aeroplanes
from Mudros, and aeroplanes of the French Air Service
from Salonika, could watch the coastal area.
On the 3rd of May 1916 an attempt by all available
aircraft, including a French air detachment from Salonika,
was made to bomb the enemy communications in southern
Bulgaria, but the weather prevented the pilots from the
more distant bases taking part, and the bombing was
confined to seaplanes from Stavros and from the Empress,
which attacked a bridge-building depot near the Mesta
river, barracks at Ferejik, and barges at an alleged sub-
marine base at Fener Point. A few days after this attack the
Empress, still under the Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediter-
ranean, was sent south to Port Laki and she settled down
to a routine of reconnaissance and bombing operations
along the Asia Minor coast, south of Smyrna. On the 3rd
of June a Short seaplane from the Empress spotted for the
cruiser Grafton and the monitor Earl of Peterborough
during a bombardment of the railway bridge, north-east
of Scala Nuova; the range was ten miles and two hits on
the bridge were made.
About this time diplomatic relations with Greece
became strained. In May 1916 the Central Powers had
occupied, without opposition, the Greek fort of Rupel,
the key to the Struma valley, and the Allies had retahated
by assembling a punitive squadron in Milo Bay for action
against Athens. The Empress was transferred to Milo on
the 19th of June to provide aircraft, if and when necessary,
for reconnaissance of the Greek fleet, but the Greek
Government eventually acceded to the Allied demands
and the 'pacific blockade' was raised on the 22nd of June.
The naval squadron was thereupon dispersed and the
Empress returned to Port Laki.
At the end of May a scheme for the redistribution of
British naval aircraft in the Aegean had been approved
by the Vice-Admiral. The pohcy on which the scheme
was based was the provision of a suitable force of air-
craft within striking distance of all points of the enemy
coast from the Mesta river to Cape Alupo, the southern
i9i6] REPAIR WORK 37S
limit of the patrol area of the Eastern Mediterranean
Squadron. The main bombing force was to be mobile in
order that the maximum strength might be concentrated
rapidly in any specified area. A new aerodrome was prepared
on a dried-up marsh near Mudros to serve as a testing and
instructional ground, and also as a departure point for the
bombing squadron. A unit, known as 'D' FHght, was
transferred to this aerodrome (Marsh aerodrome) from
Imbros on the 2nd of June.
About the same time a repair base was started at the
airship station at Mudros. 'We collected', says Lieutenant-
Colonel L. H. Strain, who was Wing Captain Scarlett's
staff officer, 'lathes and other machines from various ships,
'bedded down a motor lorry in concrete to drive the
'machines, and not only repaired aircraft, but built new
'ones from the foundation. In addition to our own riggers
'and mechanics we employed a large number of Greeks.
'One of the best efforts of the Repair Base was when we
'wanted a regular ferry service between Repair Base and
'the various stations . . . No ship could be spared so we
'raised El Piniki, a small Greek cargo boat with Denny
'engines, which had been sunk as a harbour guard, repaired
'her and reconditioned her engines, manned her, and used
'her steadily as a ferry until the Armistice.'
From the aerodrome which had been established on
the western side of Thasos Island, the lines of communica-
tion on the flank of the Bulgarian army on the Macedonian
front were open to attack from the air. A Flight, therefore,
made up of three Henri Farmans, one Nieuport, and two
Bristol Scouts, was sent to Thasos at the end of May from
No. 2 Wing at Imbros and was joined by a Flight of
Nieuports and Maurice Farmans of the French air service.
The composite unit at Thasos, called 'A' Flight, was
placed under Royal Naval Air Service command. When,
at the beginning of July, the French detachment was
withdrawn to Salonika, the seaplane unit at Stavros, which
had completed its photographic survey, was transferred to
Thasos to reinforce 'A' Flight.^ The main operations of
' For air patrols over the approaches to the Gulf of Salonika, an airship
shed had been erected at Kassandra, and an S.S. airship had been sent to
376 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii /
this Flight during June and July were expeditions to
southern Bulgaria to destroy ripening crops with incen-
diary bombs. Many fires were started and patches of crops
were burnt, but it is doubtful whether the results obtained
justified the use of aircraft for such a purpose.
In August 1916 the Bulgars advanced and took control
of Macedonia east of the Struma,^ and it became necessary
to make changes in the disposition of the naval aircraft
in the Eastern Mediterranean to give the maximum
assistance to the ships protecting the British right flank
at Chai Aghizi, and to the 80th Brigade operating on that
front. As a result of the unsatisfactory conduct of the
Greek army, Allied ships were again assembled in the
neighbourhood of Athens, among them the aircraft carrier
Empress, transferred from Port Laki. Air reconnaissances
were made of the Greek fleet in the Piraeus and there
were daily flights over Athens. ^ On the 12th of September
the Empress was sent to Stavros to work with the British
ships. Two seaplanes were transferred to the monitor Sir
Thomas Picton and the cruiser Endymion, from which they
made spotting flights, &c., direct. For work with the 80th
Brigade, 'D' Flight was moved from Mudros to Stavros at
the end of August. The arrival of 'D' Flight enabled the
aircraft of 'A' Flight at Thasos to be used for more ex-
tended reconnaissance work over the Bulgarian lines of
communication, and for bombing operations.
An important target was the railway bridge across the
Mesta river at Buk. On the 15th of October 1916 a hit
by a lOO-lb. bomb destroyed the second span of the bridge,
and subsequent air reconnaissances revealed that the
enemy was transferring stores by wagon transport across
a new trestle-bridge between trains on each side of the
broken bridge. Attacks were thereupon made on other
bridges on either side of Buk at points where alternative
road transport was diflicult or impossible, and, at the end
of October, the bridge at Shimshirli, half-way between
this base in June. The first patrol by this ship was made on the 1st of
July. ^ ^ ^ ^ I See pp. 339-40.
2 Relations with Greece were strained until the middle of December
1 91 6, when the Greek Government acceded to the Allied demands.
i9i6] BOMBING BRIDGES 377
Buk and Drama, collapsed into the river as a result of hits
from Ii2-lb. bombs, and this important stretch of railway
was put out of action until the middle of November.
When repairs had been made, anti-aircraft guns were
mounted and, although other bomb attacks were at-
tempted, the accuracy of the gun-fire forced the pilots
to fly too high for effective aiming.
The enemy assembled aeroplanes and seaplanes to
counter the Royal Naval Air Service offensive. Aero-
dromes were established at Drama, Xanthe, and Maswakli,
and a seaplane base at Gereviz on Lake Boru, thirty-five
miles from Thasos. Many bombing attacks were made on
the Thasos aerodrome, and in the autumn of 19 16 the
German fighters began to take toll of the Naval Air
Service bombers. It was not long, however, before the
seaplane base at Gereviz lost importance. Up to the end
of November the base was continuously enlarged, but on
the 29th of that month bombs from two Henri Farmans,
dropped from heights of under 1,000 feet, started fires
which were fanned by a strong wind and spread over the
whole camp. The burning of the base was watched from
Thasos, and later reconnaissances showed that Gereviz
had been reduced to one hangar and a few bivouacs.
Seaplanes from the Empress and aeroplanes of 'D'
Flight at Stavros were meanwhile working over the British
right flank. On the 29th of September 1916 the fire
of one of the ships was being directed on batteries at
DranH when the air observer saw about 4,000 men drawn
up near the village. The ship's fire was at once diverted,
and shells exploded among the enemy troops, who scattered
to the hills, followed by the fire from the ship's guns.
Bombing attacks on the aerodrome at Drama, and on
camps and depots, were made by 'D' Flight from time to
time, notably in November. On the 30th of this month
bombs narrowly missed a train running into the station
at Angista, whereupon the pilot descended within fifty
feet from the ground and attacked the engine driver and
fireman with his machine-gun: they jumped from the
footplate, leaving the train to go on out of control.
While the operations off the Bulgarian coast were in
378 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
progress, Flight at Mudros, and 'B' Flight at Mitylene,
were busy in the Dardanelles and in the Smyrna areas.
On the 15th of April 19 16 two pilots of 'C Flight
attacked Constantinople and, on the same day, a third
pilot bombed Adrianople. Other targets were Gallipoli
barracks on the Peninsula, Ferejik railway junction east
of Dede Agach, and Smyrna railway station.
Towards the end of the year there was a marked increase
in the enemy air activity. On the 21st of November an
aeroplane and a seaplane attacked the airship shed at
Mudros. The aeroplane pilot, after dropping one of his
bombs within a few yards of the shed, escaped, but the
seaplane was pursued and shot down by FHght Sub-
Lieutenant A. F. Brandon in a Sopwith Schneider Cup
seaplane: the destruction of the enemy seaplane was
completed by ships' gun-fire.
On the 13th of December an attack by five aeroplanes
from Imbros (four Henri Farmans and a Bristol Scout)
was made on the railway bridge across the Maritsa river at
Kuleli Burgas. One loo-lb. and nine 65 -lb. bombs were
dropped, and one of them hit an island supporting the
centre of the bridge. The bridge was attacked again by
moonhght on the 4th of January 19 17, when three Henri
Farmans dropped bombs from between 1,000 and 2,000
feet. Two loo-lb. bombs hit the bridge and three 65-lb.
bombs exploded on the abutments. One of three 65-lb.
bombs aimed at an iron road bridge, south of the railway
bridge, exploded at its eastern end.
When Romania came into the war in August 19 16,
the Germans, realizing the weakness of the Romanian air
service, sent No. I Battle Squadron to Bulgaria for a
bombing offensive against Bucharest and other towns.
Attacks were made by day and by night and Romania was
forced to appeal to the Allies for help. The Admiralty
agreed to send an air detachment from the Eastern
Mediterranean and, on the 25th of October, three
Nieuport two-seaters and two Henri Farmans set out
from Imbros on the 300 odd mile journey over the Balkan
mountains to Bucharest. All pilots had to fight their way
through a thunderstorm. One reached his destination
i9i6] HELP FOR ROMANIA 379
after a 6i-hour flight, and another, whose compass became
useless, landed in Russia. The remaining three pilots
landed near Bucharest and afterwards proceeded to their
destination hy road or hy air. As a result of a further
appeal for aircraft in November, the Admiralty decided
to send a squadron of twenty i-|-strutter Sopwiths, and
meanwhile, on the 21st, an additional three Nieuports
and one Henri Farman were sent to Bucharest from
Imbros: they arrived without incident.^ By the end of
November, however, the Germans had overrun Romania
and were at the gates of Bucharest. The organization of
a Sopwith squadron for service in Romania was therefore
abandoned, and no further naval aircraft were sent from
the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition to this small naval
flying detachment, three armoured-car squadrons of the
Royal Naval Air Service, which had been working on the
Russian front, operated with the Romanian army, notably
during the attack on the German and Bulgar positions in
the neighbourhood of the Tchernavoda bridge from the
25th of November to the 3rd of December 1916.
Palestine, Asia Minor, and the Red Sea,
Seaplane Carriers
At the beginning of 191 6, when reported Turkish troop
movements in Palestine were causing some uneasiness in
Egypt, the seaplane carrier Ben-my-Chree was transferred
from the Eastern Mediterranean to Port Said for opera-
tions under the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. Since
December 1914 the task of air reconnaissance of the
enemy movements on the sea flank in Sinai and Syria had
been undertaken, as has already been told,^ by a seaplane
unit based at Port Said. This unit had the use of two
former tramp steamers, the Anne and the Raven II, which
had been fitted to carry two seaplanes each. Throughout
1915 the small seaplane unit at Port Said made many
reconnaissance flights, particularly over the Sinai desert,
during the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal in January
1 91 5. The endurance of the seaplanes, however, did not
^ Ground personnel and stores for this detachment were sent to Romania
by way of Russia. ^ Chapter III, p. i6i et seq.
38o OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
permit of extended reconnaissances of southern Palestine,
and aircraft of higher performances were asked for.
In January 1916 the seaplane carrier Empress^ with
two Short and four Sopwith Schneider Cup seaplanes,
reinforced the Port Said base from England, and at the end
of the month the Ben-my-Chree, Empress, Anne, and
Raven II, and the air unit at Port Said, were grouped
to form a single command under Squadron Commander
C.J. L'Estrange Malone of the Ben-my-Chree^ The duties
of this composite unit were diverse. They included over-
land reconnaissance of the approaches to Egypt through
Syria and Sinai and bombing attacks on enemy centres
along these routes, reconnaissance of the western desert,
air patrol of the Syrian and Sinai coasts and of the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, and, finally, air operations to
distant bases in the East Indies.
During the first three months of 19 16 the main work
of the seaplanes was reconnaissance of the Turkish dispo-
sitions in southern Palestine and Sinai to assist the Royal
Flying Corps to watch for movements or concentrations
which might threaten the Suez Canal.^
At the beginning of February the Ben-my-Chree was
sent to the north coast of Africa in connexion with
operations undertaken against the Senussi in the western
desert. On the i ith of February air reconnaissances were
made of Barrani and Solium in preparation for an advance
by the Western Frontier Force from Matruh.3 Early
in March the carrier was back off the coast of Palestine
and her seaplanes made reconnaissances of the Beersheba
area.
In this month a demand for aircraft came from Aden,
where the Protectorate was invested from the north by
^ The French seaplane Fhght was withdrawn in the middle of April.
The Empress, about the same time, was temporarily transferred to Mudros
for operations under the Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean. In May
Wing Commander C. R. Samson succeeded Squadron Commander C. J.
L'Estrange Malone.
^ By arrangement between the naval and miHtary commands, the sea-
plane carriers were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C., Egypt, as and
when required.
3 See Chapter III, pp. 168-9.
i9i6] RED SEA OPERATIONS 381
a Turkish force which had advanced from the Yemen in
July 1915, and had occupied Lahej, twenty miles north
of Aden. ^ The British and Indian troops of the garrison
were strong enough to hold the Turks to their positions
so long as the local tribes did not rally to the side of the
enemy. In the spring of 191 6 it became known that tribal
leaders had arrived at Lahej to confer with the Turkish
commander, Ali Said Pasha. The Turkish force in the
Yemen was separated from the main Turkish force in the
north by the hostile Idrissi country and had, therefore, to
rely almost entirely on local tribes for its supplies. The
authorities at Aden considered that a show of force would
impress the tribesmen and go a long way towards removing
the threat to Aden. Owing to the great heat infantry
action was undesirable and it was therefore decided that
a surprise air attack should be made against the Turkish
head-quarters and camps.
When the decision was reached, the Ben-my-Chree was
back at Port Said, refitting, and she therefore transferred
one two-seater Short and five Sopwith Schneider Cup sea-
planes to the Raven II which left for Aden. As surprise was
aimed at, the Raven II stopped off Perim Island to erect
her seaplanes, vv^hich v/ere then stowed on deck, ready to fly,
and she entered Aden harbour after dark on the 30th of
March. At a conference between the Commander-in-
Chief, East Indies, and the General Officer Commanding,
Aden, at which Flight Commander C. H. K. Edmonds in
command of the Flight was present, it was decided that a
reconnaissance of the enemy camps should be made at dawn
on the 1st of April and that the reconnaissance flight should
be followed by a series of bombing attacks. This arrange-
ment was duly followed and, in three days, 91 bombs of
20-lb. weight were dropped from low heights on the main
Turkish camps near Subar, Waht, and Fiyush. Pamphlets,
urging the Arabs to desert from the Turks, were also
dropped. On the 3rd of April, the demonstration having
been made according to plan, the Raven II left Aden to
return to Port Said.
^ See Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine (MacMunn and Falls),
Vol. I, pp. 221-4.
382 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Early in June 1916 further air operations over the
Yemen were undertaken by the Ben-my-Chree. As the
carrier approached Aden at dawn on the 7th of June, a
Short seaplane was sent away to make a reconnaissance
of the Lahej delta. The report of the air observer made
it clear that the best objectives for the initial attacks were
camps north of Lahej, and a camp and depot at Subar.
Other camps and also trench and gun positions were
subsequently noted and, during the next six days, bombing
attacks were made twice daily, morning and evening.
Forty-four bombs up to 112-lb. weight were dropped
from heights under 1,000 feet. Petrol bombs dropped
on the camp at Subar on the morning of the 12th caused
a fire which was still seen to be burning when the Ben-my-
Chree left for Perim Island in the late afternoon. The
carrier was off Perim Island early on the 13th, and bombing
attacks were begun on the camps at Jebel Malu and Jebel
Akrabi. At the same time a wireless-fitted Sopwith
spotted for the Ben-my-Chree^ s guns against these objec-
tives. From Perim Island the carrier sailed for Jidda to
join a small naval force v/hich was assisting the Sherif of
Mecca in his revolt against the Turks. ^
The Ben-my-Chree returned from the Red Sea to Port
Said, but at the beginning of July she went to the Syrian
Coast to relieve the Raven II. The latter carrier then
sailed for the Island of Kastelorizo for reconnaissance and
bombing operations along the Levisi district of the coast
of Asia Minor, where, it was suspected, U-boat refuelling
bases existed. After reconnaissance and bombing in the
neighbourhood of Beirut, and also of El Arish, the Ben-
my-Chree went back to Port Said. She sailed again on
the 25th of July, in company with the French destroyer
Arhalete^ to make reconnaissances of the Nazareth valley.
On the way a look-out was kept for gun-running dhows
which were known to be supplying the Turks. In particu-
lar, the carrier was asked to watch for a red-painted
schooner — a suspected ammunition ship. As the Ben-my-
Chree was steaming along the Syrian coast on the 25th
three schooners came into view. The leader made off
^ See pp. 219-20.
i9i6] AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 383
as soon as she sighted the carrier, but a seaplane was
launched at once and the pilot succeeded in heading the two
remaining schooners from the shore. One of them proved
to be the red-painted vessel, and by feint attacks the
seaplane pilot was able to shepherd her towards the
Ben-my-Chree which, in co-operation with the Arbalete,
destroyed her. The explosion, when the schooner blew
up, left no doubt about the nature of her cargo.
Next day, the 26th of July, an air reconnaissance of the
Nazareth valley from Haifa to Affule, an important
junction on the Aleppo-Beer sheba railway, revealed that
a large camp and dump were being established at the
railway junction. This discovery led to a plan for a
bombing attack which was made in the following month.
Meanwhile the Ben-my-Chree went into dock and the
main air work fell to the Raven 11^ which was sent into
the Red Sea to make a photographic survey of the country
at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, and along the east coast
of the Red Sea as far as Mowilah and Wejh. This task
finished, she returned to the Syrian coast.
On the loth of August, during the retreat of the
Turkish forces after their attack on Romani,^ two of the
seaplanes from the Raven II made spotting flights for the
monitor M.21 in connexion with a bombardment of a
Turkish camp near Bir el Mazar on the coast road in
Sinai. The first seaplane dropped four 20-lb. bombs on
the camp to indicate its position to the monitor, but
soon after fire had been opened the second seaplane,
from which the observer was sending fire corrections, was
attacked by an enemy aeroplane and forced down on
the water. It was taken in tow by the monitor and
eventually hoisted back on board the Raven II, Enemy
aeroplanes then appeared and bombed the carrier, but
made no hits.
On the 14th of August the Ben-my-Chree was out of
dock and she sailed with a French destroyer escort to make
an extended reconnaissance of the lines of communication
behind the Turkish Sinai forces. One hundred and sixty-
five miles of coast line to a depth of twenty miles were
' See Chapter III, p. 194.
384 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
examined by the carrier's seaplanes, and the more impor-
tant centres were photographed. As a result of the infor-
mation gained, a series of air attacks was planned to take
place from the 25th to the 29th of August.
The first objective was the dump at Affule which had
been discovered in the previous month, and the Ben-my-
Chree, Raven II, and Anne assembled at Haifa at dawn on
the 25th of August. Ten seaplanes flew off, and when they
reached Affule the pilots found that the camp had been
greatly enlarged and that the anti-aircraft defences had
been strengthened. For about half an hour the attack
was made methodically on the camp, dump, and railway,
and stores and carriages were set on fire. One train, which
steamed out of the station, was found by the Raven's
seaplanes which had been allotted the task of bombing the
railway line. The rear coach of the train was shattered by
a direct hit from a bomb, while other bombs destroyed the
permanent way.
All the seaplanes returned safely to the carriers, and
when they had been hoisted in, the three ships and their
escort went south down the coast. On their way they en-
countered two dhows, one of which was destroyed by gun-
fire from the Arbalete, while the other was captured and
taken in tow by the Ben-my -Chree. Prisoners from this
dhow confirmed that the two vessels were used for revic-
tualling the Sinai troops. About midday, seven seaplanes
were sent away to bomb the camp at Bureir and the rail-
way viaduct over the Wadi el Hesi. The camp was hit and
damaged and camels were stampeded by Lewis gun fire,
but the viaduct was not destroyed, the nearest bombs
exploding on the embankment and on the permanent
way by the bridge. One of the pilots. Flight Commander
G. B. Dacre, failed to return and was taken prisoner by the
Arabs. On the night of the 25 th of August the three ships
separated. The Ben-my-Chree went north to Tripoli on the
Syrian coast, and next morning one of her Shorts, carrying
an observer, made a photographic reconnaissance to Homs,
forty-five miles inland beyond the cloud-topped Lebanon
hills, 1,800 feet high. On the 29th the carrier was in
Alexandretta Bay whence bombing attacks were made on
i9i6] AIR COMBATS 385
the railway station at Adana and on the bridge over the
river Jeihan.
Meanwhile the Anne had gone to Nahr Iskanderune,
north of Jaffa, and on the 26th one of her seaplanes
attacked the station at Tul Karm while the second bombed
a camp north-west of Er Ramie. The Raven 11^ after
parting company from the other ships, had gone to Asia
Minor and on the 27th, from the Gulf of Adalia, her two
seaplanes bombed a factory near Fineka.
The Ben-my-Chreeh attack on Adana ended the special
operations, during which places had been reconnoitred and
bombed from Adalia in Asia Minor to Bureir in southern
Palestine.
The Raven II was back in Port Said on the ist of
September, making ready for an expedition into the Red
Sea in support of the Sherif of Mecca, when a bomb
from an enemy aeroplane struck the ship, causing nine
casualties. The carrier had to remain behind for repairs,
and her place in the Red Sea was taken by the Anne,
Enemy aircraft struck another blow about a fortnight
later. On the morning of the 17th of September the
Ben-my-Chree was off the coast near El Arish in company
with the Espiegle and the monitors M.J5 and M.31, Her
orders were to send one Short and two Sopwiths to spot
for the fire of the Espiegle on suitable targets found on
the road from El Arish to Bir el Mazar, and another Short,
similarly escorted, to direct the fire of the monitors on
the camp and aerodrome at El Arish. Soon after the
seaplanes arrived over their objectives, enemy aeroplanes
appeared. Some of them attacked the ships, unsuccess-
fully, with bombs, and one, a fast single-seater fighter,
shot down two of the escorting Sopwiths. One of these
was destroyed in flames, but the other landed on the
water and was salved by a trawler. A third Sopwith,
which landed on the sea through engine trouble, was lost,
but the pilot was rescued.
In November the Ben-my-Chree went to the Gulf of
Adalia, where spotting flights were made to range the
guns of a small French naval detachment on Turkish shore
trenches and gun positions. Towards the end of December
2504-5 r c
386 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
the carrier was given a more important task. On either
side of Karatash Burnu, in the Gulf of Alexandretta, rivers
flow into the sea. They are the Jeihan and the Seihan, and
across these two rivers, inland of the coast, long girder
bridges carried the single line of railway by which the
Turkish armies in the east were supplied. It was not,
however, until 191 8 that through railway communication
from Constantinople was completed. In 19 16 troops and
supplies had to be detrained at Bozanti and then sent
forward by road to Tarsus, where they were again entrained
for Alexandretta. From this port they were moved by road
to Aleppo, where they finally took to the railway, south-
wards for Palestine or eastwards for Mesopotamia.^ The
bridges across the Jeihan and Seihan were on the important
stretch of line between Tarsus and Alexandretta. They
were within striking distance of seaplanes hoisted from
carriers, but although arrangements were made to attack
the bridges there was no attempt to concentrate sufficient
bombers to ensure destruction, a feat probably within the
capabilities of the contemporary aircraft, more especially
as the Turkish anti-aircraft defences in the neighbourhood
were negligible. On the other hand, there was little point
in diverting resources to destroy the bridges if the cutting
of communications was not closely co-ordinated with
military operations. The effect could be no more than
temporary, and of military importance, therefore, only if
the delay in the passage of troops and supplies occurred
at a time when delay was vital in connexion with army
operations.
Such forces as were used came near to achieving their
object. The Ben-my-Chree and the Raven II were off
Karatash Burnu on the morning of December 27th. The
target chosen for the attack was the Chikaldir bridge over
the Jeihan. One Short and three Sopwiths from the
Ben-my-Chree made the first attack from under 700 feet.
In the second attack two Shorts from the Raven dropped
one 65-lb. and eight i6-lb. bombs and, in the third, one
Short and two Sopwiths from the Ben-my-Chree dropped
^ See Military Operations^ Egypt and Palestine (MacMunn and Falls),
Vol. I, p. 21 et seq.
I9I7] THE ADRIATIC 387
six 65-lb. bombs. Two light-weight bombs and two of
65 -lb. weight hit the bridge, but they were not destructive
enough and the damage inflicted was insufficient to stop
normal traffic, although it was known afterwards that the
passage of heavy guns for Baghdad was delayed.^
igiy-March igi8
The Adriatic. Anti-submarine Measures
The Mediterranean proved almost ideal for the opera-
tion of enemy submarines. German U-boat commanders
found that navigation in its waters was simple, that some
of the lonely islands in the Aegean offered pleasant con-
cealment when necessary, and that the geographical
formation of the inland sea made evasion extremely
difficult for Allied shipping. The U-boats lurked, a
menace of increasing importance, in the path of the supply
and troop movements upon which the campaigns in Egypt
and Palestine, in Macedonia, and to some extent in
Mesopotamia, depended. The ports from which most of
the U-boats began their operations were in the Adriatic.
At Cattaro was the base from which the majority of the
submarines worked, and at Pola were the dockyards in
which the U-boats were refitted and repaired. From
the Allied point of view it was desirable, no matter how
great the difficulties might be, to make the departure of
submarines from, and their entry to, the Adriatic as
dangerous as possible. Common sense, as well as the British
^ It appears that the attack had been sanctioned as a suitable operation
for a period of quiet air activity. In notifying their approval General Head-
quarters staff in Egypt had said : 'Adana Bridge appears to offer an objective
'which might with advantage be attacked at any moment, as damage to
'this bridge, with its constant mihtary traffic, would almost certainly
'produce serious dislocation in the enemy's transport arrangements, and,
'further, would probably take considerable time to repair.'
It is of interest that the question of cutting the Turkish communica-
tions in the Adana section was considered by the Air Staff early in 1918
and also by the Air PoHcy Committee of the War Cabinet. The decision
was that the resources available precluded an allotment of aircraft necessary
to cut the communications, and to keep them cut. There were many other
targets suitable for air attack which offered a prospect of more effective
military results.
388 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
doctrine of naval warfare, demanded also that the sub-
marines should be attacked at their bases, and that those
bases should be damaged as much as possible. It may
sound axiomatic that, in war time, offensive action is
essential, but the state of mind which U-boat attacks
tended to engender must be remembered. Merchant
ships, on which the whole existence of the Allies depended,
were being destroyed daily at a rate which, in the spring
of 191 7, had become alarming. It was not unnatural that
the inclination should exist to surround merchant vessels
with every available safeguard, and that the argument
should be put forward that it was undesirable to dissipate
the small forces, suitable for protective duties, on offensive
measures which might produce no immediate or definite
success.
In May 191 5 Italy had declared war on Austria, and
in the same month a British squadron of old battleships
and light cruisers had, under Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby,
joined the Italian fleet at Taranto to work in the
Adriatic under the Italian naval Commander-in-Chief. In
September 191 5, with the object of impeding the passage
of U-boats through the Otranto Straits, a barrage of
indicator nets, operated by British drifters with a covering
force of French submarines and French and Italian surface
craft, had been initiated. In the spring and summer of
1916 the Austrian submarine U.6 and the German U.B.44
had been trapped in the drifter nets and destroyed, and it
was believed that other Austrian submarines, similarly
caught, had also been accounted for. But in the latter
part of 1916 the U-boat commanders had betrayed
cautiousness in which they were helped by the considerable
depth of the water in the Otranto Straits, and it soon
became obvious that they no longer found the net barrage
an obstacle.
Meanwhile, in May 1916, Rear-Admiral Mark E. F.
Kerr, who had a lively appreciation of the value of air
power, had taken over the command of the British
Adriatic Squadron, and it was not long before he asked for
aircraft for three purposes, namely, (i) patrol of the drifter
line in the Straits of Otranto so as to force the U-boats
i9i6] DUTIES FOR AIRCRAFT 389
to keep under water and go blind through the nets; (ii)
for bombing attacks on that part of the dockyard at Pola
where submarines transported overland from Germany
were assembled, and on the submarines lying in the
harbour at Cattaro; and (iii) for bombing attacks on a
factory at Fiume at which torpedoes were being made.
The Adriatic, however, was primarily an Italian responsi-
bility and after that a French one, and Rear-Admiral
Mark Kerr was informed, in answer to his requests (and
similar subsequent ones), that no British aircraft could be
made available for the Adriatic for a long time, and he
was told to raise the matter with the Italians and with the
French. This he did, at intervals, but without success.^
In October 1916 Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr asked for
a kite-balloon ship as he was anxious to use balloons on
the drifter line, and in ships engaged on anti-submarine
patrol. When this request was considered at the Admiralty
it was stated that seaplanes would be of more use to the
drifter patrol than kite balloons because the latter could
only observe and could not attack, but there was still the
difficulty that aircraft and, particularly, trained personnel,
could ill be spared. There was, however, a small naval
air station at Gibraltar which had been established after
the passage of Hersing through the Straits in the U.21
in May 191 5. Apart from the fact that Gibraltar had
become of decreasing importance as an area for U-boat
activity, experience had shown that submarines could pass
through the swift-running waters of the Straits of Gibraltar
with little fear of detection from the air. In consequence,
the Admiralty decided that the air personnel at Gibraltar
might be employed to open a base at Otranto and, by the
^ The insistent note for attack, running through Rear-Admiral Mark
Kerr's communications, may be illustrated by an extract from a letter to
Mr. Balfour, the First Lord, on the 23rd of June 1916. Referring to
his representations to the Italians, he said: 'I also pointed out that the loss
'of transport was very serious to the Allies and that the principal place
'where we were all being bled was in the Mediterranean, and all the
'submarines worked from Cattaro, had their torpedoes made at Fiume,
'and were constructed and had large repairs done at Pola. Consequently
'if we destroyed the Base and both factories we would cut the root of the
matter. This can only be done by air. . .
390 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
end of 1916, the naval air detachment at Gibraltar had
been withdrawn to Malta preparatory to the formation
of the new Otranto air station.
A little time before this a situation of some delicacy
had arisen in the Adriatic. That the Allied measures to
counter the U-boat threat in that area were ineffective
was recognized, but the French and Italians could not
come to an agreement about reorganization and command.
Eventually in November 19 16 it was decided that a
British naval officer should take charge of the barrage,
under the direct orders of the Italian naval Commander-
in-Chief, and the appointment was given to Commodore
A. W. Heneage. This extension of British control in the
Otranto Straits area made the question of the provision
of aircraft one of immediate concern to the Admiralty.
'The inefficiency of this barrage', wrote the Chief of the
Staff at the Admiralty in December 1916, 'is the root of
'all the submarine trouble in the Mediterranean', and he
proceeded to lay stress upon the need for effective air patrol
of the barrage line. Although steps had already been taken
to initiate a small base at Otranto by transferring the naval
air detachment from Gibraltar, this would not go much
of the way to solve the problem, and because the calls for
aircraft for anti-submarine work were many and urgent,
the First Sea Lord (Admiral Jellicoe) was asked to give
a definite ruling on the relative importance of the different
areas of U-boat activity in order that the naval aircraft
resources might be apportioned accordingly. Admiral
Jellicoe defined the order of importance as (i) the English
Channel, (ii) Otranto, and (iii) Malta and Gibraltar. It
was therefore decided to open the air base at Otranto
as soon as possible and Wing Commander R. Gordon was
sent to the Adriatic to confer with Rear-Admiral Mark
Kerr. As a result of their conference the site for a sea-
plane base was taken over, and at the end of January
191 7 orders were given for the transfer to Otranto of
six 225 horse-power Shorts from the Dundee air station.
Arrangements were also made for the dispatch of four
additional 150 horse-power Shorts as soon as they were
delivered from the makers.
1917] TORPEDO-CARRYING SEAPLANES 391
Meanwhile, in December 19 16, Commodore Murray
F. Sueter, who had long advocated the value of torpedo-
carrying aircraft, had submitted a paper to the Board of
Admiralty in which he outlined proposals for attacks, by
torpedo-carrying seaplanes, on the German fleet at
Wilhelmshaven and on the Austrian fleet at Pola. The
First Sea Lord, who favoured the idea, thought that the
chances of success in the immediate future were more
likely in the Adriatic than on the North German coast, but
that the operation would call for a responsible officer who
believed in, and was enthusiastic for, this form of attack,
and he proposed therefore that the command should be
given to Commodore Sueter. This proposal was approved
by the Admiralty at the end of January 191 7, and at the
same time orders were given to the manufacturers for
twenty-five i8-in. torpedo-carrying seaplanes. Meanwhile
the immediate dispatch of eight 14-in. torpedo-carrying
seaplanes to the Mediterranean was sanctioned.
The establishment laid down for the Otranto base in
February 191 7 was six two-seater and six 'Baby' seaplanes
for barrage-work, twelve 310 horse-power Shorts for
torpedo attacks on the Austrian fleet or for bombing
attacks on naval targets, and six two-seater aeroplanes
to provide escorts for the torpedo seaplanes. A torpedo
school at Malta was to be equipped with four 240
horse-power and two 310 horse-power Short seaplanes.
Before the end of April the personnel and the greater
part of the stores had arrived. A base for the housing of
stores and for the erection of the seaplanes was opened at
Taranto, and slipways were built at Poveglia Island in the
Venice Lagoon from which the seaplanes could, when
the time came, start on their torpedo or bombing attacks
on the Austrian bases at Pola and Fiume. The naval air
units in southern Italy were, at the same time, reorganized
into two squadrons and one Flight to form what became
known as No. 6 Wing with head-quarters at Otranto. A
direction-finding station and two other wireless stations
were erected by the Royal Naval Air Service, and a special
look-out post, manned by air service personnel, was
established at Cape Palascia, south of Otranto.
392 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Meanwhile, at a conference held in May between the
Italian, French, and British air service officers in the
Adriatic, under the presidency of the Italian vice-admiral,
the organization of the Allied aircraft patrols in the lower
Adriatic, and in the Ionian Sea, was decided upon. Patrol
zones were allotted to the three Allied air services. Those
for which No. 6 Wing was to be responsible were: (i) by
seaplanes, eight miles north of, and parallel with, the
drifter line, (ii) by seaplanes, ten miles north of proposed
northern hydrophone line^ with the object of compelling
U-boats to dive, and (iii) by aeroplanes, along the western
side of the Otranto Straits and to the southward of Cape
Sta. Maria di Leuca, to prevent U-boats making a landfall.
The patrols from Otranto began in June 191 7. Sopwith
I J-strutter aeroplanes, which could get away quickly, were
used chiefly as stand-by aircraft to be sent up immediately
news came of the sighting of a U-boat. The U-boat com-
manders, however, increased their caution, and no sub-
marine was attacked by the naval aircraft until the 8th
of August, when seaplanes found a U-boat previously
reported by the look-out station. She dived before the
seaplanes could get into position for effective attack, but
she was reported to the French aircraft base at Corfu, and
when the U-boat came up later she was found by French
pilots who claimed that they destroyed her with bombs.
The first attempt to use the torpedo-carrying Short
seaplanes was made on the 2nd of September. Six Shorts
were towed on 'skids' by motor launches to a rendezvous
fifty miles south of Traste Bay, whence they were to leave,
w^ith a covering force of Allied light cruisers and destroyers,
for an attack on submarines lying off Cattaro.^ The sea-
planes were towed on 'skids' part of the way because they
could not lift sufficient petrol to reach their objective if
they flew from their base direct. The weather reports had
^ This line was to be established eight miles north of Otranto to Saseno
Island or to Cape Linguetta.
^ Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr's orders gave 'ist Objective. Submarines
^lying in Straits of Kumbor. 2nd Objective. (If ist not possible or no
'submarines are found). Any ships found in Teodo Bay, preferably light
'cruisers or destroyers.'
1917] OTRANTO AND TARANTO 393
indicated that the conditions would be favourable, but
at 4 a.m., when the Shorts were ready to take off, the
wind increased almost to gale force and heavy seas were
running. Two pilots tried unsuccessfully to get off the
water and the enterprise was then, perforce, abandoned.
On the journey back to Otranto the seaplanes were
buffeted by the choppy seas: one became waterlogged
and sank, and the others were damaged.
Commodore Sueter was not daunted by this disappoint-
ment. In his report of the operation he asked for an
increase in the number of torpedo or bombing seaplanes,
and he followed this, on the 20th of September, with
a memorandum in which he surveyed the existing strengths
of the Allied air units, and outlined his future require-
ments for the Royal Naval Air Service. These were based
on the opinion that a more vigorous offensive against
the Austrian bases was essential, especially in view of the
vulnerability to aircraft attack of the railway down the
east coast of Italy by which a new line of communications
to Egypt and Salonika had been established through the port
of Taranto. An increase of U-boat activity against Allied
transports using Taranto was also to be expected. Com-
modore Sueter believed that Allied aircraft operations,
sustained and properly co-ordinated, might make the
Adriatic ports untenable as submarine bases, and would
certainly make it difficult or even impossible for U-boats
to work in the Adriatic. For the barrage, he would require
65 patrolling, bombing, and fighting aircraft, and for the
offensive against Pola and Fiume, 30 to 50 bombers, and
25 fighters. The Admiralty, on consideration of this
memorandum, sanctioned an increase of the establishment
at Otranto and Taranto to 80 seaplanes and aeroplanes,
but some time elapsed before any definite action was
ordered.
^he Appointment of a British Commander-in-Chief
By this time steps had been taken to co-ordinate the
efforts of the various British naval squadrons in the
Mediterranean. The appointment of a British Com-
mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had lapsed on the
394 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
outbreak of war when the French had taken over
general responsibiHty. Although the main strategical
question, namely, the destruction of the enemy fleet
should it put to sea, had thereafter been provided for
by the presence of the French Commander-in-Chief, in
command of his battle fleet, the Mediterranean had
become the scene of many disconnected campaigns,
each under its own flag oflicer. The need for centralizing
Allied direction had not been fully realized until after the
opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare in February 1917.
It had soon become apparent that the arrangement must
end by which separate British squadrons, in different areas
of the Mediterranean, conducted independent operations
with no British Commander-in-Chief to redispose squad-
rons and ships in order that the best use might be made of
the total resources.
In April 191 7 an important conference of Allied
admirals was held at Corfu. It was then decided that
anti-submarine patrols should be abolished, except at
focal points, and that all shipping must sail escorted,
preferably in small convoys. It was recognized by the
Allied delegates that the appointment of a Flag Officer,
to take charge of all questions affecting the allotment
of routes and the protection of shipping in the whole
Mediterranean area, was necessary. It was ultimately
agreed that this officer should be British and this deci-
sion involved, in effect, the reintroduction of a British
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The appointment,
which was made in August 19 17, was given to Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe,
whose head-quarters were opened at Malta. So that there
should be no doubt about the supremacy of the French
Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of operations, it was
decreed by the Admiralty that the British Commander-
in-Chief should fly his flag ashore. Meanwhile, arising out
of this reorganization, Egypt had been separated from
the East Indies command. Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A.
Gaunt had relieved Vice- Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss
as Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, on the 21st of July,
and next day Rear-Admiral Thomas Jackson had taken
1917] DEMANDS FOR AIRCRAFT 395
over as Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, his command includ-
ing the Red Sea as far as Bab el Mandeb.
Although it w^as the depredations of the German U-
boats w^hich brought back a British Commander-in-Chief
to Malta, the advantages which follov^ed that appointment
extended to every naval activity in the Mediterranean.
Vice- Admiral Sir S. A. Gough-Calthorpe exercised super-
vision and control over the squadrons and bases com-
manded by the rear-admirals and commodores in the
Aegean, in Egypt, in the Adriatic, at Gibraltar, and at
Malta.
On the 9th of October 191 7 Vice- Admiral Gough-
Calthorpe, in a memorandum to the Admiralty, pointed
out the urgency of the need for an increase in the aircraft
at Otranto. ^Aircraft', he said, 'are among the most impor-
'tant, if not the most important, weapons of offence that
'can be used against enemy submarines in the Adriatic.
'It should be possible, if not to prevent enemy submarines
'from using Adriatic bases, at any rate to make their
'passage to and from the Mediterranean such a risky pro-
'ceeding as to constitute a serious deterrent to them.
'Very great opportunities are afforded for the work of
'aircraft, and their use should be developed with the
'least possible delay so that there may be a constant air
'patrol of the whole Straits of Otranto, instead of the
'present spasmodic patrol, and that the bomb attacks on
'Cattaro and Pola may be continued relentlessly and
'regularly. ... I hope also to strengthen and improve with
'all the means at my command the barrage of the Straits
'by surface craft. These operations must be regarded as
'the first and most important duties of the Naval forces
'in the Mediterranean, and if it is necessary, other
'squadrons or areas in my command will be called on to
'provide additional personnel and material. ... I am of
'opinion that the machines already asked for by Com-
'modore Sueter . . . should be provided. Further, that
'for the present, only sufficient material and personnel
'necessary to keep the existing establishment complete
'should be sent to other parts of the Mediterranean. If
'this procedure is not adopted, then, instead of a strong
396 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
'concentration at the place which offers the best strategical
'conditions, a large amount of effort, energy and fighting
'power will continue to be expended in a dispersion which
'can give no decisive results.'
The Vice-Admiral supported his arguments with a
summary of the work done by Allied aircraft in the Straits
of Otranto. 'It is remarkable', he said, 'how many sub-
'marines were hunted and attacked in view of the small
'number of machines available for flying.' His list showed
that between the end of May and the 17th of September
191 7 aircraft were in action against U-boats on thirteen
occasions. In addition to the U-boat already referred to
as destroyed by the French air station at Corfu on the
7th of August, another was shown as seriously damaged
or destroyed by a Sopwith from Otranto on the 17th of
September. On this occasion the U-boat was attacked
twenty-five miles off Otranto with a 65 -lb. delay-action
bomb which was dropped just ahead of the submarine
a few seconds after she had dived. A large oil patch came
to the surface and although a hydrophone patrol was kept
up for eight hours nothing more of the submarine was
heard or seen.
The Commander-in-Chief, having received no reply
from the Admiralty to his letter, wired on the 15th of
December: 'I request I may be informed what action has
'been decided upon. At the end of November Commodore
'Sueter reported that only six machines were ready for
'flying. This in view of the number of targets presented
'by enemy's submarines in the Straits of Otranto recently
'is lamentable. I request that the situation as regards
'aircraft in the Mediterranean may receive the earnest
'consideration of the Board.'
The Admiralty reply had been sent off two days before.
In this the Board expressed their general agreement with
the Vice-Admiral's views, and stated that many seaplanes
and fighting aeroplanes were on the way to Otranto, and
that the whole question could be discussed with Wing
Commander A. M. Longmore who had already left
England for Malta. The Board stated that the Vice-
Admiral should make such dispositions as he saw fit of the
1917-18] REORGANIZATION 397
air forces under his command and pointed out that the
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron had over one hundred
aeroplanes in service, in transit, or allocated, and that some
of these might be diverted to Otranto at the Vice-
Admiral's discretion.
In the result, a general scheme for the reorganization
and expansion of the air units in the Mediterranean was
drawn up, and it received Admiralty approval in February
191 8. The post of Senior Air Service Officer on the staff
of the Commander-in-Chief was created and the appoint-
ment given to Wing Captain A. M. Longmore. The
Mediterranean was divided into several areas (Malta,
Italian, Aegean, Port Said, and, later, Gibraltar), each
of which was to be self-contained for aircraft, personnel,
and repairs. Wing Captain Longmore was, under the
Vice-Admiral, to have executive authority over all the
areas, with power to move air units as required. Under
the scheme Malta took on a new importance. The main
aircraft spares and stores were to be kept there, and all
aircraft arriving by sea were to be allocated to Malta for
distribution by the senior air service officer. Four more
carriers would be required to assist in the distribution of
aircraft, stores, and personnel from Malta, and to form, in
addition, mobile bases for air operations against U-boats
in areas outside the range of shore stations. In the Italian
area, there was to be established at Taranto a new aero-
drome for the accommodation of a mobile bombing wing
(twenty-three bombers and twelve fighters) for an air
offensive against the U-boat base at Cattaro, and also a
seaplane station to house nine large flying-boats for patrols
along the barrage-line. The establishment laid down for
Otranto was twelve two-seater seaplanes (260 horse-power
Shorts), twelve light-bomber or reconnaissance aero-
planes (D.H.4's), and twelve fighter aeroplanes (Sopwith
'Camels'). In addition, for the two stations, Taranto was
to maintain a reserve of three flying-boats, three aero-
planes, and thirteen bomber or fighter aeroplanes. By the
end of March 191 8 the majority of these aircraft had
arrived or were on their way, and the British air activities
in the Adriatic were widely extended.
398 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
MALTA
Anti-submarine patrols by small 'America' flying boats
from Malta had been begun towards the end of 191 6.
They had been continued throughout 191 7, mostly by
Short seaplanes and by flying boats purchased from the
Italians. A number of U-boats had been sighted and
attacked, and although none had been destroyed, the air
patrols, because they helped to restrict the freedom of
movement of the submarines, and because they were able
to give warnings to shipping, had been of value.
When it became clear, in the spring of 19 17, that all
the available large flying-boats, eminently suitable for anti-
submarine work in the Mediterranean, would be appro-
priated by the home stations, arrangements were made to
build flying boats in the dockyard at Malta. The first was
completed in November 191 7, and by the time of the
Armistice seventeen more had been constructed.
Kite Balloons
Impressed by the proved value of kite balloons for
escort duty with convoys in home waters, the Commander-
in-Chief, Mediterranean, had asked in August 1917 for
balloons for similar work in the Mediterranean, where the
conditions were particularly favourable for this type of
air observation. He suggested that sheds should be built
at important ports of call from which balloons might be
embarked in destroyers and sloops engaged on convoy
escort duties. He proposed Malta as the first base, and in
December 191 7 sheds were erected at Sliema and gas-
making plants laid down. In the same month a site for
a balloon station was chosen at Brindisi, and another at
Alexandria. Men and material were sent to these bases
and, during the next few months, to Gibraltar, Bizerta,
and Corfu, but none of the stations had begun work by
the end of March 191 8.
THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 1917
The air operations in the Aegean during 191 7 may be
divided into: (i) watching the Dardanelles for possible
1917] EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 399
movements of the Turko-German fleet, (ii) preventing
enemy aircraft from surveying the British fleet bases and
the movements of ships, (iii) long-distance reconnaissance
to the Marmara and Bosporus, (iv) bombing attacks on
mihtary objectives in Turkey and Bulgaria, (v) work on
the right flank of the army in Macedonia, and (vi) anti-
submarine patrols. For these extensive operations there
was, in the Eastern Mediterranean on the ist of February
191 7, a total strength of 57 flying officers, 78 aeroplanes,
29 seaplanes, and 5 S.S. type airships. This strength was
distributed among the following units: 'A' Squadron^ at
Thasos and 'D' Squadron at Stavros, responsible for re-
connaissance and bombing operations in southern Bulgaria
and the Lower Struma; 'C Squadron at Imbros for
reconnaissance and bombing of the Gallipoli Peninsula, th e
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Constantinople
railway; and 'B' Squadron at Thermi (Mitylene) for anti-
submarine patrols of the Smyrna and Aivalik areas, and
for reconnaissance and bombing of the Panderma-Smyrna
railway and other communications. The rest of the air
command comprised the stores depot and base at Mudros,
the S.S. airship station at Kassandra, the seaplane carrier
Empress, and the depot ship Ark Royal.
Two additional squadrons were formed early in the
year. At the end of February 191 7, when the German
mobile bombing unit made its appearance on the Dojran
front in Macedonia, the assistance of the Royal Naval
Air Service was sought. The admiral commanding the
Eastern Mediterranean agreed to make up a mobile
fighting squadron, and a bombing squadron, by taking
aeroplanes and personnel from the existing squadrons in
the Eastern Mediterranean. ^ A unit (called 'E' Squadron)
equipped with four Sopwith ij strutters, and with one
Sopwith Triplane, was formed in March and sent to an
aerodrome at Hadzi Junas, behind the Dojran front,
where it combined, temporarily, with a Royal Flying
^ On the 1st of January 1917 the naval FHghts in the Mediterranean
had been renamed squadrons.
^ 'C Squadron at Mudros and 'B' Squadron at Mitylene were reduced
to half- strength.
400 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Corps detachment to form a unit known as the Composite
Fighting Squadron. 'F' Squadron, made up of Sopwith
bombers and fighters, was formed in April 191 7, and
operated first from an aerodrome at Amberkoj, behind
the Dojran front, and later from Marian on the Struma
front for bombing operations in the Upper Struma.^
Meanwhile the bombing offensive by 'A' Squadron
at Thasos was being maintained against the Bulgarian
communications in Macedonia, particularly against the
bridges, railheads, and dumps on the Xanthe-Drama
line. When, towards the end of March 191 7, it became
known that large military bakeries and stores had been
set up at Pravi, a series of bombing attacks were made
which resulted in some direct hits and the burning out of
part of the buildings.
Early in May prisoners reported that submarines were
being assembled, under the supervision of German experts,
in the Customs House buildings at Kavalla. Subsequent
air reconnaissances disclosed great activity in the port,
and to these indications was added the significance of
new mine-fields, as well as reports of additional heavy
guns on the coast. The Vice-Admiral thereupon ordered
a bombardment of Kavalla to take place on the 20th of
May, in which all the Royal Naval Air Service units in
the area were to co-operate. Preliminary photographic
reconnaissances of Kavalla and of its forts were made,
and the waters near the port were closely surveyed for
mines.
'A' Squadron at Thasos, reinforced by three seaplanes
from Mudros, was given the task of directing the fire of
the monitors M.2g and M.33 on the Customs House,
Post OflBce, and lighters, and of the Raglan on any enemy
guns which opened fire on the bombarding ships. Air-
craft patrols in search of U-boats and mines were also
to be maintained while the bombardment was in progress.
The first aeroplanes left at 4.10 a.m. to take up the
spotting. The monitors were quickly ranged on their
targets, and it was not long before the Customs House,
the Post Ofl&ce, and a barracks were on fire. The Henri
^ See also pp. 349-50.
1917] KAVALLA BOMBARDED 401
Farman scheduled to co-operate with the Raglan was shot
down near Kavalla and its two occupants were thrown
out and killed. ^ The relieving aircraft, a Short seaplane,
took over the spotting for the monitors soon after 6 a.m.
and a Nieuport arrived at the same time and patrolled
in readiness to direct the Raglan on active enemy guns.
These, however, showed no disposition to interfere, and
the possible reason was the presence over them of five
bombers and three escorts of 'E' and 'F' Squadrons which
had flown down from Marian specially for this operation.
An early bomb made a hit on an occupied gun emplace-
ment, and other bombs, dropped at any sign of activity,
induced the gun crews to keep under cover. Air photo-
graphs taken next day revealed considerable damage to
the Customs House and to other buildings in its vicinity.
The time was now approaching when the growing
crops in enemy territory would be ripe enough for burning,
and the squadron at Thasos was temporarily reinforced
on the 6th of June by T' Squadron. ^ The attacks had
begun on the 3rd of June, and they were continued to
the 17th, when T' Squadron was withdrawn to Mudros
for work elsewhere. During this time the smoke from the
burning crops was often visible from Thasos, and when
the attacks ended only isolated patches of crops were left
standing in the area of Sarishaban and in the fertile valley
of the Mesta river.
During all this time 'D' Squadron at Stavros worked in
co-operation with the naval detachment operating on the
British right flank and with the 80th Brigade in the Lower
Struma. In addition to reconnaissance and photographic
duties, the squadron made bombing attacks from time to
time on enemy camps and dumps, and also sent up patrols
to engage enemy pilots who attempted to reconnoitre the
British positions.
i ^ The Henri Farman was shot down by Leutnant von Eschwege: see
I War Flying in Macedonia, by Haupt Heydemarck, pp. 68-73.
j ^ After the explosion on the aerodrome at Marian, when eight aero-
; planes, &c., were destroyed, 'E' and 'F' Squadrons were merged into a
i, new 'F' Squadron which was re-equipped at Mudros and sent to Thasos
;] on the 6th of June.
I 2504.5 D d
402 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
At the end of July, owing to a shortage of aircraft, the
squadrons at Thasos and Stavros were reorganized. All
reconnaissance and spotting aircraft were concentrated
at Stavros, and Thasos was left with a seaplane station,
chiefly for the duties of anti-submarine and mine-field
patrol. The aerodrome at Thasos was given over tem-
porarily to a Greek bombing squadron (*Z' Squadron^),
but Thasos remained available as an advanced base, when
necessary, for Royal Naval Air Service aeroplanes.
Early in August four bombing attacks were made by
moonlight on the air base at Thasos, and the bomb and
petrol dumps were set on fire. While the attacks were
being made, the Greek pilots from Thasos were actually
away bombing the enemy aerodrome at Drama, and they
later retahated for the raid on Thasos by bombing the
enemy air base at Gereviz which was in process of being
enlarged. Offers of assistance were also made by the Royal
Flying Corps at Salonika, and as a result a series of com-
bined attacks by the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Naval
Air Service, and by the Greek bombing squadron, were
planned against Drama aerodrome and Gereviz. The raids
took place on the 9th and i ith of August, the Royal Flying
Corps taking part in the attacks on the latter day:^ at
Gereviz a hangar used as a petrol or bomb store was set on
fire and burnt out, and a seaplane shed was hit. When the
Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes returned from Thasos to
the mainland, three fighter 'Baby' seaplanes and two
naval 'Camel' aeroplanes were sent to Thasos, and they
sufficed to frustrate retaliatory bombing which, for some
days after the attacks on Gereviz, the enemy attempted.
Towards the end of 191 7 an increase of U-boat activity
in the northern Aegean necessitated the diversion of air-
craft to extensive anti-submarine patrols, and as, owing
to a lack of reinforcements, the strength of the air units
at Thasos had dwindled, offensive operations had to be
curtailed.
^ Greek naval and military officers for this squadron were trained by the
Royal Naval Air Service at Mudros. The first of them had arrived at
Thasos, after qualification, in March 191 7.
^ See also p. 357,
I9I7-I8] OPERATIONS FROM IMBROS
Squadron at Imbros
Air reconnaissances of the Dardanelles and of the
Gallipoli Peninsula were a daily routine of the Imbros
squadron, which had also to supply aircraft for anti-
submarine patrols and for intermittent bombing. In
April 191 7 shipping in Kephalo harbour and Aliki Bay,
Imbros, was shelled by an enemy gun, the position of
which was located from the air on the Peninsula. In the
morning and afternoon of the 17th of May, the fire of the
Raglan and of three small monitors was ranged by aircraft
and the gun was silenced. Occasional shelling of Imbros,
however, with the help of spotting aircraft, continued,
but the enemy pilots were not allowed to remain long
enough to permit of accurate ranging, and the shelling
did no particular harm.
In October 191 7 Squadron moved from Kephalo
to a new aerodrome at Gliki, on the north-east side of the
island, where they were shortly reinforced by two D.H.4
aeroplanes. These were used in November for the bomb-
ing of bridges on the main Sofia-Constantinople railway,
the enemy seaplane base at Nagara, and the flour mills
and warehouses at Gallipoli. When the attack on the
last-named objective took place on the 27th of Novem-
ber, it was observed that on the aerodrome at Galata,
untenanted for many months, three hangars had been
erected. These were bombed by the D.H.4's, with a
Sopwith fighter escort, on the ist of December, and there-
after patrols of Sopwith 'Camels' and Tups' occasionally
visited the aerodrome, seeking combat. In a fight on the
morning of the 2nd of December two enemy aeroplanes
were shot down over the aerodrome, and in the afternoon,
when the enemy attempted a raid on Gliki aerodrome,
another was driven down.
The bombing raids by the D.H.4's were continued in
191 8. In January, in the second of two attacks on the
Lule Burgas bridge, direct hits were made: the permanent
way was torn up and the bridge was holed. An approach-
ing troop-train, forced to a standstill, was attacked with
machine-gun fire, and when the troops jumped from the
404 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
train they were pursued with fire as they scattered into
the fields. On the 2ist of March 191 8 one of three
D.H.4's attacking Lule Burgas and other bridges found
and bombed two trains in the station at Alapie. A hit on
one of the trains with a lOO-lb. bomb destroyed two
wagons and damaged the permanent way: other bombs
hit station buildings.
'5' and 'F' Squadrons at Mitylene
The aerodrome of 'B' Squadron at Thermi on the island
of Mitylene was well placed for offensive action against
the Smyrna-Panderma railway, and many attacks on the
bridges were made throughout 1917. Other objectives in
the first half of the year were the aerodromes at Paradisos
and Kassimir, ripening crops, granaries, and shipping in
Smyrna harbour.
At the end of July 'F' Squadron arrived at Thermi
from Mudros for special bombing operations in the
Smyrna area. 'F' Squadron brought five Sopwith bombers,
three Sopwith i J-strutter fighters, and a Sopwith ^Camel',
and made their first attack on the 1st of August. The
objective was the group of railway workshops at Halka
Bounan, east of Smyrna, and fires started by direct hits
from some of the bombs were fanned by a strong wind and
the buildings were still burning long after the attack had
ended. One of the escorting two-seater Sopwiths was shot
down by gun-fire and its occupants killed. The squadron
next made two attacks, on the 3rd of August, on the
station and stores at Soma and obtained many hits. On
the following day the enemy aeroplane base at Sanjak
Kale in the Gulf of Smyrna was the target, and on the
1 2th the workshops and accumulated rolling-stock at
Halka Bounan were bombed. On the 13th the Manisa
railway bridge was hit, and two days later Soma was
attacked again.
To counter the activities of 'F' Squadron the enemy
air unit at Paradisos aerodrome was reinforced. When this
became known a night attack on the aerodrome buildings
was made by five bombers on the 30th/3ist of August.
The squadron continued its offensive until the 17th of
1917] MUDROS ON LEMNOS ISLAND 405
September, when the bombing aeroplanes were flown
back to Mudros. The fighters, including three recently
arrived 'Camels', were left behind at Thermi to deal with
enemy attacks made by way of reprisal. During their
brief stay on Mitylene the pilots of T' Squadron had
covered a total of 13,000 miles on bombing expeditions.
Much of this flying was done over the sea, but the squadron
suffered no loss other than the one aeroplane shot down
in the opening attack on Halka Bounan.
On the 9th of October Squadron moved from
Thermi to a new aerodrome at Kalloni (Mitylene). While
the move was in progress, Thermi was vigorously shelled.
By this time, the squadron was short of personnel, and
six of its aeroplanes were sent back to Mudros because
there were no pilots to fly them.
Mudros
Mudros, on Lemnos Island, was the main store and
repair base for the air units working in the Aegean. Also
at Mudros was an airship station for anti-submarine
duties, a seaplane station for similar work and for the air
defence of the port, and the depot ship Ark Royal.
In the first six months of 19 1 7, repair, supply, and anti-
submarine work fully occupied the activities of Mudros,
but in July a bombing offensive was begun, one of the
objectives being Constantinople. The distant bombing
was done by a Handley Page aeroplane which was flown
from England to Mudros, a 2,000-mile journey, according
to time-table, in spite of bad weather.^
To create a diversion during the bombing expeditions
of the Handley Page, and to accentuate the moral effect of
the raids, day and night attacks were planned against the
enemy aerodromes and other objectives on the Gallipoli
Peninsula. For this purpose T' Squadron and the Greek
naval squadron from Thasos were transferred temporarily
to Mudros. The attacks were opened in the evening of
the 3rd of July by five bombers and four fighters of
^ The crew were, Squadron Commander K, S. Savory, Flight Lieu-
tenant H. McClelland, Lieutenant P. T. Rawlings, R.N.V.R., Chief Petty
Officer 2 (E) J. L. Adams, and Leading Mechanic (C) B, Cromack.
4o6 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
Squadron. Their target was Galata aerodrome or, alterna-
tively, the flour mills and shipping at Gallipoli. The
bombers found Galata occupied only by two widely spaced
sheds, and they therefore attacked shipping in the inner
harbour at Gallipoli and warehouses on the water front :
four hits on the latter were claimed. Some hours later, in
the dark, the Handley Page passed over the Peninsula,
followed by a Henri Farman which made a second attack
on Gallipoli and on Galata. The Handley Page got as far as
Shar Keui on the west coast of the Sea of Marmara, but
there met a hot wind from the south which caused her
engines to overheat. She lost power and avoided a forced
landing only by dropping a part of her load of bombs.
She turned back and dropped the remainder of her bombs
on a camp near Bulair, after which she made her base
with some difficulty. Next evening warehouses at Chanak
were bombed by T' Squadron, but the conditions were
not again favourable for night flying until the 8th of July.
At intervals during this night, targets on the Peninsula
were attacked by pilots of the Greek squadron while the
Handley Page was making her way towards Constantinople.
In the Sea of Marmara, however, a strong head wind was
encountered, and after three and a half hours the Handley
Page had not progressed more than half way to her objec-
tive. The Constantinople raid was therefore abandoned
and the bombs were dropped on the return journey on
various targets in the Peninsula.
On the 9th of July the weather appeared more promising
and, at 8.47 p.m., the Handley Page set out once more.
This time all went well and Constantinople was reached
just before midnight. The Goeben was found, surrounded
by smaller craft including submarines and destroyers, in
Stenia Bay. The Handley Page attacked the Goeben from
800 feet, but although it appeared at the time that some of
the eight 1 1 2-lb. bombs dropped hit the battle cruiser, there
is not much doubt that she was undamaged. Hits, hov/-
ever, were made on a destroyer, and an explosion and fire
followed. The Handley Page pilot (Squadron Comimander
K. S. Savory) then flew to the upper waters of the Golden
Horn and dropped two bombs on the s.s. General, the
1917] HANDLEY PAGE BOMBER 407
reported German head-quarters, and afterwards found
and attacked the Turkish War Office with the last two
bombs. One of the latter hit the stables while the other
burst near the main gate. The raid, which lasted thirty-
five minutes, took the enemy by surprise. Not until it
was nearly ended did searchlights and anti-aircraft guns
become active. The Handley Page arrived safely back at
Mudros at 3.40 a.m. While she had been away the Greek
squadron had made three separate attacks on targets in
the Peninsula, and a pilot from Imbros had bombed the
enemy seaplane base at Nagara.
Shipping and warehouses at Chanak were bombed by
'F' Squadron on the nth of July and a brig was sunk.
The final attack by this squadron, before it left at the end
of July for operations from Mitylene, was made on the
15th on a camp north-east of Suvla. When 'F' Squadron
left Mudros for Mitylene, a detachment of four Henri
Farmans, known as 'G' Flight, was established at Marsh
aerodrome, Mudros, for night bombing, and for day and
night anti-submarine patrols to supplement those made
by the seaplanes.
On the 27th of July Lemnos was reconnoitred by an
enemy seaplane escorted by two fighting seaplanes. Flight
Lieutenant J. W. Alcock, who was on the aerodome at
Mudros, went up in a 'Camel' and made contact with the
enemy near Tenedos. He approached out of the sun and
made a surprise attack on one of the fighting seaplanes,
which went down, apparently in trouble. The 'Camel'
pilot thereupon attacked, at close range, the second
fighter, which nose-dived and landed near Sedd el Bahr
in a damaged condition. The reconnaissance seaplane,
meanwhile, had alighted on the sea under cover of the
Turkish guns on the Peninsula.
On the 6th of August the Handley Page bombed ware-
houses and shipping at Panderma on the southern shore
of the Sea of Marmara. Thereafter, as U-boat activity in
the Aegean was increasing, the Handley Page was occasion-
ally used to assist the aircraft employed on anti-submarine
work. Meanwhile, experiments of some promise had been
made by the Henri Farmans of 'G' Flight in co-operation
4o8 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
with hydrophone-fitted drifters. Wide areas were searched
by the Henri Farman personnel, who made their reports,
by Aldis lamp, to the drifters. On one such patrol, on the
15th of August, the observer in a Henri Farman sighted
a U-boat periscope near Lemnos. Before the aeroplane
got over her the submarine went under, but two lOO-lb.
delay-action bombs were dropped on her calculated
position. A warning was given to the drifter by the aero-
plane, which also sent wireless messages to Mudros. In
answer to the wireless call, four other aircraft were sent
out, but although they searched the area in conjunction
with the drifter, the U-boat was not seen or heard again.
At dawn next day a U-boat, possibly the same one, was
observed eighteen miles south of the original position.
As the Henri Farman dived to attack the submarine,
engine trouble supervened and the aeroplane landed on
the water, into which both the occupants were thrown.
The observer, however, had, before the aeroplane landed,
sent the position of the U-boat by wireless and she was
subsequently hunted, but without success, by the drifter
flotilla. As an extension of the idea, a seaplane was fitted
with a hydrophone to work with the drifters. The seaplane
was to alight and listen on the water every few miles, and
experiments showed that a wide area of sea could thus be
methodically patrolled.
On the 2nd of September the Handley Page set out
for an attack on Adrianople. On the way, north-east of
Samothrace, a U-boat was sighted in the moonpath and
two delay-action bombs were dropped on her as she was
submerging. The Handley Page then went on by way of
Kuleli Burgas (two bombs) to Adrianople, where her main
load was dropped on the station and neighbouring
buildings: she then returned safely to her base. While
she had been away, seven enemy bombing attacks had
been made on Mudros, causing slight damage, but no
casualties, and in retaliation four Henri Farmans, one
of which failed to return, had attacked Chanak.
On the morning of the 3otli of September three enemy
seaplanes, two of them single-seater fighters of a type
known to the Royal Naval Air Service as 'Blue Birds', and
1917] J. W. ALCOCK 409
the other a two-seater reconnaissance seaplane, were
reported to be approaching Mudros. Three pilots went
up at once to engage them, but only two came into action.
They were Flight Lieutenant H. T. Mellings in a Sopwith
Triplane, and Fhght Lieutenant J. W. Alcock in a
Sopwith 'Camel'. The Triplane pilot shot down one of
the 'Blue Birds', which dived into the sea and broke up,
and the 'Camel' pilot eventually forced the other to land,
and its wounded pilot was subsequently picked up by the
Acheron, The German two-seater was pursued to the
Dardanelles, where a Sopwith Tup' pilot from Imbros
(Flight Lieutenant P. K. Fowler) joined in the attack.
The observer in the German seaplane was apparently
wounded, but, flying low down, the two-seater came under
cover of the guns of the Dardanelles forts and escaped
destruction. Although the aeroplane flown by Flight
Lieutenant Alcock is set down in the official reports as
a Sopwith 'Camel', there is some evidence that it was
of Alcock's own design. From a German twin-engined
bombing aeroplane shot down by naval pilots in April
191 7, on the Macedonian front, a Benz engine, in good
order, had been taken. The engine had been sent to
Mudros and Flight Lieutenant Alcock had sought, and
been given, permission to design an aeroplane for the
Benz. 'He did so,' says Lieutenant-Colonel L. H. Strain,
'but except for one short flight, it had not been tried out,
'but Alcock was going to test it on the morning of the 30th
'of September. The engine had been warmed up, but
'Alcock was in his bath when the enemy reconnaissance
'appeared. He put on his pyjamas, ran to the machine,
'got into the air, bagged MuUer^ before they were out of
'sight. . . . The machine he designed was 20 m.p.h. faster
'at 10,000 feet than anything we had. We sent the
'drawings home. Alcock had no knowledge of aerodyna-
'mics, etc., but he had a natural genius for knowing where
'stresses came and how to meet them.'
In the evening of the same day Flight Lieutenant
Alcock set out in the Handley Page to bomb the railway
stations at Constantinople and Haidar Pasha, but after
^ The German pilot who was picked up by the Jcherofi,
4IO OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
a flight of an hour and a half one of the two engines went
out of action, and the pilot turned back towards Mudros.
He was, however, forced to land in the Gulf of Xeros, and
although the Handley Page floated for two hours, during
which time the crew fired Very lights, nothing of the
accident was seen from British destroyers lower down the
Gulf. The crew had eventually to take to the water and
make an hour's swim to land. They were found by the
Turks on the Peninsula next morning and were eventually
sent to Constantinople as prisoners.^
The Sortie of the Goeben and Breslau
Routine anti-submarine patrols, and occasional bomb-
ing, kept the Mudros aircraft occupied down to the end
of the year. In January 191 8, however, the whole of the
forces in the Eastern Mediterranean were stirred into
special activity by the sortie from the Dardanelles of the
two German cruisers, Goeben and Breslau. A message
that these cruisers had come out was intercepted at
Mudros on the morning of the 20th of January, and all
aircraft were immediately ordered to concentrate at
Mudros and Imbros. The two cruisers had passed out of
the Dardanelles about 5 a.m. with the object of attacking
the two British monitors in Kusu Bay, Imbros, and of
bombarding Mudros. Off Mavro Island the Goeben struck
a mine, but the cruisers went ahead and they opened fire
on the monitors and on general shipping in Kusu Bay
about 8 a.m. Six or seven salvoes were fired, and these
destroyed the two monitors {Raglan and M.28). The
cruisers then turned off towards Mudros, but aircraft
from Imbros were now on the scene and they began to
^ Flight Lieutenant J. W. Alcock had taken his Royal Aero Club certi-
ficate in November 191 2. He joined the Royal Naval Air Service in
November 1914, and had served as an instructor at Eastchurch before
going to the Mediterranean. After the Armistice he returned to England,
took up an appointment with the Vickers firm and, with Lieutenant
A. W. Brown as his navigator, made the first flight across the Atlantic on
I4th/i5th June 1919. The feat won the Daily Mail prize of 10,000, and
each airman was created K.B.E. While piloting an aeroplane to Paris on
the 1 8th of December 1919 Sir John Alcock made a rough landing in a mist
near Rouen and was fatally injured.
I9I8] GOEBEN AND BRESLAU 411
attack with bombs. Before any hits were made, the bomb-
ing, indirectly, brought about the destruction of the
Breslau. The anti-aircraft shells fired by the guns from
the Goeben were seen to be falling close to the Breslau and
the latter ship was thereupon ordered by her consort to take
station ahead. As she moved to obey orders the Breslau
was so harassed by the attacking aircraft that she zigzagged
into a mine-field near Rabbit Island and had her stern shat-
tered by a mine. Almost at the same moment she received
a direct hit from a bomb. The Goeben turned to take
the Breslau in tow, but soon gave up the attempt and left
the damaged cruiser to her fate. The Breslau struck more
mines and finally sank. Turkish destroyers which at-
tempted to help her before she went under were kept
at a distance by British ships with the aid of aircraft
which observed for their fire.
The Goeben, meanwhile, with fine determination, con-
tinued her journey towards Mudros, but she struck a mine
on the way and her commander thereupon decided to go
back. He failed to find the gap he had made in the mine-
field off the Dardanelles and struck another mine going
in. As the Goeben entered the Straits two bomb-carrying
Blackburn 'Baby' seaplanes, escorted by a Greek pilot in
a 'Camel', appeared over her, but they were promptly
engaged by a formation often enemy seaplanes. In a sharp
fight, three of the enemy seaplanes were driven down by
the 'Camel' pilot (Commander A. Moraitinis), and one
of the Blackburn 'Baby' seaplanes (Flight Sub-Lieutenant
W. Johnston) fell in flames. By this time the hostile
formation had been broken and the second Blackburn
'Baby' pilot (Flight Sub-Lieutenant R. W. Peel), persisted
in his bombing attack and aimed his 65-lb. bombs at the
Goeben, but without the luck of a hit. He was then forced,
by engine trouble, to land in the Straits near a Turkish
destroyer, but his engine proved sufficiently serviceable
to enable him to taxi and hop round the Cape, and he
eventually reached Imbros safely. Soon after this attack
two D.H.4 aeroplanes found the Goeben, apparently in
trouble, and they saw her run aground south of Nagara.
Before returning to report her plight, the D.H.4's dropped
412 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
their bombs, one of which scored a hit on a vessel making
to assist the German cruiser.
When the position of the Goeben became known aircraft
were sent up to take photographs, and the concentration
of bombers and fighters at Imbros and Mudros was pressed
forward. In the afternoon there were low clouds and
patches of mist, but four Ii2-lb. bombs were dropped,
without direct results, by D.H.4 aeroplanes. At the same
time a widespread air patrol of the waters off Mudros
was made by all available aircraft to test the truth of
statements, made by rescued members of the crew of the
Breslau, that mine-fields had been laid outside the harbour
by U-boats. No mines were discovered and it is a point
of interest that the prisoners' statements, whether they
were made in good faith or with the intention to deceive,
had the effect of diverting temporarily the activities of
aircraft from the possible bombing of the Goeben,
The attack on the battle cruiser was resumed at dawn
next morning, the 21st of January, but clouds at 500 feet
and mist hampered the bombing operations. Three
separate attacks were made during the day, but only one
bomb, of Ii2-lb. weight, hit the Goeben. After dark,
nine aeroplanes were sent to the Straits, but they got a
poor view of their target and no hits were claimed. To
help the Royal Naval Air Service in their task, the Royal
Flying Corps at Salonika took over the work of the naval
air station at Stavros and also sent aircraft to Mudros to
take part in the bombing.^ On the 22nd and 23rd day
and night attacks were kept up; one direct hit was
claimed on the morning of the 22nd, with a 112-lb. bomb
dropped from a D.H.4. ^ "^^^ bombing formations were
escorted by fighters, but there was no opposition other
than heavy anti-aircraft gun-fire, by which a Greek pilot
was shot down on the 23rd. On the 24th of January the
carrier Empress arrived and her pilots were used to relieve
the overworked officers at Mudros and Imbros. Next day,
also, the Manxman reached Mudros with badly needed
supplies of bombs. Strong winds and low clouds continued
^ Three Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes arrived at Mudros on the 21st,
three on the 22nd, four on the 25th, and one on the 28th January. See p. 363.
I9I8] THE GOEBEN ESCAPES 413
to make bombing difficult up to the morning of the 27th.
On the evening of the 24th a monitor, with aircraft
observation, attempted to fire at the Goeben, but just
v^hen her shells v^ere being signalled near the target a
haze spread over the Straits and no further spotting was
possible. On the morning of the 27th a 'Camel' pilot, in
difficult conditions of w^eather, reached the Straits to
find no trace of the German cruiser, but a little later
another 'Camel' pilot thought he could distinguish her
in the mist. She had, in fact, got off on the 26th, and by
the morning of the 27th had reached Constantinople
under her own steam, but it w^as not until the morning
of the 28th that the vv^eather v^as clear enough for air ob-
servers to say definitely that she had gone. During the few
days in which she had been grounded in the Straits fifteen
tons of bombs had been dropped. Pilots had been tireless
in their efforts to disable their enemy, but they had no
luck, nor could they be expected to achieve much with
the only bombs immediately available which were of
65-lb. or Ii2-lb. weight, too light to inflict serious damage
on a ship of the Goebenh construction.
Two and a half years before this, in August 191 5, a
Short seaplane from the Ben-my-Chree had obtained a
direct hit with a 14-inch torpedo on a steamer in the Sea
of Marmara,^ but no reliable torpedo-carrying aircraft
were in the Eastern Mediterranean when the Goeben ran
aground. An attempt was made to fit a 14-inch torpedo
to one of the old Shorts in the Ark Royal, but the seaplane,
so loaded, would not move off the water. When the
Manxman arrived in Mudros harbour from Brindisi at
7 a.m. on the 25th of January, she brought with her two
seaplanes fitted with 18-inch torpedoes, but there was
an unaccountable delay in sending up her seaplanes, and,
on the 26th, the day of the Goebenh departure, the wind
freshened and the sea was judged too choppy for the
torpedo-loaded seaplanes to get away. Meanwhile the
officers of the Ark Royal had succeeded in fitting one
of the Short seaplanes to take depth-charges of 300-lb.
weight, or 18-inch warheads. On the night of the 27th,
^ See Vol. II, p. 64.
414 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
when it was still doubtful whether the Goeben had gone,
a pilot set out in a Henri Farman aeroplane, loaded
with a warhead, to search for her. The visibility over the
Dardanelles was poor, and although the pilot could not
locate the Goeben, he decided to drop the warhead, from
1, 600 feet over Nagara Point, in the hope that the ship,
although not visible through the mist, might still be
aground. The resultant explosion was so heavy as to
shock the anti-aircraft gunners into immediate silence.
Other naval seaplanes were over the Straits that night to
keep the attention of the Dardanelles garrison off the
entrance in order to make easier the passage of a British
submarine, the whigh had been sent out in the
afternoon to attack the German cruiser. The E.14 got
through to Nagara, but found that her quarry had gone
and that her gallant attempt had been made in vain. Nor
did she otherwise have the luck she deserved: on her
homeward journey she was sunk by gun-fire off Kum Kale.
Many subsequent reconnaissance flights, by D.H.4 aero-
planes fitted with extra fuel tanks to give an endurance
of seven hours, were made to Constantinople to keep
watch on the Goeben in Stenia Bay; she never came out
again.
^he Southern Aegean
In February 1917 a small seaplane base (four seaplanes)
for anti-submarine work had been established at Suda Bay
in the island of Crete. Two months later the Vice- Admiral
Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron had
reported that four or five similar stations, on the Aegean
Islands of Syra, Kos, and Skyros, would enable him to
maintain an effective patrol of the southern Aegean, and
he had asked for one or two extra carriers from which
these stations could be supplied and administered. The
Admiralty, however, had replied that no carriers or aircraft
were available, and, as a temporary measure, the Peony
had been fitted in May 191 7 to carry three seaplanes to
search the smaller Aegean Islands for U-boat bases.
Between the middle of May and the end of July, from
Leros Island, her seaplanes made a systematic search of
1917] BEN-MT-CHREE ON FIRE 415
the gulfs along the Asiatic coast and of the neighbouring
islands from Rhodes northwards to the Gulf of Scala
Nuova. In August the Peony went to Port Vathi, Samos
Island, and settled to a routine of reconnaissances and
patrols. To provide aircraft patrols of the Doro, Mykoni,
&c., channels, in which U-boat activity had been pro-
nounced, a seaplane station was opened on the Island of
Syra in December 1917.
East Indies Squadron
In January 191 7 the Ben-my-Chree was destroyed.
On the 8th she had left Port Said to work with a French
naval squadron on a reconnaissance patrol of the coast
of Asia Minor. She was ordered to operate from the
Island of Kastelorizo, which is situated less than a mile
from the mainland. The weather, on arrival, was too
stormy for immediate operations and the Ben-my-Chree,
on the advice of the French admiral who was already
inside, went into the harbour and anchored. This was
on the morning of the 9th of January, and in the afternoon
shells from an undiscovered Turkish battery on the main-
land began to fall near the carrier. The fourth shell set
the hangar on fire, and as the petrol shot up in flames it
became clear that the Ben-my-Chree, which had been
a thorn in the flank of the Turks for eighteen months, was
doomed. In a forlorn hope ten hoses were led to the
hangar, but they had no effect, and as shells were still
striking the vessel Commander Samson gave the order
for 'Abandon ship' to be piped, and the crew swam and
waded ashore. The bombs on board the carrier exploded
intermittently up to the morning of the 13th, by which
time the hulk of the Ben-my-Chree had settled in shallow
water. ^
To replace her, the Empress was withdrawn from the
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron and, after refit at Genoa,
joined the East Indies Squadron in April 191 7. Meanwhile
the few seaplanes carried in the Anne and in the Raven 11
^ The Ben-my-Chree was salved after the war and towed into the Piraeus.
Her end is described in Fights and Flights (Air Commodore C. R. Samson),
pp. 342-6, and in In the Side Shows (Captain Wedgwood Benn), pp. 143-53.
4x6 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
had to do all the air work that was required. On the 1 6th
of January the Anne went into the Red Sea to help the
naval forces co-operating in the Arab advance on Wejh.^
About this time news was received of a German raider,
equipped with a seaplane, in the Indian Ocean, and
there was talk of mines being found off Colombo. She
was the Wolf (Captain Karl Nerger), which had left
Germany at the end of November 191 6 and had jour-
neyed by the Cape. As part of the measures taken to hunt
the Wolf, Commander Samson was ordered to take one
of the carriers and join the French cruiser Pothuau at
Aden. He chose the Raven II, which was slightly faster
than the Anne, and, with some recently arrived 240 horse-
power Short seaplanes, and one Sopwith ^Baby' on board,
left Port Said on the loth of March. The Raven reached
Aden on the i6th, and, while awaiting the Pothuau, her
pilots made reconnaissance and bombing flights over the
Turkish positions. When the French cruiser arrived, it
was decided that the first centre of search should be the
group of Laccadive Islands, after which the ships would
go on to Colombo to coal before exploring the Maldive
Islands. On the way to the Laccadives the Shorts were
hoisted out from time to time and search was made within
a radius of about fifty miles from the ships. Every island
and atoll of the Laccadives was explored, but there was
no sign of the raider. 'Flying amongst these islands',
wrote Air Commodore Samson, Vas most exhilarating,
'as you could see for miles when in the air, while below
'you saw the bottom of the sea, and hundreds of islands
'of all shapes and sizes, some above water, others being
'made beneath the sea, some day to rise above the waves.
'Most of the time we used to take the Raven inside the
'outer reefs whilst the Pothuau cruised outside. . . .'^
On April the 2nd the ships arrived at Colombo and,
^ See p. 222. The Anne returned to Port Said at the end of January
1 91 7. At the end of February she went first to Haifa, and then to Beirut.
From off these ports her seaplanes made a series of reconnaissances. On
her return to Port Said in March 191 7 she ceased to be used for seaplane
work, and was eventually reconverted as a cargo ship. Her place was taken
by the City of Oxford. (See p. 419.) ^ Fights and Flights, p. 349.
I9I7] A FLIGHT OF FACT 417
after coaling, went on to the Chagos and the Maldive
groups. After a search of the islands of the latter group,
on the 2 1 St of April, two officers of the Raven, in one
of the Shorts, were overtaken by a storm and failed to
find their parent ship. The Raven looked for them until
the 24th, but found nothing more than a patch of oil
and a ship's biscuit, which prompted her to report, on
return to Colombo, that the officers were missing and
believed drowned. The two officers, Flight Sub-Lieu-
tenant G. D. Smith, pilot, and Lieutenant W. C. A.
Meade, R.N.V.R., observer, were, indeed, very much alive.
They had landed, in the dark on the 21st, on a coral reef
off the most southerly island of the Maldives and had
had to wait until after midnight before the rising tide
enabled them to push the seaplane off again. The observer
then climbed to the top of the centre section and from there,
aided by the lightning and by lights fired from his Very
pistol, he was able to direct the pilot through the coral
reefs as they taxied from one island to another in search
of a channel. When the stock of Very lights was exhausted
the seaplane was beached on the shore of an island and
made fast to a palm-tree. At dawn the receding tide had
left the Short high and dry and an inspection revealed
minor damage to a float and to the ailerons.
The islands were being lashed by rains and the two
officers therefore built themselves a rough shelter made
from palm-trees. For food they shot down coco-nuts with
their Lewis gun. In the afternoon, with difficulty in a
high wind, the seaplane, which had been refloated by the
tide, was flown off, but the officers were unable to recover
their clothes which they had discarded while the seaplane
was manoeuvred to keep it free of the bank. Only an hour's
supply of petrol was left, and course was headed north.
The Short eventually alighted in a lagoon, and the pilot
and his observer, after a formal farewell, each of the other,
took to the (presumably) shark-infested water and made a
long swim for the shore. For costume one wore a Gieves
waistcoat and the other an airbag which he had cut from
the fuselage of the seaplane. They reached land safely,
covered themselves with palm leaves, and fell asleep, but
2504-5 E e
4i8 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
at midnight they were awakened hy three natives who,
when greeted with the word Salaam, fled.
Next morning the officers searched the island, but
found no inhabitants, so they set about the gathering of
material to make a raft. Later in the day, however, they
were able, by waving rags on a stick, to attract the attention
of fishermen who had appeared in the lagoon, but these
people, suspicious of white men who had come among
them from the skies, went back to their own island to
collect reinforcements. When the fleet of feluccas returned
the officers swam out to the boats and eventually per-
suaded the reluctant natives to give them passage and
also to take the seaplane in tow. The procession put
into Fiale Island, where, for four days, the officers were
imprisoned in the quarters of the unmarried male natives,
passing their time with an interchange of songs and
dances with their rescuers. On the fourth night they
were taken, by native dhow, to the home of the Sultan
on Male Island, where they were clothed in the uniform
of the Sultan's bodyguard and royally entertained until
a dhow was ready to sail to Colombo. The officers
rejoined the Raven at Colombo on the 6th of May and
the carrier then returned to the Maldives to pick up the
Short seaplane. It was found on arrival that a rough shed
had been constructed to protect the Short, and the sea-
plane was hoisted on board the Raven little the worse for
its adventures, as were two goats, a young bull, two turtles,
and other gifts pressed on the party by the Sultan of Male. ^
From Colombo many flights were made by the Raven's
seaplanes, but nothing of the Wolf was seen, and on the
2 1st of May the carrier sailed from Bombay with the
Brisbane and Exmouth in escort of a convoy to the Red
Sea. A brief stay was made at Aden while the Raven's sea-
planes, at the request of the General Officer Commanding
the Aden Field Force, reconnoitred the Turkish positions,
and the carrier then returned to Port Said, where she
arrived on the loth of June. ^
^ This adventure in the Maldives formed the basis of the short story,
A Flight of Fact, by Rudyard Kiphng.
2 While the Raven''?, seaplanes had been searching the Maldives, the Wolf
1917] CARRIER OPERATIONS 419
While the Raven II had been away, seaplanes (four 240
horse-power Shorts) from the Empress^ which had arrived
at Port Said early in April, had operated off the coast of
Palestine. On the 23rd of June the seaplanes, in co-
operation with Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes, bombed
Tul Karm, where a large accumulation of stores had been
reported.^ In the middle of July the carrier went across
to Asia Minor to make a bombing attack on cotton
factories and crops near Adana. The attack took place,
from oif Karatash Burnu, on the 15th of July and the
four Short pilots reported hits on the factories. In
August the Empress was off Beirut, where a successful
attack was made on quayside store sheds. Four seaplanes
took part in the raid and dropped seventy-eight i6-lb.
and four 65-lb. bombs. Fires were started in the sheds
from which smoke spread miles out to sea. On the 27th
of September seaplanes from the carrier again attacked
Beirut, in conjunction this time with the Grafton, whose
fire, directed by a seaplane observer, caused further
damage to the quayside buildings. On the 9th of October,
during an attack on the Chikaldir bridge, one of the Shorts
was destroyed by its own bombs, and another was made
unfit for further use by Turkish gun-fire. A third Short,
which went off later to bomb the locomotive sheds at
Adana, failed to return. The Empress thereupon went
back to Port Said for reinforcements.
Meanwhile the former kite-balloon ship, the City of
Oxford, now converted as a seaplane carrier, had arrived at
Port Said. In the third battle of Gaza, directed by General
Sir Edmund H. H. AUenby, which opened on the 31st of
October 191 7, seaplanes from the Empress, City of Oxford,
and from the Raven II, took part. The main initial attack
of the military offensive was made against Beersheba, and
was followed by a subsidiary attack on Gaza on the ist
was far away, making towards Australia. She did, however, on her return
to the Indian Ocean, spend some time in the Maldive Islands in September
and October 1917. The Wolf eluded capture and got back to Germany
in February 1918. She had kept the sea for 14^ months and had sunk
twelve vessels, in doing which she had been aided by her seaplane, the
Wolf Cub. I See p. 231.
420 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
of November. In the Gaza attack the naval forces co-
operated hy bombarding the Gaza defences and the
railway and depots north of the town. One of the bombard-
ing ships was the 14-inch monitor Raglan which had on
board a seaplane from the City of Oxford. On the morning
of the 30th of October, the day before the military attack
on Beersheba, the Raglan, spotted for by her seaplane,
shelled the railway station at Deir Sneid, five miles
inland north of Gaza. Several hits on the station were
obtained and the air observer then switched the monitor
over to an ammunition dump which he had discovered
near the station. His corrections led to a direct hit with
the ninth round, the dump exploded, and the station and
much of the railway track were demolished. The monitor
was then ranged on a road bridge across the Wadi el Hesi
at Deir Sneid, which was hit. As a result, wheeled traffic
could not cross and had to be diverted by way of the sandy
wadi, a process which caused delay. The seaplane was
afterwards attacked by a German Halberstadt fighter and
was forced down on the water. It was salved by the Raglan,
but was wrecked on board by the concussion of the fire
of the monitor's 14-inch gun. In the afternoon and
again next day the Raglan continued her bombardment
with the aid of seaplanes from the City of Oxford.
On the 1st of November, while the City of Oxford'' s
seaplanes were spotting for the river gun-boats. Ladybird
and Aphis, off the Wadi el Hesi, whither they had pro-
ceeded in company with the Raglan, the Raven II,
operating from the same area, helped to spot the fire of
the French coastguard ship, Requin.
Next day the Empress, which now carried two Hamble
'Baby' and four Sopwith 'Baby' seaplanes, took a part in
the operations. To keep alive the Turkish anxiety that a
landing might be made on the coast behind the right
flank, Rear- Admiral T. Jackson had organized a feint em-
barkation at Deir el Balah in the afternoon of November
the 1st. Men of the Egyptian Labour Corps had been
put ashore from about 4.30 p.m. onwards, but when it
became too dark for the enemy to see what was happen-
ing, they had been re-embarked. It was difficult to employ
1917] SINAI— PALESTINE 421
seaplanes in a way that would keep up the impression
that the landing operation had something behind it, but
Rear-Admiral Jackson allotted them objectives of military
importance, mainly in the hope that the bombing would
prolong the enemy's anxiety. From off El Haram, north
of Jaffa, three seaplanes from the Empress flew to Jaljulye
on the morning of the 2nd and attacked the railway bridge
with six 65-lb. bombs: the line was damaged on both sides
of the bridge which itself escaped a hit. On the return
of the aircraft the Empress went north to Haifa to attack
her second objective, an oil factory near the port. Four
hits on the factory were claimed, but two of the seaplanes,
forced down in Haifa Bay, were lost after the pilots had
been rescued by the French destroyer Coutelas,
While the Empress had been coasting northwards, sea-
planes from the Raven were over the Wadi el Hesi directing
the fire of the Raglan and Grafton on a railway embank-
ment alongside the bridge put out of action by the
Raglanh fire three days previously. The Raglan and
Grafton had been allotted the task of hampering the
movements towards Gaza of Turkish reserves believed to
be north of the Wadi el Hesi, but as nothing of these
reserves was seen, the fire of the ships was directed against
the railway embankment as an alternative target. The
firing was continued on the 3rd and again on the 4th,
by which time the embankment and stretches of line on
each side of it had been damaged. A train which was
derailed through a settling of the line, consequent on
damage to the embankment, caused a blockage for some
time.
By the 4th of November the main defences of Gaza had
been captured (Beersheba had fallen on October the 31st),
but the northward advance along the coast was held by
Turkish batteries in the neighbourhood of En Nezle.
Before the Raglan attacked the railway embankment over
the Wadi el Hesi on the 4th, she and other monitors had
fired on these battery positions with seaplane observation
from the City of Oxford, The fire was continued, again with
the help of the seaplanes, on November the 5th and 6th.
With the fall of Gaza on the 7th, the Turks grouped
422 OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN [ch. vii
field guns north of Deir Sneid and occupied trenches south
of Ashkelon with the object of stemming the advance along
the coast. The Requin, in company with the City of
Oxford^ followed the Turkish retreat and fired on the new
enemy positions. The seaplane observer reported convoys
of transport at the railway junction of Julis, north-east
of Ashkelon; the monitor M.15 and, later, the Raglan
were ranged on the convoys and scored many hits.
On the 8th, when the British troops were advancing
along the coast, the City of Oxford's seaplanes did some
spotting for the monitors M,is and M.31, and for the
Aphis, Ladybird, and Requin, to keep down the fire of the
Turkish batteries. This ended the special co-operation
of the seaplane carriers in the Palestine olfensive and the
City of Oxford returned to Port Said. From that port her
seaplanes, together with those of the Empress, began a
series of anti-submarine, mine, and convoy patrols. In
the middle of January 191 8 a sub-station for this work
was opened at Alexandria with two Short seaplanes.^
Towards the end of January 191 8 the City of Oxford
gave up some of her pilots and observers to the Empress
when that carrier was sent to Mudros to take part in the
attacks on the Goeben in the Dardanelles. On the return
of the Empress the personnel went back to the City of
Oxford, which was ordered to the Red Sea to work under
the orders of the Senior Naval Officer of the Red Sea
patrol. She was off Loheia on the 22nd of February 191 8,
and sent up seaplanes to reconnoitre and photograph the
Turkish positions at Jebel el Milh and Zohra. The former
place was bombed for some days afterwards, and when,
on the 28th, the Idrissi tribesmen got a footing on the hill,
the opposing Turkish guns and troops were continuously
attacked. At the request of the friendly Arab commander,
the Turkish head-quarters at Zohra were bombed to
impress the Arab population. The effect was immediate:
the Arab tribes which had hitherto adhered to the Turkish
cause deserted and went over to the Idrissi.
^ In the three months January to March 191 8, seaplanes from Port
Said and Alexandria made 120 patrols, during which fifty convoys were
escorted.
i9i8] THE RED SEA 423
On the 19th of March 191 8 the City of Oxford went
north to Wadi Habil, whence demonstration flights were
made over Habil and Medi, and bombing attacks were
made on the Turkish positions at Jebel el Milh. On the
22nd the carrier was back again off Loheia and made
further demonstration flights to impress the Arab popula-
tion before she returned to Suez. During the month in
which the City of Oxford operated in the Red Sea, her
four seaplanes made fifty-eight flights, in the course of
which sixty-three i6-lb. and fifty-two 65 -lb. bombs were
dropped.
CHAPTER Vni
TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS
Part I. Home
ROYAL FLYING CORPS, 1917
At the beginning of 19 17 the expansion of the Royal
Flying Corps to 106 service squadrons and to 97 reserve,^
or training, squadrons had been approved. This meant
an addition to the existing programme of tw^enty service
squadrons and thirty-seven reserve squadrons. The main
training developments at home in the first half of 191 7
w^ere to meet the new requirements. In the first place
the Training Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General
J. M. Salmond, v^as decentralized in January w^hen three
'Group Commands' w^ere formed with head-quarters at
York (Northern), London (Eastern), and Salisbury (South-
ern). The new commands were made responsible, under
the direction of Brigadier-General Salmond, for the
training and administration of all Training Brigade units
within their defined areas.
To meet the demands for the expanded programme
advantage was taken of the resources offered by Canada, ^
and of the existing training organization in Egypt, 3 but
two new wings were also formed at home in May and
June. The delay in forming these additional wings was
mainly due to a shortage of training-type aeroplanes,
a limiting factor which continuously cut across the plans
for training expansion.'^ There was also diflfiiculty about
providing land for new aerodromes, and labour and
material for buildings.
New schools had been opened in January, at Farn-
borough for Photography and the preliminary training
of Armourers, and at Loch Doon and at Turnberry for
^ The original approval was for 95 reserve squadrons, but two more,
specially for night flying, were added in January 191 7.
2 See pp. 458-68. 3 See pp. 449-58.
^ Figures which are available for March 191 7 show that out of an approved
establishment of 1,041 aeroplanes, excluding service types, no more than
763 were actually held by the Training Brigade. Problems of supply and
man-power will be dealt with in Volume VI.
1917] EXPANSION PROGRAMMES 425
Aerial Gunnery. The intention was to move the existing
gunnery school from Hythe to Loch Doon, but after
much work had been done the site was abandoned as
unsuitable because of the weather conditions. The school
at Turnberry was employed to give final gunnery instruc-
tion to fighting pilots, and the school at Hythe was
reserved, henceforward, for the training of observers in
the Lewis gun. For pilots, gunnery instruction began
in the cadet battalions, was continued in the schools of
military aeronautics and in the elementary and higher
training squadrons, and was completed at Turnberry or,
later, at other gunnery schools.^
In June 19 17, with the coming of the German daylight
aeroplane bombers to London, decisions were taken of
which one effect was a formidable expansion of the
training organization. It will be recalled^ that the War
Cabinet directed the Air Board to consult with the other
service departments to prepare a comprehensive plan for
the further development of the Royal Flying Corps. As
a result the Government decided in July upon an
expansion of the service squadrons to two hundred, with
a similar increase in the number of training squadrons :
a beginning was to be made at once with the provision
of the necessary additional aerodromes and personnel.
Among the departmental memoranda which were pre-
pared in connexion with the new scheme of expansion
there is much that is illuminating. It was stated that the
number of pupils under training as pilots, in June 191 7,
was 5,841, and that eight months would elapse before
this number, less reductions due to wastage, would be fully
trained. 3 Allowing for normal wastage (killed, injured,
sick, unsuited for flying, &c.) it was to be expected that
4,650 would ultimately qualify as pilots.
To meet the new requirements, 3,252 trained pilots
^ Two additional gunnery schools had been opened before the end of
191 7, namely, No. 3 at New Romney in Kent (in August) and No. 4 at
Marske, Yorkshire (in November). ^ See p. 29.
3 The eight months for each pupil were made up as follows : in a Cadet
Wing, 2; School of Military Aeronautics, 2; Elementary Training Squad-
ron, I; Higher Training Squadron, 2; post graduation course, I.
426 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
would be needed during the six months ending 31st
December 1917, and 2,199 from January 1918 to the end of
March, that is, a total of 5,451, and this would mean that
there would, on existing figures, be a deficiency of 801.
One method of meeting this deficiency would be to reduce
the training period, but this, it was pointed out, had been
tried before with results which had proved that it was
extremely undesirable. The real solution would be to
obtain a number of trained army officers who could be
sent direct to schools of military aeronautics and so save
the two months of the cadet course. Allowing for a
wastage of officers of 17 per cent, during training, 960
would be required to begin their course during the next
three months if they were to be ready to take their place as
pilots in the critical period at the beginning of 191 8.
Whereas the average monthly requirements of pilots
would be 542 for the six months July to December 1917,
and 733 for the three months January to March 191 8,
a figure of 1,293 would be reached for the nine months
April to December 191 8. The existing rate of production
was entirely inadequate to meet this expansion, and it was
essential that an increased flow of cadets should begin at
once. The wastage during the various pupil courses was
about 28 per cent., and to produce 1,300 pilots some 1,800
pupils had therefore to pass every month into the Cadet
Wings. Each of the existing three wings took 300 cadets
a month and it would be necessary to establish three
additional wings to cope with the larger flow of pupils.
It was stated that the estimated average eflPective service
of a pilot or observer in France was four months in the
two-seater corps and night-flying squadrons, and 3^
months in the fighter-reconnaissance and day-bombing
squadrons, while the effective service of a pilot in a single-
seater fighter squadron was no longer than 2| months.^
The specific requirements allowed for may be set out
in tabular form as shown on the opposite page.
On the 5th of August, as a result of the new develop-
ment programme, the Training Brigade was raised to
the status of a Division, and the sub-commands became
^ These estimates took sickness as well as battle casualties into account.
I9I7] CADET WINGS 427
Training Brigades, namely, 'Northern' (York, Brigadier-
General P. L. W. Herbert), 'Eastern' (London, Brigadier-
General R. E. T. Hogg), and 'Southern' (Salisbury,
Brigadier-General H. C. T. Dowding). An additional
Pilots^ Royal Flying Corps
igiy
July-
December.
1918
January-
March.
April-
December.
To complete establishment of squad-
rons in France
460
400
1,580
To complete establishment of Home
Defence Squadrons .
Nil
Nil
90
To replace wastage, France .
2,693
1749
9752
To replace wastage, Home Defence
99
1 5"
216
Grand total of pilots required, 17,089.
Training command, known as 'Western Group' (Colonel
U. J. D. Bourke) was formed in September 1917.
A new School of Military Aeronautics, No. 5, similarly
organized to the existing schools at Reading (No. i) and
Oxford (No. 2), was formed at Denham in September
1917. ^ As soon as the school at Denham had started,
another. No. 6, was organized there in November, and
in January 191 8 moved to Bristol, where it remained
until the end of the war.
In July 191 7 the existing Cadet Wings at home were.
No. I at Denham, 2 and No. 2 at Hursley Park (Win-
chester).3 Additional Cadet Wings, Nos. 5 and 6, were
formed, on paper, at the beginning of August 191 7, and
Nos. 7 and 8 early in September, but almost at once such
personnel as had been allocated to the two last-named
were sent to strengthen No. 5 Wing which settled down
at Hastings.4 No. 6 Cadet Wing remained as a nucleus
^ No. 3 School of Military Aeronautics was in Egypt and No. 4 in
Canada.
^ No. I Cadet Wing moved to St. Leonards in August.
3 No. 3 Cadet Wing was being formed in Egypt. No. 4 was in Canada.
4 Nos. 7 and 8 Cadet Wings were never really resuscitated. In July
191 8, how^ever, Nos. I and 2 Officers' Technical Training Wings were
renamed Nos. 7 and 8 Cadet Wings.
428 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
only until January 191 8, when it became an effective
v^ing at Hastings. There w^as also at home, in process of
formation at Hursley Park, an Officers' Technical Training
Corps. This had been begun as a result of a suggestion of
Major-General W. S. Brancker, the deputy director-
general of military aeronautics, that cadets might be
entered a little younger than the age limit for the cadet
wings (18 years). They could go to the preliminary
technical school at iy\l years and pass, in due course,
to the cadet wings with a ground work of knowledge
in engines, instruments, aeroplane construction, and
machine-guns. No. i Officers' Technical Training Corps
was opened at St. Leonards in August,^ and No. 2 at
Hastings on the ist of November 191 7. The number of
pupils allowed for was 600-800 at each wing (the nomen-
clature was changed from corps to wing in October) and
the duration of the course was three months.
In August 191 7 the section for Equipment Officers,
attached to the School of Military Aeronautics at Reading,
became a school of its own with the title 'Equipment
Officers' School of Instruction'. It continued to give
preliminary training to prospective technical and adminis-
trative officers in a course lasting eight weeks : in Novem-
ber 191 7 the school moved to Henley.
Other schools grew up in various directions. There
was one for bombing, opened in Langham Place, London,
in October 1917, mainly to train instructors. Another,
the 'Artillery and Infantry Co-operation School', to train
about 500 observers a month, was established at Hursley
Park, Winchester, in October when the existing school at
Brooklands was decentralized. ^ Yet another, to train
officers and men as inspectors of aircraft, was formed at
Watford in August 1 91 7. Those selected for the course
at the School of Inspection were required to possess
practical experience in rigging, engine tuning, fitting, the
timing of guns, and in the installation of instruments.
In November 191 7, arising out of the Government
decision to open the bombing offensive against targets in
^ It was begun at Hursley Park and moved to St. Leonards.
2 See pp. 436-7.
1917] THE GOSPORT SCHOOL 429
Germany, Major-General Trenchard wrote from France
to point out the need for better training for pilots
of long-distance day and night bombers. 'It is of the
'utmost importance', he said, 'that these pilots should be
'above the average and have more experience in long-
'distance flying than other types of pilots. I find pilots
'who have only done four or five months' flying are of
'little use for this work, and therefore I would request
'that a most careful selection may be made and the fullest
'training be given to pilots for this work. Otherwise it
'will necessitate long-distance machines being used on
'short trips for a long time until pilots gain the necessary
'experience. These pilots should be trained to use their
'compasses and they should also be taught map-reading
'and be able to find their way by the country. . . .'
Arrangements to improve the training of bombing
pilots in navigation had, in fact, been made. Selected
officers, at first called Compass Officers, but later known
as Aerial Navigation Oflficers, had been posted to the Royal
Naval Compass Laboratory at Slough for a six weeks'
course in navigation, and had rejoined the VI Brigade
to instruct pilots. Some time had necessarily to elapse
before the advantages of the improved training in naviga-
tion at home could become noticeable in the field.
The Gosport School
The most arresting feature in the development of
flying training in 19 17 was the establishment in August
of a school for special flying at Gosport. The creator
of this school, which changed the training of fighting
pilots in the Allied air services, was Major R. R. Smith-
Barry, an oflicer of forceful personality. He had qualified
for his Royal Aero Club certificate in November 191 1,
and had been granted a commission in the Royal Flying
Corps in the following year. He went to France with
No. 5 Squadron in August 19 14, but was injured in a
flying accident and, when he had recovered, served at home
as an instructor and also as a night-flying pilot during
Zeppelin raids. In July 19 16 he took command, in
430 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
France, of No. 60 Squadron, at that time one of the few
fighting squadrons in the Royal Flying Corps, in which
he had served as a Flight Commander since its formation
in April. He was back in England in December 1916, with
experience of the development of air fighting on the
Western front, and he was given command of No. i
Reserve Squadron at Gosport.
It was while he commanded this training squadron
that he developed his ideas. At that time mystery still
surrounded the less usual movements of an aeroplane. It
was known that if a pilot worked his controls in a particu-
lar way certain movements would, or should, follow,
but the reasons were only vaguely understood, and there
were few, even among instructors, who could give an
explanation of the part played by the various controls
at each stage of a particular manoeuvre. If, therefore,
anything unexpected happened, a pilot, especially before
he became experienced, was apt to lose control, and it was
often a matter of chance whether he could regain it.
Major Smith-Barry was greatly helped by the pro-
duction of the Avro fitted with the 100 horse-power
monosoupape engine. This aeroplane, which first appeared
in the autumn of 19 16, proved very suitable for every
kind of manoeuvre in the air. It was also of help that
the problem of spinning had been solved. Up to the
autumn of 1916 not many pilots who had the mis-
fortune to get into a spin in the air had ever regained
control. One exception was Major J. A. Chamier who,
while in France, found himself spinning as he came from
a cloud. While he was falling he recalled an incident on
Salisbury Plain before the war when Lieutenant W.
Parke, R.N., had recovered from a spin near the ground.
When people had crowded round to congratulate Lieu-
tenant Parke on his luck, he had explained that he had
stopped spinning by doing 'everything wrong'. Major
Chamier likewise did the opposite of what his experience
as a pilot suggested and he also recovered. He subsequently
related his adventure at Royal Flying Corps head-quarters.
Whether any spinning experiments were made as a result
there is no record. However that may be, it was about the
1917] SPINNING 431
same time that Captain R. Balcombe-Brown,^ a New
Zealand pilot in No. i Squadron, appeared on the aero-
drome of No. 60 Squadron in France, commanded by
Major Smith-Barry, and said he had discovered how to
get into a spin as well as out of one. 'I remember laughing',
says Colonel Smith-Barry, 'and saying that a consciously-
'produced spin could not be the true article, and that
'a true spin had to be an act of God.' He, however,
followed the directions given by Captain Balcombe-
Brown, as did several other pilots of No. 60 Squadron,
and quickly proved that a spin could be produced and
continued at will.
No doubt other pilots were making a similar discovery
about the same time. The manoeuvre was also studied at
the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, mainly by
Dr. F. A. Lindemann. 'It was evident', says Dr. Linde-
mann, 'from the fact that spins sometimes continued
'over several thousand feet, that it was a comparatively
'stable form of flight, i.e., that the forces on the wings
'were balanced.' It was deduced that to recover from
a spin it was essential to push the nose of the aeroplane
down, and as the pilot would already be descending
almost vertically, this action would be exactly against his
instinct. To prove the mathematical deductions. Dr.
Lindemann took his aeroplane into the air and made many
spins, and he carried with him special instruments by
which he could take readings to elucidate the exact move-
ments.
The spin was not an act of God, but a simple man-
oeuvre which could be explained, and explanation was
the key-note of the Smith-Barry system. In the words
of one of his instructors, 'the gospel he preached was that
'the aeroplane was a nice-tempered, reasonable machine
'that obeys a simple honest code of rules at all times and
'in any weather. And by shedding a flood of light on the
'mysteries of its control he drove away the fear and the
'real danger that existed for those who were flying aero-
'planes in the blackest ignorance even of first principles.'
The results attained by No. i Reserve Squadron soon
^ Killed in combat in France, 2nd of May 1918.
432 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
became known, by report, throughout the Royal Flying
Corps. Major-General J. M. Salmond, commanding the
Training Division, who had given Major Smith-Barry an
entirely free hand to develop his ideas, recommended that
the squadron be developed as a School of Special Flying,
and this was done in August 191 7 when Nos. 27 and 55
Training Squadrons were added to make the establishment
up to that of the newly created depot stations.^ Chiefly
the school was one for instructors, who were taught how
to impart the methods of ^acrobatic' flying, and the
influence of Gosport spread, therefore, throughout the
Royal Flying Corps at home and overseas. In October
1 91 7 a pamphlet. General Methods of Teaching Scout Pilots,
embodying Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Barry's teachings,
was circulated. So far as the principles could be applied
or adapted by local instructors, this was done, and the
Gosport School therefore exerted a general influence on
training long before Gosport-trained pilots had been
distributed throughout the air services. The introductory
matter in the pamphlet may be quoted as summarizing the
change in ideas.
'This squadron has been temporarily transformed into
'a school for teaching the methods of instruction in flying
Vhich are set forth below. Some may think them hetero-
'dox, but most, it is thought, will consider them quite
"^normal, and indeed rather old-fashioned. The chief
'thing is dual control. Dual control has been employed
'here to teach every possible manoeuvre, including flying
'in a wind, landing and getting off across wind, spinning,
'etc. The next and most important thing is that quite
'half the dual control that is given is administered after
'the pupil has gone off alone, as unless a learner has
'practised doing a given thing, such as turning a good deal,
'he will not appreciate the details that are shown him. In
'this way, bad habits are corrected before they have time
'to get fixed. The next thing is that as far as possible
'advanced pupils have been allowed to fly exactly as they
'chose, their experiments being limited only by the state
^ The object of creating depot stations was to economize in personnel,
transport, and in land for aerodromes.
1917] TALKING IN THE AIR 433
'of their own nerve. This has not been found to increase
'the number of casualties. The instructors have been
'teaching aWays from the passenger's seat, so that the
'pupil has not had to experience an embarrassing change
'of seat either just before his first solo or at any other time.
'In this w^ay the instructor has, of course, been deprived
'of instruments, but I take it that a flyer who could not
'do without instruments would have less to teach than
'to learn. The object in view throughout has been to
'teach pupils how to get out of all the various difficulties
'which one may get into in flying, by means of dual
'control. The object has been not to prevent flyers from
'getting into difliculties or dangers, but to show them how
'to get out of them satisfactorily, and having done so, to
'make them go and repeat the process alone. If the pupil
'considers this dangerous, let him find some other employ-
'ment as, whatever risks I ask him to run here, he will
'have to run a hundred times as much when he gets to
'France. How can a young officer be expected to do very
'much in France if, during the whole of his training in
'England, he has been told of nothing but what it is con-
'sidered dangerous to do in flying ? As most of the sup-
'posed dangers are not dangerous at all, but both easy and
'pleasant, it would seem a simple matter for the pupil to
'be taught, chiefly by example, to be frightened of nothing
'connected with flying on this side of the lines.'
It was not until towards the end of 191 7 that suitable
telephones were devised to make conversation between
the instructor and his pupil natural and easy. Up to the
time when these telephones came to be fitted to the dual
control aeroplanes, a series of simple hand signals, made
by the instructor, passed orders or limited information to
the pupil. If the instructor wished to talk more generally
he would stall the aeroplane for a momentary conversation.
'This', says the pamphlet of the Gosport method, 'has
'given a useful indication of the state of the pupil's nerve,
'as those who are likely to prove unsuitable for scouts
'generally cling to the side with an unintelligent expression
'instead of conversing fluently and with confidence.'
The importance and value of the work done by
2504.5 F f
434 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [en. viii
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith- Bany cannot be over-empha-
sized. Now that the things he taught are the commonplace
of a pilot's training, it is, perhaps, a little difficult to reahze
that they were looked upon as revolutionary when they
were introduced. Before the era of the Gosport school, the
training of pilots in England fell short of the requirements
of air warfare on the Western front. In too many instances,
pilots had to complete their education on active service.
It is true that the only real training for war is war, but the
Gosport system, by raising the technical efficiency of pilots,
and by giving them the confidence which came of conscious
mastery of their aeroplanes, helped them to concentrate,
on active service, on those things which contact with the
enemy alone could teach.
technical Instruction for Men
There were many changes in 191 7 in the organization
for training air mechanics. In January it was stated
that engine fitters would be given a preliminary course of
eight weeks at Coley Park, Reading, and would then pass
to the Scottish School of Fitters at Edinburgh, or to the
Central Flying School at Upavon, for a further course of
eight weeks, after which they would be posted to a unit
as fully trained. Within a month the system was modified.
At the beginning of February instructions were issued that
all fitters must first pass through one of the Polytechnic
Schools, either at Regent Street (School of Preliminary
Technical Training) or its branches, where they would
receive eight weeks' tuition in the use of tools and in bench
work. At the same time the administration was re-
modelled. Hitherto the schools for fitters at Edinburgh and
at Upavon had been administered by the General Officer
Commanding, Training Brigade, while the school at Coley
Park came under the Commandant of the School of Military
Aeronautics, Reading. On the 8th of February the three
schools were amalgamated as the School of Technical
Training (Men), Reading, which was placed directly
under an Inspector of Technical Training in the depart-
ment of the Director of Air Organization at the War
Office. The inspector was also made generally responsible
1917] TRAINING OBSERVERS 435
for the system of instruction for fitters and riggers at the
Polytechnic schools. The next step was to amalgamate
the Polytechnic schools of preliminary training which
were scattered throughout the country. This was done,
by groups, from May onwards and was completed by
October 191 7. Concentration, although it made for
efficiency in administration and for a general level of
instruction, taxed the existing resources at Reading and,
in July 191 7, it was decided that the School of Technical
Training (Men) should move from Reading to Halton
Park, a move which took effect, officially, on the loth of
September, although instruction continued for a time to
be given at Reading in a course now lasting sixteen weeks.
The Training of Observers
The progress in the training of air observers up to the
end of 1 916 has already been reviewed.^ In December
1916 Major-General Trenchard, writing from France,
stated that much time was being employed in teaching
newly joined observers in the squadrons, and that because
many of them were posted from the trenches without
intermediate leave they were often not in a condition
to take up work which demanded absolute mental and
physical fitness. He therefore proposed to send home,
for a course of training, all officers who joined the Royal
Flying Corps in the field as probationary observers. He
anticipated that when the scheme was working well about
100 officers would thus pass to England, and he suggested
that they should be given a course of training lasting one
month, after which they could be sent out again in weekly
batches. The proposals were approved and became effec-
tive on the 1st of January 19 17. It was arranged that
seventy per cent, of the officers should be trained at the
existing Schools of Military Aeronautics, and thirty per
cent, at the School of Aerial Gunnery at Hythe. The curri-
culum for observers at the Schools of Military Aeronautics
was laid down as follows :
Artillery work: Organization of the Royal Artillery in
the field with the types of guns, howitzers, and
^ Vol. Ill, pp. 298-9.
436 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
ammunition in use. Meaning of simple gunnery-
terms. Signal codes. Methods of aircraft co-opera-
tion. Practice with an artillery target.
Wireless. Sending and receiving morse. Elementary
principles of wireless telegraphy as applied to
aeroplanes. The transmitter and receiver and their
care and maintenance.
Machine-guns. Care of the Lewis gun. Stripping and
assembling. Stoppages. Filling the ammunition
drum. General principles of aiming and firing.
Photography. Manipulation of service cameras. Taking
photographs. Study of air photographs, particularly
in connexion with artillery work.
Map Reading and Use of the Compass.
On the suggestion of Major-General Trcnchard, officer
observers of the corps reconnaissance squadrons became
known as corps observers, those with fighter reconnaissance
or bombing squadrons as arniy observers, and the non-
commissioned officer machine-gunners in the two-seater
squadrons as aerial gunners.
In March 191 7 it was decided to give training to about
300 pilots and observers each month at the Wireless and
Observers' School at Brooklands. At that time the school
ivas mainly responsible for giving wireless instruction to
officers, particularly to equipment officers, but it also gave
some training to observers in artillery co-operation and
in the use of the machine-gun. As a result of the deci-
sion to expand the observers' side of the school. Major
J. A. Chamier, an officer experienced in the methods of
co-operation with other arms, was brought home from
France to take command, and he prepared a new curricu-
lum for a course lasting one month during which ten hours
were to be spent in the air.
Pupils from Brooklands were attached, in batches, to the
^Artillery Co-operation Squadron' at Netheravon^ where
they had opportunity to work with artillery in practice
'shoots'. In October the observer side of the school was
^ In January 1917 the artillery co-operation Flights at the Central
Flying School and at Lydd were organized as a Reserve Squadron with
head-quarters at Netheravon.
1917] MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SALMOND 437
given an independent existence and it moved to Hursley
Park, Winchester, as the 'Artillery and Infantry Co-opera-
tion School'. Observers, after completing one month's
training at the school, passed to Hythe for a two weeks'
course in aerial gunnery.
In October 191 7 there were important administrative
changes. Sir David Henderson, the Director-General of
Military Aeronautics, was relieved of his appointment in
order that he might give his undivided energies to the
details of the amalgamation of the naval and military air
services as the Royal Air Force. He was succeeded on the
1 8th of October by Major-General J. M. Salmond who
consequently became a member of the Army Council at the
age of thirty-six, the youngest officer who had ever had
a seat on that body. Major-General Salmond, an officer
of tireless energy, had directed training at home from
February 1916. His task had been, from some points of
view, one of the most difficult of the war. At no time were
conditions static and, working with such material as he
was given or could obtain — always short of his require-
ments— he had to adapt and to improvise to meet demands
arising from rapid expansion, from new methods of
employment of aircraft, and from the air casualties
consequent on the series of offensives conducted by the
armies on the Western front. Although his outlook was
essentially practical, he had shown himself responsive to
new ideas and he had given a free hand and whole-hearted
encouragement to those who earned his confidence. When
Major-General Salmond went to the War Office he took
with him, as Director of Air Organization, Brigadier-
General G. Livingston, also aged thirty-six, who had been
his chief staff officer in the Training Division. Major-
General C. A. H. Longcroft^ was brought home from
France to take command of the Training Division with
Brigadier-General J. G. Hearson as his chief staff officer.
The appointment of Deputy Director-General of
Military Aeronautics at the War Office had been held,
^ Major-General C. A. H. Longcroft had commanded the V Brigade,
and his successor was Brigadier-General L. E. O. Charlton who had been
Director of Air Organization at the War Office from February 1917.
438 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
since February 1917, by Major-General W. S. Brancker.
In October this officer left to take command of the Royal
Flying Corps in the Middle East, and, for a time, the
appointment which he had held was not filled. On the
20th of November, however, Brigadier-General E. L.
Ellington, who had been serving on the staff of the VIII
Corps in France, was brought back to England to take up
the appointment. This officer, who had been commis-
sioned in the Royal Artillery in 1897, had learned to fly
at Brooklands in 191 2 when he was serving as a staff officer
at the War Office. At the time he qualified for his Royal
Aero Club certificate military aviation was dealt with at the
War Office by a small committee, called the Royal Flying
Corps Committee, under the chairmanship of Brigadier-
General D.Henderson. Captain Elhngton succeeded Major
D. S. Maclnnes as secretary of this committee in November
1912. In June 1913 the committee was dissolved and its
work was taken over by a section of the newly formed
Military Aeronautics Directorate, and of this section,
which dealt with general air policy and administration.
Captain Ellington took charge. In December 191 3 he
graduated at the Central Flying School, but he afterwards
returned to the Artillery. In October 1914 he was given
a staff appointment with the armies in the field and he
continued to fill various army staff appointments in
France and in England until November 191 7, when he
returned, once more, to the Royal Flying Corps. When,
in January 191 8, Major-General J. M. Salmond went to
France to succeed Major-General H. M. Trenchard, who
had been appointed Chief of the Air Staff on the newly
formed Air Council, Brigadier-General Ellington became
Director-General of Military Aeronautics, a post he held
until the Royal Air Force came into being, officially, on
the 1st of April 191 8. He acted, in effect, as a liaison
officer between the Army Council and the Air Council.
The Royal Naval Air Service, igi4-March igi8
On the outbreak of war, aeroplane and seaplane pilots
for the Royal Naval Air Service were being trained at the
Central Flying School at Upavon, and at the naval flying
1914] ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE 439
school at Eastchurch, while airship pilots received instruc-
tion at Kingsnorth or Farnborough. To cope with the
immediate expansion when war was declared, arrangements
were made for naval pupils to undergo preliminary
training at civilian schools of aviation, and an additional
training Flight was attached to the defence Flight at
Hendon. Skilled mechanics who entered from civilian
life went to the naval depot at Sheerness, where they
were fitted out with uniform and, if circumstances per-
mitted, given a little drill before being posted direct to
naval air units.
The Admiralty experienced no difficulty about the
recruitment of pilots. Candidates were interviewed by
a committee of senior naval officers who paid particular
attention to their standard of education, their sporting
accomplishments, and to their social and general qualifi-
cations. Because many more thousands offered themselves
than could be taken, some who, otherwise qualified, were
judged not fitted to receive commissions were offered
appointments as warrant officers.
There was little change in the training system until
September 191 5, when, in consequence of a general
reorganization of the Royal Naval Air Service, it was
decided to centralize the training of pilots. Rear-Admiral
C. L. Vaughan-Lee was appointed to the newly created
post of Director of Air Services at the Admiralty and, at
the same time, another post, that of Inspecting Captain
of Air Training, was established and the appointment
given to Wing Commander F. R. Scarlett. A scheme
was at once prepared for the organization of a central
training school where pupils could be taught to fly aero-
planes and non-rigid airships, and be given instruction
in the handling of kite balloons. A site for the school was
found at Cranwell which, it was stated, was capable of
expansion in any direction, was well situated for feeding
the principal air stations on the East Coast, and could be
developed, when necessary, as a war station for rigid
airships. Cranwell was opened on the ist of April 1916,
under the command of Commodore Godfrey M. Paine
who was transferred from the Central Flying School
440 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
at Upavon.^ About the same time the Naval Division
vacated the Crystal Palace, w^hich was promptly taken over
by the Royal Naval Air Service to serve as a depot where
newly entered officers and men could be given preliminary
training in technical subjects and in discipline.^
The scheme of standardized training which came into
force with the opening of Cranwell was briefly as follows.
It was first laid down that 'on and after 1st of April 1916
'all officers under instruction in aeroplanes, kite balloons
'and airships are to graduate as pilots at Cranwell'. The
various kinds of pilot were to qualify thus :
Aeroplane pilots. After a disciplinary course at the
Crystal Palace, pupils were to be posted for pre-
liminary flying training (20 to 24 hours solo) to the
Schools at Eastchurch, Chingford, Eastbourne, or
Redcar.3 They were then to pass on to Cranwell for
advanced training in cross-country flying, navigation,
engines, aerial gunnery, bomb-dropping, photography,
and wireless telegraphy.
Seaplane pilots. Pupils were to pass from the training
schools, as above, to the seaplane stations at Calshot,
Felixstowe, or Killingholme. They were then to go
on to Cranwell, where they were required to graduate
in all subjects except flying.
Airship pilots and kite-balloon observers. Airship pilots,
after preliminary training at the airship station at
Wormwood Scrubs, were to pass to Cranwell, as were
kite-balloon observers who had completed a prelimin-
ary course at Roehampton.
The question of the rank of pupil pilots who entered the
Royal Naval Air Service was one which troubled the
Admiralty from time to time. From the outbreak of war
^ In January 191 7 Commodore Godfrey Paine was appointed Fifth
Sea Lord (for air) on the Board of Admiralty. He was succeeded at
Cranwell by Commodore John Luce.
^ The prehminary ground training of officer pupils was transferred
from the Crystal Palace to the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in the
summer of 1917.
3 Eastbourne was opened in August 1 91 4, Chingford in May 19 15,
and Redcar (originally as a home defence station) in July 191 5.
i9i6] CRANWELL 441
they had been commissioned as probationary flight sub-
Heutenants and they at once ranked with, but drew higher
pay than, equivalent officers in the Royal Navy who had
been long in the service. Furthermore, owing to the rapid
expansion of the air service, many young pilots received
rapid promotion to the rank of flight lieutenant which
made the disparities in pay even greater. The Admiralty
decided, therefore, to introduce what was popularly called
the 'Midshipman' scheme by which pupils were to rank,
on entry, as 'Probationary Flight Officers', and were to
wear the uniform, with minor modifications, of a mid-
shipman. The pay was not, however, to be affected, but
was to continue at the rate of 10 shillings per day plus
half flying pay, namely 4 shillings per day. Not until
pupils had graduated at Cranwell were they to rank as
Flight Sub-Lieutenants and to receive full flying pay.
The scheme was approved by His Majesty by an order in
Council dated the 1 8th of August 19 16.
Meanwhile the Admiralty had in April 1916, on the
opening of Cranwell, set up a committee of senior officers
to reconsider the whole system of training in the Royal
Naval Air Service. The most important of their recom-
mendations, which were generally approved by the
Admiralty in July, was that all matters relating to the
training of pupils at the preliminary schools should be
placed under the direction and supervision of the com-
manding officer at Cranwell. This was done by orders
which took effect on the 1st of September, when Com-
modore Godfrey Paine assumed responsibility for the
training of pilots at Cranwell, Eastbourne, Chingford,
Eastchurch, Redcar, Windermere,^ Calshot, and Vendome
(France). The appointment of Inspecting Captain of Air
Training was no longer required and, on its abolition.
Wing Commander H. D. Briggs, who had taken over the
appointment from Wing Commander Scarlett in January
1916, and had been responsible for much of the reorgani-
zation of naval air training, was given command of the
new school at Vendome.
^ Windermere, a civilian flying school, was taken over as a naval seaplane-
training station in June 191 6.
442 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
The Vendome School, which became well known, owed
its establishment to the unfavourable flying weather in
England in the winter of 1915/1916. In March 19 16 the
Director of Air Services, on the suggestion of Wing Com-
mander Briggs, had asked that the approval of the French
Government should be sought for a Royal Naval Air Service
aerodrome in a locality where favourable flying weather
might be expected. The Board of Admiralty did not at
once approve because the season of fine weather in England
was approaching, but they requested that the matter
should again be raised in July. Actually their approval
was recorded at the end of June, and a suitable site was
found near Vendome, west of Orleans, on which work
was begun in August, and the school was opened in
November. The intention was that military as well as
naval pilots should be trained at the school and, in return,
the Royal Flying Corps undertook to train Royal Naval
Air Service pilots, as required, at the schools in Egypt.
From Vendome naval pupils passed to Cranwell for
graduation.^
In September 1917 a statement of naval air require-
ments was, on the instructions of Sir Eric Geddes, the
First Lord of the Admiralty, prepared to cover the period
ending December 191 8. The statement showed that 200
trained pilots would be required each month. At the
time the paper was prepared the number of pilots gradu-
ating from Cranwell was stated to average 90 per month,
but that an increase to 100 per month could shortly be
expected. To meet the new requirements it was decided
to establish two additional preliminary training schools
and to make the existing school at Manston responsible,
jointly with Cranwell, for advanced training.
About the same time the post of Inspecting Captain
of Aircraft Training was revived and Captain H. D. Briggs,
R.N., was relieved of the command of the school at
Vendome to take up the appointment. He became
officially responsible for the direction of all training, and
* By agreement with the French Government a number of French
naval air pilots were also trained at Vendome as were, later, American
pupils.
I9I8] FLEET AIR OFFICERS 443
the commanding officer at Cranwell was now able to
confine his attention, so far as concerned training, to
Cranwell and its sub-station at Freiston.^ He continued,
however, to exercise disciplinary control over the schools
at Chingford (with its sub-station at Fairlop), Eastbourne,
and Redcar.
Naval air observers were trained at Eastchurch, where
Captain J. M. Steel, R.N., was in command. The course
lasted four months and the subjects included seamanship,
wireless telegraphy, navigation, intelligence organization,
bomb dropping, and aerial gunnery. Instruction was also
given at Eastchurch to armament officers (sixteen weeks),
armament instructors (twelve weeks), gun-layers (eight
weeks), armourers (eight weeks), wireless telegraphy ratings
(three weeks), and to engineer ratings for flying boats (two
weeks).
On the 1st of April 191 8, on the formation of the
Royal Air Force, Captain Briggs ceased to be Inspecting
Captain of Aircraft Training. He took command of Cran-
well and the naval air training organization passed under
the control of Brigadier-General J. G. Hearson, Director
of Training in the new Air Ministry.
Fleet Air Officers
Such, in brief, was the general training organization
for naval air personnel, but it will be necessary also to
consider the special arrangements made to train officers
for co-operation with the Fleet. In July 191 6 Captain
Oliver Swann, R.N., of the aircraft carrier Campania^ had
sought, and received, approval to develop the Scapa air
station as a small training establishment where pilots and
observers could be taught the methods of co-operation
with the Fleet, and thus provide a reserve of officers for
fleet work. No more than three additional seaplanes were
asked for, and these were easily accommodated, but when
^ A school to give advanced training to Cranwell pilots in air fighting
and in bomb dropping had been opened at Freiston in September 1917.
The site at Freiston had been in use as a bombing-ground for Cranwell
pupils from the early summer of 1916.
444 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
in September the Commander-in-Chief requested that
more seaplanes should be provided to enable reconnais-
sance patrols to be organized, it became necessary to
choose another site for an air base because the accom-
modation at Scapa could not be expanded. As a result
a new station was opened at Houton Bay in the summer
of 1917 and, in addition to patrol work, gave training to
pilots and observers in the work of co-operation with the
Fleet. At the same time a base for kite balloons was estab-
lished at Smoogroo, about midway between Houton Bay
and Scapa, and a small aerodrome was laid out where
reserve pilots and observers were instructed in aeroplane
work with the fleet. Training in deck-flying was begun
at the Isle of Grain, where a circular deck was constructed
on the aerodrome. Later, the air station at East Fortune
was employed for the training of aeroplane pilots attached
to ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet based at Rosyth.
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, 191 8
The first Air Council was formed in January 19 18, and
one of its tasks was to reorganize the training systems of
the naval and military air services in consequence of their
amalgamation. The guiding principle was that nothing
should be done which might interfere with the supply
of trained personnel to meet the needs of the fighting
services.
In November 1917 the post of Inspector of Training,
Training Division, had been created and the appointment
had been given to Brigadier-General E. R. Ludlow-
Hewitt who was transferred home from France. There
followed many conferences between those responsible for
directing training and, as a result, revisions in the existing
syllabuses were made. It was reahzed that the schools of
military aeronautics were attempting to teach too much,
and artillery observation was therefore deleted from the
syllabus of the schools and the time saved was given to
instruction in engines and rigging. In April 191 8 the
subjects of aerial gunnery, and of synchronizing gears,
were also deleted from the syllabus of each of the schools
I9I8] THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 445
of aeronautics.^ Instead, cadets were posted, before going
to a training squadron for flying instruction, to the
Armament School at Uxbridge where the courses varied
from one lasting thirteen days for bombing pilots to one
of twenty-seven days for single-seater fighter pilots. The
number of cadets who passed through the Armament
School averaged, after April 191 8, 1,200 per month.
Perhaps the most important of the efforts made to
remodel the training system was the issue to all instruc-
tors of a comprehensive manual, dealing fully with the
methods of Flying Instruction. This booklet, a model of
its kind, was based on the principles developed at the
Gosport School and, coupled with the other measures
which were taken, sufficed to ensure, from the spring of
191 8 onwards, when expansion was slowing down, that
pupils received competent and adequate training.
There were some additions to the schools of aeronautics
in 191 8. The three existing schools in England at the
end of 19 1 7 were those at Reading, Oxford, and Denham.
In January 191 8 No. 6 School came into being at Bristol
and No. 7 (Observers) School at Bath on the 24th of
February. No. 8 began to form at Cheltenham on the
17th of July 1918, and on the 23rd of September 1918
authority was given to convert No. 7 Observers Cadet
Wing into No. 9 (Observers) School of Aeronautics.
About November 19 17 it was decided to convert the
higher training squadrons into 'all through' squadrons
where instructors would be able to keep pupils under
their own charge during the whole course of their in-
struction in flying, that is, up to the time when they
were ready for transfer to a finishing school or to be sent
overseas. As higher training squadrons were transformed
to give 'all through' training there was a decreasing need
for the elementary squadrons, which were gradually dis-
solved.
On the formation of the Royal Air Force on the 1st
of April 191 8, the United Kingdom was divided into five
Areas, each commanded by a Major-General, with head-
^ When the Royal Air Force was formed on the 1st of April 191 8 the
word 'miHtary' disappeared from the titles of the schools.
446 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [en. viii
quarters at London, Salisbury, Birmingham, York, and
Glasgow. At the Air Ministry a Directorate of Training,
to deal with all questions of training policy, under
Brigadier-General J. G. Hearson, came into being
officially, although it had been working some little time.
The Training Division was to be abolished as soon as the
five area commands were fully ready to take over. The
Areas were subdivided into operational, technical, and
training groups and the last named were required to refer
all training matters to the Director of Training at the Air
Ministry. The Training Division was gradually dissolved
by Brigadier-General Ludlow-Hewitt who commanded
from the ist of April to the 20th of May, when the division
ceased to exist.
At the end of May the Air Council set up a committee
to watch the question of accommodation, the lack of
which had affected past estimates of output of trained
personnel. The discussions and recommendations of the
Training Expansion Committee, as it was called, covered
a wide field and would have borne fruit had the war
continued into the winter of 1918/1919.
Under the energetic direction of the Air Ministry the
whole training system had been so reorganized that it
was possible to issue in October 191 8 a publication which
set out the particulars for every type of training course
in the Royal Air Force. The service student who has access
to this book^ will find it useful as giving the whole train-
ing system at home and the conditions of service as they
existed at the end of the war. The full list of special
schools at home administered by the Air Council at the
time of the Armistice was as follows :
All types of officer pilots and observers.
All types of pilots except officers.
All types of observers.
Schools oj Aeronautics .
Reading
Oxford, \
Denham, I
Bristol, and j '
Cheltenham j
Bath
' F.S. Publication 39.
I9i8]
LIST OF SCHOOLS
447
Aerial Fighting Schools.
Turnberry
Marske
Sedgeford .
Freiston
East Fortune
Fighting scouts (officers and N.C.O.s).
Two-seater fighter reconnaissance (officers and
N.C.O.s).
Two-seater fighter-reconnaissance observers
officers and N.C.O.s).
Day bombers (officers and N.C.O.s).
Do.
Do.
Fighting scouts (officers and N.C.O.s).
Torpedo-plane pilots, fleet-reconnaissance and
fighting scout for fleet work.
Schools of N avigation and Bomb-dropping.
Stonehenge
Andover .
Thetford .
Observers^ Schools.
Hythe and New
Romney
Manston .
Eastchurch
Day-bomber pilots (officers and N.C.O.s).
Day-bomber observers (officers and N.C.O.s).
Night-bomber pilots. Night-bomber obser-
Do.
Do.
Corps observers (officers and N.C.O.s).
Day-bomber observers (officers and N.C.O.s).
Two-seater fighter-reconnaissance observers
(officers and N.C.O.s).
Night-bomber observers.
Army observers.
Fleet-reconnaissance and submarine-patrol
observers (W /T observers (N.C.O.)).
School for Marine Operation Pilots — Dover.
Ground Armament School.
Uxbridge .
All types of pilot.
WjT Telephony School.
Chattis Hill
pilots
Two-seater fighter-reconnaissance
(officers and N.C.O.s).
Two-seater fighter-reconnaissance observers
(officers and N.C.O.s).
Day-bomber pilots (officers and N.C.O.s).
Day-bomber observers (officers and N.C.O.s).
School of R.A.F. and Army Co-operation.
Winchester. (Worthy
Down) . . Corps pilots and observers (officers).
448 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
School of Photography, Map Reading, and Reconnaissance.
Farnborough . . Two-seater fighter-reconnaissance observers
(officers).
Schools for Training Marine Observers.
Eastchurch . . Fleet-reconnaissance and submarine-patrol
observers.
Aldeburgh . . Anti-submarine patrol observers.
Balloon-training Depots.
Roehampton . . Personnel working with Royal Navy.
Richmond Park . . Personnel working with Army.
Balloon-training Base and Schools.
Sheerness . . . Personnel working with Royal Navy.
Lydd and Salisbury . Personnel working with Army.
Flyi?ig Instructors^ Schools.
Gosport for SW. Area. Shoreham for SE. Area. Lilbournc for
Midland Area. Redcar for NE. Area. Ayr for NW. Area. Curragh
for Ireland.
The development of the home-flying training organiza-
tion represented a series of striking efforts at improvisation.
Those efforts, however, were not free from the disadvan-
tages which improvisation must always entail, the chief of
which, perhaps, is a not very lively regard for economy,
whether of man-power or material. It so happened that
training was begun in reserve squadrons, and it was perhaps
inevitable that early expansion should tend towards a mere
multiplication of training units. As the war progressed
there were some notable attempts at concentration, such,
for instance, as the amalgamation of squadrons to form
training depot stations, but the many schools in England,
for ground work as well as for flying, found no parallel in
the French flying training system. In the autumn of 19 17
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Barry paid a visit to France and
investigated the French training organization. He reported
that the French flying schools were few^ and large. The
head-quarters of each school was at a central aerodrome,
where there were workshops equipped to effect major re-
pairs, and, within a radius of a few miles, were five or six
^ Eleven in October 191 7, but the aim was to reduce them to five.
i9i6] ECONOMY 449
subsidiary aerodromes from which the instruction Fhghts
(of 30 or 40 aeroplanes each) worked. The largest of the
existing schools, at Avord, housed 721 training aeroplanes
of which one quarter were in continuous flying use. What
impressed Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Barry, in particular,
was the economy of man-power which the French system
of concentration achieved. The statistics for the French
schools showed that the number of men, skilled and
unskilled, and of women, for each aeroplane kept in the
air, varied between ten and eleven, whereas the compar-
able figure in England was about seventeen. On his return
from France he recommended the establishment of similar
large schools in England. His recommendations, which
led to much discussion, were not adopted, the main
reasons being, so far as can be judged, that the English
system, which had developed on wholly different lines,
was not adaptable to such drastic change without serious
and perhaps prolonged loss of efficiency, and because the
English country-side lacks the spaciousness of the plains
of France so that areas suitable for such large-scale schools
would have been hard to find.
Part II. Egypt
In April 1916 the War Office decided to organize
a training establishment for pilots in Egypt. The idea
when the scheme began was that one hundred pupils
should be under instruction at a time, and this, it was
stated, would mean sending out three reserve squadrons.
In order that training might be under way at the beginning
of the cool weather, personnel were sent from England in
July and August 19 16, and the reserve squadrons came
into being at the Royal Flying Corps camp at Abbassia
(No. 21 on the 12th of July), and at Abu Qir (Nos. 22 and
23 on the 24th of August). Work was partly held up in
the beginning because some of the experienced personnel,
notably of No. 22 Reserve Squadron w^hich had begun to
arrive in Egypt on the 19th of July, were sent to help No.
14 Squadron during operations in the Canal zone. In
September the three reserve squadrons were grouped to
form the Twentieth (Reserve) Wing under Lieutenant-
2504-5 G g
450 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [en. viii
Colonel A. G. Board who arrived at Abu Qir from England
on the 15th of the month. ^ The pupils passed from ele-
mentary training in No. 21 Squadron to intermediate
training in No. 22 and then on to No. 23 Squadron in
which they graduated. Some of the pupils were sent back
to England after they had completed fifteen hours' solo
flying. Those who stayed in Egypt and qualified for their
wings were employed to reinforce the air units in the
Middle East Brigade.
What was to become (in November) No. 3 School of
Military Aeronautics^ began, in August 1916, as a
Technical Training Class held in the ante-room of the
officers' mess by Captain J. E. Dixon-Spain of No. 14
Squadron, and a few experienced non-commissioned
officers and mechanics. Lectures and practical instruction
were given on engines, rigging, and miscellaneous subjects.
Examination papers of the kind set at the schools at
Reading and Oxford were procured, and the first examina-
tion in Egypt was held on the 15th of September 1916,
when 27 out of 31 pupils passed.
In December a fourth Reserve Squadron, No. 57, was
formed at Ismailia from nucleus Flights trained by the
Fifth Wing. Meanwhile waiting lists of applicants anxious
to transfer to the Royal Flying Corps from other units
of the Army had been compiled in Egypt, Salonika,
Mesopotamia, and India, but as the training organization
in Egypt got under way these lists were rapidly reduced,
and the War Office was asked to supply pupils from
England at the rate of sixty per month, beginning in
January 1917. Because of a slowing down of training in
England due to unsuitable weather on winter days, the
War Office appreciated the advantages of the organization
in Egypt, where the winter conditions were normally
perfect for flying, and agreed to send pupils from home.
It was again stipulated that when pupils, superfluous to
requirements in the Middle East, should have completed
^ Subsequent Commanders of the Twentieth Wing were Lieutenant-
Colonel G. E. Todd and Lieutenant-Colonel H. le Ai. Brock.
2 The School moved from Abbassia to the Heliopolis Palace Hotel in
October 1917.
1917] EXPANSION IN EGYPT 451
fifteen hours' solo flying they were to be sent home for
final training.
In 191 7 the training organization in Egypt expanded
greatly, although there was recurring anxiety about the
supply of pupils. Early in February an additional Reserve
Squadron, No. 58, arrived at Suez from England, and in
April a School of Aerial Gunnery was established from
a nucleus of instructors who had arrived at Abu Qir from
the gunnery school at Hythe in November of the previous
year and had worked under the Twentieth (Reserve)
Wing. Just when all was proceeding smoothly, however,
there came the first of the man-power shocks when the
supply of pupils from England was suddenly stopped.
The reason given by the War Oflice was that the rate of ex-
pansion of training facilities at home had temporarily gone
ahead of the rate of entry of pupil pilots, and Brigadier-
General W. G. EI. Salmond, the General Officer Com-
manding the Middle East Brigade, when informed of this
decision, was told that he must meet his needs from the
army in the Middle East. Cables were at once sent to the
Commanders-in-Chief in Salonika, India, and Mesopo-
tamia, but Brigadier-General Salmond pointed out to
the War Office that time must elapse before arrange-
ments to obtain pupils within the Middle East could
become effective and that in the meantime there would
be a shortage of pupils in the elementary training squad-
rons, a shortage which would later make itself felt in the
advanced squadrons. He asked that the dispatch of 150
officer pupils, promised him from South Africa, should be
expedited. He had 250 pupils in the Reserve Wing (on
the 7th of May) and if the South African contingent
arrived by the end of May his output would continue to
be about 100 pilots per month for the next three or four
months, but this output could be maintained only if
pupils came forward at a higher rate to allow for failures.
The call which had been sent out to the various theatres
of war for suitable officers to transfer to the Royal Flying
Corps met with a good response, but it soon became clear
that if the training system in Egypt was to be put to full
use candidates for commissions must be accepted mainly
452 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
from among the rank and file, and in June, therefore,
sanction was sought to estabhsh a cadet squadron. There
was an army school of instruction for cadets at Zeitoun,
and a few pupils, earmarked for the Royal Flying Corps,
had been sent there, but, apart from the fact that the
preliminary training was different in some particulars
from that given in the Cadet Wings of the Royal Flying
Corps, the school was liable to be closed when active
operations were in progress. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of pilot cadets in the school could, in the circum-
stances, only be a small one. The Royal Flying Corps
proposal was approved and the formation of No. 3 Cadet
Wing, under Major A. P. Pargiter,^ was begun. The
preliminaries were many and it was not until October
1 91 7 that the wing was in being at Heliopolis. The course
was for a period of six weeks and the training was similar
to that given at the Cadet Wings in England.
When in July 191 7 the Government decided to
double the Royal Flying Corps, the War Office was
pleased, once again, to take advantage of the climate and
organization in Egypt. In August the formation of an
additional Training Wing — the Thirty-second, under
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Primrose^ — was sanctioned,
to include five squadrons, made up from nucleus Flights
to be provided by the existing reserve squadrons in Egypt.
At the same time it was agreed that the training units
in the neighbourhood of Cairo should be grouped, for
administrative purposes, as a reserve wing, and in Septem-
ber there were three reserve wings as follows : the Thirty-
eighth (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Boddam-Whetham)^
at Heliopolis, the Thirty-second at Ismaiha, and the
Twentieth at Abu Qir. The two last named each con-
tained one elementary squadron and three higher training
squadrons. The War Office said that pupils would be sent
^ Subsequent Commanders were Major P. J. Whitty and Lieutenant-
Colonel A. H. C. Kearsey.
2 Subsequent Commanders were Major R. P. Willock (temporarily)
and Lieutenant-Colonel S. Grant-Dalton.
^ Subsequent Commanders were Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. C. Groves,
Lieutenant-Colonel W, H, Primrose, and Major A, W. Tedder.
I9I8] EGYPTIAN MECHANICS 453
to Egypt for training both from England and America,
and that, subject to the requirements of the Middle East
squadrons, they should be returned to England for final
training when they had completed twenty-five hours
solo flying. On the ist of November the three training
wings, together with No. 3 School of Military Aeronautics
and No. 3 Cadet Wing, became a Training Group under
Colonel P. L. W. Herbert, who came direct to Egypt
from the command of a Training Group in England and
was, therefore, conversant with the details of organization
and with the latest methods of instruction in the Training
Division at home.
About this time man-power problems were once more
engaging the close attention of the authorities at home. In
England one solution was the enlistment of women to
replace able-bodied men in a variety of duties. In Egypt
recourse was had, at the request of the War Office, to
local labour. The Egyptians and other natives of the
country were, it was said, quick to learn and, once they
came to understand what was required of them, would, it
was believed, be efficient. As a beginning, a number of
natives were attached to each training squadron for
instruction as carpenters, sailmakers, and blacksmiths. The
experiment proved reasonably successful and the training
of local labour was gradually extended to the trades of
armourer, coppersmith, vulcanizer, photographer, and
mechanical transport driver. In February 191 8 War Office
sanction was sought for the establishment at Abu Qir of
a Base Depot to take local boys in the fifth year of their
apprenticeship, and mechanics who could pass a trade test.
It was proposed to staff the depot with British instruc-
tors from the Eastern Aircraft Factory, ^ but in order
that apprentices might enter with some knowledge of the
duties they would be required to do, it was also suggested
that native instructors in the technical schools in Egypt
should be given a special short course at the depot. The
scheme for the formation of the Base Depot, which was
ultimately approved by the Ministry of Education in
Egypt and by the War Office, allowed for instruction to
^ See p. 456.
454 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
400 Egyptians as a beginning with a gradual increase to
2,000.1
Meanwhile in January 191 8 Brigadier-General W. G. H.
Salmond had pointed out, in a letter to the War Office, that
a still greater training expansion on an economic basis was
possible in Egypt. As soon as he had received his full
complement of training aeroplanes it would be possible
to produce 180 fully trained pilots each month. With an
increase in the establishment of about 1,400 men the rate
of output could be accelerated to 400 pilots each month,
or, in other words, better returns would be obtained from
expansion in Egypt within the existing organization than
from new training schemes initiated elsewhere. 2 The
War Office expressed interest and asked for further details,
but nothing more was done until the end of February
191 8, when Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, on behalf
of the War Cabinet, visited Egypt to discuss with the
Commander-in-Chief and his staff plans for a campaign
against the Turks in Palestine. While the plans were
being shaped the Royal Flying Corps was called upon to
submit a full statement of its requirements. One result
was that in March the War Office agreed that the number
of squadrons with the Training Brigade^ in Egypt should
be increased to twenty, by changing the existing squadrons
into Training Depot Stations, each of a strength equal to
three squadrons as in England. The mechanics who would
be required were to be recruited in the Middle East
Brigade and in South Africa. The Depot Stations began
work as such on the 21st of July 1918. They were No. 16
Training Depot Station, formed from No. 194 Training
Squadron, No. 20 from 193, 18 from 21, 17 from 57, and
19 from No. 195 Training Squadron. At the same time
^ Lieutenant-Colonel C. Fraser, of the Middle East head-quarters air
staff, who handled this question of Egyptian labour, has stated that some
1,200-1,500 native civilians came to be employed.
2 For a table of the monthly output of pilots in Egypt in 191 8 see
Appendix X.
3 At the end of January 191 8 the Royal Flying Corps in the Middle
East was raised to the status of a division, with the Training Group as
a Training Brigade. The Palestine Brigade was to be commanded by
a Brigadier-General who was to have no duties west of the Canal.
I9I8] REPAIR AND SUPPLY 455
a new Training Wing — the Sixty-ninth (Lieutenant-
Colonel E. W. Powell) — ^was formed at Ismailia to take
over two of the Depot Stations (17 at Abu-Sueir and 19
at El Rimal) and also No. 145 Squadron.
At the beginning of September the separate schools for
gunnery and fighting were amalgamated to form No. 5
Fighting School, a recognition of the fact that fighting
and gunnery were interdependent. About the same time
a Flying Instructors' School was formed at El Khanka
to give selected pilots training in the Gosport method,
the aim being to teach them the sequence of instruction
and the necessary 'patter' in order that they might them-
selves take over instruction in accordance with the latest
methods developed in England. The school had resulted
from a demand made by Egypt that flying instructors
should be sent from England to overcome a shortage due
to expansion of the training squadrons. The War Office
could not meet this request, but sent out a commanding
officer and two experienced instructors to form a school so
that Egypt could train its own pilot instructors.
Other schools started in 191 8 were: an Artillery
Observation School at Almaza in January;^ one for
Navigation and Bomb-dropping (No. 3) at Almaza in
May; and another to give instruction in Armament at
Abbassia in the same month.
Repair and Supply Organization in Egypt
The original 'X' Aircraft Park, for service with the two
squadrons (Nos. 14 and 17) sent to Egypt in 191 5, left
England in November of that year, under Captain C. H.
Rowe, and settled down at Abbassia, Cairo. The squad-
rons in the Middle East, however, were soon operating
as widely scattered detachments, and it became clear that
this fact, together with general expansion, would necessi-
tate special arrangements for repair and supply. In July
19 16 the port depot at Alexandria, administered by the
Park, was enlarged as 'X' Aircraft Depot and was made
responsible for the issue of technical equipment and stores
^ The School was originally called No. 197 Training Squadron which
had begun work in August.
456 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
for all the Royal Flying Corps squadrons in the Middle
East. Until the formation of the Base Depot (in July 191 7)
'X' Aircraft Depot also dealt with reinforcements and with
the training and trade testing of men transferred on proba-
tion in Egypt. When the Aircraft Depot was formed, 'X'
Aircraft Park became a mobile park similar to those in
France. It kept a specified number of aeroplanes, ready
to fly, in what was known as its First Reserve, while aero-
planes under reconstruction were held in Second Reserve.
To this reserve, aeroplanes crashed in the field, but re-
pairable, were sent, a replacement going to the detachment
from the Park's first reserve.
In January 191 7 the Air Board considered a proposal
put forward by Brigadier-General W. G. H. Salmond for
the partial construction of aeroplanes in Egypt. Shipping
space through the Mediterranean had to be strictly
rationed, and because of this, and because also of loss
due to submarine attacks on transports, the Royal Flying
Corps in Egypt had to reckon with a shortage of aero-
planes. The suggestion had been made that one of the
British manufacturers might be asked to establish a branch
factory in Egypt, but it was recognized that this was im-
practicable because the essential raw materials were not
locally available. As an alternative, Brigadier-General
Salmond and his staff evolved the scheme for assembling
aeroplanes, and for manufacturing certain aeroplane parts,
in Egypt, and it was shown that an appreciable economy
in the tonnage space allotted to the Royal Flying Corps
could be achieved. The Air Board decided that every
encouragement should be given to Brigadier-General
Salmond and that he should have all the help available
to make his ambitious scheme effective. By June 191 7
work on the factory had begun at Abu Qir, and while the
building was proceeding, personnel, including promising
native mechanics, were selected and given training at 'X'
Aircraft Park. There were delays in building and equip-
ping the factory — called the Eastern Aircraft Factory —
but in January 191 8 it was opened under the command
of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Burchell who had been closely
associated with the scheme from its inception. The factory
I9I8] MAJOR-GENERAL SALMOND 457
was organized in separate sections for plane assembly, sail-
making, fuselage assembly, erection and testing, inspection,
stores, transport, engine overhaul, and for propellers.
Statistics of the numbers of men engaged, and of the work
done, are not available, but returns for part of the year,
from July to November 19 18, show that forty-eight aero-
planes were constructed at the factory.
Throughout 191 8 also there was appreciable expansion
in the depots and parks. 'X' Aircraft Park was incorporated
in the Palestine Brigade and moved from Abbassia to Qan-
tara in January. Its workshops and general premises at
Abbassia were taken over by the Engine Repair Section
which split away from 'X' Aircraft Depot at Abu Qir. At the
same time the head-quarters and stores section^ of the depot
moved to Alexandria, leaving Abu Qir to the Aeroplane
Repair Section. The formation of a Native Base Depot
for training has already been dealt with. The Engine
Repair Section ceased to be administered by 'X' Aircraft
Depot in August and became two separate units under
head-quarters, Middle East, with the title 'X' Engine Repair
Depot, and 'X' Mechanical Transport Repair Section. At
the same time the Aeroplane Repair Section, Salvage
Section, and Wireless Repair Section at Abu Qir were
grouped into an 'Acceptance, Workshop, and Salvage
Park', with an independent head-quarters, but under the
general administrative orders of 'X' Aircraft Depot. There
was also an 'X' Balloon Repair Section. The Aircraft Parks
in Macedonia, Mesopotamia, and India were additionally
a responsibility of head-quarters. Middle East.
The shape of the air service in the Middle East during
the war was moulded chiefly by Major-General W. G. H.
Salmond. He had experience, vision, sane judgement,
and great charm of manner, a combination of qualities
which enabled him to get things done with the minimum
of fuss. It was due to him that the scattered detachments
of the Royal Flying Corps east of Malta enjoyed unity of
command from the beginning. That command, extending
from the Balkans to India, and embracing operations,
' A Stores Distributing Section was sanctioned in April 191 8, and came
into being at Ismailia later in the year.
458 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
training, repair, and construction, as well as the creation of
new squadrons, was a remarkable one. Efficient administra-
tion of activities so dissimilar must be counted an achieve-
ment. The best tribute, however, to the personality of
Major-General Salmond lies in the fact that the many and
diverse air detachments in the Middle East were conscious
of their unity and developed a corporate spirit of their own.
Part III. Canada^
Canada enjoyed two advantages over Egypt as a
training centre; there were great numbers of young
men well equipped to make excellent pilots, not only in
Canada, but also in the United States, and supplies and
material were available in almost unlimited quantities.
A disadvantage was a less favourable winter climate. For
a long time the source of supply of trained pilots was a
small civilian school, financed by the Curtiss Company,
at Long Branch, west of Toronto. Many Canadians
passed through the Curtiss School, but the majority of
those who joined the air services entered direct and
received their training in England.
In the supply of suitable candidates the Admiralty
enjoyed an advantage over the War Office in that candi-
dates who presented themselves for the Royal Naval Air
Service were, if found acceptable, immediately granted
commissions as Probationary Flight Sub-Lieutenants. The
Royal Flying Corps, on the other hand, did not grant
commissions to pupils. They had to enter as cadets and
they received their commissions only if found suitable
after training. It was to the air that the young Canadians
were attracted, and as they were not much concerned
whether their horizon was one of water or land they
did not hesitate, whenever they had the choice, to take
the commission and let the cadetship go. The War Office
was naturally critical of a system which inevitably deprived
the Royal Flying Corps of an adequate share of the volun-
^ For a detailed account of the war development of service aviation in
Canada the reader may be referred to Jznatiun in Canada^ igiy-iS, by-
Lieutenant Alan Sullivan.
1917] CANADA 459
teers forthcoming, and from time to time the Army
Council pointed out the need for closer co-operation be-
tween the two departments. No blame can be laid on the
Admiralty, which knew what it wanted and saw that it got
it, nor on the War Office, which could not give preferential
treatment to Canadians. The fault lay with the system
which placed the two departments in competition. The
Admiralty sometimes found themselves with more com-
missioned pupils than could be absorbed in the naval air
training organization. Writing, for instance, to Canada
in April 1917, the Director of Air Organization at the War
Office said: 'The R.N.A.S. are recruiting probationary
'flight officers^ largely in Canada and a party of 62 arrived
'yesterday, of whom they could only absorb 40. I took
'on the remaining 22, and planted them at Reading with
'temporary commissions. Since then I heard this morning
'from Commodore Paine that another 124 are awaiting
'shipment in Canada, who also cannot be absorbed into
'the R.N.A.S. establishments and I said I would take the
'lot on the same terms. I hope the effect of this will not
'be to put our own cadets' "noses out of joint".'
Royal Flying Corps officers from England visited
Canada from time to time to organize recruiting, but it
was not until 1916 that a serious effort was made to take
advantage of the resources of the Dominion in men and
material. Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Burke, who had
visited Canada in the autumn of 191 5, had urged, in a well-
reasoned and far-sighted report, that a wing of the Royal
Flying Corps should be established to train Canadian
pilots. The suggestion, however, was rejected by the
War Office, 'in consequence of the difficulties attendant
'on the permanent establishment in Canada of a school of
'instruction administered by the Royal Flying Corps'. The
next move came from industrialists in Canada, who pro-
posed to set up an aviation factory and school for which
they sought the goodwill of the Ministry of Munitions.
The project was referred in April 1916 to the Imperial
Munitions Board in Canada. Members of the Board
^ The rank of Probationary Flight Officer was introduced in August
1916.
460 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
thereupon visited the Curtiss stations at Toronto and
Buffalo and learned that orders for aircraft had been placed
with this American company by the British Admiralty to
a total value of twelve million dollars.
The Board reported that there was no reason why an
aviation industry should not be organized in Canada.
Protracted negotiations then ensued, involving the Air
Board, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Canadian
Government, the Ministry of Munitions, and the
Treasury. These various bodies, with their diverse in-
terests in the scheme, found agreement difficult, and it
was not until October 1916 that something definite began
to emerge. The Ministry of Munitions was advised by
cable in this month that 'the Dominion Government has
'now passed an Order in Council assenting to the scheme
'for an aeroplane factory and aviation school in Canada'.
The proposal was that Canada should provide funds up
to one million dollars to establish a Dominion Govern-
ment aircraft factory on condition that the British
authorities ordered aeroplanes to keep the factory going.
The school, it was suggested, should be established by,
and at the cost of, the British Government.
By this time the need of the War Office was one of
urgency. At the end of September 191 6 Major-General
Trenchard had stated that, in view of the great increase
in fighting in the air, it must be expected that his pro-
grammes of expansion would eventually entail doubling
the number of fighting squadrons with each army in
France. The Director of Air Organization had thereupon
reviewed the whole position in a memorandum, and he
produced a general programme which would necessitate
an additional 35 reserve, or training, squadrons.^ He
suggested that some of them might be raised in Canada
with a nucleus of officers and men sent from England. The
main advantage would be a saving in the transport of
training-type aeroplanes and engines across the Atlantic
from the American factories, as well as of material for
the air station buildings. Furthermore, if the proposal
for an aviation factory in Canada was sanctioned, there
^ Excluding two night-flying reserve squadrons.
1917] THE TORONTO FACTORY 461
would be a ready outlet for its aeroplanes. In the result,
it was decided that twenty Reserve Squadrons should be
raised and stationed in Canada, and that the idea of a
separate school should be abandoned. Each reserve squad-
ron was, in effect, a self-contained training school.
The scheme for a Canadian factory, as finally approved,
aimed at establishing an aviation industry through private
enterprise with Government financial backing, and with
official supervision in the early stages. The Curtiss works
and staff at Toronto were taken over by ^Canadian Aero-
planes, Limited', with capital provided by the Imperial
Munitions Board whose Director of Aviation, Mr. F. W.
Baillie, became the general manager of the factory.
Included in the transfer to the newly formed Canadian
Company were certain manufacturing rights, and a
beginning was made with a building programme of 100
Curtiss aeroplanes for training.
It was decided that the squadrons to be formed in the
Dominion should be known as Nos. 78 to 97 (Canadian)
Reserve Squadrons, and that a nucleus Flight for each
squadron should be sent to Canada from England. At
the beginning of January 191 7 a small party of officers,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Hoare,
left for Toronto to start the new organization. When they
arrived the country was deep under snow, and as the ground
would not be visible until the end of March the question
of deciding upon suitable aerodrome sites w^as difficult.
The first site inspected was Borden Camp, fifty miles
north-west of Toronto, which had previously been
occupied by Canadian troops. The camp was five miles
along a branch line from the railhead at Angus, but the
line was closed and the Royal Flying Corps inspecting
party made the journey on sleighs. The site was con-
sidered to be suitable and a contract was signed for clear-
ing the ground and for the construction of additional
buildings. Lieutenant-Colonel Hoare cabled to England
asking for two of the nucleus Flights to be sent at once,
with three more to follow in the middle of February. He
anticipated that twenty aeroplanes would be delivered
from the Toronto factory by the end of February and
462 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
that by the end of March he would have a total of eighty
training aeroplanes from this and other sources. He
decided to concentrate the squadrons in groups of five
rather than distribute them. Meanwhile he arranged to
attach cadets to the Officers' Training Corps of the
Toronto University for preliminary drill, &c.
The first three nucleus Fhghts, bearing the titles Nos.
78, 79, and 81 (Canadian) Reserve Squadrons, left England
on the 15th of February 191 7, and a few days later
Lieutenant-Colonel Hoare was able to report that he had
received more than 1,000 applications for cadetships, so
that he anticipated no difficulty so far as flying pupils were
concerned, but he said that the recruitment of mechanics
still proceeded very slowly. He was forming a Cadet Wing
in which, he said, 'the training is, of course, very ele-
'mentary, as I have not the instructors, but they will at
'least be drilled, do some signalling, a Lewis gun course,
'and as soon as I can get some old engines and machines
'together I can teach them something of engines and
'rigging'.
While the nucleus Flights were still on their way,
flying training in Canada had begun. The sheds of the
former Curtiss Company at Long Branch, Toronto, had
been taken over, and the first aeroplane manufactured by
Canadian Aeroplanes, Limited, had been delivered there
on the 22nd of February. Within five days a nucleus
Flight, called 'X' Squadron, beginning with three aero-
planes, had been established at Long Branch and instruc-
tion had started. The first pupils were making their solo
flights on the i6th of March.
The three Flights from England reached Canada at the
beginning of March, and by the 19th two more (Nos. 80
and 82) had arrived. By the end of March training at
Borden Camp had started and by the middle of April the
Reserve Squadrons Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, and 82 were settled
there.
The next site chosen was at Deseronto, 130 miles east
of Toronto in the Bay of Quinte, and 'X' Squadron from
Long Branch moved there on the ist of May. By the end
of the month, Nos. 83, 84, 86, and 87 nucleus Squadrons
I9I7] NUCLEUS FLIGHTS 463
had reached Deseronto from England, and, with the Long
Branch unit, made the station estabhshment five squad-
rons. Four other Flights (Nos. 85, 88, 89, and 90) were also
on the aerodrome waiting for the formation of a new base
north of Toronto. This base was partly ready hy the
middle of June and No. 91 Squadron, direct from England,
took up its station there on the 15th, followed by No. 90
on the 22nd, No. 88 on the 29th, 'Y' Squadron^ on the
6th of July, and by No. 89 on the 13th.
Meanwhile on the 21st of March, the day the German
offensive began in France, the War Office had cabled
asking if Lieutenant-Colonel Hoare could dispense with
the last five of the twenty nucleus Flights from England,
and he had replied saying he would make do with fourteen
from home and that he would make his own arrangements
in Canada about the remainder. The War Office had also
stated that it was desirable for Canada to complete higher
training, 'including whole Training Brigade system of
'tests, gunnery, photography, aerial observation, &c.',
and that instructors, equipment, and full training
schedules would be sent out from England if Lieutenant-
Colonel Hoare thought he could undertake the work.
The reply from Canada said there would be no difficulty
about higher training, and experts in photography, wire-
less, and gunnery were thereupon dispatched and had
begun work at the end of April.
Before they arrived the War Office had again raised
the question of expansion of the Canadian training scheme.
Writing on the 31st of March the Director of Air Organi-
zation had said: 'I should like you now to push on as far
'as possible, and in keeping with the progress of your
'recruiting, equipment, and building, with a complete
'system of training identical, except for local adaptation,
'with that obtaining at home, i.e.
\a) A Cadet Wing on the lines of the Royal Flying
'Corps Cadet Wing at Denham. . . .
\b) A School of MiHtary Aeronautics on the Hues of
'Oxford
^ 'Y' Squadron was one of the two ('X' was the other) which had been
raised in Canada,
464 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
'I will start on this side earmarking for you technical
'instructors to meet your demands when they arise, which
'I expect will be very soon.' The staff of instructors for
the School of Military Aeronautics arrived in Canada
from England early in June and the School, No. 4, began
its activities with 204 cadets on the 1st of July. It took
over the existing Cadet Wing organization and a new
Cadet Wing was thereupon formed at Toronto on the
nth of July, but did not begin an independent existence
until the 23rd when it moved to Long Branch.
T^exas
The entry of the United States of America into the
war in April 191 7 opened up new responsibilities as well
as new opportunities for the Royal Flying Corps in
Canada. America was anxious to take advantage of
British experience and training in military aviation, and
the Royal Flying Corps looked ahead, with questioning
eyes, to winter sunshine in the southern states. There
was also a hope that the unofficial avenues by which some
of the fine human material in the United States entered
the Royal Flying Corps as cadets might be widened.
Colonel Hoare visited Washington in June. He had
already made arrangements for winter aerodromes on
Lulu Island, near Vancouver, because he was anxious to
avoid a long gap in training, especially in the first three
months of the year when the severity of the Ontario
climate might hold up instructional flying. Vancouver,
however, was distant nearly five days by rail from Toronto,
and although it enjoyed a mild climate, spring rains might
go some way to counteract this advantage. There was the
further trouble that the country surrounding the accept-
able sites in Vancouver was mostly forest and not, therefore,
too desirable for pupils who could not always be relied
upon to land on their aerodrome. Although the sites had
been chosen and work started on them, Colonel Hoare
was anxious to replace the scheme by an aerodrome for
winter flying in the United States. He found the
American authorities keen and helpful and he, in turn.
1917] SUNSHINE IN TEXAS 465
was able to offer facilities which the Americans were grate-
ful to accept. About the reciprocal agreement which they
made there was a noticeable absence of bargaining. Each
gave freely and generously, so far as was possible, what
the other needed without any meticulous balancing of
items.
The main results of the visit were as follows : A recruit-
ing office for cadets for the Royal Flying Corps was
opened in Fifth Avenue. The acceptance of American
citizens was irregular, but if any presented themselves (and
many did) they were not, if found suitable, discouraged.^
Officially the United States Government undertook to
provide aerodromes to accommodate ten Royal Flying
Corps squadrons for winter training. Not only so, but
they also undertook to buy 180 aeroplanes and sufficient
spares from Canadian Aeroplanes, Limited, to maintain
a full establishment of 180 aeroplanes on the winter aero-
dromes, and to make themselves responsible for petrol,
oil, light, and power. The Royal Flying Corps, during the
time it made use of this equipment, was to be responsible
for necessary repairs and was to leave all material in good
order on departure. The Royal Flying Corps, for its part,
undertook the training of officers and personnel for ten
American squadrons in Canada during the summer
months.
Three aerodromes, called Hicks, Everman, and Ben-
brook, were selected in Texas. At the end of September
191 7 an advanced head-quarters of the Royal Flying
Corps was opened at Fort Worth, Texas. Five of the
American squadrons which had been trained under the
Royal Flying Corps in Canada moved to Hicks aerodrome
in October. Also accommodated on this aerodrome was
the School of Aerial Gunnery from Borden^ which had
an equipment of thirty aeroplanes and gave all gunnery
instruction both to the American squadrons and to the
British. The School completed one course at Borden
^ The enhstment of American citizens into the Royal Flying Corps
continued until January 191 8 when it was stopped.
^ This School had been formed by No. 80 Reserve Squadron at Borden
Camp in June.
2S04.5 H h
466 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
Camp in Canada on the 30th of October and began a new
flying course in Texas on the 5th of November. Everman
and Benbrook were occupied in the middle of November
by the Forty-second and Forty-third Wings from Borden
and Deseronto respectively.^ These Wings had attached
to them, for training, American oflBcers and men who
replaced the personnel at Hicks aerodrome when the
American squadrons training there were judged qualified
to go overseas. The first American squadron to leave
Texas for England was No. 17 which departed on the 19th
of December with 25 pilots and a full complement of
ground ofificers and men. The pilots had passed the
Royal Flying Corps tests and they continued their close
association after they arrived in France on the 6th of
February 191 8, being attached, by Flights, to Royal
Flying Corps fighting squadrons. Three more American
squadrons (Nos. 22, 27, and 28) left Texas for overseas in
January 191 8, three (Nos. 139, 147, and 148) in P'ebruary,
and the remaining three in March, thus completing the
ten for which the Royal Flying Corps in Canada had
undertaken to provide initial training. The contingent
at Texas moved back to Canada in April 191 8.
Meanwhile training had also proceeded in Canada
throughout the winter, under great diflftculties, at the
Forty-fourth Wing aerodrome at North Toronto. Flying
was undertaken when the temperature was as low as 22°
below zero. The aeroplanes were equipped with skis
and some of the pilots had unexpected adventures. One,
ov/ing to engine failure, made a forced landing over two
miles from his aerodrome and taxied (or skied) home
across country and down the high roads.
A statistical summary was made to show what had been
accomplished by the Royal Flying Corps in Canada up
to the 26th of January 191 8, the anniversary of the day
^ The stations at Borden, Deseronto, and North Toronto were raised
to the status of Wings in October, viz. Forty-second Wing (Borden),
Nos. 78, 79, 81, and 82 Squadrons, and the School of Aerial Gunnery;
Forty-third Wing (Deseronto), Nos. 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 87 Squadrons;
and Forty-fourth Wing (North Toronto), Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91, and 92
(originally 'Y') Squadrons.
I9I8] ACHIEVEMENT 467
on which work had been begun at Toronto. The table
of pilots reads as follows :
Trained and sent to England ....... 744
Trained and awaiting transportation . . . . . .83
Retained as instructors . . . . . . . .138
Commissioned and killed during instruction .... 6
At recruits depot ......... 348
At Cadet Wing 742
At No. 4 School of Military Aeronautics . . . . '753
At 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Wings 843
At School of Aerial Gunnery . . . . . . .154
Discharges . . . . . . . . . .197
Cadets, fatal accidents . . . . . . ~ . .28
Total 4,036
Throughout 191 8 Canada sent to England an average
of rather more than 200 trained pilots each month and,
in addition, supplied a few hundred cadets who had
passed the course at the Cadet Wing and the School of
Aeronautics, but had been given no flying instruction. ^
At the time of the Armistice the full organization of the
Royal Air Force in Canada comprised, in addition to the
three training wings, another of five squadrons in process
of formation, a Cadet Wing, a School of Aerial Fighting,
made up of four squadrons (formerly called the School
of Aerial Gunnery), No. 4 School of Aeronautics, separate
Schools for Armament, Special Flying,^ and Artillery
Co-operation, a Recruits Depot, Engine and Aeroplane
Repair Parks, a Stores Depot, and a Mechanical Transport
Section.
Any account of the training developments in Canada,
no matter how brief, must take note of the help given by
institutions and by individuals. Prominent citizens in the
various towns formed voluntary committees to handle
recruitment; presentations, ranging from aeroplanes to
^ The cost of training a pilot in Canada worked out at $9,835. (See
Aviation in Canada, igiy-iS, by Lieutenant Alan Sullivan.) Calculations
made in April 191 8 for the training organization in England showed that
the cost of each pilot being produced at home at that time was ^1,030.
The sum of ^1,000 was proposed to the American Government in respect
of the cost of training an American cadet in Royal Air Force squadrons
in England. ^ The Gosport method.
468 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [ch. viii
books, were made to the Brigade; facilities of many kinds
were placed at its disposal, and there was generous provision,
whether of material or service, for whatever appertained
to the well-being of officers and men during the time of
their service in Canada.
This summary review of training developments in the
war tells a story of fine endeavour and of many excursions,
often remarkable, into the prodigal fields of improvisation.
It does not, however, tell the whole story and it will be
necessary to make reference to the inadequacy of the
training given in certain instances. There were times
when the production of pilots was accelerated to meet
requirements of the Western front, and pupils were
pushed along in such a way that many of them were sent
to France with little more than an elementary knowledge
of flying. The tragedy of this lay in the fact that it was
the most promising pilots who were thus picked out and
plunged into the stern realities of Western front warfare
before they were properly equipped to sustain themselves
in the air. There is little doubt that the air casualties in
France, particularly on the Somme in 191 6 subsequent
to the arrival of the new German fighters in September,
took the authorities at home by surprise. At an Air Board
meeting early in December 1916, when there was
discussion about additional naval fighting squadrons being
placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief in
France, Rear-Admiral Tudor, the naval member of the
Board, asked Major-General Trenchard, who attended
the meeting, whether, if the Navy provided more squad-
rons, the Royal Flying Corps would be enabled to give
its pilots longer training. It was his impression, he said,
that the casualties among military pilots were partly
due to the shortness of their training. Major-General
Trenchard did not agree that the losses were due to the
inexperience of pilots except, perhaps, on long-distance
work, while Major-General Henderson stated that the
shortness of training was a consequence of the number of
casualties, not the reverse.
These statements call for some comment. If the reader
1917] PILOT WASTAGE 469
turns back to Volume II he will find' an account of the
formation of Boelcke's Jadgstaffel on the Somme at the
end of August 1916, and of its subsequent influence on
the air position on the Western front. He will be reminded
that not only did the aeroplanes with which Boelcke's
unit was equipped outclass the contemporary British
aeroplanes opposed to them, but that the German pilots
were experienced and carefully selected, and that they
had been given special additional courses of training at
single-seater fighting schools. In the light of this know-
ledge, hidden at the time, it must be admitted that the
Royal Flying Corps pilots, except those who had been
flying on the Western front for some time, were by
comparison inexperienced. The statement of Major-
General Henderson is illuminating because it reveals what
is undoubtedly true, that the trouble was begun by the
unexpectedness of the casualties. It was then accentuated
by the fact that training was hastened, while the arrival
in France of British fighters capable of standing up to the
German aeroplanes was delayed until the battles of 191 7
began. The heaviest casualties suffered by the Royal
Flying Corps in the war occurred in March and April
191 7, and they continued on such a scale throughout most
of the year that the training facilities did not catch up
with Western front requirements until the year was well
spent, and then it was that, although new pilots who
arrived in France were comparatively much better trained
than at any previous period of the war, they were not,
as human material, up to the general standard of their
predecessors. 2 In a memorandum prepared for the War
Cabinet in June 1917 Major-General Henderson stated:
*The actual requirements in pilots are very largely governed
'by the casualties. Wastage from all causes has hitherto
'been so great that, although we have succeeded in increas-
'ing the strength considerably, yet we have never been able
'to give pilots as much training as would be desirable.'
^ p. 281 et seq.
^ In April 191 7 pilots were going overseas after an average of 17*5
hours' instruction in the air: by September 1917 the average time in the
air had increased to 48'5 hours per pilot.
470 TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS [cii. viii
It is important to seek further explanation of the con-
ditions under which the Royal Flying Corps worked in
1917. It cannot be said that there was any lack of pre-
vision in the field. In June 19 16, before the Somme
battle began, Sir Douglas Haig, on the initiative of Major-
General Trenchard, put forward a programme of expansion
for the Royal Flying Corps which asked for a total of 56
service squadrons for the Western front by the early
spring of 191 7. This new programme raised the total of
service squadrons for all theatres of war to eighty-six. On
the calculations of the War Office, the maintenance of this
number of service squadrons would require a total of
sixty reserve or training squadrons. These calculations,
which were based on past experience, were too low, and
in any case the Army Council, faced with a serious dearth
of technical man-power, failed to approve the full in-
crease.^ Sanction was given for only one-half of the pro-
posed expansion, and it was stated that the whole subject
would be reviewed in October 19 16. This provisional
sanction covered fifty instead of sixty reserve squadrons.
It is of interest that the War Office calculations were
based on a wastage of pilots at the rate of 230 per cent,
per annum for all squadrons. The average wastage during
the Somme battle was at the rate of 300 per cent,
although it was nearer 400 per cent, for the period sub-
sequent to the arrival of the new German fighters in
September. It is a further commentary on the difficulties
of forecast that in the month of April 191 7, when the
battle of Arras was fought, the wastage in France of pilots
was at the rate of 600 per cent, per annum. It may be
remarked, incidentally, that these facts and figures
emphasize the importance of reserves, and of industrial
organization for immediate and continuous output, in
any assessment of air strength. It is a modern fashion to
speak in terms of first-line aeroplanes, but such measure-
ments may be misleading unless it is realized that in
war first-line aeroplanes might suffice only for a sharply
diminishing offensive between, say, one moon and the next.
^ See also Vol. Ill, pp. 289-92. The question of man-power will be dealt
with in Vol. VI.
1917] THE OFFENSIVE POLICY 471
Whether or not the air casualties on the Western front
would have been fewer had the policy which directed the
employment of the squadrons been different, is a matter
which may be argued. From a consideration of German
official statistics supplied by the Reichsarchiv^ it would
appear that the offensive which was relentlessly pursued
in the air by the British air service was about four times
more costly than the defensive policy adopted by the
Germans. This is not the place for a final statement
about the respective policies. On their merits and demerits
much has already been written, but they deserve, and will
receive in the final volume of this history, careful review ;
and until the reader has the fuller facts before him he
would do well to suspend judgement.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
STATISTICS OF GERMAN AIR RAIDS ON GREAT BRITAIN, 1917-18
TABLE 'A'— AIRSHIP RAIDS
Locality
(ill general where
Total bombs dropped.
{British estimate:
No. of defence
aircraft which
Britain.
Cnsstd
proportion on London
M.P.D* in brackets).
(Lmdon M.P.D.' in
brackets).
damage.
dropped).
Number.
Weight linlb.)
Killed.
Injured.
Remarks.
See pp.
17th reb.
No bombs dropped
i6th/i7th
March
23rd/24th
May
i6th/i7th
June
s
Kent, East Sussex.
Norfolk, Suffolk,
Kent, Suffolk.
79
(includes 33
incendiary).
60
(includes 25
incendiary).
29
(includes 13
4,548
5>9S4
16
£■63
£599
,C28,'S9
■ 6
72
29
L.39 destroyed by gun-fire near Compiegne,
France. One defence aeroplane crashed, pilot
A Short seaplane failed to return, but six days
later seaplane and crew picked up in the sea.
One defence seaplane missing, pilot missing.
L.48 destroyed by Second Lieutenant L. P.
Watkins at Theberton, buflolk.
Two defence aeroplanes crashed, one pilot
8-1.
Aug.
8
East Riding.
,£2,272
(include^large
54-6
24th/z5th
Sept.
I9th/20th
Oct.
5
Yorkshire,
Midlands,
Eastern Counties,
incendiary).
(includes 18
incendiary).
(•ncludes''79'(°3)
incendiary).
11,081
30,621
36 (33)
55 (S°)
,C^,2io
£54,346
America Sea-
plane).
73
Four defence aeroplanes crashed, one missing.
L.44 destroyed by gun-fire near Luneville,
France. L.4$ destroyed by crew after forced
landing at Sisteron, France. L.4<) made a forced
landing near Bourbonne-lea-Bains, France. L.50
also landed near Bourbonne-les-Bains, France.
Ship rose with four men on board and apparently
foundered in iVIediterranean Sea. Z,.55 wrecked
at Tiefenort, Germany. Six defence aeroplanes
79-82
MaLh
I3th/i4th
March
I2th/i3th
April
S
3
Yorkshire.
West Hartlepool.
49
(includes 12
incendiary).
6,28s
2,316
■
39
£3,474
£■4,280
10
'5
Two defence aeroplanes crashed, one pilot killed.
121-2
5
5
Lincolnshire,
Northamptonshire,
Lancashire,
Wigaa,
Warwickshire,
141
(includes 4.
incendiary).
21,527
7
£".673
Two defence aeroplanes crashed, one pilot in-
jured, one pilot wounded.
.23-6
Sth/6th
5
Birmingham,
Norfolk.
Norfolk Coast.
on land.
L.70 destroyed by Major E. Cadbury (pilot) and
Captain R. Leckie (observer) off Wells-next-the-
missing. One pilot killed, two pilots missing,
one observer missing.
■3'-4
Total, 1917-18. (No. of raids in which bombs were
dropped, 9.)
Total, 1914-16. (No. of raids in which bombs were
dropped, 42.)
From Vol. Ill, App. Ill (A).
8^;^
(2=)
94,07s
(2,454)
345,9^5
(5^,844)
56
(33)
501
(■5°)
— m —
(5°)
1,224
(466)
£"7,'76
£■,410,409
Grand Total, (For 51 raids in
1914-18. dropped.)
(746)
1,358
(S'6)
£■,527,585
64'lb.'.
(55,298
i3cwt.
82 lb.)
• Note. 'M.P.D.' refers to the Metropolitan Police District which covers an area within a radius of approximately 15 miles from Charing Cross.
APPENDIX I
TABLE 'B'— AEROPLANE RAIDS, 1917-18
(N= Night)
(D=Day).
bomh Kcre dropptS).
lmlh,^hU„pp,i^^ ^^^^^^
m!p.O.* In hachil,).
Total casualties
{Undon M.P.D.' in
m.j,/drf,,,.
atct'ndid
s« pp.
Starud
(G = Gotha
R =. Giant
Coau.
JVrmfer. | migb, [in lb ).
J917
I4tl. Feb. (D)
,.1 M.rcl. (D)
16th March (N)
,7th March (D)
;th April (N)
6/7th M.y (N)
2ith May (D)
Sth June (D)
,3th June (D)
4th July (D)
7th July (D)
22„d July (D)
I2thAug.(D)
2=nd Aug. (D)
2nd Sept. (N)
3rd/+th Sept. (N)
4/ith Sept. (N)
24th Sept. (N)
2sth Sept. (N)
28th Sept. (N)
29/30th Scpt.(N
30th Sept. (N)
lit Oct. (N)
29th Oct. (N)
31.t Oct. (N)
3I.t Oct./ (N)
1st Nov.
6th Dec. (N)
l8th Dec. (N)
22nd Dec. (N)
28/29?hjfr,. (N)
29/3othJa,.. (N)
16th Feb. (N)
i7/i8th Feb. (N)
7/8th Mar. (N)
i9/20th May (N)
.7th June (D)
.8th July (D)
2olh July(D)
1 C
t C
. C
1 C
1 (seaplane)
t C
23 G
22 G
22 G
2S 0
24 G
23 G
13 G
i; G
S G
I. G
16 G
IS G
2sG
7 G
3R
.1 G
I C
r8 G
3G
(seeremar
22 G
■SG
1 R
I G
■3G
5 R
I R
6R
38 G
3 R
I C
I C
1 C
1 C
2'i G
22 G
18 G
22 G
22 G
.1 C
4 g'
9G
16 G
ISG
rS G
(see remark,
column)
7G
3R
'°c
18 G
1 G
22 G
2 R
IS G
. R
. G
7 G
3R
sR
38 G
3R
(see^remark.
I C
Deal.
Kent, Ramsgate.
Kent, Folkestone.
Essex, Kent.
Kent, Margate,
Essex, London.
Margate, London.
Harwich district.
Kent, Margate.
Kent, Margate,
Dover.
Kent, Margate,
Chatham, Shcerncss.
East Suffolk, Essex,
Kent, Dover,
Margate, London.
Kent, Dover, Essex,
Kent, London.
Suffolk.
Kent, Essex,
Kent, Margate.
Dover, Rochester,
Essex, Southend,
London.
Kent, Essex,
London.
Kent, Dover.
Kent, Thanet, Essex,
London.
Kent, Thanet,
Essex, London.
Kent, Thanet,
Essex, London,
Westgate, Broad-
Margate, Deal, '
Kent, Margate,
Ramsgate, Sheerness
Essex, London.
(ou't'sidfcounTy 0"
London area).
Kent, London.
London (County of).
Essex, Bedfordshire,
Hertfordshire,
Kent, London.
Essex, Southend,
Kent, London.
Thanet.
Thanet.
Kent Coast.
diary). ^
,28 (,i8)
'""""76 (73)
(13 dropped in sea
known).
( d "d'
kn^wnV""'
90 (57)
(at least 3 dropped
.°8'(3o)
(includes 47 (17)
bomb.).
60 (26)
(includes 21 (19)
(■ Id*'
SS t'S)
(includes I (i) in-
cendiary bomb).
9^(43)
(Include. 38 (17)
inctndiary
bombs).
81 (28)
'tcend'a
bombs). .
8
(6 dropped in sea
-weight not
"""74 (8S)
(includes <8i (48)
incendiary
423 (276)
(includes 395(267)
incendiary
bombs).
.4S (89)
(include, s. (47)
(bor^bl 'in°"sea-
weight not
62(44)
74(54)
(includes 19 (19)
■9 ('9)
35 ('7)
(■„eludefi'''ce
Dayhght reco
■33 {.33)
9,257
8,984 (8,77')
2,536
6,929 (6,S98)
3,123
3,828
4,508
2,39'
5,998 (3,s2o)
'•»T> (',529)
3,922 (9'')
2,683
4,539 (".g")
4,823 (2,868)
5, ""4 (2,58s)
547
7>9M (2,907)
7,170 (3,863)
8.'S3 (4,392)
6,633 (4,649)
6, '69 (3,964)
5,292 (3,308)
2,011 (2,01 r)
6,73' (4,4")
23,724(12,128)
inaisanee, no bombs d
Do.
'■'(')
95
13
57 (54)
32
132
■9(16)
21 ('4)
9(9)
14(13)
14(3)
I.(.l)
10(9)
8(3)
■4(13)
67 (65)
'2(12)
2' (2')
23 (23)
49 (48)
■ 5
34
432 (426)
193(190)
26
46
96
7' (56)
70 (49)
23 (22)
87 (86)
38 (31)
42 (41)
22 ('9)
28 (15)
83 (79)
i66(,59)
■ 0 (,o)
6(6)
32 (32)
39 (39)
.77(172)
^700
£45
Ci
£510
£'9,405
£S,oo3
£'29,498
£2,065
£205,622
£2,780
£9,600
£'7,145
£3,486
£3,993
£46,047
£30,818
£'6,394
£129
£23,154
£21,482
£45,570
£2
£22,822
£'03,408
£238,861
£'87,350
£8,968
£'9,264
£38,922
£42,655
£'77,3'7
23
83
133
137
.6
18
30
30
33
18
69
84
Belgium, one destroyed in combat
by R.N.A.S. Dunkirk.
One enemy aeroplane destroyed by
One British observer killed in corn-
One British observer killed ia corn-
destroyed in combat. Two de-
fence aeroplanes destroyed. British
wounded, one observer wounded.
One enemy aeroplane shot down in
the aea north of Ostend.
ing at Zcebrugge. One destroyed
by A.A. fire, one destroyed in
Type of raiding aircraft uncertain.
One enemy aeroplane missing.
One enemy aeroplane missing.
crossed the coast uncertain. Three
enemy aeroplanes destroyed by
A.A. fire. Sk wrecked on landing
in Belgium.
One enemy aeroplane destroyed by
which started, two dropped their
One enemy aeroplane caught fire
crashed and^ wrecked in Belgium.
lire and destroyed. Two made a
forced landing in Belgium as a
combat. One destroyed by A.A.
fire. Two destroyed by fire on
landing. Two damaged by forced
"^combat. Four damaged on^and-
Ing.
One defence aeroplane destroyed,
pilot killed.
Two enemy aeroplanes badly dam-
aged by forced landings on return.
Three defence aircraft crashed on
Number of raiding aeroplanes
Three enemy aeroplanes destroyed
in combat, three destroyed by
A.A. fire, one forced to land owing
18
18
18
2S
26-8
34-6
36-8
57-8
60
78-9
82- 3
83- +
8+
8s-6
88-9
103
103
103-4
116- 17
11 7- 18
127-30
130
130
Toul 1917-18. {No. of raids in which bon\bs were dropped, 33.)
Total t9t4-r6. (No. of raids in which bombs were dropped, tg.)
From Vol. Ill, App. Ill (B).
2.539 (1,072)
233 (6)
159,772(70,510)
5,049 (132)
837 (487)
'■99' (1,434)
67(10)
£1,423,019
£11,507
2,772 (■,07s)
164,821 (70,642)
69 lb! 82 lb.)
857(487)
2,058 (1,444)
£1,434,526
• Note. 'M.D.P.' refers to the Metropolitan Police District which covers an area within a radius of approximately miles from
APPENDIX II
AIR RAID STATISTICS FOR THE COUNTY OF LONDON, 1917-18*
Bcthnal Green, City,
Southwark, Pcckham,
Bermondsey, Poplar,
Shorcditch, Stoke Ncwi
Borough, and Marylebone.
Tichborne Street, Victo
Street, Strand, Regent's
Park, Holloway, Hornse
Kentish Tovm, Blackheath,
-Jottbg^Hilf^Ki^sland,
Homsey Road, Kenning-
Chelsea, Brixton, Batte
Stepney, Whitcchapel
ClerkenweU, Strand, <
Inn Road, Shorcditch, Lec,
Knightsbridge, Lai
Upper Sydenham, J
Peckhai
, Pento
Stepney, Lambeth, Somers
Town, Poplar, St. John's
Wood, Holborn, Long
Acre, Strand, Bethnal
Green, City, KenningtOHj
Wandsworth, Hackney,
and Kilbum.
Chelsea and Woolwich,
.n Road, Lewisham,
APPENDIX III
GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID ON LONDON, 13th JUNE 191 7
Bombs, Damage, and Casualties
// igh-explosive
bombs
(mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
LONDON
'K' Division.
Nnrl-h Strppf
JL^ Wl Lii I^JLlV-^Ua
I
Nil.
£ast Ham.
Park Avenue.
I
Unexploded.
Allntrnpnl"*
/illW LlllCil to,
I
Nil.
Goosley Lane.
xiL,
Nil.
VjrUUolcy X^ctlXC.
riicAaiiura i\,uau.
XXULIbCo UclIIld^CU* JV« . J W« 1 Cn» Iflj**
T m ^7 W rVi
Allnfmpnf"?
I
JxdIlLllllC ixUaU.
Alr^<»t•i■ T^rt/^l^e
ixoyai /viDeri. j^/ocks.
CU ^ ffi J M 1 J J
oned, oiTices, and railway stock damaged j
windows of Seamen s Hospital broken.
JC ' 8 m Tfti • n m
*^ XXX. A. Il/J . . U XXX.
L^ustom rlouse.
Windows broken 5 tramcar damaged*
Freemason's Road.
ini ' T m /I w T c\\
■* II' J . • X XXX. ^ VV . X ^xx.
"Rprlf fnn
A/I anni'wji V Kfifm
J
TTnpvnlnrlpfl
W XXViVLIXWUV^Vi.
Canning Town.
X lldllll^O XI \^1X VV ^1 IVD.
2
Nil.
Plaistow.
Eastern Road.
Windows broken m several nouses. A..1
2 w. Inj. '. 5 w. I ch.
porest Oate.
OCUcrL JxUaU.
XT.UUoC!> UctxIl.ctgCU. inj,. 0 III. 1 lllClUUlllg
T Qolnipr 1 w T r-n
1 oUxviiCX J ^ W. I Cil.
r Y \/V/lXCX AXX&V.^ XX^^CIU.
I
Nil.
Bow.
Wellington Road.
vjlass broken J garden damaged.
Union Castle Co.'s
I
In river.
Wharf, Bow Creek.
Poplar.
Woodstock Road.
I
Houses damaged. X^. : i m.
Wade Street.
I
Houses damaged.
Upper North Street
I
Schools and houses damaged. K.: 1% ch.
(schools).
Inj. : 2 m. 2 w. 30 ch.
Swale Street.
I
Houses damaged.
Morant Street.
Houses damaged. X. : i m. i w. i ch.
Inj.: I m. 5 w.
476 GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
L.uiNJJUi\ [com. J
Limehouse.
Burdett Road.
2
Houses damaged. One bomb unexploded
Commercial Road.
Town Hall, houses, and church dam-
aged. K.: I m. Inj.: 5 m. 3 w.
Copenhagen Place.
2
Oil and cake mills damaged. K.: 2 m.
Inj.: I m. I w.
Salmon Lane.
I
Houses damaged. Inj.: 5 m. (including
2 constables) 2 w. i ch.
Regent's Canal, near
I
Unexploded.
Commercial Road.
Stratford.
Carpenters Road.
I
House damaged. AT. : i m.
Angel Lane.
Nil.
Broadway.
J
L9ll\JLJ \lamac.\,\X Uy ill J V • • ill*
The Grove, St. John's
I
Nil. K.: 1 m. Inj.: 4 m. 2 w.
Churchyard.
The Grove.
House damaged.
*T~r* T^TVTCTr^Kr
in x^iVioiUiN*
Tower Hill.
The Mint.
Mechanic's shop damaged. K.: 4 m.
Inj. : 30 m.
Tower.
The Moat.
Unexploded.
Mountford Street.
I
Houses damaged.
Mulberry Street.
I
House damaged.
Whitechapel.
High Street and
2
House damaged. K. : i ch.
Half Moon Passage.
Church Lane.
I
Nil. X!.: 3 m. I ch. Inj.: 2 m. i w. 2 eh.
Fire Station,
I
Building damaged. K.: i m. Inj.: 3 m.
Commercial Road.
(including i soldier) i w. i ch.
Adler Street.
I
House damaged. K.: i m.
Plumber's Row.
Two houses demolished; others dam-
aged. K.: I w. Inj. : I m. 2 w. 4 ch.
Stepney.
Grosvenor Street.
I
Houses damaged. K.: i w. i ch. Inj.:
3 m. (including i constable) 5 w.
Spitalfields.
1
Flower and Dean
1
I
House damaged. K.: 1 ch. Inj.: 3 m.
Street.
I w.
Bethnal Green.
Fashion Street.
Factory damaged.
Ducal Street.
House damaged; room wrecked.
Gibraltar Walk.
I
House destroyed. K.: 2 w. 6 ch. Inj.:
5 w. 1 1 ch.
Camlet Street.
I
i In roadway.
ON LONDON, 13TH JUNE 1917
477
High-explosive
botnbs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight) .
LONDON {cont.)
Thorold Street.
I
Rochelle Street.
I
*G' Division.
Hoxton.
Appold Street.
2
Curtain Road.
1
Great Eastern
3
Street.
Chiswell Street.
I
Golden Lane.
I
Bunhill Row.
I
Vestry Street.
3
Moneyer Street.
I
East Road.
5
Provost Street
I
Central Street.
5
Peartree Street.
2
Eastwick Street.
I
Shoreditch.
Charlotte Street.
I
Tabernacle Square.
Tabernacle Street.
I
Cowper Street.
I
Little Leonard
I
Street.
French Place.
I
Old Street.
I
Dodsley's Folly.
I
Great Chart Street.
I
Styman Street.
I
Willow Street.
City.
Liverpool Street
3
Station.
Billiter Square.
2
Bishopsgate.
I
Damage and casualties.
Fell through a house.
Houses damaged. Inj.: 7 m. 5 w. 10 ch.
6 m.
Inj. :
Damage to buildings.
Houses damaged. ^. : 2 m. Inj.:
I w.
Houses damaged. K.: i w. Inj.:
3 w. 2 ch.
Brewery damaged. Inj.-. 1 m.
House damaged.
House damaged. Inj. : i m.
Mission Hall and houses damaged.
8 m. I w. 6 ch.
House damaged.
Houses damaged.
House damaged.
Houses damaged. K. : 6. m. (including
I constable) 4 w. 2 ch. Inj. : 8 m. 3 ch.
Houses damaged.
Foundry damaged.
Factory burnt out. Inj. : 2 m.
Fire station and houses damaged. K.:
1 m. I ch. Inj. : 4 m. I w.
House damaged. K.i i ch.
School damaged. One bomb unex-
ploded.
Shop and houses damaged. K.: 3 m.
Inj. : 4 m. I w. I ch.
Printing works damaged.
Nil. Inj. : 2 m. I ch.
Houses damaged. Inj. : 3 w.
Technical Institute and houses dam-
aged. K.: I w. Inj. : 2 w. I ch.
Nil. Inj.: i m.
Two trains wrecked, station damaged
One bomb unexploded. K.: 16 m
(including 4 soldiers). Inj.: 15 m
(including 4 soldiers).
Unexploded. Buildings damaged. K.
2 m. Inj. : i m.
Top story of offices wrecked. Inj.
2 m. I w.
478 GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID
LONDON {cont.)
Fenchurch Street.
Aldgate, High
Street.
Aldgate, District
Railway.
Creechurch Lane.
St. Mary Axe.
Maiden Lane.
Paternoster Square.
Charles Street,
Bridgewater Square.
Allhallows Church-
yard, London Wall.
Beech Court.
'J' Division.
Dalston.
Woodville Road.
Mathias Road.
Mayville Street.
St. Peter's Street.
'E' Division.
Saffron Hill.
'M' Division.
Southwark.
Sumner Street.
Duke Street.
Bermondsey.
Staple Street.
Tanners Street.
Horney Lane.
Larnaca Street.
Powell's Yard,
Tooley Street.
T otal:
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
Three floors of building demolished.
J^.: 15 m. 5 w. Inj.: 12 m. i w. I ch.
Burst on pavement; windows broken. K. :
9 m. 2 w. 2 ch. Inj.: 12 m. 6 w. 4 ch.
Nil.
Top story of building demolished.
Inj.'. I m.
Slight damage to building. K.x i m.
Fur merchant's premises wrecked. Inj. :
3 m. I w. 2 ch.
Warehouses damaged. K.: i ch. Inj.:
14 m. 5 w. 3 ch.
Unexploded.
Unexplodcd. Nil.
Foundry yard damaged. K.: % m.
Inj. : 10 m.
House damaged. K.: i w. 4 ch. Inj.:
2 m. I w. 2 ch.
Houses damaged. Inj.: 4 m. (including
I soldier) 2 w. i ch.
Nil.
House damaged. Inj.: i ch.
Printing works and houses damaged by
fire. Inj. : 2 m. i w.
Demolished ground floor store and
storeroom. AI.: i w. 2 ch. Inj.\ 6 m.
13 w. 5 ch.
Unexploded. House damaged.
Factory damaged. A^. : 3 m. Inj.: i m.
Nil.
Tan yard damaged. Inj. : 4 m.
Nil. Inj.: i w.
Unexploded. Nil.
K.'. 92 m. 25 w. 43 ch. Inj.: 212 m.
98 w. 98 ch.
ON LONDON, 13T11 JUNE 191 7 479
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
KENT
Margate.
ESSEX
5
Nil. htj.: I m. I w. 2 ch. 2 bombs
unexploded.
Barling.
Shoeburyness.
I
4
Nil.
Nil. Inj.: i m. i ch.
Total:
128
K.: 92 m. 25 w. 43 ch. Inj.: 214 m.
99 w. loi ch.
By Anti-aircraft Fire (totals)
Shells.
Damage and casualties.
Various districts.
Number not
known.
Houses damaged. K.: 2 m. Inj. : 6 m.
II w. I ch.
Total casualties:
1
H.E. Bombs.
A.A. Fire.
K.: 92 m. 25 w. 43 ch. = 160
Inj.: 214 m. 99 w. loi ch. = 414
K.: 2va. =2
Inj.: 6 m. II w. I ch. = 18
Grand Total:
K.: 94 m. 25 w. 43 ch. == 162
Inj.: 220 m. no w. 102 ch. = 432
Note. To above casualties must be added:
Killed— C^iT^tsan C. H. C. Keevil, Royal Flying Corps.
APPENDIX IV
METHODS SUGGESTED FOR THE PREVENTING OF AIR
RAIDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
[Memorandum of Major-General H. M. Trenchard, prepared for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, June 2917]
Before attempting to lay down methods, the following points must be
understood :
(a) To keep one machine in the air all day requires five machines and
five pilots at least.
{h) It is no good suggesting methods which the present limitation of
aircraft would prevent being carried out regularly and systematically, such
as choosing an objective outside the normal range of the machine.
(c) The least effective and most expensive way of protecting a place like
London is to have constant patrols.
48o METHODS FOR PREVENTING AIR
{d) The limitation of the output of pilots, machines, and engines owing
first to the shortage of labour and secondly to the shortage of raw material.
The following methods are suggested:
1. To capture the Belgian Coast up to Holland.
2. Landing people with explosives to set fire to sheds at night.
3. Reprisals.
4. Patrols.
1. Capture of the Coast.
With regard to this, the advantages are:
{a) If the coast was captured the German machines would then have to
cross our lines or pass over neutral country. If they crossed our lines they
would be engaged by our anti-aircraft guns; they would have to pass over
our aerodromes, and our fast machines would be able to see them and go up
and engage them over the latter long before they got to England. The
Germans would also have to come back the same way, again being engaged
both by aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
(b) They would also be more easily seen and warnings could be sent to
England.
(c) Their landing-grounds would be further away from England.
2. Landing People at Night.
The advantages of this system are:
{a) Very few machines are required to do this. Two or three machines
could land in the vicinity of a big aerodrome on a really good moonlight
night and set fire to the sheds.
{b) If these big bombing machines which the Germans are using could
be burnt, it would take some considerable time to provide new ones.
The disadvantages are:
{a) It could not be done except on a good night.
{b) It is impossible to say on which aerodrome the machines might be.
Even if a squadron is located at one aerodrome, there is nothing to prevent
it from moving to another unknown to us.
{c) If the sheds were set alight and destroyed it would only be possible
to do this once or twice before the sheds were heavily protected and if
unsuccessful the first time it would probably fail again at subsequent
attempts.
{d) The man landed would have to trust to get through to Holland
to get away and probably this would be impossible, but no doubt we could
get volunteers for it.
3. Reprisals (by a few machines or by large organized squadrons).
The advantages of this method are :
{a) The German population is more easily moved by having their own
country touched than the English population.
RAIDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 481
(b) The first method is to use a few machines which could be made
available in England and sent out to us here to go long distances such as
to Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Coblenz and to send one or two of these
machines with selected pilots to drop bombs and papers warning them
that more machines would be sent as was done in the case of the French
bombing raid on Freiburg. This might have some effect without entail-
ing the use of large forces as single machines would have a greater chance
of getting through and back again without being seen, and this could be
done at once.
{c) The G.O.C. the German Flying Corps has stated that the distant
towns are out of reach of British machines, and he has assured the whole
country of this.
{d) This might have a great effect on the enemy as it might make him
withdraw a certain number of machines, and certainly withdraw pilots
for the local defence of towns.
The disadvantages are :
(a) There are no army machines in France with sufficient range to be
able to carry out raids on Prussian towns, but this difficulty would be got
over by improvised machines. There are a certain number of machines in this
country that would be able to carry out raids on the Southern German
towns such as Freiburg, but there are machines which could be provided
from home, if the information I have been supplied with is correct (such as
the De Hav. 4 with B.H.P. engine and 5 J hours petrol), but these machines
could not bomb the far distant towns except on favourable occasions.
(p) To organize bombing squadrons with a large range on a large scale
would take a considerable time.
{c) Another disadvantage of reprisals is they would only lead to further
reprisals from the enemy. We must be prepared, if reprisal methods are to
be adopted, to carry it through and outlast the enemy. They would
always defeat us at reprisals unless we put forth our whole energy and this
would seriously interfere with the supply of the machines necessary for
artillery work.
4. Patrols.
I will discuss these rather generally from the point of view of three
possible systems :
{a) Constant patrols protecting London, the English Coast, or the Coast
out here. The patrolling of these areas would mean a large number of
machines, and even then, as the air is so vast, it would still be compara-
tively easy for the German machines to get to London without having
been seen or caught by any of our patrols on the way. This method might,
of course, with luck, intercept the machines and either bring them down
or drive them back. This has been proved without a doubt during the
last two years of fighting on the Western front. The system would,
however, lock up a very large number of machines and pilots on a purely
defensive plan which would never stop an aggressive enemy.
{b) Another system of patrols would be to patrol over the enemy's
2504-5 I i
482 METHODS FOR PREVENTING AIR RAIDS
aerodromes to watch for machines leaving. This would also entail a large
number of machines and in addition they would either have to patrol
under the fire of the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, or if they kept at such
a height that the guns could not do much harm then the aerodrome
would very often be out of sight. It would be very hard to know whether
our machines were patrolling over the right aerodromes, as during the
summer the enemy has many temporary aerodromes, and all our informa-
tion goes to prove that they move their machines constantly from one
aerodrome to another. Temporary aerodromes are made fairly easily
during the dry weather.
(c) A third system of patrolling would be to have one or two machines
with long-range wireless to patrol the Coast from Dunkirk to Holland
watching for the German machines to come out to sea. This, of course,
has the same drawback as the first system of patrolling, i.e. the machine
would probably not see the enemy, but, of course, if he did see them and
sent his wireless message England would be warned earher and also
Dunkirk, at both of which places a special group of fast machines could
be located ready to go up and attempt to follow and attack the raiders.
This might be successful at times, but it is not a sure method.
Other methods which have been suggested are:
The constant bombing of German aerodromes. But I would point
out that during the whole time we have been on the Western Front only
once has a bomb hit one of our hangars, on this occasion it destroyed five
machines. We have bombed the enemy's aerodromes a great number of
times, but I do not suppose we have destroyed more than one hundred
of his machines in this way, as even if we do hit a shed it is probably a small
one containing one machine only, as many German aerodromes have this
type of shed.
Daylight bombing from a height is still very inaccurate and though
large towns and big stations are easy to hit, it is very hard to hit a small
individual shed.
The chief point to remember is that practically none of our machines
have got the necessary range or tank capacity for long-distance bombing.
It should be remembered that over a year ago we asked that, as soon as the
Army had been supplied with the necessary number of machines to enable
the Army's operations to be carried out efficiently, ten bombing squadrons
should be provided with a view to carrying out this sort of work. I regret
to say we are apparently nowhere near receiving these latter squadrons as
we have not yet got the necessary number of machines to meet the needs
of the Army.
15th June 1917.
APPENDIX V
GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID ON LONDON, yth JULY 1917
Bombs, Damage, and Casualties
LONDON
(Cuy)
Aldersgate Street.
Shaftesbuiy Place.
Cherry Tree Court,
Aldersgate Street.
Barbican, in roadway
opposite Australian
Avenue.
Aldermanbury.
Coleman Street.
Lothbury.
Bartholomew Close.
Cox's Court, Little
Britain.
Little Britain.
Central Telegraph
Office.
Whittington Avenue,
Leadenhall Street.
Leadenhall Street.
Creechurch Lane.
Fenchurch Street.
Lime Street.
Near Moorgate Street
Station, Metropoli-
tan Railway.
Red Lion Wharf,
Upper Thames
Street.
Synagogue, Duke
Street, Houndsditch.
2/3 Lower Thames
Street.
H igh-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
Damage to offices.
Nil.
Warehouse damaged.
Unexploded.
Unexploded. Damage to top story of
warehouse.
Damage to shops and offices. Inj. : i m.
Two floors of bank damaged. Inj. : 4 m.
Warehouses burnt out, and neighbour-
ing premises damaged. K.: 5 m. Inj.:
3 m. I w.
Warehouses damaged. K.: i m.
4 w.
Severe damage to warehouse.
Roof and floor below demolished.
I m. (soldier). Inj.
I soldier).
Unexploded. Archway
aged.
Shops and warehouses damaged. One
bomb unexploded.
Houses damaged.
Ironmongers' Hall- shops and offices
damaged. One bomb unexploded.
K. : I m.
Roof and upper floors seriously damaged.
Inj.: I m.
Unexploded.
K.
4 m. (including
slightly dam-
Slight damage.
Slight damage.
Buildings seriously damaged. K.: 4 m.
Inj. : 6 m. I ch.
484
GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID
LONDON
{City) {cont.)
Church of St. Ed-
mund, Lombard
Street.
Baltic Exchange,
24 St. Mary Axe.
METROPOLITAN
AREA
'Cj' Division.
Shoreditch.
Gifford Street.
Styman Street.
Vincent Street.
Murray Street.
Herbert Street.
Britannia Street.
Cavendish Street.
Wenlock Road.
Whitecross Street.
Junction of Haber-
dasher Street and
East Road.
Golden Lane.
Goswell Road.
Old Street.
Junction of Goswell
Road and Powell
Street.
Chiswell Street.
Artillery Ground
(H.A.C.), Finsbury.
*H' Division.
Bishopsgate Goods
Station.
Code Street,
Bethnal Green.
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
Unexploded. Damage to roof and
adjoining premises. Inj. : i w.
Slight damage to roof and ground floor.
Houses damaged. A!^. : i m. i ch. Inj.:
I m. 2 w. 2 ch.
Houses damaged. A^. : i w.
Unexploded. Slight damage.
Houses damaged. K. 2 m. Inj.: 2 m.
(soldiers) 4 w. 2 ch.
Houses damaged. K.: i w. Inj.: 3 m.
1 w. I ch.
Houses damaged. Inj.: 2 ch
Houses damaged. K.: i m. \ ch. Inj.:
3 m. 6 w. 6 ch.
Timber yard, zinc mills, and houses
damaged. AT. : 3 m. Inj.: 6 m.
Houses damaged. K.: i m. Inj.: 2 m.
2 ch.
Houses damaged.
Houses damaged. : 2 m. Inj.: 14 m.
4 w. I ch.
Houses damaged. Inj. : i w.
House damaged.
Unexploded.
Houses damaged. Inj. : 4 m.
Unexploded.
Damage to archways, buildings, and
houses. Inj. : 2 m.
Houses damaged. Inj.: 2 m. 2 w. 6 ch.
ON LONDON, 7TII JULY 1917 485
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly of 50-
/vy, ci/ciyrjij.
l^drntiyt! Clrt'C^ CU-ol'f'Ul'li'Co*
METROPOLITAN
AREA (cont.)
Buxton Street,
I
Nil.
Spitalfields.
1 ower xiiii.
I
Houses damaged; 3 horses killed. K.:
7 m. I ch. Inj.: 14 m. i w.
Nightingale Lane,
I
Houses damaged; i horse killed. Inj.:
Wapping.
I m.
'J' Division.
Dalston.
Boleyn Road.
I
Houses damaged. K.: 5 m. 2 w. 2 ch.
Inj.: 3 w. 6 ch.
Kingsbury Road
I
Nil.
(West London
Jewish
Cemetery).
North London
I
Unexploded.
Railway (near
Mildmay Park
Station).
*M' Division.
Newcomen Road,
I
Houses damaged.
Southwark.
Battle Bridge Lane,
I
Unexploded. House damaged.
Bermondsey.
'N' Division.
Field near
4
Nil.
Tottenham Gas
Works.
Field near Old
I
Surface drain of Metropolitan Water
Church Road,
Board damaged.
Chingford.
Vegetable Oil
2
Buildings damaged; one horse killed.
Extraction Co.,
Angel Road,
Edmonton.
Cowper Road,
I
Houses damaged.
Stoke Newington.
St. Matthias Vicarage,
I
Damage to glass and brickwork. Houses
Wordsworth Road,
damaged.
Stoke Newington,
Ponders End Sewage
I
Nil.
Farm,
486 GERMAN AEROPLANE RAID ON LONDON
High-explosive
bombs
{mostly oj
kg. weight).
Damage and casualties.
METROPOLITAN
AREA {com.)
'Y' Division.
Wallers Court, near
Pancras Road.
Midland Railway
Goods Depot.
Ossulston Street,
Somers Town.
In waste ground
between Wharf Road
and Battle Bridge
Road.
I
I
I
Mouses damaged. K.: i m. Inj.: 2 m.
I ch.
Uncxploded. Broken glass and damage
to roadway.
Nil.
'T.A.' Division.
Barge Glen cairn
moored in Thames
off Cotton's Wharf.
In river off Billings-
gate Fish Market.
I
Barge sunk. Premises on shore damaged
by concussion.
Pier damaged. Premises on shore
damaged by concussion.
MARGATE
3
Houses damaged. K.: i m. 2 w. Inj.:
2 w. I ch.
Total:
76
K.: 36 m. 6 w. 5 ch. Inj.: 75 m. 32 w.
31 ch.
By Anti-aircraft Fire (totals)
Shells
Damage and casualties
Various districts.
52
Houses damaged. 4 m. 3 w, 3 ch.
Inj.: 23 m. 13 w. 19 ch.
Total casualties:
( H.E. Bombs.
|a.A. fire.
K. 36 m. 6 w. 5 ch. = 47
Inj.: m. 32 w. 31 ch. = 138
^. : 4 m. 3 w. 3 ch. = 10
Inj.: 23 m. 13 w. 19 ch. = 55
Grand Total:
K.: 40 m. 9 w. 8 ch. = 57
Inj.: 98 m. 45 w. 50 ch. = 193
Note. To above casualties must be added:
Killed: Second Lieutenant W. G. Salmon and Lieutenant J. E. R. Young,
Royal Flying Corps.
Wounded: Captain J. Palethorpe and No. 21547 2nd Air-Mechanic C. C.
Taylor, Royal Flying Corps.
APPENDIX VI
HOME DEFENCE
[Report of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts^s Committee, July
1. The War Cabinet at their l8ist meeting held on the lith July 191 7,
decided (Minute 3) :
'That the Prime Minister and General Smuts in consultation with
'representatives of the Admiralty, General Staff and Field-Marshal
'Commanding-in-Chief Home Forces, with other such experts as they
'may desire should examine :
'i. The defence arrangements for Home Defence against air raids.
'ii. The air organization generally and the direction of aerial operations.'
2. We regard the first subject for our examination as the more pressing
and we deal with it accordingly in this first report, so far as the defence
of the metropolitan area is concerned.
The second subject of our inquiry is the more important and will
consequently require more extensive and deliberate examination. We
propose to deal with it in a subsequent report.
3. London occupies a peculiar position in the Empire of which it is the
nerve centre, and we consider, in the circumstances, that its defence
demands exceptional measures. It is probable that the air raids on London
will increase to such an extent in the next twelve months that London
might through aerial warfare become part of the battle front. We think,
therefore, that it is necessary to take special precautions, so far as the
defence of London is concerned, and so far as this may be done without
undue prejudice to operations in the Field and on the High Seas, as the
fighting forces must, as a matter of general principle have the first call
upon our output of aircraft and anti-aircraft guns.
4. The arrangements for Home Defence, including that of the London
area, against hostile air raids, have been undergoing a continual and rapid
transformation, which, together with other causes, has militated against
efficiency. In the first instance, attacks were made by Zeppelins at night
and our defences were so organized as to deal with this form of attack.
Anti-aircraft guns, singly or in pairs, or in large numbers, were placed at
convenient points, and aeroplanes of no great power or speed were disposed
at suitable centres.
After some modification, the original dispositions were found to be ade-
quate to meet night attacks by Zeppelins. We have, however, now to
meet attacks of an entirely different character, which take the form of
invasions by squadrons of aeroplanes in formation and our arrangements
for defence are accordingly being adapted to meet this development.
One cannot, however, entirely preclude the possibility of a repetition
of Zeppelin attacks, and it would consequently be unwise to abandon the
earlier defence arrangements. Additions to these arrangements are, however,
necessitated by the new 'formation attack' by day. The defence against
Zeppelins was effectually carried out, not only by individual anti-aircraft
guns, but also by single aeroplanes fitted with special armament.
488 HOME DEFENCE
As operations were conducted by night, there was no question of for-
mation either for attack or defence. Now, however, that the attack is
made by day by large enemy units in formation, one or two anti-aircraft
guns firing from any particular point cannot hope to cause serious damage,
and generally have no other effect than that of frightening the enemy
pilots, while the defending aircraft, unless they can also operate in formation,
are liable to very serious risk and cannot do much more than hover round
the outskirts of the enemy formation. An attack in formation could, we
think, only be properly met by a barrage fire from guns concentrated in
batteries at suitable points in front of the area to be defended, or by
flights or squadrons whose object is, by concentrated attack, to break up
the hostile formation and destroy individual machines after they have
been scattered out of their formation.
5. The relevance of these remarks is well illustrated by what happened
in the air raid over London on Saturday, 7th July. The enemy machines
attacked in definite formation which they maintained throughout the
raid. In our view they should have been met and repelled by a heavy
barrage of gun-fire before they reached London. Instead of this they were
only subjected to a sporadic gun-fire in the London area which did them
no observable damage. As regards aeroplanes on that occasion, we actually
disposed of a larger number of first-class machines than the enemy, but
our machines were distributed among a number of stations and some of
them came in in driblets from various training centres.
Our machines were not in formation when in the air, and even when
they attempted to concentrate they did not come under a unified command
in the air, nor have they been trained so to fight. The result was that their
very spasmodic or guerrilla attacks failed to make an impression on the
solid formation of the enemy, and the damage that was done by our superior
numbers of first-class R.F.C. machines was comparatively negligible.
We have investigated the circumstances in some detail and are informed
that the reasons why greater results were not achieved were that some of
our pilots were not accustomed to the new machines they were flying,
that certain machines were not used because of missing spare parts, and
a certain amount of shells that were fired were useless on account of defec-
tive fuses. These defects should, and can be remedied with all possible
speed, but it is to the general arrangements and organization that we wish
to refer more fully.
6. Four separate agencies contribute to the defence of the London
area against air raid:
{a) Royal Naval Air Service, which is not under the Home Command,
but works under the direction of the senior naval officers in the naval
districts, but in co-operation as far as possible, with the Home Defences.
There seems to be a general agreement among those whom we have
consulted that for the limited purpose of the defence of London, the
present division of command in this respect should not be disturbed.
The principal function of the Royal Naval Air Service Squadrons is
to deal with enemy raiders on their return journey, as they recross the
Channel. They did so very effectively on the occasion of the last raid, and
HOME DEFENCE 489
after consideration of all the circumstances, we are disposed to think that
the above squadrons should continue to operate under separate Naval
Commands, but in close co-operation with the Home Defence.
{h) The Observation Corps (distinct from the Royal Flying Corps or
Royal Naval Air Service), which consists of a number of observers round
London, mostly infantry soldiers, often elderly and not specially qualified
for the duties they have to perform.
This Corps is directly under orders of the Field-Marshal Commanding
Home Defences.
{c) Various incomplete units or single inachines of the Royal Flying Corps
allocated to Home Defence, under the Command of Colonel Higgins.
{d) The anti-aircraft guns of the London area under the command of
Colonel Simon.
7. The last three agencies operate separately under orders of the Home
Defence head-quarters which is the only connecting link between them.
This system appears to us to involve too great a dispersal of Command
when dealing with a problem like the air defence of the London area,
which is not only of very far-reaching military and political importance,
but also constitutes a well marked, distinct task, separable from other
problems of Home Defence, which accordingly calls for a corresponding
concentration of executive command.
Our first recommendation therefore is that :
Subject to the control of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the
Home Forces^ a senior officer of first-rate ability and practical air experi-
ence should be placed in executive Command of the air defence of the London
area including the above services (b) (c) (d) of paragraph 6 above, and that
this officer should be assisted by a small but competent staff, who should
be specially charged with the duty of working out all plans for London
A ir Defences.
This officer would take his instructions from the Field-Marshal and would
in turn issue his orders to the Observation Corps, the Officer Commanding
the anti-aircraft guns, and the various Air Units. The unity of command
which is essential to any warlike operation, whether of an ofYensive or
defensive character, would be thus achieved. We think that this officer
should be appointed without delay so that he may at once set to work to deal
with the various pressing problems connected with London air defence,
some of which are referred to below.
In view of the possibility of the recurrence of Zeppelin attack, as well
as for other reasons, we think it would be inadvisable to remove the anti-
aircraft guns from their present stations in the London area. In our view,
the best defensive use of anti-aircraft guns against hostile aeroplanes
attacking by day, would be for them to put up a barrage in front of and
covering London, and our second recommendation accordingly is that :
Immediate attention should be given to the question of the numbers and
disposition of anti-aircraft guns to put up such a defensive barrage.
It is true that there is at present said to be an insufficiency of guns for
490 HOME DEFENCE
this purpose but, as stated in paragraph 3 above, we regard the defence
of London as so important as to call for exceptional measures, and special
endeavours should therefore be made to provide an adequate number of
guns for this purpose.
8. A more pressing problem, in our opinion, is the provision and organi-
zation of a sufficient number of air units, trained to fight in formation, and
their proper disposition to dispel any air attack on London. At present
the only reliable unit formed for this purpose is the squadron specially
detailed a week ago from the Western front. Three other units are
in process of formation, but they neither have the necessary number of
machines nor have the pilots the required training for fighting in forma-
tion. We understand that an additional squadron, complete in point of
numbers, will be furnished almost immediately and posted to the North-
East of London. Another squadron to be disposed to the South-East
should be complete in numbers in three or four weeks. Both of these will,
however, require to be properly trained to manoeuvre in formation in
suitable units. Our third recommendation therefore is that:
The completion and training of these three additional squadrons, successively,
be pushed on as rapidly as possible and that, in the meantime, the return
of the first unit to France should not be sanctioned until the air defence
of London is reasonably secure.
9. In the course of our investigation, we considered the point whether
our present type of fighting machine is the best to cope with the slower but
more powerful Gotha raiders. In regard to this we make no recommenda-
tions and leave the problem for the further consideration and study of the
experts of the Air Board, the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Ministry
of Munitions.
10. The question of the provision of sufficient aircraft for defence
purposes and for the formation of a reserve is one which, in our view,
requires careful and immediate consideration. The enemy may possibly
adopt the ruse of sending a small number of machines well in advance of his
main attack in order to lure our squadrons into the air; the main enemy
force may then appear on the scene and find himself unchecked, owing to
the fact that our machines in coping with the advanced patrols had ex-
hausted their petrol, and our pilots, their energy. We are advised that,
theoretically, for our machines in the air to descend, refill with petrol, and
reascend to the proper height, would take some 45 minutes, but in practice
other factors would supervene and the actual time taken would be con-
siderably longer. The result might well be that the main enemy force
would meet with practically no opposition, and after doing the maximum
amount of damage, might return to its base with immunity and intact.
In view of such a situation, which might well arise at any time, we submit
that it might be advisable to avoid sending up more units than are necessary
on the first warning of a coming raid. Such a contingency we think must
be contemplated and to meet it reserves should be kept in hand. We
accordingly recommend that :
The air defence units for the London area should he sufficient not only to cope
HOME DEFENCE 491
with feints, but to meet the real attack or a possible second attack follow-
ing close on a first attack.
The formation and retention of such a reserve is only in accordance with
the general and elementary principles of warfare.
II. We believe that if prompt effect is given to the above recommenda-
tions, subject always to the adequate and reasonable provision of aircraft
for naval and military operations by land and sea, a fair measure of security
for the London area from hostile raids may be obtained until, at any rate,
some unforeseen development takes place.
APPENDIX VII
NIGHT AIR RAIDS ON LONDON
[Memorandum of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, September 1917^
The recent night air raids on the London area have formed the subject
of repeated discussion between the Air Board, the Home Defence Staff
and myself, and it will be useful to summarize the principal considerations
and conclusions provisionally come to.
It is interesting to note how the enemy is changing the form of his
attack as our defence develops. In view of our defences and his consequent
losses he is no longer repeating the Zeppelin night attacks. Again, since
the sensational aeroplane day raid on London last July our defences
against that form of attack have been rapidly pushed forward, and in their
recent attempts the raiders have not been able to penetrate the line of
our coast defences by day. "
The enemy has now at last resorted to the form of attack which our
air commanders have long anticipated, and which it is most difficult to
meet — viz. night attacks by aeroplanes. This form of attack we have for
a long time now been carrying out with comparative impunity against
his aerodromes, depots, bases, and lines of communication in France and
Belgium. Almost every night tons of explosives are dropped by our aero-
planes on these objectives, and the enemy has as yet developed no means
of meeting this attack. Again, the enemy not infrequently crosses our
lines at the front by night for the purpose of bombing objectives in our
rear, and it is admitted that so far no form of defence against these raids
has proved adequate.
Although the recent night attacks on London were made in bright
moonlight, there is no reason why such attacks should not be attempted
even on dark nights, so long as other weather conditions are favourable.
The line of the Thames would furnish sufficient guidance to the raiders
even on a dark night, and the working of our searchlights would indicate
to them even at a great distance the total London area for which they are
making; but of course it would not be possible for them to distinguish
any particular locality or objective under such conditions, and the bombing
would have to be general instead of being directed to specific objectives.
492 NIGHT AIR RAIDS ON LONDON
Cloudy, rainy or uncertain weather would form very unfavourable con-
ditions for night raids, and no development of this form of attack on
London on any very large scale need be anticipated until next spring and
summer, although repetitions of these attacks should be anticipated as
long as the autumn weather remains favourable, and there is consequently
time to develop our methods of countering these attacks.
So long as we are adopting merely defensive measures, however, it will
be most difficult to prevent these raids, and they may even assume larger
proportions and inflict more damage and destruction than hitherto. Our
aeroplanes afford no means of defence at night as they find it impossible
to see the enemy machines even at a distance of a couple of hundred yards.
In the recent night raids they have been sent into the air but to no purpose,
and they might just as well have remained on the ground. They are
at night useful only against very large and conspicuous objectives, like
Zeppelins, once these have been picked up by them. On moonlight nights
our anti-aircraft guns are not much use either, as the moonlight neutralizes
the searchlights and makes it very difficult for them to pick up the enemy
aeroplanes. In raids on dark nights both searchlights and anti-aircraft guns
could be used more effectively.
Hitherto only two measures of defence have been suggested against
these night raids, both of which will be tried in the London area. The
first is the use of more powerful searchlights, whose blinding effect on the
pilots will, it is hoped, be such that it will be impossible for them to navi-
gate their machines. A certain number of these powerful searchlights arc
now being secured both from France and from the Navy. It must, how-
ever, be seen how far it will be possible for the enemy pilots to neutralize
their effect by wearing smoked glasses.
The second means of defence wliich has been suggested and with which
experiments are now being made is the establishment of a wire screen
suspended from balloons and intended to form a sort of barrage in which
the enemy machine navigated at night will be caught. It is said that
a similar device at Venice has been useful against Austrian night raids.
At Venice light balloons are used from each of which (at a height of about
10,000 feet) a wire hangs suspended, a sufficient number of such balloons
and wires forming the screeen or barrage. With larger balloons connected
together it may be possible to have not only perpendicular but also cross
wires, and with this idea General Ashmore is now experimenting. To
carry this plan into effect, it will be necessary to release a certain number
of our large captive balloons from the front and inquiries to this end are
now being conducted. It will take some time before it will be known to
what extent either or both of the above measures will furnish any reliable
defence against night air raids.
The question of shelters and protection for life has also been discussed.
It is generally agreed that the time has not yet come to construct dug-outs
or special shelters, and it is hoped that they will never become necessary.
London has sufficient basements and underground cellars to accommodate
the population against all immediate dangers. All that is necessary at the
present stage is that by means of the Press the public be kept fully and
NIGHT AIR RAIDS ON LONDON 493
continuously advised and warned by the Home Office to retire to houses
and basements on the first signal of danger. Every raid should be followed
by an official notification of its lessons.
It is possible that a development of these attacks on a larger scale and
consequent loss of life may hereafter justify the adoption of further
measures and even of a certain amount of compulsion, either under Martial
Law or the Defence of the Realm Acts. But so far it cannot be said that
the public have unduly ignored the notices and warnings issued to them,
and it would be premature at this stage to adopt drastic measures.
Careful attention should be given to the probability of the enemy
resorting in future raids to the use of gas shells on a larger scale than
hitherto, and to the proper measures that should be taken and suitable
notices that should be issued to provide against such a contingency. It
may be necessary in the above notices to provide for the closing of windows
and doors until not only the raid is passed but also the danger of gassing
is passed. At any rate it is a real danger against which it would be wise to
take precautions in time. As gas shells are largely used by the enemy at
the front, we have full information as to the measure of gassing that might
be expected from an air raid in the neighbourhood of crowded houses or
areas.
It is felt that the above-mentioned methods of defence touch only the
fringe of the danger of these night attacks, and that in such cases the only
proper defence is offence. We can only defend this island effectively against
air attacks by offensive measures, by attacking the enemy in his air bases
on the Continent and in that way destroying his power of attacking us
across the Channel. Information has just come into our possession as to
the site of the Gotha aerodromes, and orders for attacking them have
already been given. The larger question of our future air offensive will be
dealt with in another memorandum.
2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
6th Sept. 1917.
APPENDIX VIII
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS (September 1918)
By Major-General E, B. Ashmore, C,B., C,M,G., M.F.O», Commanding
London Air Defence Area.
Operation Order No. 30
These orders will come into force at noon on 12th September 191 8.
They will supersede Operations Order No. 20 and subsequent amendments
which will be destroyed.
A. Aeroplane Patrols against Aeroplanes by Night
Patrol.
I. On receipt of the order Aeroplane Attack Patrol, machines will
go up as quickly as possible, and will patrol on the lines laid down in
494 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
Schedule No. i. No machines may leave their patrols unless in actual
pursuit of an enemy aeroplane, or unless a concentration of lights or A. A.
gun-fire leads a pilot to suppose that an enemy aeroplane is in such a con-
centration.
Machines should get their height over their own aerodromes and then
proceed on to their patrol lines.
The G.O.C., VI Brigade, R.A.F., will issue from time to time such
orders as are necessary as to the height of the patrols.
Apron Line.
2. Along a line running Winchmore Hill Railway Station-Mossford
Green Church-Valence House, near Becontree HEATii-due S. to the
Greenwich-Dartford main road-ELTiiAM Palace, balloon aprons arc
installed. Aeroplanes will not cross the apron line at a less altitude than
11,000 feet. Single balloons are installed in St. James's Park and in Ken-
sington Gardens.
Zeppelin Raids during Aeroplane Raids.
3. If a Zeppelin raid should occur at the same time as an Aeroplane raid,
the G.O.C., VI Brigade, R.A.F., will order red rockets to be fired from
such aerodromes or landing-grounds as he thinks fit. On this signal the
highest machine on the patrol in question will climb as high as possible
and will remain on his patrol on the look out for Zeppelins.
Recognition Signals,
4. The Recognition Signal of the current colour will be made by our
machines under the following circumstances :
{a) When challenged by searchlight or gun-fire.
(b) While climbing to, or descending from, patrol below a height of
6,000 feet.
(c) When flying over areas within range of our guns which are outside
the normal patrol zones. The signal will be continuously exhibited
when over such areas.
{d) When uncertain of their position, especially when near the coast.
(e) When within sight or sound of British lightships.
(/) When crossing the coast.
The night Challenge and Reply Signals between our aircraft will be
made as necessary.
Lights on Aeroplanes.
5. Navigation lights will be lit while cHmbing or descending from patrol
below a height of 6,000 feet or less.
Landing Orders.
6. Machines before landing will fire the Very's Light Signal of the day
at a height of 1,000 feet. Should there be an obstruction on the ground
which will prevent a machine landing safely, a succession of red lights will
be fired from the ground.
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS 495
Wireless Telephone Control,
7. Squadron Commanders, or their deputies, will control their machines
by wireless telephone from their operations rooms, and order concentra-
tions, &c., as required by the tactical situation.
Aeroplane Searchlights.
8. Aeroplane searchlights will only expose their beams when a target is
seen or heard. If the visibility is very bad, orders should be given not to
expose beams.
Recall Signals.
9. Squadron Commanders will give orders to their lights to blink if they
wish to recall their machines.
B. Aeroplane Patrols against Aeroplanes by Day
Fighting Patrols.
1. On receiving the order 'Patrol' the Squadrons concerned will go up
and patrol on the lines laid down in Schedule II.
As far as possible, machines should get their height and formation over
their own aerodromes and then proceed on to their patrol lines.
In the case of No. 143 Squadron, whose patrol runs parallel to No. 141
Squadron's patrol, a height of 4,000 feet and formation will be formed over
the aerodrome or its vicinity, and the formation will then proceed to their
patrol line via South Ash landing-ground.
In the case of No. 61 Squadron, whose patrol runs parallel to No. 44
Squadron's patrol, a height of 4,000 feet and formation will be obtained
over the aerodrome, and the formation will proceed to their patrol line
by way of the railway line running from Southend to Hornchurch.
2. The G.O.C., VI Brigade, R.A.F., will issue from time to time such
orders as are necessary as to the height of patrols.
Artillery Wireless Machines.
3. Artillery Wireless Machines will patrol outside the Outer Barrage,
and will send down height of formation, and general observations of anti-
aircraft fire, according to the form laid down.
All spark wireless-receiving stations will listen in after 'Readiness', but
only heights and movements of Hostile Aircraft will be transmitted to the
London Warning Control.
Priority of Action — A. A. Guns and Aeroplanes.
4. During such time as any Hostile Formation is approaching London all
A.A. Guns outside the Green Line will normally have priority of action,
that is to say while crossing all gun areas any formation of our machines
will fly to a flank to give unrestricted action to A.A. Guns. If, however,
at any time while the Hostile Formation is crossing these gun areas the
Patrol Leader considers he has really favourable opportunity to attack he
will do so and A.A. Guns will stop firing.
Inside the Green Line our aeroplanes will always have priority of action,
496 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
that is to say, all A.A. Guns will give preference to our machines, and will
fire only up to that time when it becomes plain that our machines have
seen the enemy and are in a position to attack him.
Attack.
5. Fighting Squadrons will be prepared to attack as soon as possible
after the Hostile Formation on its way to London crosses the Green Line.
If on the outward journey, the enemy is in good formation. Patrol
Leaders should manoeuvre to attack when the guns of the barrage have had
an opportunity of breaking up the enemy formation.
Wireless Telephone Control and Ground Signals.
6. All squadrons will act in accordance with wireless telephone orders
issued direct by G.O.C, 6th Brigade, R.A.F., through the wireless tele-
phony station at Aperfield Court. In the event of the failure of the wireless
telephony at Aperfield Court, Ground Signals will be displayed, as
requisite, at any of tlie positions shown in Schedule IV. These will be
regarded as orders by Patrol Leaders and isolated machines.
Directing Arrows.
7. In the neighbourhood of London a number of Arrows pointing towards
Hostile Aircraft will be displayed. These will be shown only from points
where the Hostile Aircraft can actually be seen. The Arrows are to be
considered only as giving information to machines in the air, and not as
orders. The positions of Arrow Stations are set out in Schedule V.
Freedom of Action.
8. It is desired to give the Patrol Leaders in the air as much freedom of
action as possible. Orders conveyed from the Ground Signals are based
on information which may not be available to the Patrol Leaders. Patrol
Leaders must constantly keep in mind the fact that the defence of London
itself is the main object. It is probable that the enemy will make feints
or take on subsidiary objectives in order to uncover London. Squadron
Leaders will, therefore, have to judge for themselves whether small Hostile
Formations are worth following to any considerable distance, or whether
a part only of our Fighting Formations should be detached to deal with
them.
Resume Normal Conditions.
9. When 'Turn in' is given, all machines must land on their aerodromes
if possible, and prepare immediately for further action.
Recognition Signals.
10. The Recognition Signal of the colour current for the day will be
made as a Signal to our guns not to fire or to cease fire in that direction.
C. Aeroplane Patrols against Airships by Night
Zeppelin Patrol.
I. In the event of a Zeppelin raid, on receiving the order 'Zeppelin
Patrol' the Squadrons concerned will patrol as laid down in Schedule III.
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS 497
Aeroplane Searchlights.
2. Aeroplane searchlights will expose their beams when a target is seen
or heard. They will also search according to standing instrucpons in the
case of airships which have been previously located to sight or sound, but
whose engines are cut off. If the visibiHty is very bad, orders should be
given not to expose.
Action of Machines, l^c.
3. The orders contained under (A) paragraphs I, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 above,
apply equally in the case of Airship attack by night.
C. Han KEY,
Lieut -Colonel,
General Staff.
H.Q., L.A.D.A.,
Horse Guards, S.W. i.
loth September 191 8.
SCHEDULE NO. I
The following will be the Aeroplane Patrols against Aeroplanes hy night:
Squadron.
Patrol.
Course.
To go upfront:
39
B
South-eastern corner of Ball's Park-
North Weald
North Weald Bassett-Crabtree
Hill,
Bassett.
44
C
Greenstead Farm-Sutton's Farm.
Hainault Farm.
78
D
South Weald to lighthouse on south
Sutton's Farm.
bank of Thames north of Swanscombe
Marshes.
141
E
Church at Swanscombe-Fawkham
Biggin Hill.
Green-Biggin Hill.
37
F
South-eastern corner of Northey
Goldhanger.
IsLAND-TlPTREE.
37
J
Hatfield Peverel-Stow Maries.
Stow Maries.
61
G
I mile south of Stow Maries-Leigh-
I mile north of Yantlet Creek.
Rochford.
112
H
Throwley-Judd's Hill-Warden
Point.
Throwley.
50
K
WiNGHAM-north end of Margate
Bekesbourne.
Sands.
143
M
Detling-Marden.
Detling.
The following Patrols, BX and EX, may be ordered as alternative to the normal
Patrols B and E :
39
BX
South-eastern corner of Ball's Park-
North Weald
London COLNEY-RUISLIP.
Bassett.
141
EX
Biggin Hill-Brooklands.
Biggin Hill.
2504.5
Kk
498 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
SCHEDULE NO. II
The following will be the Aeroplane Patrols against Aeroplanes hy day.
Squadron.
Patrol.
Course.
7*0 go up Jrotn .*
39
B
South-eastern corner of Ball's Park-
North Weald
North Weald Bassett-Crabtree
Bassett.
Hill.
4 Artillery Machines patrol over Zones
North Weald
J, N and R.
Bassett.
44
C
Greenstead Farm-Sutton's Farm.
Hainault Farm.
78
D
South Weald to lighthouse on south
Sutton's Farm
bank of Thames north of Swanscombe
Marshes.
141
E
Church at Swanscombe-Favvkham
Biggin Hill.
Green-Biggin Hill.
4 Artillery Machines patrol over Zones
Biggin Hill.
V and Z.
37
F
South-eastern corner of Northey
Goldhanger.
Island-Tiptree.
37
J
Hatfield Peverel-Stow Maries.
Stow Maries.
61
c
Vide No. 44 Scjuadron Patrol.
XX w ^ n r \jt\u»
112
H
Throwley-Judd's Hill-Warden
Throwley.
Point.
rn
WixrriiT A\f— nnrf h c-v\A nf IV'Tauhatf
ULiK^SLiOiyyj U KIN £#•
Sands.
143
E
Vide No. 141 Squadron Patrol.
Detling.
75
Circular patrol round Harwich, radius
Elmswell and
5 miles.
Hadleigh.
SCHEDULE NO. Ill
The following will be the Aeroplane Patrols against Airships by night:
Squadron.
Patrol.
Course.
To go up from:
39
B
South-eastern corner of Ball's Park-
North Weald
NoRTH Weald Bassett-Crabtree
Bassett.
Hill.
44
C
Greenstead Farm-Sutton's Farm.
Hainault Farm.
78
D
South Weald to lighthouse on south
Sutton's Farm.
bank of Thames, north of Swanscombe
Marshes.
141
E
Church at Swanscombe-Fawkham
Biggin Hill.
Green-Biggin Hill.
37
F
South-eastern corner of Northey
Goldhanger.
Island-Tiptree.
37
J
Hatfield Peverel-Stow Maries.
Stow Maries.
61
G
I mile south of Stow Maries-Leigh-i
ROCHFORD.
mile north of Yantlet Creek.
112
H
Throwley-Judd's Hill-Warden
Throwley.
Point.
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS 499
SCHEDULE NO. Ill {cont.)
Squadron.
Patrol.
Course.
T<? go up from:
50
K
WiNGHAM— north end of JVIargate
Sands,
H3
M
Detling -Marden.
Detling.
75
L
Wormingford-Hadleigh-Elmswell-
Hadleigh and
Tibenham-Mattishall.
Elmswell.
/ Mattishall-Marham.
Mattishall.
51
N
I Marham-Tydd St. Mary.
Marham.
ITydd St. Mary-Orton
Tydd St. Mary.
The following Patrols, BX, CX, DX, EX, FX, &c., may be ordered as alterna-
tive patrols to the normal Patrols, B, C, D, E, F, &c. :
39
BX
South-eastern corner of Ball's Park-
North Weald
London COLNEY-RUISLIP.
Bassett.
44
CX
Hainault Farm-Hounslow
Hainault Farm.
78
DX
Sutton's Farm-Wimbledon
Sutton's Farm.
141
EX
Biggin Hill-Brooklands
Biggin Hill.
37
FX
Patrol to be extended north to Wor-
Gold HANGER and
MINGFORD.
Stow Maries.
50
KX
Patrol to be extended south to Westen-
Bekesbourne.
HANGER.
143
MX
Patrol to be extended south to Cran-
Detling.
BROOK Station.
SCHEDULE NO. IV
List of Places at which Ground Signals are displayed
Orfordness
Hertford
Wormingford
Martlesham
Braintree
Biggin Hill
Stutton
Hendon
Detling
Plough Corner
NORTHOLT
Throwley
Blackheath
Sutton's Farm
Bekesbourne
Easthorpe
ROCHFORD
Wye
Goldhanger
North Benfleet
Dover
Broomfield
Orsett
Penshurst
Sawbridgeworth
Allhallows
Marden
Fyfield
HOUNSLOW
Leigh Green
North Weald Bassett
Grove Park
Lympne
London Colney
Manston
Lydd
Stow Maries
Croydon
Rye
BURNHAM
South Ash
Swingfield
Shenfield
Kenley Common
King's Hill
Hainault Farm
Sole Street
New Chapel
Guilton
Frinsted
Runwell
Harty
Edgware
SiBLE HeDINGHAM
Pluckley
Hadleigh
500 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
Letchmore
Parndon
Theydon
LiTTLEHEATH
Temple
Ware
Stifford
Thorndon
SCHEDULE NO. V
List of Direction Arrow Positions
Inner London A.A. Defences
Dartford
Halstead
SiDCUP
Belvedere
Horsendon
Hounslow
Langley
Redhill A.A. Defences
Red hill
Ide Hill
Chart
Banstead
Addington
Esher
Streatham
Hyde Park
FiNCHLEY
Wanstead
St. Albans A.A. Defences
Harpenden
Datchworth
Chelmsford A.A. Defences
Billericay Matching
HiGHVi'ooD Oak Farm
Had HAM
Thames and Medway A.A. Defences
Chalk Harvel
Ightham
Operation Order No. 31
These orders will come into force at noon on the 12th September 191 8.
They will supersede Operation Order No. 21, and subsequent amendments,
vv^hich will be destroyed.
Control
1. Information of Hostile Aircraft comes into the London Warning
Control.
Orders for 'Readiness' and 'Operations' are issued direct from there to
A.A. Defences and the Royal Air Force Squadrons.
Orders for 'Patrol' are issued by VI Brigade, R.A.F., on instructions
received from L.A.D.A.
Limits of Outer London Barrage.
2. The Outer London Barrage comprises the following gun stations:
(a) A.A.D.C., Chelmsford . . . Coalhouse to Hadham.
ib) „ St. Albans .... Batsham to Chalfont St.
Peter.
(c) „ Staines .... Gerrards Cross to Wotton
(excluding Farnborough,
Newhaven, and Portslade
Defences).
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS 501
{d) A.A.D.C., Redhill Westcott to Southwood.
{e) ,j Thames and Medway . All guns as far East as All-
hallows inclusive.
The Green Line.
3. The inner limit of fire of the Outer London Barrage is called the
Green Line, and runs Shenfield Railway Station-High Ongar Church
-Ware-St. Albans-King's Langley-Uxbridge-Weybridge-Effingham-
N.W. Corner of Chevening Park-Hartley-Orseit-Shenfield Railway
Station.
Intelligence.
4. All inteUigence will be passed direct to the London Warning Control
by A.A. Controls and Nos. 39, 44, 78, 141, 37, 61, 143, 112, and 50 Squad-
rons, R.A.F., and will be repeated by the London Warning Control to
such A.A. Controls and squadrons as may be concerned.
Intelligence will be passed between Nos. 75 and 51 Squadrons, R.A.F.,
and the London Warning Control through VI Brigade, R.A.F.
A. Aeroplane Attack by Night
Patrols and Guns. Certain Guns restricted
1. When our own machines are not up, all guns in the L.A.D.A.,
without exception, will fire to sight and sound.
2. When our own machines are ordered up on patrol, information will
be passed to A.A. Commands concerned; certain guns, as shown below,
will be restricted in firing to sound. All other guns will fire to sound
without restriction, and all guns without exception will fire to sight.
(i) B, C, D, E, EX, F, J and M Patrols entail no restrictions from firing
to sound.
(ii) When BX Patrol is ordered up :
Littleheath Gun will only fire from true bearing 60° to 250°.
Watford Gun will only fire from true bearing 190° to 50°.
(iii) When G Patrol is ordered up :
Canvey Guns wiU only fire from true bearing 145° to 25°.
Allhallows Gun will only fire from true bearing 100° to 325°.
Whitehouse Farm Guns will only fire from true bearing 20° to 280°.
Port Victoria Guns will only fire from true bearing 50° to 300°.
(iv) When H Patrol is ordered up :
Judd's Hill and Harty Hill Guns will be completely restricted.
Conyer Gun will only fire from true bearing 180° to 0°.
Eastchurch Gun will only fire from true bearing 260° to 330°.
Graveney Gun will only fire from true bearing 20° to 180°.
Whitstable Guns will only fire from true bearing 350° to 210°.
Boughton Gun will only fire from true bearing 340° to 210^"'.
(v) When K Patrol is ordered up :
Hengrove Gun will only fire from true bearing 345° to 210°.
Cliffsend Gun will only fire from true bearing 350° to 230°.
Richborough Gun will only fire from true bearing 0° to 210°.
502 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
Heights of Enemy Machines.
3. Up to the present 10,000 to 12,000 feet has included heights at which
enemy machines normally fly at night.
Searchlights.
4. Fighting and linking lights will only expose their beams when a target
is seen or heard. In Central and West London Defences searchlights may
show out otherwise than to sight or sound during barrage fire. Jf the
visibihty is very bad orders should be given not to expose.
Fire to Sound.
5. If the searchlight fails to pick up the target by the time the Gun
Commander judges it to be nearly entering his barrage zone he will open
barrage fire (in the case of the 3-inch 20-cwt. guns with reduced charge), on
the principles indicated in these orders, but the light will continue to
search in the area of the shell bursts during barrage fire.
Star or A.Z. Shell.
6. One Star (or A.Z.) shell may be fired as an indication of the first
round of a barrage to sound. It may be fired regardless of areas over which
the firing of the A.Z. shell is restricted.
Guns observing the one signal round of Star (or A.Z.) shell will stand
by to open support barrage fire in accordance with the scheme in force.
Barrage Fire.
7. Barrages will be fired at the predicted angle and bearing, allowing
for temps mort, at the ballistic height ordered. Vertical distribution should
be given by changing the Q.E. between each round. Lateral distribution
will be given by traverses on either side of the predicted bearing.
Suitable Q.E.s and fuses should be selected to give eflPect at the ballistic
height ordered.
All sights and deflexion scales should be put at zero.
Barrage fire should normally be for i to ij minutes and then listen,
varying the duration of fire.
The rate of fire should not exceed 15 rounds a minute.^
Unsupported fire to sound should only be employed in cases of isolated
defences, or when the direction of the target is such that it only comes
within the range of one gun of a group.
Machine-guns.
8. In view of possible attack by low-flying enemy machines, machine-
guns have been installed at various points in the London, Thames and
Medway, Dover and Harwich Areas. These guns will be manned by night.
I The rate of fire for i8-pr. guns may be increased to 25 rounds per minute in
the following cases:
Single line of gun stations in the Outer London Barrage — St. Albans, Staines, ,
and Redhill A.A. Defences.
Isolated A.A. Defences:
Harwich A.A. Defences — Pulham.
Staines A.A. Defences — Farnborough and Newhaven.
HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS 503
Fire should only be opened on machines under 4,000 feet high:
(a) Which are definitely recognized by sight as hostile.
{b) To sound, at machines which arc committing hostile acts.
No machine-gun will be fired at a less elevation than 40°. A proportion
of tracer ammunition will be used.
Aeroplane Recall Signal.
9. A.A.D.C.s will order their lights to blink, as required, as a Recall
Signal to our machines.
B. Aeroplane Attack by Day
Priority of Action — A. A. Guns and Aeroplanes.
I. During such time as any hostile formation is approaching London
all A.A. Guns outside the Green Line will normally have priority of
action, that is to say, while crossing all gun areas any formation of our
machines will fly to a flank to give unrestricted action to A.A. Guns. If,
however, at any time while the Hostile Formation is crossing these gun
areas the Patrol Leader considers he has a really favourable opportunity to
attack he will do so and A.A. Guns will stop firing.
Inside the Green Line our aeroplanes will always have priority of
action, that is to say, all A.A. Guns will give preference to our machines
and will fire only up to that time when it becomes plain that our machines
have seen the enemy and are in a position to attack him.
j 2. Guns will fire to sight only. Heights will be assumed at 16,000 feet
1 in default of an ascertained height or observation of fire.
3. Guns will fire two signal rounds H.E. full charge (at the longest fuse
setting and with Q.E. to reach appropriate height) in the direction of enemy
aircraft which are out of range and are not being fired at by other guns.
C. Airship Attack by Night
Searchlights.
1. Fighting and linking lights will expose their beams when a target is
seen or heard. They will also search according to standing instructions in
the case of airships which have been previously located to sight or sound,
but whose engines are cut oflF.
A.Z. and Star Shell.
2. A.Z. Shell will be used when firing to sight or sound, except over
certain populous or dangerous areas to which restrictions have been
applied. Over such areas only H.E. Shell (full charge) will be fired. One
Star (or A.Z.) Shell may be fired as a signal round for barrage fire, regard-
less of the above restrictions.
Patrols and Guns: Certain Guns restricted.
3. In addition to the above restrictions as to A.Z. Shell, the following
guns are restricted from firing to sound as shown :
When the Patrols named in A 2 (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v) are ordered up, the
restrictions for firing to sound laid down in those paragraphs hold good.
504 HOME DEFENCE OPERATION ORDERS
In addition the following restrictions to sound will be observed :
(i) When CX or DX Patrols are ordered up :
All Guns inside the Green Line will be completely restricted,
(ii) When KX Patrol is ordered up :
Westenhanger Gun will be completely restricted.
The remainder of the Patrols (B, C, D, E, EX, F, FX, ], L, M, and MX)
entail no restrictions from firing to sound.
All A.A.D.C.s and Mobile Brigades concerned will be informed when
Patrols are ordered up, so that the necessary restrictions in firing to sound
may be ordered.
All other guns will fire to sound without restriction, and all guns will
fire to sight without exception.
Fire to Sound.
4. The instructions laid down in paragraphs 5 and 6, apply equally
in the case of airships, except that all guns will fire ammunition with full
charge.
Barrage Fire.
5. Barrages will be fired at the predicted angle and bearing, allowing for
temps mort. Fire should be opened with A.Z. or (in the case of restricted
arcs) H.E. ammunition, at a fixed Q.E., using appropriate fuses to give
vertical distribution between the ballistic heights ordered.
The Q.E. at which barrage fire is opened should not be less than 70°
for 3-inch 20-cwt. guns. In the case of i8-prs. and 13-pr. 9-cwt. guns,
the maximum Q.E. should be used. The limits of ballistic height are
16,000 to 20,000 feet.
Lateral distribution may be extended to 10° on either side of the
predicted bearing.
All sights and deflexion scales should be put at zero.
Duration of Barrage.
6. The rate of fire will not exceed 10 rounds per minute. The duration
of fire will be for one minute, then listen, varying the duration of fire.
Firing to Sight — Assumed Height.
7. In default of definite information the height of Zeppelins should be
assumed as 18,000 feet, but fire should be opened at lower angles of sight
at assumed heights of 17,000 feet and 16,000 feet.
I Aeroplane Recall Signal.
8. The instructions in A, paragraph 9 above, apply.
C. Han KEY,
Lieut.-Colonelf
General Staff.
H.Q., L.A.D.A.,
Horse Guards, S.W. i.
loth September 1918.
X
I — I
Ph
ft
H
Ph
<
c/D <;
y p:i
w pq
CO
CO
CO
ON
CO O
O CO
t\
Personnel.
Height
finders.
CO
CO
ON
OO
Search-
lights.
O CO
CO
vo
vo
cT
o^
vo
Guns.
OO vo
LO lo
CO
CO
cT
VO^
vo"
Ov O
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OO
VO
t
as
Total armament.
Height
finders.
CO
vo
N
Search-
lights.
oo
ON
VO
Guns.
O Tt-
vo w->
vo
o
OO
No. of
A.A. Companies.
39 (including
I Signal Coy.)
9 Mobile Batteries
On
68 (including
I Signal Coy.)
9 Mobile Batteries
No. of
Sub- Commands.
II Sub-Commands
2 Mobile Brigades 1
+ 3 Mobile Batteries /
OO
19 Sub-Commands
2 Mobile Brigades
-1- 3 Mobile Batteries
Area.
London Air
Defence Area.
Northern Air
Defence Area.
Total.
3
bo
13
4-> "
APPENDIX IX {cont.)
TABLE 'B'. HOME DEEENCE SQUADRONS
{Operational Units of the VI Brigade).
Brigade Head-quarters. Horse Guards Parade,
London.
Southern Group {H.O. London)
(Allotted to London Air Defence Area)
47th Wing
(H.Q. Trumping-
ton, Cambridge).
No. 51 Squadron (F.E.zb) (H.Q. Marham, Norfolk)
1 1 1
'A' Flight 'B' Flight 'C Flight
(Mattishall, (Tydd St. Mary, (Marham,
Norfolk) Lines.) Norfolk)
49th Wing
(H.Q. Upminster,
Essex).
No. 39 Squadron (Bristol Fighter) North Weald Bassett,
Essex.
No. 44 Squadron (Camel) . . Hainault Farm, Rom-
ford, Essex.
No. 78 Squadron (Camel) . . Sutton's Farm,
Hornchurch,
Essex.
No. 141 Squadron (Bristol Fighter) Biggin Hill, Kent.
50th Wing
(H.Q. Great Bad-
dow, Chelmsford,
Essex).
No. 37 Squadron (Camel) (H.Q. Stow Maries, Essex)
1 1 1
•A' Flight 'B' Flight 'C Fhght
(Stow Maries, (Stow Maries, (Goldhanger,
Essex) Essex) Essex)
No. 61 Squadron (Camel) . , Rochford.
No. 75 Squadron (Avro) (H.Q. Elmswell, Bury St. Ed-
munds, Suffolk)
1 h ,
'A' FHght 'B' Flight 'C Flight
(Hadleigh, (Elmswell, (Elmswell,
Suffolk) Suffolk) Suffolk)
53rd Wing
(H.Q. Harrietsham,
Maidstone,
Kent).
No. 50 Squadron (Camel) . . Bekesbourne,
Canterbury,
Kent.
No. 112 Squadron (Camel) . Throwley, Faver-
sham, Kent.
No. 143 Squadron (Camel) . Detling, Maidstone,
Kent.
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES 507
No. 7 Balloon
(Apron) Wing
(H.Q. Chingford,
Essex).
No. I Balloon Squadron
No. 2 Balloon Squadron
No. 3 Balloon Squadron
Barking, Essex.
Shooter's Hill (S.E.
London).
Northern Group {H.Q. Leeds)
(Allotted to Northern Air Defence Area)
46th Wing
(H.Q. York).
48 th Wing
(H.Q. Gains-
borough, Lines.).
No. 36 Squadron (Bristol Fighter) (H.Q. Usworth,
Sunderland)
'A' Flight 'B' Flight 'C Flight
(Usworth, (Ashington, Morpeth, (Seaton Carew,
Sunderland) Northumberland) West Hartlepool)
No. 76 Squadron (Avro) (H.Q. Ripon, Yorks.)
'A' Flight 'B' Flight
(Copmanthorpe, (Helperby,
Yorks.) Yorks.)
I
'C Flight
(Catterick,
Yorks.)
No. 77 Squadron (Avro) (H.Q. Penston, East Lothian)
^1
I
'A' Flight
(Whiteburn,
Berwickshire)
I
'B' Flight
(Penston,
East Lothian)
'C Flight
(Penston,
East Lothian)
No. 33 Squadron (Avro) ( H.Q. Kirton Lindsey, Lines.)
I
'A' Flight
(Scampton,
Lines.)
I
'B' Flight
(Kirton Lindsey,
Lines.)
'C Flight
(Elsham,
Lines.)
No. 90 Squadron (Avro) (H.Q. Buckmlnster, Lines,)
\
I
I
'A' Flight
(Leadenham,
Lines.)
I
*B' Flight
(Buckminster,
Lines.)
'C Flight
(Wittering,
Northants.)
Note. The war estabUshment of the home defence squadrons set out above was:
officers, 576, other ranks, 3,548, and women, 448.
The war establishment of No. 7 Balloon Wing was 120 officers and 3,475 other
ranks.
APPENDIX X
STATISTICS FOR THE TRAINING BRIGADE IN
=^
^!
f
9'
a
2;
3'9
i
I
s
i
tl
2,782
92
No.sF.i
33*
I
s
89
2,710
•s:H:=--
October
707
t
29>
3,948
,0,
3,07s
ss
.4
97
2,782
i„g School with effect frotn
^'fT,tl'F;^hJL7s"ho?o''n
6,426
63s
34
38
3,789
38
8z
S.ofA.O
68
M
i?
I
I
I
!
i
I
I
I
INDEX
Abbreviations
A. A. = Anti- Aircraft
B. = Battleship
B.Cr. = Battle Cruiser
Br. = British
Cmdre. = Commodore
Commr. = Commander
Cr. = Cruiser
Fit. = Flight
Fr. = French
Ger. = German
H.D. = Home Defence
L.Cr. = Light Cruiser
Ldg. Mech. = Leading Mechanic
Mon. = Monitor
R. = Reserve
Sqdn. = Squadron
N.T. = Night Training
S/M. = Submarine
T. = Training
T.B.D. = Destroyer
W/T. = Wireless Telegraphy
Officers and jnen, who are mentioned more than once in the events described^ are here
given their highest rank
Abbassia, 165, 188, 227, 449-5o«., 457;
Armament Sch., 455
Abiad Wells, 173-5
Aboukir, see 'Abu Qir'
Abu Qir, Air Station, 187-8, 449-53,
456-7; Native Base Depot, 453, 457
Abu Sueir, 188, 455
Acheron^ Br. T.B.D., 409
Adams, 2nd Lt. A. P., 316
Adams, Chief Petty Officer J. L., 405n.
Adana, 371, 387«.; bombed, 385, 419
Adastral House, H.Q. H.D. Group,
138; H.Q. 50th (H.D.) Wing, 139
Addison, Rt. Hon. C, Minister of
Munitions, 40
Aden, 380-1
Admiralty Top Plane gun mounting,
148
Adrianople, bombed, 378, 408
Adriatic Sqdn., Royal Navy, 388
Aenne Rickmers, Br. Aircraft Carrier,
see 'Anne'
Aerodromes and Landing Grounds:
Home Defence, at Armistice, see
App. ix. Table 'B'; see also 'Egypt
and Palestine, air operations',
'Mesopotamia, campaign in', 'Ma-
cedonia, air operations in', 'Medi-
terranean and Near Eastern
Waters — Naval Air Operations in'
Aeroplanes:
importance of the technical
factor in air warfare, 179-80, 214,
305, 359-
types :
British and French, A.R,, 363;
Armstrong-Whitworth, 37, 92,
148, 358, 367; Avro, 143, 150,
430; B.E.2a, 160; B.E.2C, 92, 147,
179, 186, 195-6, 207, 261-2, 280,
284, 306-7, 313, 338, 372; B.E.2d,
147; B.E.2e, 80-1, 147, 232-3,
241; B.E.I 2, 34«., 92, 129, 147,
241, 338, 341, 345-6, 354, 35^;
Bristol Fighter, 37, 129, 148-50,
179, 231, 238; Bristol Monoplane,
230, 324, 363, 366; Bristol Scout,
203, 209«., 2i6«., 305, 313;
Caudron, 256-9; D.H.2, 230,
346, 358; D.H.4, 90, 131-3, 238,
321, 324, 329, 397, 403, 411-12,
414; D.H.9, 134; Farman, Henri,
160; (steel), 268-9, 279; 372,
378-9, 401 «., 406-7, 414; Farman,
Maurice, 160, 165, 253-4, 256,
258, 262, 264, 266, 280; F.E.2b,
92, 141, 147-8; F.E.2d, 123, 147;
Handley Page, 90, 405-10; Mar-
tinsyde Scout, 207, 221, 232-3,
257-9, 264, 286«., 313, 315;
Nieuports, 358, 372, 378-9;
R.E.8, 148, 226, 312-13, 323;
S.E.5, 37, 129, 149, 238, 324,
363-4, 366; Sopwith 'Camel', 36,
62, 129, 143, 148-51, 366, 397,
402, 409; Sopwith 'Dolphin', 149;
Sopwith 'Pup', 33, 37, 52-3, 143,
148, 150; Sopwith 'Snipe', 149,
151; Sopwith Triplane, 346,409;
Sopwith two-seater (i|-strutter),
148, 346, 349, 379, 392; Spads,
313, 321-2; Vickers 'Bullet', 230,
358; Voisin, 268. 270, 279, 283
German, A.IE.G., 345; Albatros,
5IO
Aeroplanes — continued
290, 311; Fokker, 179, 269, 283,
304; Fricdrichshafcner, 345, 348;
'Giant', 60, 83, 109, 1 16-18;
Gotha (G.IV), 19-20, 74, 83-4,
150, 345; Halberstadt, 214-15,
304, 344-5. 35 ^ 420; Rumpler,
179, 214, 345; see also 'German
Air Service'
Aeroplane Lights, see 'London, A.A.
defence of
AflFule, bombed, 384
Agamemnon^ Br. B., 336, 37 1«.
Agents, landing of (Macedonia), 342
Ahlhorn, Ger. airship station, 95;
disaster at, 120-1
Airbandit, H.D., code, 108
Aircraft Carriers, see Antie, Ark Royal^
Ben-my-Chree, City of Oxford, Em-
press, Manxman, Raven II
Aircraft Depots: Canada, 467; 'X'
(Egypt), 187-8, 455-7; 'X' (Engine
Repair, Egypt), 457
Aircraft Parks: Canada, 467; East
Africa, 187; India, 457; Mesopo-
tamia (No. 4), 187, 261-2, 305, 310,
457; Salonika, 341, 457; 'X' (Egypt),
165,^ 187, 227, 455-7
Air Ministry, Directorate of Training,
443, 446
Air raids:
on Great Britain, false alarms, 7, 119,
126-7; daylight aeroplane, 18,
26-8; effect on the public, zzn.,
28-9, 38, 86, 90, 106-7, 109-10,
119, 134-8, 153, 156-7; reprisal
proposals, 29-31, 38-9, 86-8, 90-1,
App. iv; campaign abandoned, 58;
moonlight aeroplane raids, 60;
effect on munitions output, 86-7,
154-5; Zeppelins, the 'silent raid',
92-102; the effect of the Ahlhorn
station disaster, 120-1; final aero-
plane raid (19/20 May 191 8), 127-
31, 154; reasonfor cessation, 130-1 ;
final Zeppelin raid, 13 1-4; general
review of, 152-9
By Airships, list of, see App. i.
Table 'A'
By Aeroplane, list of, see App. i.
Table 'B'
On London, list of, see Apps. ii, iii,
and V
INDEX
Air Raid Shelters, sec 'Home A.A.
Defence', and 'London, A.A. defence
of
Airships:
German :
L.20, iin.; L.35, 9, 10, 54-5, 81;
destroyed, 9-10; L.40, 9-14;
L.41, 9, 10, 54-5, 80, 92, 94, 95«.,
<)7;L.42, 9, 10, ii«., 12, 13, 32-3,
54-5, 8c^i, 92n., 122-3;
12, 13; L.44, 12, 54-6, 92-3,
destroyed, 96; L.45, 12, 13, 54,
56, 92-3, destroyed, 97-9; L.46,
54, 56, 81, 92, 94, destroyed, 120;
L.47, 12, 13, 54, 56, 92, 94, de-
stroyed, 120; L.48, destroyed, 33-
4; 92-3, 99, forced to land
by French Sqdn., 100; L.$o, 92-3,
99, lost, loo-i; L.51, 54-5, 92«.,
destroyed, 120; L.52, J^n., 92,
94-5, 122-3; ^ 53, 81, 92, 94-5,
121, 131, 133; L.54, 92, 94, 121;
L.55, 79» 80, 92, 94-5; L.56,
1 22-3, 131,133-4; L.58, destroyed,
120; L.60, 124; L.61, 1 2 1-2, 124-
5; L.62, 121-2, 124, 126; L.63,
121-2, 124, 131, 133; L.64, 124;
^•65, 131, 133; ^-70, 131, de-
stroyed, 132-3; L.Z.81, 336;
L.Z.85, 336, destroyed, 336-7,
37i«.; L.Z.107, 7; S.L.20, de-
stroyed, 1 20-1; see also 'German
Airship Service'
Airship Stations, German, see Ahlhorn,
Nordholz, Tondern
Akab, 318
Alapie, bombed, 404
Alarms, false, see 'Air Raids on Great
Britain'
Alcock, Fit. Lt. J. W., 407, 409, \ion.
Aldeburgh, bombed, 63; Sch. for
Marine Observers, 448
Alexandria, 160, 398, 422, 455
Ali Dinar, see 'Darfur, Sultan of
Ali Gharbi, 255, 258, 266-7
Ali Said Pasha, Turkish Commander,
381
Allenby, Gen. Sir E. H. H., assumes
command in Egypt, 225; xzjn.,
233-4, 237-8, 246-8, 419, 454
Almaza, Artillery Observation Sch.,
188, 455; Sch. of Navigation and
Bomb-dropping, 188, 455
Amara, captured, 254-5; 258
Amberkoj, 349, 356, 400
America, see 'United States*
Amethyst^ Br. Schooner, 133
Ammunition : Buckingham, 1 5 1 ; Pome-
roy, i32«.; R.T.S., 151; Sparklet,
147, 1 50; Tracer, 1 19^.5 'Z.P.T.', 132
Ana, captured, 329
Anderson, Ldg. Mech. S. F., 17-18
Anderson gun mounting, 148
Andover, Sch. of Navigation and Bomb-
dropping, 447
Angista, bombed, 355, 377
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 251
Anne^ Br. Aircraft Carrier, 161-2, 164,
i65«., 222-3, 372j 379-80, 384-5,
415-16
Aphis^ Br. river gun-boat, 420, 422
Aprons, Balloon, see 'London, A.A.
defence of — Balloons'
Aqaba, 162, 226
Arab village, 284, 288
Arhalete^ Fr. destroyer, 382-4
Areas, division ofU.K. into (Apr. 191 8),
445-6
Arish, El, bombarded, 184-5, 197-8,
385; bombed, 196
Ark Royal, Br. aircraft carrier, 337,
37c^2, 399, 405, 413
Arkell, Lt. A. J., 130
Armament, in aircraft (H.D.), 147-51
Armoured Cars, 169
Armstrong, Capt. D. V., 130
Army:
British:
Corps:
I. (Indian), 285, 288-9, ^94, 296,
301, 316, 324
III. (Indian), 285, 288-9, 292-4,
296-7, 307«., 318-19, 324
VIII. 438
XII. 339-41; H.Q. bombed, 343;
345, 348, 350-2
XVI. 337, 339-40, 35i«-, 354-6
XX. 236-7, 239
XXI. 236, 239-40 _
Camel, Bikanir, 165
Camel, Imperial, 190
Desert Mounted, 236-7, 239,
246
Divisions:
Cavalry:
Anzac, Mounted, 182, 185, 212
INDEX 511
Australian, Mounted, 200, 203,
208
Imperial Mounted, 2o8«., 212
Mesopotamia, 287-9, 3o6, 319
New Zealand, Mounted, 200, 203,
208
Infantry:
3rd {Indian), 266, 285; 6th, 252,
254, 258, 260; yth (Indian), 266,
277-8, 284, 285, 316-17; 12 th
(Indian), 266; 13 th, 285;
14th (^Indian), 285; 22nd, 339;
26th, 339; 27th, 339; 2^ 339;
42nd, 193; 52nd, 208; 33rd,
2o8«., 212; 54th, 208; 60th
(London), 225; 74th, 208
Brigades:
Cavalry:
Anzac, ist Light Horse, camp
bombed, 185; 201, 2o8«.; 4th
Light Horse, 2o8«.
Camel, Imperial, 200, 208
Imperial Service, 240
Mounted, 5 th, 180-2
New Zealand Mounted Rifle, 192
Infantry:
8th, 329; nth, 326-8, 330;
3gth, 287; 80th, 376, 401;
22gth, 208
Royal Artillery: 203, 293;/., 3o7«.,
438
Royal Engineers : Searchlight Com-
panies formed, 127; 182, 297, 312
Regiments:
Cavalry:
Australian Light Horse, 5th, 183
Dorset Yeomanry, 168
Gloucestershire Yeomanry, 182
Warwickshire Yeomanry, 181,
183
Worcestershire Yeomanry, 18 1-3
Infantry:
Bedfordshire, 220
Scots Fusiliers, 5th Royal, 183
Suffolk, 3rd Bn., camp bombed,
35
See also 'Desert Column'
'Eastern Frontier Force'
'Tigris Corps'
Bulgarian :
First: H.Q., bombed, 356
Second: H.Q., bombed, 356
Divisions: 9th, 352
512 liNJ
Army — continued
Greek: 340
Turkish:
Seventh, 244, 246
Eighth, 243-4, 246
Corps:
XIII, 300-2, 304, 306, 308-9
XVIII, 301, 304, 308-10, 316
XX, 246
Divisions:
2nd, 273, 302; 3rd, 210-11; yth
{Reserve), 240; j6th, 210-11;
27th [Arab), 210; 35th, 272;
45th, 273; 51st, 263, 273; 52nd,
273; 53rd, 210-11
Regiments:
I St, 273
. 5th, 273
Artillery Co-operation:
Home Defence, 145-7; Egypt and
Palestine, 203, 209, 211, 213-14,
216-17, 229, 237-41, 247; Meso-
potamia, 260, 275, 277, 284, 287-8,
290-5, 297-8, 302, 306-7, 309-10,
317-18, 326«., 328; Macedonia,
34I5 35^3
Asani, 256
Ashmore, Maj.-Gen. E. B., appointed
to command London A.A. Defence
Area, 43; 44, 66-9, 76, 86«., 131,
139-41, App. viii
Asluj, bombed, 221
Aspull, bombed, 125
Asyut, 170, 190
Avord, Fr. Training Sch., 449
Aylmer, Lt.-Gen. Sir. F. J., 266-8, 270,
272, 274, 276
Ayr, Flying Instructors' Sch., 448
Aziziya, 260, 262-3, 296-7
Baghdad, 281, 298; captured, 299-300;
3o7«., 309-10, 313, 315, 324, 328;
bombed, 284, 291, 298, 321; aero-
drome bombed, 298
BaiUie, F. W., 461
Balad Ruz, captured, 305; bombed,
310
Balcombe-Brown, Capt. R., 431
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., First Lord of
the Admiralty, 389«.
Balloons:
British:
Egypt and Palestine, 226-7, 238«.;
Mesopotamia, 283, 324, 326, 331;
Macedonia, 341, 350-1, 361;
Mediterranean and Near Eastern
Waters, 398
Wings: establishment of Home
Balloon Wing, 68-9; Seventh,
1 54, App. ix
Companies:
2ist, 226-7; 22nd, 350; 23rd, 324«.
Sections:
7, Z7^n.',i4, 283;i7, 34i,36i;26,
350; 27, 35c^i ; 4g, 226-7, 238«. ;
50, 226-7; 51, 324«-; 52, 324, 326
French:
Caquot, 67-70, 1 12
Italian: 67-8, 70
Balloon Aprons, see 'London, A. .A.
defence of — Balloons'
Bamford, Lt. J. L., 358
Banks, Lt. C. C, 62
Bannatyne, Capt. E. J., 173, 175
Baquba, captured, 302; 303«., 304,315,
318-19, 322-3, 325; bombed, 310
Baratoff, Gen. N. N., 300, 304
Barnt Green, bombed, 94
Barr and Stroud Height-finder, 71-2
Barrani, 168-9, 3^°
Barrett, Maj.-Gen. Sir. A. A., 252
Barura, 307n.
Barwise, Air Mechanic H. B., 129
Basra, 253, 255-7, 262, 265, 268-70,
283-4, 305, 312
Bates, Capt. F. A., 248
Bath, No. 7 Sch. of Aeronautic?, 445-6
Battcrsea, bombed, 119
Bayud, Bir, bombed, 184
Beaufort, Maj. V. A., 227
Beckenham, bombed, 118
Bedford Hotel, bombed, 78
Beersheba, 179, 198, 214; captured,
239; bombed, 199, 203-6
Beirut, bombed, 419
Bekesbourne, 32
Bell, Capt. W. D. M., 342
Bellamy, Lt. F., 174
Benbrook aerodrome (Texas), 465-6
Ben-my-Chree, Br. aircraft carrier, 168,
179, 184, 197, 219-20, 370, 372,
379-84, 386, 413; destroyed, 415
Benn, Capt. Wedgwood, 219-20, 41 5«.
Bennett, G. T., 72; Height Finder,
72-3
Bermondsey, bombed, 82, 106
Bicharakoff, Col., 323
Biggin Hill, Wireless transmitting stn.,
_ I44«.
Birmingham, A.A. guns for
bombed, 123-5; H.Q.,
Area, 446
Bishopsgate Goods Station, panic at,
114
Midland
H.
32-3
Bittles, Fit. Sub-Lt. G.
Bizerta, 398
Blackwall tunnel, air-raid shelter, 136
Board, Lt.-Col. A. G., 450
Boddam-Whetham, Lt.-Col. A. C,
227, 452
Bodoma, bombarded, 37i«.
Bogdanci, bombed, 348
Bold, bombed, 125
Bombing attacks:
(British), Egypt and Palestine, 170,
179, 184-6, 193, 196, 198-9, 201,
203-6, 219, 221, 224, 23c^3,
242-5, 247; Mesopotamia, 283-4,
287-9, 294-5, 298, 310, 315-16,
318-21, 325, 329; Macedonia, 342,
345-9> 355-8, 360, 362; Mediter-
ranean and Near Eastern Waters,
374, 37^7, 381-6, 40^9, 411-14,
416, 419, 421-3
{German), on British Isles by aero-
plane and airships, App. i, Tables
*A' and 'B'; Egypt and Palestine,
184-5, 196-8, 216; Mesopotamia,
269, 310, 320-1; Macedonia, 336,
342-9, 357, 361-2; Mediterranean
and Near Eastern Waters, 377-8,
385,408-9
Bombs : German, failure of incendiary,
104-5; ^'"^^ 3oo~kg- on England, 105;
weight carried by 'Giant' type, 115,
117; first i,ooo-kg. on England, 117,
119; load carried by Zeppelin, 124;
weight carried on final aeroplane
raid, 128; total dropped on Great
Britain, App. i. Tables 'A' and 'B';
on London, Apps. ii, iii, and v
Borden Camp (Canada), 461-2, 466;
Sch. of Aerial Gunnery, 465, 466^.,
467
Borton, Lt.-Col. A. E., 209, 227
Boston, Lines., bombed, 81
Bourke, Lt.-Col. U. J. D., 427
Boyle, Capt. W. H. D., R.N., 219, 222
Bradley, Maj. R. A., 313, 33o«.
INDEX 513
Brancker, Maj.-Gen. W. S. (D.D.
G. M.A.), 428; (D. of Air Organiza-
tion), 460; to command R.F.C.,
Middle East, 227^., 438
Brand, Capt. C. J. Q., 62, 129-30
Brandenburg, Hauptmann, 20, 27-8,
37«., 42
Brandon, Fit. Sub.-Lt. A. F., 378
Brauncewall, A.A. gun at, 124
Brentford, bombed, 117
Breslaw, Ger. Cr., 363, 410; destroyed,
411-12
Brigades (R.F.C. and R.A.F.): VI,
138-9, 140-1, 151-4, 429; App. ix,
Table *B'; Eastern (Training), 427;
H. D. (renamed VI Brigade), 139;
Middle East, formation, 186-9; 310,
338; becomes H.Q., R.F.C, Middle
East, 227«.; Northern (Training),
427; Palestine, formation, 226-7;
228, 236, 454K., 457; Southern
(Training), 427; Training (Egypt),
454; Training (Home), 23, 424;
raised to a Division, 426
Briggs, Wing Commr. H. D., 441-3
Brindisi, 398
Brisbane, Australian L. Cr., 418
Bristol, No. 6 Sch. of Aeronautics,
427, 445-6
British Fire Prevention Committee,
i34«. _
Broadstairs, bombed, 18
Brock, Lt.-Col. H. le M., 450^.
Broke-Smith, Maj. P. W. L., 252-3,
269^., 283
Brooking, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. T., 314,
327-8, 330
Brooklands, Wireless and Observers'
Sch., 428, 436
Brown, Lt. A. W., 410;^.
Brown, 2nd Lt. J., 195
Browning, Lt. L. H., 323
Buchanan, Lt. W. J., 363
Bucharest, 345, 378-9
Buckingham bullet, see 'Ammunition'
Buckingham Palace gardens, bombed,
105
Bughaila, 293, 297; bombed, 290, 295
Buk, bombed, 17^~7
Bulair, bombed, 406
Bulgaria, see 'Macedonia, air operations
in', and 'Mediterranean and Near
Eastern Waters*
1
514
Bulgarian Army, see 'Army
garian'
Billow, Maj. Freiherr von, 18;/., 20;/.,
58-9, 62, 104-5,
Burchell, Lt.-Col. H., 456
Bureir, bombed, 384-5
Burke, Lt.-Col. C. J., 459
Burlington House, bombed, 78
Burn, Lt. W. W. A., 253, 255-6
Burnham, bombed, 102
Burns, Lt. J. R., 291
Bury, Air Mechanic T. H., 360
Bustan, 299
Buttlar, Kapitdnlcutnant Freiherr von,
94, 121
Cadbury, Maj. E., 33, 131-3
Cadet Wings (R.F.C. and R.A.F.):
No. J, 427; No, 2, 427; No. 3
(Egypt), 188, 427«., 452-3; No. 4,
(Canada), 427^., 463-4, 467; No.
5, 427; No. 6, 4275 No. 7, 427;
No. 8, 427
Cairo, 227; bombed, 200
Caldwell, Lt. J. H., 320
Calshot seaplane station, 440
Camber Marsh, bombed, 10
Camberwell, bombed, 82, 97-8
Canada, training in, sec 'Training
Developments — Canada'
Canadian Aeroplanes, Limited, 461-2,
465
Canning, Br. balloon ship, 371
Canterbury, bombed, 103; 104
Caquot, see 'Balloons'
Cassels, Brig.-Gen. R. A., 330
Casualties:
R.F.C. and R.A.F., 425-7; in air
fighting in France, 469-70; during
air raids on Great Britain, 153,
158; Canada, 467; see also Apps.i,
Tables 'A' and 'B', iii, and v
Catford, bombed, 129
Cattaro, 387, 389, 392, 397
Cave, Rt. Hon. Sir. G., Home Secre-
tary, 46, 107, 136
Cerniste, bombed, 348, 356
Cestovo, bombed, 345, 348, 356, 360,
362, 364, 366
Chack, M. Paul, i6in.
Chai Khana, 318-19
Chamier, Maj. J. A., 430, 436
Chanak, bombed, 406-8
INDEX
Bui
Charlton, Brig.-Gen. L. E. O., 1). of
Air Organization, 437«., 463
Chatham, naval barracks bombed, 61
Chattis Hill, W/T Sch., 447
Chauvel, Maj. -Gen. Sir H. G., 203
Chaytor, Brig-Gen. E. W. C, 192W.,
195
Chelsea Hospital and Barracks, bombed,
117-18
Chelteniiam, Nos. 8 and 9 Schs. of
Aeronautics, 445-6
Chcriton, bombed, 21
Chetwode, Lt.-Gen. Sir P. W., 200,
202, 208, 213, 234
Chikaldir bridge, bombed, 386-7, 419
Chingford, Naval Flying Sch., 440-1,
443
Churchill, Rt. Hon Winston S.,
Minister of Munitions, 86, 89
City of Oxford, Br. aircraft carrier,
237//., 416;/., 419-23
'Claude Orthophone', Sound Locator,
Cleghorn, Maj. A., 341
Clematis, Br. sloop, 167
Codes, used in warning system, 49-51,
108
Colombo, 416, 418
Comet, Br. gun-boat, 254-5
Compiegne, L.JQ destroyed at, 9-10
Constantinesco synchronizing gear, 148
Constantinople, 405, 410, 413-14;
bombed, 378, 406-7
Cook, 2nd Lt. W. W., 79-82
Corfu, 394, 398
Coutelas, Fr. destroyer, 421
Coventry, bombed, 126
Cowdray, Rt. Hon. Lord, President
of Air Board, 86«.
Cowper St. School, bombed, 27
Cox, Lt. C, 316
Cox, Sir P. Z., 254-5
Craig, Lt. H. W., 306
Cranwell, Central Training Sch.,
439-43
Cromack, Ldg. Mech. B., 405«.
Crops, burning of, 376, 401, 404
Crystal Palace, R.N.A.S. depot, 440
Ctesiphon, 260; battle of, 261-4
Curragh, Flying Instructors' Sch., 448
Curtiss Company, 458, 462
Cutlack, F. M., 28 1».
Cuxwold, bombed, 81
INDEX
Dacre, Fit. Commr. G. B., 384
Dahra Bend, 292; captured, 293;
bombed, 289
Dalston, bombed, 27
Darfur: operations, 170-7
Darfur, Sultan of, 170-1, 175-7, 241
Dartford, A. A., sub-command, 5?^.
Davidson, Lt. D. A. L., 280
Dawes, Lt.-CoL G. W. P., 341
Dedeli, bombed, 356
Deir el Balah, 21 6«., 226-7, 420
Delamain, Brig.-Gen. W. S., 252
Delli Abbas, captured, 306
Deniir Hissar, Turkish T.B., 1657^
Denham, No. 5 Sch. of Aeronautics,
427, 445-65 No. I Cadet Wing, 427
Denning, Lt. C. ff., 342
Derby, Lord, 29, 41, 109
de Robeck, V.-Ad. Sir J. M., 369-70,
372, 374, 38o«.
Deseronto, 462-3, 466
Desert Column, formation, 200; 203-5,
208-9, 212-13
Dhaba, bombed, 193
Dhibban, captured, 310
Dietrich, Kapitdnleutnant Martin, 10,
12, 32-3, 55, 80, 123
Divisions (R.F.C. and R.A.F.): Train-
ing, 426,^ 437, 444, 446
Dixon-Spain, Capt. J. E., 450
Djemal Pasha, 210
Dobell, Lt.-Gen. Sir C. M., 196,
208-9, 213, 217, 234«.
Doddington, bombed, 124
Dojran, battle of, 350-5
Doris^ Br. L.Cr., 161
Dose, Kapitdnleutnant 133
Dover, 22, 84; bombed, 18, 57-8, 60,
63, 78, 85, 103-4, 128-9;
Marine Operation Pilots, 447
Dowding, Brig-Gen. H. C. T., 427
Drake, Fit. Sub.-Lt. J., 58
Drama, 342-3, 377; bombed, 349,
355;6, 365, 377, 4°°, 402
Dranli, bombarded, 377
Dudular, bombed, 345
Duff, Gen. Sir B., C.-in-C. India, 284
Dujaila Redoubt, 270-3, 275-65
captured, 281
Dundee, air station, 390
Dunkirk, air station, 22, 25, 36-7
'Dunster force', 323
Dunsterville, Maj.-Gen. L. C, 323
E.I 4^ Br. S/M., sunk, 414
Earl of Peterborough, Br. Mon., 374
Eastbourne, Naval Flying Sch., 440-1,
443
Eastchurch, Naval Flying Sch., 439-
415 Armament Sch., 4435 Obser-
vers' Sch., 447-8
Eastern Aircraft Factory, Abu Qir,
453, 456
Eastern Frontier Force, 196, 208-10,
212-13, 217, 234
Eastern H.D. Wing, see 'Wings: Forty-
Ninth'
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,
Royal Navy, 346, 369, 397, 414-15
East Fortune, air station, 4445 Aerial
Fighting Sch., 447
East Halton, bombed, 124
East Ham, bombed, 265 Gotha
destroyed at, 130
East Indies Squadron, Royal Navy,
197, 368,415^
East Indies Station, Royal Navy, 231,
372-3, 379, 394
Edinburgh, School of Fitters, 434
Edmonds, Fit. Commr. C. H. K., 381
Edmonton, bombed, 88
Edwards, 2nd Lt. E. W., 195
Egypt and Palestine, air operations in,
1914-17:
Suez C^7«iz/, Turkish attackon(i9i5),
160-55 arrival of air detachment,
160, Fifth Wing arrives, 1655
Western desert, operations against
the Senussi (1915-17), 166-70,
concluded, 189-91, Darfur opera-
tions (191 6), 170-75 Suez Canal
defences reorganized, 177-8, rail-
way construction, 180, 1845
Qatiya, Turkish attack on, 181-45
formation and organization of
central air command (Middle
East Brigade), 186-95 Romani,
battle of, 191-5, end of threat to
Suez Canal, 1955 Disposition
R.F.C. (August 1 91 6), 1 93 5 Eastern
Frontier Force, organized, 1965
Advance into Palestine, action of
Rafah, 202-85 Gaza, first battle
of, 208-155 Gaza, second battle of,
215-18, German airmen attack
pipe-line, 2185 Arab Revolt (1916)^
218-24, capture of Mecca, 2205
5i6
Egypt and Palestine— continued
preparations for the capture of
Jerusalem, 225-495 Gen. Allenby
takes command, 225, requests
additional squadrons, 225-6, 238,
formation of Palestine Brigade,
226-7, reorganization of Middle
East Brigade, 227M.; Gaza, third
battle of, 233-465 Jerusalem
captured, 248-9
Aerodromes and Landing Grounds:
(British), see Abu Qir, Abu Sucir,
Aqaba, Asyut, Barrani, Becrshcba,
Deir el Balah, Gayadah, Gharaq
El (Faiyum), Hammam, El, Helio-
polis, Helwan, Ismailia, Jebcl el
Hilla, Julis, Junction Station,
Kharga (Sherika), Khirbet Deiran,
Mabeuik, Matruh, MInya, IVIusta-
big, Nahud, En, Port Said,
Qantara, Rabigh, Rafah, Rahad,
Ras el Hagg, Rigum, Er, Salmana,
Sheikh Zowaiid, Solium, Suez,
Ujret el Zol, Wejh, Weli Sheikh
Nuran, Yenbo
[German), see Arish, EI, Beersheba,
'Iraq el Menshiye, Ramie, Er,
Tine, Et, Tul Karm
Artillery Co-operation, Rafah action,
203; Gaza {ist), 209, 21 1, 213-14;
Gaza {2nd), 216-175 Gaza {3rd),
237-41; Fall of Jerusalem, 229,
247,
Bombing attacks {British), Senussi
operations, igi^-id, 1705 Sinai
front {1916), 179, 185-6, 196,
198-9, 2015 Qatiya attack, 184;
Romani battle, 193; Rafah action,
203-6; Arab Revolt {1916), 219,
221, 224; Gaza {3rd), 242-5;
Fall of Jerusalem, 230-3, 247
(German), 184-5, 196-8, 216, 385
Contact patrols, Sinai front (igiO),
178-9, 1985 Senussi operations, 1905
Romani battle, 1935 Gaza (ist),
209, 2T2; Gaza {3rd), 239; Fall
of Jerusalem, 230
Fighting in the Air, Romani battle,
195; Sinai front {1916), 1975
Gaza (ist), 214-155 Gaza {3rd),
236, 239n.; Fall of Jerusalem, 231
French Air Service, co-operation,
161, 164-5
INDEX
German Air Service, arrival of
detachment on Sinai front (191 6),
179, the superiority of, 179-80,
reinforcements (Rumplers), 214-
15; attacks on pipe-line, 218
Low-flying attacks (British), Sinai
front (191 5-16), 163-4, 178, 185,
198; Darfur operations (19 16),
175-6; Qatiya attack, 183-45 Gaza
(ist), 209, 2135 Gaza (2nd), 2185
Arab Revolt (19 16), 219, 2225
Gaza (3rd), 239-42, 2455 Fall of
Jerusalem, 247-8
Naval, and Naval air co-operation,
161-2, 164-5, 167-8, 179, 184-5,
194, 197, 217, 219-22, 231-2,
237-8, 38c^5, 415-16, 4195 4225
Spotting for H.M. ships, 184-5,
194, 197, 222, 237-8, 382-3, 385,
419-22
Patrols, offensive, Gaza (ist), 21 15
Gaza (3rd), 237
Photography, air, Sinai front {igi6),
178, 185, 1985 Rafah action, 202,
2065 Gaza (2nd), 2165 Arab
Revolt (1916), 219, 221-35 Gaza
(3rd), 237-405 Fall of Jerusalem,
228, 230
Railway communications, 180, 184,
205-6, 208, 220-2, 224, 245
Reconnaissance, air (British), Sinai
front {1914-16), 160-5, 178-81,
185, 197, 199, 200-15 Senussi
operations (igi5-iy), 166-70, 189-
915 Darfur operations (igi6),
174-65 Qatiya attack, 182-4;
Romani battle, 191-5; Rafah
action, 202-75 Gaza (ist), 209,
211-135 Gaza (2nd), 216-185
Arab Revolt (igi6), 219, 221-35
Gaza (3rd), 236-9, 2415 Fall of
Jerusalem, 230, 246-8
(German), Qatiya attack, 1845
Sinai front {igi6), 186, 1975 Gaza
(ist), 210-115 Gaza (3rd), 235-6
Wireless Telegraphy, Sinai front
(igi6), stations established, 1865
Romani battle, 193-45 Rafah
action, 2035 Gaza (ist), 2095
Fall of Jerusalem, 229-30
Egypt, training in, see 'Training
Developments — Egypt'
Egyptian Labour Corps, 205, 248«., 420
Ehrlich, Kapitanle'utnant Herbert, lo,
8i, 122, 124-5 .
Eichler, Kapitdnleutnant, 33-4
Ellington, Brig.-Gen. E. L. (D.D.
G.M.A.), 4385 becomes D.G.M.A.,
438
El Pinikt, Greek cargo-boat, 375
Elstow, bombed, 96
Empress, Br. aircraft-carrier, 231,
237«-5 337«-, 372-4, 376-7, 380,
399, 412, 415, 419-22
Endymion, Br. Cr., 376
Engines, aero:
types:
Beardmore, 147-8, 286^.; Benz, 60,
345, 409; Canton Unne, 268;
Clerget, 148, 372; Gnome, 256-7,
286«.; Hispano-Suiza, 149; Le
Rhone, 143, 148; Maybach, 60,
131; Mercedes, 19, 60, 179, 345;
Monosoupape, 148; R.A.F., 147,
166, 341; Renault, 161, 253;
Rolls-Royce, 147-8; Sunbeam,
258, 269; Wolseley 'Viper', 149
Erith, bombed, 103
I'Escaille, Lt. de Vaisseau de, 161
Eschwege, Leutnant von, 342-3; killed,
361-2
Espiegle, Br. sloop, 184, 197, 254, 385
Euston, bombed, 88
Evernian aerodrome (Texas), 465-6
Exmouth, Br. B., 418
Fairlop, 443
Falkenhayn, Gen. von, 340
Falls, Capt. C, i62«., 181;^., 2i3«.,
233«., 332«., 38i«., 386«.
Falluja, captured, 302
Fantasse, 174
Farnborough, air station, 439; Sch. for
Armourers, 424; Sch. of Photo-
graphy, 424, 448; Royal Aircraft
Factory, 431
Fasher, El, 171-7
Faversham, bombed, 84, 128
Felixstowe, air station, 16, 18, 440;
bombed, 35, 51
Fener Point, bombed, 374
Ferejik, bombed, 374, 378
Fighting in theaiv: Egypt and Palestine,
195, 197, 214-15, 231, 236, 239«.;
Mesopotamia, 269-70, 280, 283, 286,
290-2, 305-6, 308, 313, 316, 320-1;
KX S17
Macedonia, 342-4, 346-8, 356-8,
360-1, 364-6; Mediterranean and
Near Eastern Waters, 378, 385, 401,
403, 407, 409, 411, 420
Fineka, bombed, 385
Finsbury, bombed, 104
Firefly, Br. river gunboat, 296
Fiume, 389, 391, 393
Fiyush, bombed, 381
Fleet: Battle Cruiser, 444; Adriatic
Squadron, 388; East Indies Squad-
ron, 197, 368, 415; East Indies
Station, 231, 372-3, 379, 394;
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,
346, 369, 397, 414-15; Red Sea
patrol, 222;/., 422
Fleet, bombed, 124
Flemming, Kapitdnleutnant, 79, 95,
124
Flights, R.N.A.S., in Mediterranean,
^, 375-6; B, 373, 378; C, 378;
A 375-7; G, 407. See also 'Squadrons
— R.N.A.S.'
Flying-boats, see 'Seaplanes'
Folkestone, bombed, 21-2, 129; pro-
tests against inadequacy of defence
measures, 22
Fort Kermea, 304
Fort Worth (Texas), 465
Foster Gun Mounting, 149
Fowler, Fit. Lt. P. K., 409
Fox, Br. L.Cr., 219, 222
Eraser, Lt.-Col. C, 454^.
Freeman, Capt. R. H., 221
Freiston, Air Fighting and Bomb-
dropping Sch., 443; Aerial Fighting
Sch., 447
French Air Service, co-operate in
Egypt and Palestine operations, 161,
164-5; iri Macedonia, 338, 344, 357,
362-3; in Mediterranean and Near
Eastern Waters, 374-6, 392, 396
French, Field-Marshal Lord, C.-in-C.
Home Forces, 5, 6, 8, 11, 24-5, 39,
40-1, 43-5, 66, 68-9, 86, 89, 109-
13; appointed Viceroy of Ireland,
ii3«.
Freudenreich, Kapitdnleutnant von,
56, 94, 122, 124
Friemel, Oberleutnant zur See, 95
Fuller, Maj. E. N., 338
Furse, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. T., Master
General of Ordnance, 86«.
5i8 IN]
Gahisborough, H.Q., 48tli (II.D.)
Wing, 139
Galata, bombed, 403, 406
Gallipoli, bombed, 378, 403, 406
Galpin, Fit. Lt. C. J., 14
Gardiner, Lt. C. C, 360
Garlinge, bombed, 32
Garside, ist Air Mechanic J., 190
Gaunt, R.-Ad. E. F. A., C.-In-C.
East Indies, 394
Gayadah, 224
Gayer, Kapitdnleutuant H., 100
Gaza, 206; first battle of, 208-15;
second battle of, 215-185 228, 230;
third battle of, 233-46, 419-21
Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 442
General^ Ger. s.s., bombed, 406-7
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd, 42,
90-1
Gereviz, 357, 367, 377; bombed,
35^7, 377, 402
German Air Service :
No. 3 Bombing Sqdn. begins day-
light raids on England, 18, 26-8;
abandoned, 58; effect of bombing
on British air policy, 58-9; moon-
light raids begin, 60; cessation of
aeroplane raids, reasons, 130-1;
aeroplane casualties, App. i, 'B';
Egypt and Palestine^ arrival of air
unit on Sinai front, 179, the
superiority of, 179-80, reinforce-
ments (Rumplers), 214-15; attacks
on pipe-line, 218; Mesopotamia^
arrival of detachment, 269; re-
inforcements, their superiority,
304-5; Macedonia^ strength, 338,
superiority of, 340, 358-9, Lt. von
Eschwege, 342-3, 361-2; arrival
of No. I Bombing Sqdn., 343-5
Squadrons:
Bombing No. J, 19, 343-6, 378;
No. 3, development of, 18-20; 25,
34-6, 42, 58-60; No. 300, 179;
No. 301, 238«.; No. 302, 238;^.;
No. 303, 238n.; No. 304, 238«.
Flights:
No. J, 2on.; No. 4, 20«.; No. 6,
20«.; No. 13 y 20; No. 14, 20;
No. 13, 20; No. 16^ 20; No. 17,
20«.; No. 18, 2on.; No. 501
{Riesenfliigzeug), 60
German Airship Service:
Aiilhorn disaster, 120-1; loss of
L.70, 1 3 1-3; the last raid, 131-4;
death of Frcgattcnkapiidn Strasser,
134; airship casualties, App. i,
Table 'A'
Gerrard, Wing Commr. E. L., 370
Gharaq, El, 167
(^jhistelles, 19
Gibbs, Lt. G. E., 364, 366
Gibraltar, naval air station, 389-90,
398
Gimlngham, Capt. C. H., 361
Glasgow, H.Q., N.W. Area, 446
Glasson, 2nd Lt. D. IL, 346
GlikI, 403
Goebcn, Ger. Cr., 363-4, 367, 410,
413-14, 422; bombed, 406, 411-12
Golden Hill Artillery School, 146
Gontrode, 20
Goodyear, 2nd Lt. J. G., 115
Gordon, Fit. Sub-Lt. J. L., 17
Gordon, Wing-Commr. R., 257, 269,
390
Gorgop, bombed, 343; 344-5
Gorringe, Lt.-Gen. Sir G. F., 256,
276-7, 280
Gospel Oak, bombed, 64
Gosport, Sch. of Aerial Co-operation,
145-6; Sch. of Special Flying,
429-30, 432, 434, 445; Flying
Instructors' Sch., 448
Gothas, destruction of, see App. i.
Tabic 'B'
Gough-Calthorpe, V.-Ad. the Hon.
Sir S. A., C.-in-C. Med., 394-6,
398-9
Goulding, Lt. A, G., 366
Government buildings, as air-raid
shelters, 136
Grace, 2nd Lt. F. A. D., 37
Grafton, Br. Cr., 374, 419, 421
Grain, Isle of, seaplane base, 444
Grant-Dalton, Lt.-Col. S., 186, 452«.
Greek Air Service:
co-operate in Macedonian and
Aegean operations, 357, 402,
405-7, 411
Squadrons :
'Z', 402, 405-7
Greek Army, see 'Army, Greek'
Greenwich, tunnel as air-raid shelter,
136; R.N. College, 440;/.
Grimsby, bombed, 56; trawlers at,
bombed, 121
Grosskreutz, Maj., 6jn.
Groups, R.F.C. and R.A.F.: Eastern
(Training) formation, 424; H.D., 24,
1 38; Northern (H.D.),i4o; Northern
(Training) formation, 424; Southern
(H.D.), 141; Southern (Training)
formation, 424; Training (Egypt),
227W., 453; Western (Training),
formation, 427
Groves, Lt.-Col. P. R. C, 172-3, 186,
338, 452«.
Gubbin, 2nd Lt. J. R. F., 360, 36i«.
Guillaumat, Gen., 366«.
Guns for A.A. Defence:
2-95-in., 55 3-in., 5, 89; life of and
cost, 154; 3-in. 20-cwt., 5«., 45;
life of, 86; 89; 3'5-in., 5«-; 4-in.,
5«.; 6-in., 145; 9-2-in., 145;
i2-pdr., 5«.; French 75-mm., 5«.,
Gun-mountings:
Admiralty Top Plane, 148; Ander-
son, 148; Foster, 149; Scarff,
148-9; Strange, 147-8
Gun-sights:
Hutton, 147-8, 150; Neame, 150
Hackney, bombed, 18
Haditha, captured, 329
Hadzi Junas, 355, 365, 399
Haggerston, bombed, 88
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 29-
31, 38-9, 41, 88, ii3«., i52«., 157,
470
Hainault Farm, 43«., 143
Halka Bouan, bombed, 404-5
Hallgreen, bombed, 126
Halton Park, Sch. of Tech. Training
(Men), 435
Hammam, El, 167-8, i69«.
Hampstead, bombed, 97, 114, 119
Hamshaw-Thomas, Lt. H., 228
Hangars, underground, 1 1 3
Hanmer, 2nd Lt. H. L, 245
Harba, captured, 306
Hardinge^ Br. aux. Cr., 222
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, Viceroy
of India, 258
Harrietsham, Gotha crashes on aero-
drome, 129; H.Q. 53rd (H.D.)
Wing, 140
INDEX 519
Harwich, A.A. defences at, 3 5 ; bombed,
35, 51
Hassana, Bir cl, bombed, 1 79
Hastings, No. 5 Cadet Wing, 427;
No. 6, 428; No. 2 Officers' Tech.
Trng. Corps, 428
Hatfield, bombed, 95
Havelock, Br. Mon., 371
Havilland, Maj. H. de, 284, 291, 295,
298, 325
Hearson, Brig.-Gen. J. G., 141, 437,
443, 446
Hector, Br. balloon ship, 371, 373
Hedon, bombed, 55
Height-finding Instruments, see 'Home
A.A. Defence'
Hejaz, the, 219-21, 226; railway,
221-3; bombed, 224
Heliopolis, air station, 165, 188-9,
193-4, 45o«., 452
Helwan, 188
Henderson, Lt.-Gen. Sir David, 7, 23,
41, 43«., 86n., 226, 437-8, 468-9
Hendon, bombed, 97; 439
Heneage, Cmdre. A. W., 390
Henley, Equipment Officers' Sch. of
Instruction, 428
Henry, Sir E. R., Commissioner of
Police, 49, 107, 135-7
Herbert, Brig.-Gen. P. L. W., 227W.,
427, 453
Heme Bay, bombed, 103-4, ^^9
Herring, Maj. J. H., 284, 288, 338«.,
357
Hersing, Lt.-Commr., 389
Hertford, bombed, 93, 95
Heydemarck, Hauptmann, 343«., 40 1«.
Hicks aerodrome (Texas), 465-6
Higgins, Col. T. C. R., 24, 138
Highbury, bombed, 88
Highgate, bombed, 85
Hill, Prof. A. v., 75
Hilly Fields Schools, South, A.A.
Sub-Command, 5«.
Hirsova, 350
Hit, captured 325-7; bombed, 325
Hitchen, bombed, 95
Hither Green, bombed, 98
Hoare, Lt.-Col. C. G., 461-4
Hobart, Maj. P. C. S., 329
Hockley, bombed, 102
Hodgson, Fit. Sub-Lt. G. R., 17-18
Hodson, Lt. G. F., 134
520
Hoeppner, Gen. von, 28«.
Hogg, Brig.-Gen. R. E. T., 427
Holborn, bombed, 114
Holland, Schouwen Island, bombed,
two Gothas destroyed by Dutch
gunners, 54
Hollender, KapitanleutJiant, 56, 81,
94
Holloway, bombed, 18
Holme, bombed, 95
Holt, Lt.-Col. F. v., 138
Home Anti-Aircraft Defence:
Reduction in, 7-8, Lord French
protests, 11-12; inadequacy of
defence measures, system re-
viewed, 22-5; public indignation
on 13 June 1917 raid, 285 decision
to double Air Services, 29, 59;
memos, by Sir D. Haig and Maj.-
Gen. Trenchard, 29-31, App. iv;
withdrawal of fighter squadrons
from B.E.F., 31-2, 38-9, 41, 157,
their return, 32, 40, Sir Wm.
Robertson's views, 39-40, War
Cabinet criticism, 40-1 ; futility
of unorganized defence, 36-7,
44-5, 58; Committee formed to
examine defence organization,
41-2, Gen. Smuts's report (July
1917), 42-3, 139, App. vi; de-
fences reorganized, Gen. Ashmore
to command London defences,
43-4, 1395 daylight raiding aban-
doned, 585 effect of bombing on
British air policy, 58-9; Govern-
ment concerned about night raid-
ing, 64, Gen. Smuts's memo.
(September 1917), 64-5, App. vii;
question of air-raid shelters, 109-
10, 138; underground hangars,
113; VI Brigade, invasion scheme,
144- 5 ; co-operation with artillery,
145- 7; strength at Armistice,
App. ix. Tables 'A' and 'B'
Aircraft Defence:
Aeroplanes: reporting of as hostile,
52, 119, 126-7; organization
of the VI Brigade, 138-44,
App. ix. Table 'B'; tactical group-
ing of defence squadrons, 140;
armament of, 147-51; types at
Armistice, 150; increase in squad-
rons approved (August 191 8),
INDEX
1 5 1 ; strength of VI Brigade
(June 1 91 8 and Armistice), 153-4,
App. ix
types used: Avro, Armstrong
VVhitworth, B.E.2, B.E.12,
Bristol Fighter, D.H.4, D.H.9,
F.E.2b and d, R.E.8, S.E.5,
Sopwith 'Camel', 'Dolphin',
'Pup', ''Snipe', 'iJ^ strutter',
(two-seater), see also 'Aero-
planes'
Night Jlying, reduction in personnel,
7; pilots and aeroplanes available,
II, 24; training of personnel, 102,
141-4, 155; pioneer flight by
'Camels', 62, 65-6, fitted with
dual control, 143; unsuitability of
types of aeroplanes employed,
91-2; III, 129, 149
Action during raids, 11, 14, 22, 25,
28, 32-5j 37, 51-3, 555 57-8,
61-2, 64, 79-84, 88, 91-2, 94-5,
97, loi, 103-6, 109, 117, 119,
122-3, 125-6, 128-32, App. i,
'A' and 'B'
Squadrons, 'Home Defence', see
'Squadrons'
Ground Defence:
Anti-Aircraft guns: diverted to
protect shipping, 4-5; authorized
allotment, January 191 7, 5; reduc-
tion in, 8; new scheme of barrage
fire, establishment of zones, 76-7;
Gen. Smuts's committee on supply
of A.A. ammunition, 86; wear
and tear of guns, 89; value of the
barrage fire, 91 ; French 75-mm.
guns moved to Birmingham, 91;
requirements for, given prece-
dence over demands of B.E.F.,
113, i52«.; strength (June 191 8
and Armistice), 153, App. ix
Action during raids, 25, 35, 57-8,
61, 64, 79, 82-6, 88-9, 101-4,
106, 117, 119, 121-2, 124, 126,
130, 134
Height-finders, types of, principles
and methods of employment,
71-3; strength (June 191 8 and
Armistice), 153, App. ix
Lighting restrictions, 1-4
Observer posts, manned by Royal
Defence Corps, 44, 102; police
INDEX
521
Home AntI- Aircraft Defence — con-
tinued
take over, 108; coastal cordon
established, 108-9
Personnel, reduction in, 7, 11-12;
strength (June 191 8 and Armi-
stice), 153-4, App. ix
Range-finders, 70-1; the Linde-
mann, 146
Searchlights, importance of, 65-6,
111-12; 80, loi, 122, 127, 134,
I52«.; strength (June 1918 and
Armistice), 153-4, App. ix
Sound-locators, development of
and methods of employment,
73-6; strength (June 191 8), 153
Warnings, 3-4; system criticized,
22; introduction of night sound-
warnings, 106-7; 123-5, 1345
Home Office, 46, 107, 136
Houton Bay, seaplane station, 444
Hov/den, bombed, 122
Hoxton, bombed, 88
Hudova, 338, 348, 360; bombed, 342,
345-7, 349, 35^
Huj, 209, 212
Hull, bombed, 80, 122
Humr, 320; bombed, 321
Hursley Park, No. 2 Cadet Wing, 427;
Officers' Tech. Trng. Corps, 428;
Artillery and Infantry Co-opn. Sch.,
428, 437
Hussein Ibn Ali, Grand Sherif of
Mecca, 219-21, 382, 385
Hutton, Sgt. A. E. (Hutton Sight),
147-8, 150
Hyde Park, A. A. guns at, 5; bombed,
88
Hythe, Sch. of Aerial Gunnery, 425,
435j 437; Observers' Sch., 447
^5 370-1, 373,
407, 409-12
375,
378-9, 399, 403,
Ince, bombed, 125
Independent Force, R.A.F., effect of
German air raids on Great Britain on
formation of, 88, 90-1 5 the Forty-
first Wing formed, 91
Indian Expeditionary Force 'D', 251-2
Inland Water Transport, in Meso-
potamia, see 'Transport, river'
Invasion of Great Britain, duties
allotted to VI Brigade, 144
Inw^orth, bombed, 63
Traq (Mesopotamia), 250
*Iraq el Menshiye, bombed, 241-2
Isleworth, bombed, 117
Islington, bombed, 64
Ismailia, air station, 160, 164-5, ^7^,
184, 188-9, 193-4, 199, 200, 206,
226, 257, 450, 452, 455,457«.
Jackson, R.-Ad. T., 394-5, 420
Jadida, 3097/.
Ja'far Pasha, Turkish Commander,
168
Jaffa, captured, 246
Jaljulye, bombed, 421
Jardine, Capt. D. G. B., 134
Jebel Akrabi, bombed, 382
Jebel el Hilla, 173-4
Jebel Malu, bombed, 382
Jebel el Milh, bombed, 422-3
Jellicoe, Ad. Sir John R., 86«., 90,
390
Jerusalem, captured, 248-9
Jessop, Air Mechanic J. O., 35
Jidda, captured, 220
Jihad (Holy War), 166, 219, 251
Johnston, Fit. Sub-Lt. W., 411
Jones, Lt. H. A., 34i«., 358
Joubert de la Ferte, Lt.-Col. P. B.,
189, 209«.
Julis, 246-7, 422
y ulnar ^ river steamer, 280
Junction station, bombed, 206, 245;
246
Jurf ed Derawish, bombed, 221
Kadhimain, AI, bombed, 298; 299
Kalendra, bombed, 356
Kalinovo, 350
Kalloni (Mityleiie), 405
Kanatlarci, bombed, 357
Kantara, see 'Qantara'
Karasuli, bombed, 347-8
Kasirin, 304-5
Kassandra, 374«., 399
Kassimir, bombed, 404
Katiya, see 'Qatiya'
Kavalla, bombarded, 400-1
Kearsey, Lt.-Col. A. H. C, 452^.
Keary, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. D'U., 302-4
Keevil, Capt. C. H. C, 28
Kelab, Umm el, 227
Kelly, Lt.-Col. P. V., 171, 173, 175
522
Kempston, bombed, 96
Kennington, bombed, 84, 104
Kephalo, 403
Kerby, Fit. Lt. H. S., 53
Kerr, R.-Ad. Mark E. F., 388-90, 392«.
Kew, bombed, 117
Khan Baghdad!, captured, 328
Khan Fuhaima, captured, 329
Khanka, El, Flying Instructors' Scliool,
455
Kharga (Sherika), 189-91, 193, 199
Khios Island, 373
Khirbet Deiran, 246-7
Kifri, 320; bombed, 315-16, 318, 321
Killingholme, seaplane station, 440
Kingscote, Capt. A. R. F,, 76
Kingsland, bombed, 84
Kingsnorth, airship station, 439
Kipling, Rudyard, 4i8«.
Kitchener, Lord, Secretary of State
for War, 1 64
Kite Balloons, see 'Balloons'
Kleine, Hauptmann, 37«., 54
Koch, Kapitdnleutnant Robert, 9
KoUe, Kapitdiiletitnant Waldcmar, 13,
56, 97-8
Kopriva, 341
Kos Island, 414
Kraushaar, Kapitdnleutnant, 13
Kress von Kressenstein, Col., i8i«.,
210-11, 213, 243-4
Kukush, 341
Kuleli Burgas, bombed, 378, 408
Kut al Imara, food-dropping in, 278-
80; surrenders, 280-1 5 bombed, 276,
284
Kuwar Reach,
INDEX
304, 306
Laccadive Islands, 416
Ladybird, Br. river gun-boat, 420, 422
Lahana, 340, 342, 354-6; bombed, 361
Lahej, bombed, 219, 382
Lahfan Bir, bombed, 200
Lake, Lt.-Gen. Sir P. H. N., 267//.,
269, 280-2, 283n.
Lancashire, lighting restrictions, 2
Landguard, bombed, 88-9
Langham Place, London, Sch. of
Bombing, 428
Lapeyrere, V.-Ad. Bouc de, French
C.-in-C. Mediterranean, 369
Lawrence, Maj.-Gen. H. A., 18 1-2
Lawrence, Col. T. E., 2i8m.
Leckic, Capt. R., 131
Lee, bombed, 1 1 8
Leigh, bombed, 52
Leighton Buzzard, bombed, 96
Leman Tail lightship, 131
Le Pricur rockets, 141
Leslie, Fit. Lieut. R. F. S., 22
Lewisham, bombed, 97, 118
Lcybourne Camp, bombed, 78
Lighting restrictions, see 'Home A. A.
Defence' a«i 'London, A.A. defence
of
Lilbournc, Flying Instructors' Sch., 448
Lincoln, bombed, 56
Lindemann, Dr. F. A., 146, 431
Linford, 2nd Lt. R. D., 123
Little Iluhon, bombed, 125
Little Plumstcad, bombed, 13
Little Sutton, bombed, 124
Liverpool St. station, bombed, 27
Livingston, Brig.-Gen. G., D. of Air
Organization, 437
Livunovo, bombed, 349, 356
Lloyd, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., G.O.C.
London district, 5-6
Lloyd-Williams, Capt. J. J., 236
Loch Doon, Sch. of Aerial Gunnery,
424
London, H.Q., Eastern Training
Brigade, 424, 427; H.Q., S.E. Area,
446
London, Anti-Aircraft defence of:
Appointment of A. A. Defence Com-
mander, 5-6; pubHc indignation
on 13 June 191 7 raid, 28, War
Cabinet decision, 29; 7 July 191 7
raid, suggested reprisals, 38-40;
Gen. Smuts's report (July 191 7),
42- 3, App. vi; defences re-
organized, appointment of Gen.
Ashmore to command 'London
Air Defence Area' (L.A.D.A.),
43- 4, 139; scope of command,
43-4; schemes for defence, 44-5,
Gen. Smuts's memo. (Sept. 191 7),
64-5, App. vii; report by Lord
French (Jan. 191 8), 1 10-12 and
map p. I, his requirements, 112-
13; defences reorganized, 127;
the final aeroplane raid (19/20
May 1 91 8), 127-31; provision of
air-raid shelters, 109-10, 134-8;
detailed defence arrangements
INDEX
523
London — continued
(Sept. 1918), App. viil; strengtli
at Armistice, App. ix, Tables
'A' and 'B'
Aircraft Defence:
Aeroplanes, see 'Home A.A. De-
fence— Aircraft'
Action during raids, 28, 36-7, 64,
79, 82, 84, 88, 103-6, 115-20,
128-30
Balloons, Apron scheme, 65-705
Home Balloon Wing established,
68-9; Gen. Ashmore's memo.
(Apr. 1 91 8), 69; scheme curtailed,
70, 151; 'Giant' bomber flies
through balloon apron, 116;
strength of Balloon Wing (June
1 91 8 and Armistice), 154, App. ix
Squadrons, 'Home Defence', see
'Squadrons'
Ground Defence:
Anti-Aircraft guns: strength (Jan.
1 91 7), 5; double gun stations aban-
doned, 5; order by Lord French
restricting gunfire, 8, cancelled, 26 5
defensive gun barrage, establish-
ment of recommended, 43 ; 45, 66;
new scheme of gunfire, zones
estabUshed, 76-7; Lord French
requests more guns for London
barrage, 86; diverted from mer-
chant ships, 89; new gun barrage
scheme, 89^. and map facing;
polygon barrage, 116; gun barrier
line strengthened, 127
Action during raids, 64, 79, 82-6,
88-9, 103-4, 116-17, 119-20,
128-30
Lighting restrictions, 2-3
Observer Posts, 44, 102, 108-9
Searchlights, scheme for 'light'
patrol, 6; importance of, 65-6;
reorganization of ('Aeroplane
Lights'), 127
Warnings, 26«.; Government deci-
sion, 45-6; the organization, 46-
51; the 'Socket distress signal'
used, 47; dissemination of, 47-9;
the warning scheme, 49-51; in-
troduction of night sound-warn-
ings, 106-7; "9; warning control
organization at Armistice, see
map facing p. 134
London, bombed (6/7 May 191 7), 18;
first daylight attack on (13 June
191 7), 26-8, bombs dropped, casual-
ties, and damage, App. iii; (7 July
1 91 7), 36, bombs dropped, casualties,
and damage, App. v; moonlight
raid (4/5 Sept. 1917), 62-4; (24 Sept.
19^7), 78; (25 Sept. 1 91 7), 82;
(29 Sept. 1917), 84; (30 Sept. 1917),
85; (1/2 Oct. I9i7),88; (19/20 Oct.
1917), 97-8; (31 Oct. 1917), 103;
(6 Dec. 1917), 103-4; (18 Dec.
1917) , 105; (28 Jan. 1918), 114;
(29/30 Jan. 1 91 8), 117; (16 Feb.
1918) , 117-18; (17 Feb. 1918), 118;
(7 Mar. 191 8), 119; (19/20 May
191 8), 127-31; German High Com-
mand order bombing to cease, 131 ;
County of, air-raid statistics, App. ii;
M.P.D., air-raid statistics, App. i,
'A' and 'B'
Long Acre, air-raid shelter bombed,
1 14-15
Long Branch (Toronto), 458, 462, 464
Longbridge, bombed, 94
Longcroft, Maj.-Gen. C. A. H., 437
Long Island (Gulf of Smyrna), 373
Longmore, Wing Capt. A. M., 396-7
Lossnitzer, Kapitdnleiitnant von, 131
Louth, bombed, 56
Low-flying attacks by aeroplanes.
British: Egypt and Palestine, 163-4,
175-6, 178, 183-5, 198, 209, 213,
218-19, 222, 239-42, 245, 247-8;
Mesopotamia, 287, 295-6, 298,
312, 315716, 319-20, 325-6, 329;
Macedonia, 365
Luce, Cmdre. J., 440;;.
Ludlow-Hewitt, Brig.-Gen. E. R.,444,
446
Lule Burgas, bombed, 403-4
Lydd, 436^.; Ballooon Training Base
and Sch., 448
Lydda, 245-7
McBain, Maj. W. R. B., 366
McClelland, Fit. Lt. H., 405^.
McConnell, 2nd Lt. H. L. C, 245-6
McCrindle, Maj. J. R., 227, 248
MacEwen, Maj. N. D. K., 283
Maclnnes, Maj. D. S., 438
MacMunn, Lt.-Gen.
\%\n., 2i3«., 38i«..
Sir G., 162W.
386«.
524
McNamara, Lt. F. H., awarded V.C.,
206-7
Mabeiuk, i6im.
Macedonia, air operations in:
Macedonia before the war, 332-3;
Austro-German offensive begins,
335; Britain declares war on
Bulgaria, 335; L.Z.85 attacks
Salonika, 336; Gen. Sarrail
appointed Allied Commander-in-
Chief, 337; Gen. Milne to com-
mand British forces, 337; arrival
of No. 17 Sqdn., 338, arrival of
No. 47 Sqdn., formation of
Sixteenth Wing, 341 ; German
bombing campaign opens (No. i
Bombing Sqdn.), 343-55 ^^^Ip
from Naval aircraft, 346, forma-
tion of 'F' Squadron, 349, the
disaster at Marian, 349-50; the
battle of Dojran, 350-5; Greek
assistance to Allies, 355; fire at
Salonika, 359-60; requests for
aircraft reinforcements of superior
type, 362, their arrival 363;
attacks on the Goeben, 363-4;
formation of No. 150 Sqdn., 366
Aerodromes and Landing-grounds:
(British), see Amberkoj, Avret
Hisar, Hadzi Junas, Kukush,
Lahana, Marian, Mikra Bay
(Salonika), Mudros, Orlyak,
Snevche, Stavros, Thasos, Yanesh
(French), see Gorgop
(Enemy), see Drama, Gereviz,
Hudova, Kanatlarci, Livunovo,
Monastlr, Sveti Vrac, Xanthe
Artillery co-operation, 341; Dojran
battle, 350-3
Bombing attacks (British), 342,
345-9j 355-8, 360, 362, 364-6
(German), 336, 342-9, 357, 361-2
Fighting in the air, 342-4, 346-8,
356-8, 36c^i, 364-6
French Air Service, co-operation,
338, 344, 357, 362-3
German Air Service, strength, 338,
superiority of, 340, 358-9; Lt. von
Eschwege, 342-3, 361-2; arrival
of No. I (Bombing) Sqdn., 343-5
Greek Air Service, co-operation,
357, 402
Low-flying attacks (British), 365
INDEX
Naval, and Naval air co-operation,
336-8, 344, 346-7, 349, 357,
363-4, 373-8, 399-402, 408, 412;
Spotting for H.M. ships, Zl^lt
400-1
Photography, air, 341 ; Dojran battle,
3515364
Reconnaissance, air (British), 337-8,
34(^2
(German), 364-6
Machine-guns in aircraft, anti-flash
device fitted on H.D. aeroplanes,
1 1 9;;.
Mackensen, Field Marshal von, 335,
340
Madhij, 314
Magdhaba, bombed, 200 ; 201-2
Maghara, Bir cl, bombed, 196
Maguire, Lt. M. L., 308
Mahon, Lt.-Gcn. Sir B. T., 337
Maidstone, bombed, 96
Maldivc Islands, 416-18, 4i9«.
Male Island, Sultan of, 418
Mailing, East and West, bombed, 79
Malone, Sqdn. Commr. C. J. L'Es-
trange, 380
Malta, 390-1, 397-8
Mandali, captured, 315
Manger, Hauptmann, 10, 55, 80, 94,
95«., 122, 125
Manisa, bombed, 404
Mann, A. J., 35i«.
Mansell-Pleydell, Lt. J. M., 72
Manston, bombed, 32; air station, 37;
underground hangars at, 113; Ob-
servers' Sch., 447
Manxman, Br. aircraft-carrier, 412-13
Maratina, Br. Cr., 18
Marflcet, bombed, 80
Margate, bombed, 26, 36, 53, 57, 61,
63, 85-6, 104-5, "45 Gotha lands
at, 109
Marian, Aerodrome, disaster at, 349-
505 356-7, 400-1
Marsh Aerodrome (Mudros), 375-6,
407
Marshal Ney, Br. Mon., 83
Marshall, Lt.-Gen. Sir W. R., 306-7,
318-19, 322, 324, 326
Marske, Sch. of Aerial Gunnery, 425;
Aerial Fighting Sch., 447
Martlesham Heath, Experimental Stn.,
-3, 35
Massy, Maj. S. D., i6o, 257, 265
Maswakli, 377
Mathy, Kapitdnleutnant H., 98
Matruh, 166-9, ^^9
Maud, Brig.-Gen. P., 140
Maude, Lt.-Gen. Sir F. S., 282, 284-5,
288-90, 293-4, 300-4, 311, 315, 317;
death of, 318
Maxton, Fit. Sub-Lt. L. G., 15
Maxweli, Lt.-Gen. Sir Johin G., 161,
164, 168, 177-8
Mazar, Bir e], bombed, 193, 383
Meade, Lt. W. C. A., 417-18
Mecca, captured, 220; Grand Slierif
of, see 'Hussein Ibn Ali'
Medhurst, Maj. C. E. H., 227
Mediterranean and Near Eastern
Waters — Naval Air Operations in,
1916-March 1918:
French responsibility (1914), 368;
zones, Inter-Allied responsibility
(1916) , 3695 the appointment of
a British Commander-in-Chief
(19 1 7) , 393-4, reorganization of
forces, 394-5, his memo, asking
for increase in aircraft, 395-6;
reorganization and expansion of
air services, appointment of Wing
Capt. Longmore (1918), 397
Eastern Mediterranean [igi6-i8\
reduction of air units, 370; Wing
Capt. Scarlett takes command,
371, expansion programme, 371-2;
redistribution of naval aircraft,
374-5; air detachment for Roma-
nia, 378-9; Bulgarian communica-
tions, operations against (191 6),
373-5; (1917)? 400, 402, 408;
burning of crops (19 16), 376;
(1917), 401, 404; bridges bombed,
(1916), 376-8, (1917 and 1918),
403-4; enemy's counter-offensive
(19 1 6), 377; the bombing of
Thasos (19 1 6), 377, (19 1 7), 402;
Constantinople bombed (1916),
378; Smyrna area, operations
against (1916), 373-4, 378, (1917),
404; strength of air services and
duties (Feb. 1917), 399; assistance
for R.F.C. in Macedonia ('E' and
'F* Sqdns.), 399-400, ('D' Sqdn.),
401 ; Kavalla bombarded, 400-1 ;
Greek Sqdn. ('Z'), co-operates
INDEX 525
from Thasos, 402; Imbros (*C'
Sqdn.), operations (191 7-1 8),
403-4; Mitylene ('B' and *F
Sqdns.), operations in Smyrna
area (19 17), 404-5; Mudros, anti-
submarine work (191 7), 405, 408;
Handley Page arrives, 405, Galli-
poli area and Constantinople
bombed, 405-7; *G' Flight for
night bombing, 407; Adrianople
bombed, 408; loss of the Handley
Page, 410; the sortie of the
Goehen and Breslau (19 18), 363-4;
monitors Raglan and M.28 sunk,
410; Breslau sinks, 41 1-12; Goeben,
attacks on, 412-14; the Southern
Aegean, anti-submarine patrols
in (1917), 414-15
Palestine, Asia Minor, and Red Sea.
Seaplane Carriers (igi6), Port
Said air unit, grouping and duties,
380; Red Sea operations (1916),
381-3, 385, (1917), 416; recon-
naissance and bombing operations
(19 1 6), 382-7; co-operation in
Palestine offensive (19 17-18), 419-
22, /\.22-2', Raven II, homhed, 385;
Chikaldir Bridge bombed, 386-7
East Indies Squadron (19 17), Ben-
my-Chree destroyed, 415; the
German raider Wolf, measures
against, 416-18, adventure in the
Maldives, 417-18
The Adriatic. Ami-submarine
measures (19 17), 'U' boat bases,
387; the Otranto net barrage
(191 5), 388; Rear-Admiral Mark
Kerr takes command of British
Adriatic Squadron (1916), 388,
his request? for aircraft, 388-9;
Otranto air station opens (19 17),
389-91; Cmdre. Murray Sueter
to command torpedo-carrying
aircraft, 391; bases at Taranto
and Poveglia Island, 391; forma-
tion of Sixth Wing, 391; aircraft
operations, 392-3; action against
submarines in Otranto Straits,
396
Malta, anti-submarine patrols
(1916-18), 398
Kite Balloons, for escort duty (191 7-
18), 398
526 IN]
Mediterranean — continued
Aerodromes and Bases:
[British), see Alexandria, Bizcrta,
Brindisi, Corfu, Gibraltar, Gliki,
Imbros, Kalloni, Kassandra,
Kcphalo, Khios, Long Island
(Gulf of Smyrna), Malta, Marsh
(Mudros), Mudros, Otranto, Port
Said, Poveglia Island, Salonika,
Sliema, Stavros, Suda Bay, Syra,
Taranto, Thasos, Thermi
(Mitylene)
(Enemy), see Cattaro, Drama, Fiume,
Galata, Gereviz, Kassimir, Mas-
wakli, Nagara, Paradises, Pola,
Sanjak Kale, Xanthe
Bombing Attacks {British), 374,
376-7, 381-6, 4oc^9, 411-14,
416, 419, 421-3
(Enemy), 377-8, 385, 408-9
Fighting in the air, 378, 385, 401,
403, 407, 409, 411, 420
Trench Air Service, co-operation,
374-6, 392, 396
Greek Air Service, co-operation,
402, 405-7, 411
Photography, air, 375, 383-4, 400-1,
422 ^
Reconnaissance, air (British), 374,
376-83, 400-1, 403, 414, 416, 418,
422
(Enemy), 407
Spotting for H.M. ships, 374,
376-7, 382-3, 385, 400-1, 403,
419-22
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
177-8
Meine, Capt., Syn.
Melit, Bir, captured, 175-6
Mellings, Fit. Lt. H. T., 409
Mere, bombed, 124
Merton, Capt. G., 307«.
Merz, Lt. G. P., 253, 256
Mesopotamia, the campaign in, 1914-
March 1918:
arrival of Indian Expeditionary
Force (D), Oct. 1914, 251-2;
reorganized under Gen. Nixon,
252; arrival of a R.F.C. detach-
ment, 252-3; help from Australia
and New Zealand, 253; advance
to Kut al Imara, 253, requests for
additional aircraft, 257, War
Office assume responsibility for
aircraft, 257, arrival of R.N.A.S.
seaplane flight, 257-8; capture of
Kut, 260-1 ; battle of Ctesiphon,
261-5, air units reorganized
(No. 30 Sqdn.), 261-2, capture of
Maj. Reilly, 263-4; withdrawal
to Kut, siege of begins, 265;
attempts to relieve Kut, 265-70,
formation of 'Tigris Corps', 266,
composite flight formed, 268,
R.F.C. and R.N.A.S. to be
administered as one service, 269;
attack on Dujaila Redoubt, 270-6;
food-dropping in Kut, 278-80;
Kut surrenders, 280-1 ; advance
to Baghdad, Russians co-opcratc,
281; Army Council assumes full
control, 281M.; Gen. Maude takes
command, 282; Naval air de-
tachment withdrawn, 283;
Government define mission of
Mesopotamia Exp. Force, 284-5;
'Fis^ris Corps disbanded, 285;
R.F.C. reorganized, 291 ; Baghdad
captured, 299-300; Russians co-
operate on Persian front, 300-4,
31 1 ; Samarra entered, 308; train-
ing at Baghdad, 310; formation
of Thirty-first Wing, 310; No. 63
Sqdn. arrive, 312; battle of
Ramadi, 313-15; death of Gen.
Maude, 318; end of Russian co-
operation in Mesopotamia, 322-3;
No. 72 Sqdn. arrive, 323-4; Hit
captured, 325; the success at
Khan Baghdadi, 328-9; Col.
Tennant's capture and rescue,
329-30
Aerodromes and Landing-grounds:
(British), see Akab, Ali Gharbi,
Arab Village, Aziziya, Baghdad,
Baquba, Barura, Basra, Bustan,
Chai Khana, Falluja, Fort Ker-
mea. Hit, Jadida, Kasirin, Kuwar
Reach, Madhij, Mirjana, Ora,
Qalat al Mufti, Qasr-i-Shirin,
Qubba, Ramadi, Samarra, Shaikh
Saad, Shahraban, Sherish, Shum-
ran, Sindiya, Sinn Abtar,
Tanouma, Zor
(Enemy), Baghdad, Haditha, Hit,
Humr, Kifri, Ramadi, Samarra,
Mesopotamia.— conlinucd
Shumran, Tikrit, Tuz Khur-
matli
Artillery co-operation, advance to
Kuty 260; Dujaila redoubt^ 275,
277; advance to Baghdad^ 284,
287-8, 290-5, 297-8; 302, 306-7,
309-10, 317-18, 326«., 328
Bombing attacks (British), advance
to Baghdad, 283-4, 287-91, 294-5,
298; 310, 315-16, 318-21, 325,329
[Enemy), 269, 310, 320-1
Contact patrol, advance to Baghdad,
284, 289-90, 296-7; 308, 314-15,
317-19,327-9
Fighting in the air, siege of Kut,
269-70; 280; advance to Baghdad,
283, 286, 290-2; 305-6, 308, 313,
316, 320-1
German Air Service, arrival of
detachment, 269; reinforcements,
304-5
Low-flying attacks {British), advance
to Baghdad, 287, 295-6, 298; 312,
315-16, 31^20, 325-6, 329 _
Naval, and Naval air co-operation,
252-5, 257-8, 266, 268-9, 275-6,
283, 288, 295-6, 307
Photography, air, 261; battle of
Ctesiphon, 262; 278; advance to
Baghdad, 283-4; 3io, 3H-I5j
325-6
Railw^ay communications, 282
Reconnaissance, air {British), advance
to Kut, 254-6, 258-61; the battle
of Ctesiphon, 261-5; attempt to
relieve Kut, 266-8; Dujaila Re-
doubt, 273-6; 277-8; advance to
Baghdad, 281, 283-4, 286-92,
294-8; 301-4, 306-17, 319, 324-9
{Enemy), 311, 319, 321
River transport, the use of, 261-2,
266, 268, 282
Wireless Telegraphy, 260, 276, 278,
280, 293
Metheringham, bombed, 124
Metz Carrier-Pigeon Sqdn., see 'Ger-
man Air Service, No. 3 Bombing
Sqdn.'
Middle East Brigade, see 'Brigades,
R.F.C. and R.A.F.'
Midland Grand Hotel, St. Pancras,
bombed, 118
INDEX 527
Midland H. D. Wing, sec 'Wings —
R.F.C. and R.A.F.'
Midlands, lighting restrictions, 3;
depot sqdns. for night-flying training
in, 139^.
Micth, Leutnant zur See, 34
Mikra Bay (Salonika), 338, 340-1
Mile End railway station, bombed, 1 14
Military Aeronautics, Schools of, see
'Schools'
Millichamp, W/T Operator B. W.,
17-18
Milne, Lt.-Gen. G. F., 337-8, 345-6,
349, 351-3, 355, 362-3
Minchin, Maj. F. F., 34i«.
Minya, 169-70, 191
Mirjj
324
Mitylene, air station, 373, 378, 399,
404-5, 407
Moberly, Brig.-Gen. F. J., 250^., 261;/.,
264^., 270;/.
Monastir, 338; captured, 340-1
Monetary damage, incurred in air raids
on Great Britain, see App. i. Tables
'A' and 'B'; on County of London,
see App. ii
Monitors, British:
M.15, 184, 194, 197, 385, 422;
M.21, 2^3;M.23, 184; M.28, 410;
M.2g, 400; M.30, 373; M.jj, 197,
385, 422; M.33, 400
Monkspath, bombed, 126
Montague, 2nd Lt. P. D., 360-1 «.
Moorina, Br. transport, 169
Moraitinis, Commr. A., 411
Morris, 2nd Lt. E. C, 123
Morris, Fit. Sub-Lieut. H. M., 14-18
Morris, Lt. R. K., 298
Mudros, air station, 363, 370-2, 374-6,
399, 401, 402«., 404-5, 407-8, 412;
bombed, 378, 408
Muhammad Amin, Staff Bimbashi,
Muir, Lt. S. K., 221
Munday, Lt. E. R., 134
Munitions, Imperial Board (Canada),
459-61
Munitions, Ministry of, 459-60
Murlis-Green, Maj. G. W., 62, 105,
342, 347
Murray, Lt.-Gen. Sir A. J., 177-8, 195,
198-9, 204, 208, 215, 2i8«., 225
Murray, 2nd Lt. G., 37
528
Mushahida, captured, 301-2
Mustabig, 199-200, 221
INDEX
Nagara, bombed, 403, 407; 411, 414
Nahud, En, 173-4
Nasiriya, An, occupied, 256; 295«.
Nazim Bey, Turkish Commander, 329
Neame, Lt. H. B. (Neame Sight), 150
Nerger, Capt. Karl, 416
Netheravon, Art. Co-opn. Sqdn., 436
Netherton, bombed, 94
Neufchateau, L.4g captured near, 100
Neumann, G. P., 6on,, i86n., 2io«.,
2i4«., 299K., 3o5«.
Newbolt, Sir Henry, 370M.
New Romney, Sch. of Aerial Gunnery,
425«.; Observers' Sch., 447
Night flying: Ho7ne Defence^ 7; pilots
and aeroplanes available, 11, 24;
training in, 102, 14 1-4, 155
Nixon, Gen. Sir J. E., 252, 255, 256n.,
257-8, 262, 264«., 267«.
Noble-Campbell, Lt. C. H., 126
Nordholz, Ger. Airship Station, 92«.
Northampton, bombed, 97
Northern Air Defence Area, 140
Northern H.D. Wing, see 'Wings:
Forty-sixth'
North Midlands H.D. Wing, see
'Wings: Forty- eighth'
Northolt, 141
Notting Hill, bombed, 84
Nuttall, Lt. F., 316, 321
Observers' Corps, see 'Royal Defence
Corps'
Observers' Posts, see 'Home A.A.
Defence' and 'London, A.A. De-
fence of
Ochey, 90-1
Odhams' Printing Works, bombed, 1 1 5
Officers' Technical Training Corps,
Nos. I and 2 Wings, 427«., 428
Olives, Mount of, Turkish H.Q.,
bombed, 232
Operations Room, Horse Guards, 49«.
Ora, 266-9, 273, 279
Orford, bombed, 63
Orfordness, Experimental Stn., 23,
149-50
Orient of Leith^ Br. s.s., 16, 17
Orlyak, 356
Ostend Carrier-Pigeon Sqdn., see
'German Air Service, No. 3 Bombing
Sqdn.'
Otranto, 39':^3, 39^-7; barrage, 388-9
Owen, Lt. J. C. F., 342-3
Oxford, No. 2 Sch. of Aeronautics,
427, 445-6
Packwood, bombed, 126
Paddington, bombed, 64, 119
Padlcy, Maj. G. H., 227
Paget, Commr. H., 47-9
Paine, Cmdre. G. M., 86;/., 439, 4400.,
441, 459
Palestine, see 'Egypt and Palestine —
air operations in'
Palcthorpe, Capt. J., 34-5, 37
Palmer, Capt. W. G., 270
Pandemia, bombed, 407
Paradisos, bombed, 404
Pargiter, Maj. A. P., 452
Paris, Air Raids on, Statistics, 157-8
Paris, Lt. D. K., 186
Paris, E. T., 73W.
Parke, Lt. W., R.N., 430
Paull, bombed, 55
Peck, Capt. A. H., 236
Peckham, bombed, 118, 129
Peel, Fit. Sub-Lt. R. W., 411
Peirse, V.-Ad. Sir R. H., 368
Penshurst, Sch. of Wireless Telephony,
144
Peony, Br. sloop, 414-15
Perim, Island, 381-2
Petre, Capt. H. A., 253, 260
Petric, bombed, 356
Photography, air: Egypt and Palestine,
178, 185, 198, 202, 206, 216, 219,
221-3, 228, 230, 237-40; Mesopota-
mia, 261-2, 278, 283-4,310,314-15,
325-6; Macedonia, 341, 351, 364;
Mediterranean and Near Eastern
Waters, 375, 383-4, 400-1, 422
Piccadilly Circus, bombed, 97
Pickering, Capt. C. L., 306
Pimlico, bombed, 88
Pioneer, Turkish armed steamer, 296
Platanenwald, bombed, 356
Plumstead, East A.A. Sub-Command,
Poirier, M. Jules, I57«.
Pola, 387, 389, 391, 393
Pohce, Commissioner of Metropolitan,
49) 107, 135-7
Police Stations, used as air-raid shelters,
t36
fitters
Polytechnic Schools, training
and riggers at, 434-5
Pomeroy bullet, see 'Ammunition'
Poplar, Upper North St. Schools
bombed, 27; 85
Porna, bombed, 355
Port Said, 189, 193,379-82; bombed,
184-5,
Portsmouth, W/T. receiving station,
H5
Pothtiau, Fr. Cr., 416
Pott, Maj. A. J., i75«.
Poveglia Island, 391
Powell, Lt.-Col. E. W., 455
Pravi, bombed, 400
Preston, bombed, 55, 80
Prilep, bombed, 357
Primrose, Lt.-Col. W. H., 452
Primrose Hill, bombed, 64
Prince George, Br. B., 371 «.
Pritchard, 2nd Lt. T. B., 98-9
Prolss, Korvettenkapitdn, 81, 95, 12 1-2
Purfleet, bombed, 104
Putney, West A.A. Sub-Command,
5«., 7
Qal'at el Hasa, bombed, 221
Qalat al Mufti, 318
Qalqilye, bombed, 247
Qantara, air station, 161K., 178, 183-6,
189, 193, 227, 457; bombed, 185
Qasr-i-Shirin, 322-3
Qatiya, i6i«.; attack on, 18 1-4
Qizil Ribat, captured, 315
Qubba, 324-6
Quinnell, Maj. J. C, 312-13
Rabenfels, Br. aircraft carrier, see
Raven II
Rabigh, 220-1, 223
Radcliffe, bombed, 125
Radcliffe, Lt. G. A., 348
Rafah, action of, 202-6 ; 208-9, 2 1 6«. ;
bombed, 216
Raglan, Br. Mon., 400-1, 403, 410,
420-2
Rahad, Er, 172-4
Railway Communications: Egypt and
Palestine, 180, 184, 205-6, 208, 220-
2, 224, 24.^; Mesopotamia, 282
INDEX 529
Railways, Underground, used as air-
raid shelters, 135-6
Ramadi, 311; captured, 313-15; 318,
324-5
Ramie, Er, occupied, 246; bombed,
205-6, 231-2
Ramsgate, bombed, 32, 57, 103-4, i M-
Range finders, 70-1 ; the Lindemann,
146
Ras el Hagg, i6i«.
Raven II, Br. aircraft carrier, 161, 165,
222, 237«., 372, 379-82, 384-6,
415-21; bombed, 196, 383, 385
Rawlings, Lt. P. T., 405^.
Rawreth, bombed, 102, 117
Rayleigh, bombed, 102, 117
Reading, No. i Sch. of Aeronautics,
427-8, 445-6; Equipment Officers'
Sch. of Instruction, 428; Sch. of
Tech. Training (Men), 434-5
Reconnaissances, air:
(British), Egypt and Palestine, 160-
70, 174-6, 178-85, 189-95, 197,
199, 200-7, 209, 211-13, 216-19,
221-3, 230, 236-9, 241, 246-8;
Mesopotamia, 254-6, 258-68,
273-8, 281, 283-4, 286-92, 294-8,
301-4, 306-17, 319, 324-9; Mace-
donia, 337-8, 340-2; Mediterra-
nean and Near Eastern Waters,
374, 376-83, 40^1, 403, 414,
416, 418, 422
(Enemy), Egypt and Palestine, 184,
186, 197, 210-11, 235-6; Meso-
potamia, 311,319, 321 ; Macedonia,
364-6; Mediterranean and Near
Eastern Waters, 407
Redcar, Naval Flying Sch., 440-1, 443;
Flying Instructors' Sch., 448
Red Sea patrol. Royal Navy, 222^., 422
Regent St. Polytechnic, Sch. of Prelim.
Tech. Training, 434
Reilly, Maj. H. L., 255, 258-65;
captured, 263-5
Regain, Fr. coastguard ship, 420, 422
Retford, 142
Rhodes, Capt. A. E. T., 195
Richborough, bombed, 114
Richmond Park, Balloon Training
Depot, 448
Ridley, 2nd Lt. S. G., 190
Rigum, Er, i6in.
Rimal, El, 455
2504-5
M m
530 liN
Robertson, Gen. Sir W. R., 7, 22, 29,
38-42, 88, 90, ii3«., 215, 2i8h.
Robinson, Capt. F. L., 313
Rochford, 43«.; bombed, 52; Gotha
lands on aerodrome, 104; 141-2
Rodney, Lt. the Hon. J. H. B.,
284
Roehampton, Balloon Training Depot,
448
Romani, battle of, 19 1-5
Romania, air detachment for, 378-9
Romney Marsh, bombed, 10
Ross, Maj. A. J., 223«.
Rosyth, 444
Rothcrhithe, bombed, 129; tunnel
used as air-raid shelter, 136
Rothermere, Rt. Hon. Lord, 109
Rowe, Capt. C. H., 455
Royal Aircraft Factory, Farnborough,
431 ,
Royal Air Force: Training Develop-
ments: //ow^, 444-8; Egypt, 44()-^^;
Canada, 458-68; Strength, VI Bri-
gade (June 1918 and Armistice),
153-4, App. ix
Royal Albert Docks, bombed, 26-7
Royal Arsenal, see 'Woolwich'
Royal Defence Corps, Observers' Corps,
44, 108; Companies: No. 15, 108;
No. 16, 108
Royal Flying Corps: Strength: Home
Defence, proposal to double R.F.C.,
295 59, 425; H.D. Wing (Dec. 1916),
138; Egypt and Palestine, 20<)n.,
2i6«., 237-8; Mesopotamia, 275;
Training Development: Home, 424-
38; Egypt and Pales tine^ 449-58;
Canada, 458-68
Royal Naval Air Service: co-operate
with R.F.C. and R.A.F. in Egypt
and Palestine Operations, 161-2,
164-5, 167-8, 184-5, 194, 197, 217,
219-22, 231-2, 237-8, 380-5, 415-
16, 4-1(^22', Mesopotamia Operations,
252-5, 257-8, 266, 268-9, 275-6,
283, 288, 295-6, 307; Macedonia
Operations, 336-8, 344, 346-7, 349,
357, 363-4, 373-8, 399-402, 408,
412; Training Development, 1914-
March 191 8, 438-44; see also
'Mediterranean and Near Eastern
Waters — Naval Air Operations in'
Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 44o«.
Royal Naval Compass Laboratory,
Slough, 429
R.T.S. bullet, see 'Ammunition'
Rutherford, Capt. D. W., 206-7
Ryecroft, bombed, 82
Sahiliya, occupied, 325; 326; bombed,
325
St. Denis Westrcm, 20
St. John's Wood, bombed, 119
St. Leonards, No. i Cadet Wing,
427«.; No. I Officers' Tech. Trng.
Corps, 428
St. Margaret's Bay, bombed, 1 18
St. Pancras railway station, bombed, 1 1 8
St. Peters, bombed, 61
Salisbury, ll.Q., Southern Training
Brigade, 424, 427; H.Q., S.W. Area,
446; Balloon Training Base and
Sch., 448
Salmana, occupied, 194; bombed, 197;
198-9, 2l8«.
Salmon, 2nd Lt. W. G., 37
Salmond, Maj.-Gen. J. M., commands
Training Brigade and Division, 424,
432, 434; becomes D.G.M.A., 437;
to command R.F.C, France, 438
Salmond, Maj.-Gen. W. G. H., 165,
178, 180-2, 185-6, 189, 193, 225-7,
241, 338, 451, 454, 45<>-8
Salonika, 338-41, 356; fire, 359-60;
363, 370-1, 373-5, 402, 412;
bombed, 336, 344-5
Samarra, 305-6; captured, 308;
bombed, 310; 311, 313, 318-20,
324-6
Samson, Air Cmdre. C. R., 38o«.,
415-16
Sanjak Kale, bombed, 404
Saris, 247
Sarrail, Gen., 337, 339, 341, 351, 353,
355, 366
Saundby, Capt. R. H. M. S., 33
Saunders, Capt. F. G., 342, 347-8,
364-5
Savory, Sqdn. Commr. K. S., 405W.,
406
Sayed Ahmed, Grand Senussi, 166-71,
190
Sayed Idris, Grand Senussi, 191
Scarff Ring Mounting, 148-9
Scarlett, Wing Capt. F. R., 371-2, 375,
439, 441
INDEX
531
Scherzer, Oberleutnant E., 336
Schools:
Aerial Co-operation, Gosport, 146
Aerial Fighting, Canada, 4675 East
Fortune, 447; Freiston, 443, 447;
Marske, 447; Sedgeford, 447;
Turnberry, 447
Aerial Gunnery, Canada, 465, 466;;.,
467; Egypt, 188, 451 ; Hythe, 425,
43 5j 437; Loch Doon, 424-5;
Marske (No. 4), 425«.; New Rom-
ney (No. 3), 425«.; Turnberry,
424-5 ,
Aeronautics: Bath (No. 7 Observers),
445-6; Bristol (No. 6), 427, 445-6;
Canada (No. 4), 42777., 463-4,
467; Cheltenham (No. 8), 445-6;
Cheltenham (No. 9 Observers),
445-6; Denham (No. 5), 427,
445-6; Egypt (No. 3), 188,
427«., 450, 453; Oxford (No. 2),
427, 445-6; Reading (No. i),
427-8, 445-6
Armament, Canada, 467; East-
church, 443; Egypt, 455
Armourers, Farnborough (prel.
training), 424
Artillery and Infantry Co-operation,
Brooklands, 428; Hursley Park,
428, 437
Artillery Co-operation, Canada, 467
Artillery Observation, Egypt, 188,
Balloon Training, Lydd, 448; Salis-
bury, 448 ; Sheerness, 448
Balloon Training Depot, Richmond
Park, 448; Roehampton, 448;
Uxbridge, 445, 447
Bombing, Langham Place, 428
Central Flying, Upavon, 434, 436,
438-9
Central Training, Cranwell, 439-43
Equipment Officers, Reading and
Henley, 428
Fitters, Edinburgh, 434
Flying, India, 160
Flying Instructors, Ayr, 448; Cur-
ragh, 448; Egypt, 455; Gosport,
448; Lilbourne, 448; Redcar, 448;
Shoreham, 448
Inspection, Watford, 428
Marine Observers, Aldeburgh, 448;
Eastchurch, 448
Marine Operation Pilots, Dover, 447
Naval College, Greenwich, 44o«.
Naval Flying, Chingford, 440;
Eastbourne, 440; Eastchurch,
439-41, 443; Redcar, 440; Ven-
dome, 441-2
Navigation and Bomb-dropping,
Andover, 447; Egypt, 188, 455;
Stonehenge, 447; Thetford, 447
Observers', Eastchurch, 447; Hythe,
447; New Romney, 4475 Manston,
447
Photography: Farnborough, 424, 448
R.A.F. and Army Co-operation,
Worthy Down, 447
Special Flying, Canada, 467; Gos-
port, 429-30, 432, 434, 445
Technical Training (Men), Reading
and Halton Park, 434-5; (pre-
liminary). Regent St. Polytechnic,
434-5
''irele
436
Wireless Telephony, Chattis Hill,
447; Penshurst, 144
Schiitze, Korvettenkapitdn Victor, 33,
98, 124
Schiiz, Oberleutnant^ 305W.
Schwonder, Kapitdnlentnant, 100
Scott, Lt. W. S., 341-2
Seaplanes:
Types:
British: Blackburn, 41 t; H.12, 16;
Hamble, 420; Short, 184, 197,231,
258, 264-5, 268-9, 279, 370, 380,
390-1, 397, 402, 413, 416-19;
Sopwith, 14, 197, 370, 378, 38c,
391,416,420
French: Nieuport, 161
Searchlights, for use with A.A. de-
fences, see 'Home A.A. defence' and
'London, A.A. defence of
Sedgeford, Aerial Fighting Sch., 447
Senussi, the, operations against, 166-
71, 190-1, 199
Seward, Lt. W. E. L., 207-8
Shahraban, 315
Shaikh Saad, 28 ik., 284, 310
Shaitan, Br. armed launch, 254-5
Sheerness, 109; bombed, 25, 61, 84,
104, 114; Naval depot, 439; Balloon
Training Base and School, 448
Sheffield, lighting restrictions, 2
2504.5
M m 2
532
Sheikh Shabasi, 227
Sheikh Zowaiid, 203, 205
Shekleton, Maj. A., 227
Sheria, Tell esh, bombed, 206
Sherika, see 'Kharga'
Sherish, 254
Shimshirli, bombed, 376-7
Shirley, bombed, 126
Shoeburyness, bombed, 25-6
Shoreditch, bombed, 88
Shoreham, Flying Instructors' Sch., |
448 I
Shorncliffe Camp, bombed, 21
Shotley, balloon stn., bombed, 35
Shumran, bombed, 288-9; 269, 296-7;
aerodrome bombed, 276-7, 283-4
Sievier, Lt. R. B. B., 321
Sights, gun, see 'Gun sights'
'Silent raid' (19/20 Oct. 191 7), 92-102
Simon, Lt.-Col. M. St. L., 6, 8, 26,
44, 76
Simpson, Capt. R. D., 320
Sinai front, see 'Egypt and Palestine —
air operations in'
Sindiya, 306, 309
Singleton, Lt. M., R.N., 254
Sinn Abtar, 291
Sir Thomas Picton^ Br. Mon., 376
Skellingthorpc, bombed, 124
Skinningrove, bombed, 79
Skyros Island, 414
Slessor, 2nd Lt. J. C, 176
Sliema, 398
Slough, R.N. Compass Laboratory, |
429 I
Smith, Fit. Sub-Lt. G. D., 417-18 I
Smith-Barry, Col. R. R., Gosport Sch.
of Special Flying, 429-34, 448-9
Smoogroo, 444
Smuts, Lt.-Gen. the Hon. J. C, 42,
43«., 64-6, 86, 90, 1 39, 454, Apps. vi, ;
vii '
Smyrna, bombed, 378, 404 j
Smyth-Pigott, Sqdn. Commr. J. R. W., |
349
Snevche, 341, 347-8, 354; bombed, 342
Socket distress signal, 47
Solium, 189
Soma, bombed, 404
Sommerfeldt, Kapitanleutnant, 10, 11,
13, 14
Sound Locators, 73-6, 153
Southend, bombed, 52
INDEX
Southern H.D. Wing, see 'Wings:
Fiftieth'
South Midland H.D. Wing, see 'Wings:
Forty-seventh'
Southwark, bombed, 27, 118
Sowrey, Maj. F., 129
Sparklet Ammunition, see 'Ammuni-
tion'
Spinning, experiments, 430-1
Spotting: for H.M. ships (aeroplanes
and seaplanes), Egypt and Palestine
operations^ 184-5, ^94? ^97> ^^2,
237-8, 382-3, 385; Macedonian
operations^ 376-7, 400-1 ; Mediter-
ranean and Near Eastern Waters^
374, 403, 419-22
Squadrons {R.F.C. and R.A.F.):
Fighting: first night-fighting squa-
dron for B.E.F. (No. 151), 143,
Home Defence: organization of de-
fence squadrons, 138-44; strength
at Armistice, App. ix, Table 'B'
Night Flying: 7, 14 1-3
Australian Flying Corps:
No. J, 187, 189, 191, 193, 199,
200-1, 206-9, 2i6«., 221, 226-7,
240, 247
No. 67 {see No. i)
Canada: No. 78 (R), 462, 466^.;
No. 79 (/?), 462, 466«.; iVo. 80 {R\
462, 465«., 466^.; No. 81 (R),
462, 466«.; A'o. 82 (R), 462, 466n.;
No. 83 {R), 462, 466«.; No. 84 (R),
462, 466n.; No. 85 (R), 463, 466n.;
No. 86 (/?), 462, 4660.; No. 87 (R),
462, 466«.; No. 88 (R), 463, 466«.;
No. 89 (/?), 463, 466«.; No. 90 (R),
463, 466//.; No. 91 (i?), 463, 466«.,
No. 92 (R) (formerly 'F), 463,
466n.; 'X\ 462
R.F.C. and R.A.F.
Artillery Co-operation, 436; No. J,
431 ; No. I (/?), 430-1 ; No. 5, 429;
No. II (T), renamed No. 98
(Depot), 141; No. 14, 165-7,
169^., 178, 185-6, 189, 193, 195,
199, 200-1, 207, 209^., 21 6w.,
220-1, 226-7, 239, 246, 248,
449-50, 455; ^0. 17, 165, 167,
169, 172-3, 178, 186-7, 19^1,
338, 340-8, 354-8, 361-7, 455;
No. 21 (R), 187; formation, 449-
INDEX
533
S quadrons — con tin ued
50; No. 22 (R), 187; formation,
449; 450; 23 (T"), 187, 241;
formation, 449; 450; No. 26
{South African), 187; No. 27 (T),
432; No. 30, 166, 187, 257, 262,
265, 269, 279, 282-4, 287, 291,
295j 297, 299, 304-5, 307«., 309-
10, 314-155 318-22, 324-6; No. 33
(T), 28; No. 36 {H.D.), 123;
No. 37 {H.D.), 33, 37, 44, 117;
No. 38 (H.D.), 126; No. 39 {H.D.\
44, 98, 115, 130, 146-7; No. 44
{H.D.\ formation, 43«.; 43, 62;
No. 46, 39; No. 47, 341-7, 351,
353-5j 357-8, 360-7; No. 48, 52;
No. 50 {H.D.), 37, 44, 140;
No. 51 {H.D.\ 44; No. 55 in
432; No. 56, withdrawn for H.D.,
32; 36; No. 57 (T), formation, 450;
454; No. 58 {R\ 45 M No. 60,
430-1 ; No. 61 {H.D.\ formation,
43«.; 52, 139; No. 63, 312-13,
316-19, 320-2, 325-6; No. 63
(T), 37; No. 66, withdrawn for
H.D., 32; 35-6; No. 72, 323;
No. 75 {H.D.), 44, 142; No. 77
{H.D.), 145; No. 78 {H.D.), 44,
82, 130; No. g8 {Depot), 141-2,
renumbered ig8 {Depot), 142; No.
gg {Depo t),{oTmsition, 142, renum-
bered igg {Depot), 142; No. 100,
formation, 1 4 1-2 ; iVo. jo J, 24; No.
102, 24; No. Ill, formation, 226;
227, 247; No. 112 {H.D.), forma-
tion, 43K.; 129, 139-40; No. 113,
formation, 226 ; 227, 239, 246, 248 ;
No. 141 {H.D.), 129; formation,
139; No. 143 {H.D.), 129; forma-
tion, 1 39-40; iVo. J^5, 45 5 ; No. 150,
formation, 366; No. 151 {N.F.),
formation, 143; 151; No. 152
{N.F.), 1 5 1-2; No. 186 {N.T.),
formation, 142; No. 187 {N.T.), for-
mation, 142; A^o. i88{N.T.), forma-
tion, 142; No. i8g {N.T.), for-
mation, 142; No. igo {N.T.),
formation, 142; No. igi {N.T.),
formation, 142; No. ig2 {Depot),
formation, 142; No. ig3 (T), 454;
No. jg4 (T), 454; No. igs (T),
454; No. ig7 (T), 455«.; No. ig8
{Depot), 142; No. igg {Depot),
142; No. 200 {Depot), formation,
142
R.N.A.S.
'A' (formerly 'A' Fit.), 375-6,
399-400; *-B' (formerly 'B' Fit.),
373, 378, 3995 404-5; (formerly
'C Fit.), 378, 399, 403;
(formerly *D' Fit.), 375-7, 399?
401; formation, 399, 401;
349, 400-1, 404-7
American, see 'U.S.A. Air Service'
German, see 'German Air Service'
Greek, see 'Greek Air Service'
Stahhert, Kapitdnleutnant, 12, 55-6, 96
Stafford, 2nd Lt. W. G., 224
Stagg, Air Mechanic A. T. C, 130
Stamford, H.Q., 47th H.D. Wing, 139
Statistics:
Air Raids on Great Britain, loss of
output at Woolwich Arsenal
(Sept. 191 7), 87; aeroplane and
airship attacks, 153, 157, Apps. i,
Tables 'A' and 'B', ii, iii, and v;
A.A. defences at Armistice, App.
ix; Far is, 157-8
Training, Home, 425-7; Canada,
467; Egypt, App. X
Stavros, air station, 357, 371, 374-7,
399, 401-2,412
Stewart, Lt. N. W., 223
Stokes, Lt.-Col. C. B., 323
Stonehenge, Sch. of Navigation and
Bomb-dropping, 447
Strain, Lt.-Col. L. H., 375, 409
Strange gun-mounting, 147-8
Strasser, Fregattenkapitdn Peter, 9«.,
II, 54-5, 79, 81, 121, 124, 131, 134
Stratford, bombed, 63
Subar, bombed, 381-2
Submarines:
British, E.14, sunk, 414
German, measures against; Adriatic,
387-93; Straits of Otranto, 396;
Malta, 398; Aegean, 402, 408,
414-15
Suda Bay, 414
Sueter, Cmdre. Murray F., 391, 393,
396
Suez, Air Station, i6\n., ijz, 178,
188-9, i93-4> 1 99? 220, 451; Canal
defences, attack on, 162-6, 177, 192,
194-5
Sullivan, Lt. Alan, 458«., 467«.
534
Summerhill Camp (Salonika), bombed,
344
Sutton, bombed, 122
Sutton's Farm, 39
Sveti Vrac, bombed, 356
Swann, Capt. O., R.N., 443
Swiftsure, Br. B., 368
Swine, bombed, 122
Sydenham, bombed, 129
Sykes, Wing Capt. F. H., 370
Synchronizing gears, 147; Constan-
tinesco, 148
Syra Island, 414-15
Tanouma, 253, 312
Tara, Br. s.s., 169
INDEX
Taranto,
39h 393, 397
Taylor, Air Mechanic C. C, 37
Technical factor in air warfare,
importance of, 179-80, 214, 305,
359
Tedder, Maj. A. W., 452«.
Tennant, Lt.-Col. J. E., 283, 291,
293«., 294, 295«., 296^., 304, 329-30
Texas, 464-6
Thasos, air station, 338, 374-6, 399,
400-1; bombed, 357, 377, 402
Theberton, L.48 destroyed, 33
Thermi (Mitylene), 373, 378, 399,
404-5
Thetford, Sch. of Navigation and
Bomb-dropping, 447
Thomas, Lt. F. W. H., 358
Thorngumbald, bombed, 55
Thornton Saxby, bombed, 124
Thorpe Bay, bombed, 85
Throwley, 43?;.
Thundersley, bombed, 1 1 7
Thurnscoe, bombed, 81
Thursby, V.-Ad. Sir C. F., 346, 349,
388, 414
Tigris Corps, formation, 266; 268, 276;
disbanded, 285
Tikrit, bombed, 310; 311, 313; cap-
tured, 317
Tine, Et, bombed, 243-4
Tipton, Capt. R. J., 186
Tiptree, bombed, 63
Tod, Capt. D., 330
Todd, Lt.-Col. G. E., 45o«.
Tondern, Ger. airship station, 97
Topolcani, bombed, 357
Toronto, 460-2, 464, 466; No. 4 Sch.
of Aeronautics, 427«., 463-4, 467;
Cadet Wing, 427«., 463-4, 467
Townshend, Maj. -Gen. C. V. F.,
254-5, 258-60, 262-5, 269, 276-8,
280, 300
Trade Unions, and air-raid pre-
cautions, 109-10
Training Depot Stations, 432; No. 16,
454; No. 17, 454-5; No. 18, 454;
No. 19, 454-5; ^0. 20, 454
Training Developments:
Home:
R.F.C., 1917'- Expansion pro-
gramme, 191 7, Group Com-
mands formed, 424; effect of
daylight raids on training or-
ganization, 425; pilot require-
ments, 425-7; Training Brigade
raised to a Division, 426-7;
formation of Schools and Cadet
establishments, 427-9; the Gosport
School^ of special flying, 429, the
100 h.p. Monosoupape Avro, 430,
spinning experiments, 430-1;
432-4; Technical instruction for
men., 434-5 ; T raining of Observers,
Maj.-Gen. Trenchard's proposals,
435; course at Schools of Aero-
nautics, 435-6; the Brooklands
School, 436-7; administrative
changes, Oct. 191 7, 437-8; Home
Defence, night flying, 24, 102;
scheme of training, 14 1-3
R.N.A.S., 1914-Marcb 1918: posi-
tion Aug. 1 91 4, 438-9; reorganiza-
tion, Sept. 191 5, 439; Cranwell
school opened (i Apr. 1916), 439;
system of training, 440; rank of
pupil pilots, 440-1 ; reorganiza-
tion of training system (Sept.
1916) , 441 ; Vendome School, 442;
additional requirements (Sept.
1917) , 442-3; training of Naval
air observers, 443; Fleet Air
Officers, special training to co-
operate with Fleet, 443-4; deck
flying training, 444
R.A.F., igi8: training at the
Schools of Aeronautics revised,
444-5; issue of a Flying instruc-
tion manual, 445; additional
Schools of Aeronautics, 445; 'all
through' training, 445; division
INDEX
535
Training Developments — continued
of U.K. into areas, 445-6; forma-
tion of Directorate of Training,
446; Training Expansion Com-
mittee, 446; list of special schools
at home at Armistice, 446-8;
Home Defence, night flying, revised
scheme of training, 143-4
A comparison with the French
flying-training system, 448-9
Egypt:
decision to organize a training
establishment (Apr. 191 6), 187,
449, arrival of personnel from
England, 449, formation of reserve
squadrons and Wing, 449-50;
No. 3 Sch. of Aeronautics, form-
ed, 188, 450; War Office asked
to supply pupils from England,
450-1; the expansion in 1917,
451; supply of pupils from
England stopped, 451, decision
to double R.F.C., War Office
again take advantage of training
organization (July 1917), 452;
additional Wings and schools, 188,
452-3; raised to a Training
Group, 453; the Native Base
Depot, 453-4: still greater expan-
sion (191 8), 454-55 Training
Group becomes a Brigade, 454«.;
schools form.ed in 191 8, 455;
Re-pair and Supply Organi%ation,
*X' Aircraft Depot and Park,
455-6; Gen. Salmond's scheme
for constructing aeroplanes in
Egypt, 456, the Eastern Aircraft
Factory formed, 456-7, its output
(July-Nov. 1 91 8), 457; expansion
in depots and parks, 457; Maj.-
Gen. W. G. H. Salmond, a
tribute, 457-8; statistics for the
Training Brigade, 191 8, App. x
Canada :
Curtiss Company's School, 458;
supply of candidates. Admiralty
advantage, 458-9; Lt.-Col. C. J.
Burke recommends establishment
of Training Wing, 459; proposal
for aviation factory and school,
459-60, approved, 461 ; 'Canadian
Aeroplanes Limited', formed, 461 ;
additional reserve squadrons
needed, 460, twenty to be formed
in Canada, 461; Lt.-Col. C. G.
Hoare starts new organization,
461, selection of aerodrome sites,
461-3; arrival of nucleus Flights
from England, 462-3; formation
of Reserve Sqdns., 462-3; number
of Flights from England reduced
to fourteen (Mar. 191 8), 463; ex-
pansion, complete system of train-
ing to be adopted, 463-4; Sch. of
Aeronautics and Cadet Wing
formed, 464; Texas: effect of
entry of U.S.A. into the war, 464;
ten American sqdns, to be trained,
465 ; the Texas aerodromes, Hicks,
Everman, and Benbrook, 465;
R.F.C. contingent returns to
Canada, 466; winter training in
Canada, 466; statistical training
summary (Jan. 191 7 to Jan. 191 8),
466-7; the organization at the
Armistice, 467
General summary on training
development, 468-71. See also
'Schools'
Training Expansion Committee, 446
Transport, river, Mesopotamia, 261-2,
268
Treloar, Lt. W. H., 253
Trenchard, Maj.-Gen. H. M., memo,
on H.D. (June 1917), 30^1, 41,
App. iv; 88, 90-1, 1 12-13, 358,
429, 435-6, 438, 460, 468, 470
Tudor, R.-Ad. F. C. Tudor, 468
Tul Karm, bombed, 231-2, 247, 385,
419
Turkish Army, see 'Army, Turkish'
Turner, Lt. E. E., 129
Tushchulu, bombed, 356
Tuz Khurmatli, 320
Tydd St. Mary, bombed, 125-6
U.6, Austrian S/M, destroyed, 388
U.21, Ger. S/M, 389
UB.44, Ger. S/M, destroyed, 388
Ujret el Zol, 205, 209
Ula, Al, bombed, 224
Umbrella Hill, 239
United States of America, effect of
entry into war on R.F.C. in Canada,
464; a reciprocal agreement with
Canada, 465; R.F.C. recruiting
536 IN
United States of America — continued
office in Fifth Avenue, 465; Texas
aerodromes, 465; training of officers
and personnel, 465-6
Air Service:
Squadrons: No. J7, 466; No. 22,
466; No. 27, 466; No. 28, 466;
No. J39, 466; No. 147, 466;
No. 148, 466
Upavon, Central Flying Sch., 434,
436, 438, 440
Uplees Powder Works, Faversham,
bombed, 84
Upminster, H.Q., 49th (H.D.) Wing,
139
Uxbridge, Armament Sch., 445, 447
Van Rynevcld, Col. Sir H. A., 186
Vaughan-Lee, R.-Ad. C. L., 439, 442
Vauxhall, bombed, 114
Vendome Flying Sch., 441-2
Venice, balloon barrage, 67-8
Vertekop, bombed, 346
Victoria Cross, awarded to Lt. F. H.
McNamara, 206-7
Von Poellnitz, Maj. H. W., 323
Waddington, bombed, 124
Wadi Ghazze, 227
Wadi el Hesi, bombed, 384
Wadi es Sarar, bombed, 245
Waht, bombed, 381
Waltham, Northern, A.A. sub-com-
mand, 5«., 7; bombed, 95
Walton-on-the-Naze, bombed, 88
Wanstead, bombed, 117
War Cabinet: meetings in connexion
with H.D., 29-31, 38-41, 45-6, 64,
68, 86-91, 107, 109-10, 113, 139,
425; see also 'Home Anti-Aircraft
Defence'
Warning systems: anti-aircraft, see
'Home A.A. Defence' and 'London,
A.A. defence of. See also map
facing p. 134
Warrington Crescent, Paddington,
bombed, 119
Wastage, see 'Casualties'
Waterloo Bridge, bombed, 1 14
Waterloo Station, bombed, 84
Watford, Sch. of Inspection, 428
Watkins, Lt. L. P., 33
Weather, effect of on the work of
aircraft: on German raiding airships
and aeroplanes, 9-13, 21, 32, 36,
53-4, 60, 62, 78-9, 81-5, 88, 91-3,
102-3, 105, 114, 119, 122-3, i24«-,
126, 131, 133-4; on air operations in
Egypt and Palestine, 160, 162, 172,
176, 184, 187, 211, 213, 217, 221,
224, 248; Mesopotamian campaign,
251, 255, 260, 262, 266-8, 271, 274,
276-8, 28c^2, 290-3, 296-7, 299,
301-3, 308-11, 313, 320, 323, 33c^i;
Macedonia, 353, 357, 360, 364-5;
Royal Naval Air Operations in the
Mediterranean and Near Eastern
I Waters, 374, 381, 392-3,406,412-15
! Wejh, 223-4
WeH Sheikh Nuran, 202-3, 205, 226-7,
240-1
Wellesley, Capt. Lord G., 170
Welman, Lt. J. B., 315-16
Wembley, N.W. Sub-Command, 5«.
Wemyss, V.-Ad. Sir R. £., C.-in-C.
East Indies, 231, 372-3, 379, 381,
394
Westcliff, bombed, 52
Western Desert, Senussi operations,
166-70; Darfur operations, 170-7
Western Frontier Force, 166-7, 176,
380
Westgate, bombed, 18; air station, 14,
16
West Ham, bombed, 85
j West Hartlepool, bombed, 123
' Westminster, Maj. the Duke of, 169
Whetstone, bombed, 119
White, Capt. T. W., 253, 262^.
Whitechapel, bombed, 104
Whitehall Gardens, Central A.A. Sub-
Command, 5n., 7
White Lilac, Br. Cr., 16-17
Whitstable, bombed, 104
Whitty, Maj. P. J., 452^.
i Wickford, Gotha brought down at, 116
j Wigan, bombed, 123, 125
j Wiggin, Brig.-Gen. E. A., 180-3
Wigram, Maj. C. C, 341
Wilhams, Maj. R., 227
Willock, Maj. R. P., 452«.
Wilson, Gen. Sir H. H., 113
I W^indermere seaplane station, 441
\ Windsor, 2nd Lt. J. S., 284, 298
' Wingate, Gen. Sir R., 171
INDEX
537
Wings :
R.F.C. and R.A.F.:
Home Defence., 11-12, 24-5, 138,
145; Midland (H.D.), i39«.;
Fifth Wing, 165, i83«., 186, 189,
193, 200, 208-9, 211, 2i5-i6«.,
226-30, 237, 450; Ninth (H.Q.),
32; Sixteenth, 341, 349; Twentieth
\K), 449-52; Thirty-first, forma-
tion, 291, 310; Thirty-second (T),
formation, 452; Thirty-eighth (R),
452; Fortieth, formation, 227; 237,
239, 241, 247-8; Forty-first, 91;
Forty-second, 466-7; Forty- third,
466-7; Forty-fourth, 466-j', Forty-
sixth (formerly Northern, H.D.),
138- 9; Forty-seventh (formerly
South Midland, H.D.), 139;
Forty-eighth (formerly North
Midland, H.D.), 139; Forty-
ninth (formerly Eastern, H.D.),
139- 40; Fiftieth (formerly
Southern, H.D.), 138-40; Fifty-
third (H.D.), formation, 140;
Sixty-ninth, formed, 455. See also
'Cadet Wings'
R.N,A.S.
No. 2, 370, 372, 375; No. 3, 370;
No. 6, formation, 391-2
Wireless Telegraphy:
British: Home Defence, Admiralty
objections, 23-4; 112, I44«.,
145-6; Egypt and Palestine, 186,
193, 203, 209, 229-30; Mesopo-
tamia, 260, 276, 278, 280, 293
German J 133
Wireless Telephony, School of, 144
Wisbech, bombed, 125
Withernsea, warships off, bombed, 56
Wix, bombed, 93
Wolf, Ger. raider, 416, 418, ^i^n.
Wood, Corporal W. T., 351
Woolwich, bombed, 118; Tunnel as
air-raid shelter, 136
Woolwich Arsenal, output, effect of
air raids on, 86-7
Wormwood Scrubs airship station, 440
Worthy Down, Sch. of R.A.F. and
Army Co-operation, 447
Wright, Air Mechanic G. O., 14-18
Xanthe, 338, 377, 400
Yanesh, 341, 355, 360^.; bombed,
343-4, 346, 348, 362
Yarmouth, 131
Yeats-Brown, Capt. F. C. C, 262«.
Yenbo, 221-2
York, H.Q., 46th (H.D.) Wing, 139;
140; H.Q., Northern Training Bri-
gade, 424, 427; H.Q., N.E. Area, 446
Young, Lt. J.E.R., 37
Zaeschmar, Kapitdnletitnant, 133
Zeitoun, Army Sch. of Instruction, 452
Zeppelin Airships, see 'Airships,
German'
Zohra, bombed, 422
Zone calls, 229-30
Zor, 297
'Z.P.T.' bullet, see 'Ammunition'
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